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This thesis examines the risk factors affecting the returns of European energy utilities. 
Since 1996, European energy utilities have been impacted by changing commodity dynamics 
and European Union (EU) -induced policy challenges, including liberalisation and 
environmental objectives, which are materially affecting financial return. The EU’s drive to 
create a single European energy market and the ‘greening’ of energy supply have been 
described as the world’s most extensive cross-border reforms of energy networks and 
operating structure. Commentators suggest that these changes have resulted in a €500 billion 
loss in market value. Thus, understanding the risk factors and impact of policy on the 
financial return and valuation of European energy utilities is of utmost importance. This thesis 
represents the most comprehensive analysis of these changes to date, employing a sample of 
88 energy utilities and 54 regulatory changes between 1996 and 2013. The thesis examines 
how returns are impacted by: 1) stock market and commodity risk premia, 2) the time-varying 
nature of the risk premia and 3) liberalisation and decarbonisation objectives on the sector. 
More specifically, Chapter 4 develops an asset pricing model which is superior at 
explaining variation in energy utility returns compared with existing specifications. An inter-
sectoral analysis shows that energy utilities’ returns are distinct to other sectors, including the 
oil & gas sector. The results also show inter-temporal variability in parameters. Chapter 5 
addresses existing criticisms of asset pricing models, making adaptations to overcome poor 
performance at the sector level. The chapter also implements deductive and inductive 
structural break point tests, identifying significant break points in parameters and better 
isolates the unsystematic, firm-specific component of returns. Chapter 6 utilises the 
comprehensive asset pricing model developed in Chapter 5 to implement an event study 
approach surrounding key stages of the ordinary legislative procedure, examining the timing 
of market reaction and information incorporation. Further, Chapter 6 also explores how 
returns are impacted by four major policy streams, namely: Internal Energy Market, Energy 
Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply streams. 
The findings are multiple and appeal to academics and policy-makers alike. The 
results show that energy utilities are increasingly exposed to market and commodity risk 
factors through time, with standard finance risk factors having a greater impact than 
commodities. The results also show previously undocumented heterogeneous return profiles 
across different utilities, subject to significant structural breaks. Overall, the Internal Energy 
Market and Energy Efficiency streams have a cross-sectional negative impact on energy 
sector returns and at an early stage of the legislative procedure, thereby affect the sectors’ 
ability to raise the estimated €2.2 trillion investment capital needed to transition to a ‘smart’, 
decarbonised energy system. The Renewable Energies and Security of Supply streams have a 
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CHAPTER 1  
THESIS INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction to Thesis 1.1
This thesis contributes to a better understanding of how risk factors are affecting the 
returns of European energy utilities. Since 1996, European energy utilities have been 
impacted by changing commodity market dynamics and European Union (EU) -induced 
policy challenges which are materially affecting financial return. The EU’s drive to create a 
single European energy market and the ‘greening’ of energy supply have been described as 
the most extensive cross-border reforms of energy networks and operating structure in the 
world (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). This thesis represents the most comprehensive analysis of 
these changes to date by employing a sample of 88 energy utilities and 54 regulatory changes 
between 1996 and 2013. Using this broad sample and list of regulatory events, the thesis 
focuses on three central empirical chapters, which can be further divided into research 
questions (RQ) and analytical foci (AF). The three chapters are as follows: 
1) Risk factors in energy utility returns: An Augmented-Four-Factor Model 
(AFFM). This chapter develops a ‘global’ asset pricing model for European 
energy utilities by incorporating stock market, term premium and commodity risk 
factors. This global model allows for comparisons across sectors and to explore 
how these risk factors have evolved over time, answering four research questions 
(RQs): 
o RQ1: To what extent do commodity price changes impact the returns in the 
European energy utility sector? 
o RQ2: Could stock-market risk factors better explain the variation in energy 
utilities’ returns? 
o RQ3: Do the impacts reflect market-wide conditions or the sector-specific 
relationships between returns and risk premia? 
o RQ4: Are these risk premia time-varying? 
2) Refining the AFFM and exploring within-sector heterogeneity. This chapter 
refines the AFFM in a number of ways, including calculating sector level stock 
market risk factors, deriving the ‘local’ AFFM, which has greater explanatory 
power. Further, the chapter explores within sector heterogeneity, allowing 
comparisons between big and small utilities and between electricity, gas and multi- 
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utilities. The chapter also tests for structural breaks in risk premia, and improves 
the isolation of the firm-specific component of returns. This chapter has four 
analytical foci (AF): 
o AF1: Refining the global AFFM (above) by calculating stock market risk 
factors at sector level, creating a local AFFM. 
o AF2: Applying the local AFFM to sub-group portfolios of European 
utilities so as to explore within-sector heterogeneity. 
o AF3: Applying inductive rather than deductive structural break point tests. 
o AF4: Better isolating the firm-specific component of returns. 
3) The impact of regulatory changes on energy utility returns. This chapter 
explores the impact of regulatory changes on European energy utilities on two 
levels. First, it explores market reaction surrounding key stages of a lengthy and 
complex legislative process. Second, it explores the impact of four distinct 
restructuring streams on energy sector returns, including the: Internal Energy 
Market, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply streams. 
Accordingly, this chapter answers two research questions (RQs): 
o RQ1: Examining the timing of market reaction surrounding key stages of 
the legislative procedure. 
o RQ2: Measuring the impact of the four distinct restructuring streams. 
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to the energy economics literature. While 
energy utilities are able, and expected, to hedge against commodity risk, the impact of 
regulatory changes can have dramatic implications for the operating environment of energy 
utilities. An accurate understanding of the financial return of European utilities is yet to be 
provided, since the energy economics literature relies on antiquated asset pricing models. The 
purpose of this thesis is to improve the asset pricing model to provide precise estimates of the 
impact of various risk factors and regulatory changes on the sector’s financial return and 
valuation. As a corollary, this thesis provides a flexible tool which can be adapted to other 
sectors, since it suggests a method of more accurately examining within-sector heterogeneity, 
time-varying risk premia and isolating the firm-specific component of returns for any sector. 
Academics, practitioners and policy-makers alike can benefit from improved equilibrium 
asset pricing functions and isolation of the firm-specific component of returns. In turn, the 
improved asset pricing model can be used in a variety of ways, including: 1) portfolio 
selection, 2) evaluating portfolio performance, 3) estimating cost of capital and 4) measuring 
abnormal return in event studies. 
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Traditionally, European energy supply was based on national and regional markets 
with vertically integrated companies that could produce, transmit and distribute energy to 
nearby consumers with natural, regional monopolies. Since 1987, the EU has begun to make 
progress towards greater European integration, allowing the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital across European borders. The overall objective was to increase 
transnational competition within the EU, thereby exposing inefficiencies in firm operations 
and slowly phasing out inefficient firms. Consequently, there have been a large number of 
legislative acts establishing common rules for a single European internal market for energy, 
replacing the national- and regional-based structures for energy supply (Newbery, 2002, 
Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005, Green, 2006). This gradual approach was designed to enable the 
sector to adjust in a flexible and orderly manner to its new competitive environment. 
The removal of national barriers created an international market where energy utilities 
can compete on price, services and market share. In a regulated system, the demand for 
energy, such as electricity, was relatively easy to predict as utilities had exclusive rights to 
regions. When faced with competition, utilities must accommodate the additional challenge of 
determining their energy supply based on energy demand and competitors’ energy supplies. In 
addition, the energy sector has been exposed to a number of environmental objectives aimed 
at reducing carbon emissions through policy and market mechanisms, such as the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
Could energy market liberalisation and environmental objectives have unintended 
consequences with respect to operational and financial return? Figure 1.1 shows that the 
STOXX® 600 Europe Utilities index, a proxy for the largest European energy utilities, fell by 
-55% between December 2007 and June 2012. In a recent report entitled ‘How to lose half a 
trillion euros’, The Economist newspaper suggests the decline in market capitalisation 
equalled €500 billion – a fall in value greater than bank losses over the same period (The 
Economist, 2013b). Some utilities saw share prices fall by three-quarters and income fall by 
more than a third since 2010, coupled with a change in dividend policy. Figure 1.2 shows the 
yields on some energy stocks, which previously tracked German 10-year bonds, have 
increased over time – some in excess of 10%. The higher yields imply an increase in the cost 




FIGURE 1.1: STOXX® 600 EUROPE UTILITIES INDEX 
This figure presents the STOXX® 600 Europe Utilities index between January 1996 and March 2016. Data from STOXX®. 
 
FIGURE 1.2: DIVIDEND YIELDS ON EUROPEAN ENERGY UTILITIES 
This figure iilustrates the dividend yield on the 26 constituent stocks of the STOXX® 600 Europe Utilities index between 
fiscal years 1996 and 2015. The solid line represents the median across all companies, the dashed lines represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. Data sourced from S&P Capital IQ. 
 
Investment incentives are perceived to be a growing problem in many countries 
(Joskow, 2008). Access to private investment is essential to meet the sector’s investment 
needs. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects up to $2.2 trillion of total power 
sector investment is needed in the EU between 2014 and 2035 (IEA, 2014). Of this value, 
$1.6 trillion is allocated for new generation capacity, three-quarters of which will be invested 
in renewables, increasing the proportion of renewables in energy generation from 24% in 
2012 to 44% by 2035. This is a concern since energy sector investment is increasingly being 
shaped by government policy measures and incentives, rather than price signals from 
competitive markets (IEA, 2014, Robinson, 2015). A stable and sound market framework that 
reduces uncertainty, especially political uncertainty, encourages long-term investment 
(Cramton and Ockenfels, 2012). Yet, some argue that the current regulatory and market 
framework can conflict with the policy objectives of decarbonisation, competitiveness and 
security of supply. As a result, many private investors consider the energy sector “non-
investment grade” (FTI-CL Energy, 2015). In this respect, the thesis highlights a tension 
between liberalisation objectives and the objectives demanding that the energy sector transition to 






















































Turning to the academic context of the thesis, there is a body of literature which 
focuses on the effects of deregulation and liberalisation on company performance, both 
empirically and from a policy perspective (Kane and Unal, 1988, Beneish, 1991, Megginson 
et al., 1994, Gual, 1999, Nwaeze, 2000, Newbery, 2002, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005, Green, 
2006). Further, there is a plethora of empirical evidence regarding the role of stock market 
risk factors, term premium and commodities on the valuation of equities (Fama and French, 
1993, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Carhart, 1997, Faff and Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, 
El-Sharif et al., 2005, Boyer and Filion, 2007, Oberndorfer, 2009a, Ramos and Veiga, 2011, 
Koch and Bassen, 2013). 
Nevertheless, there is limited research which combines the two bodies of literature to 
identify a comprehensive list of risk factors for the European energy utility sector, which also 
accounts for issues such as survivorship bias and the intricacies of the European legislative 
process. For instance, Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013) respectively examine 
oil and carbon risk exposure for European energy utilities. Both papers use small samples of 
22 and 20 utilities, respectively, and fail to control for survivorship bias. While Koch and 
Bassen (2013) explore the impact of carbon price risk, neither paper examines the impact of 
liberalisation objectives on utility returns. Further, they do not account for standard finance 
risk factors such as firm size, book-to-market ratio and momentum (Fama and French, 1993, 
Carhart, 1997). Both El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Oberndorfer (2009a) have identified the 
incorporation of conventional finance risk factors into the asset pricing of energy utilities as a 
valuable avenue for further research. This thesis fills this niche. More generally, energy 
utilities are often annexed within the oil & gas sector in asset pricing tests, where risk factors 
regarding the latter are assumed true for the former. For instance, both Oberndorfer (2009a) 
and Koch and Bassen (2013) draw much of their literature from the oil & gas literature. In 
reality, nuances between the energy utility sector and the oil & gas sector warrant independent 
analysis. Therefore, this thesis enhances academic understanding of the European energy 
sector by undertaking the following enhancements to the existing literature: 
 Constructing the largest sample of 88 European energy utilities, across 
electricity and natural gas operations, which controls for survivorship bias. 
 Developing a sector-specific asset pricing model, which is superior in 
capturing variation in sector returns and isolating the firm-specific component 
of returns by incorporating standard finance risk factors into asset pricing 
models. 
 Conducting the most thorough and full-scale asset pricing test to date of risk 
premia in average sector returns and identifying within-sector heterogeneity. 
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The test also examines the time-varying nature of the risk premia through 
inter-temporal analysis and inductive structural break point tests. 
 Identifying a broad range of regulatory changes impacting the European 
energy utility sector to date and classifying them into four policy streams, 
namely: Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energies and 
Security of Supply. 
 Using the novel asset pricing model in an event study setting to isolate the 
impact of regulatory changes on the energy sector, both in terms of the timing 
(i.e. when investors incorporate information from the EU legislative process) 
and in terms of policy streams so as to determine which policies are having the 
biggest impact on returns. 
The rest of this chapter expands on the introduction to the thesis. Section ‎1.2 provides 
the motivation for the thesis. Section ‎1.3 outlines the thesis’ research objectives. Section ‎1.4 
presents the central and chapter-specific hypotheses of the thesis. Section ‎1.5 lists the 
originality and contributions of the thesis. Finally, Section ‎1.6 presents the organisation of the 
thesis. 
 Motivation and Policy Background 1.2
The motivation for this thesis is primarily empirical, where the main objective of 
Chapters 4 and 5 is to develop a single asset pricing model for the European energy utility 
sector from a finance perspective. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a divergence between 
the energy economics and finance literatures. Chapter 3 of this thesis will show that the 
finance literature is primarily concerned with searching for market anomalies which explain 
average returns across a diverse range of stocks. In contrast, the energy economics literature 
has focused on identifying macroeconomic variables which were argued to be systematically 
priced into stocks. The two bodies of literature are rarely reintegrated and the stock market 
risk factors are largely ignored in the energy economics literature. The examination of 
European energy utilities is limited to two key papers, namely, Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch 
and Bassen (2013). However, the two papers have a number of shortcomings, including: small 
sample bias, short time series, and poor selection of macroeconomic variables. A well 
specified asset pricing model and its role in determining the cost of capital is an important 
topic in the finance literature from a risk, capital allocation and regulatory perspective. 
Equally, a misspecified model creates distortions in these areas. This thesis improves on the 
existing research methods by creating an asset pricing model which more closely predicts 
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changes in equity value to better understand how risk factors are affecting the returns of 
European energy utilities. 
The novel asset pricing model is also used in Chapter 6 to examine the impact of new 
legislation on the value of energy utilities, and the implications on the ability to raise private 
capital to facilitate a transition towards a low-carbon energy grid. European energy utilities 
have been the subject of intense debate about perceived excess accounting returns and 
oligopoly power in the European energy sector. It is argued that these energy companies are 
making excess returns at the expense of the consumers, but often the risk borne by the energy 
utility companies is overlooked. 
The press, such as The Economist (2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2015) and The BBC (2013), 
has argued that renewable energy objectives have negatively impacted the valuation of the EU 
energy utility sector. For example, the Economist (2013b) suggests that the growing share of 
renewables, and the policies that support them, have destabilised the European energy grid, 
depressed wholesale prices, reduced reliability, and imposed undue and unnecessary costs. 
The report proved popular and is being increasingly cited by a range of stakeholders, 
including: academia (Heffron and Nuttall, 2014, Osorio and van Ackere, 2014, Hildmann et 
al., 2015, Robinson, 2015, Corsatea et al., 2016), think-tanks (Caldecott and Robins, 2014, 
Friends of the Earth, 2014, McKinsey & Company, 2014, Sussex Energy Group, 2015, Gray, 
2015), and energy literature (Elkington et al., 2014, Lacalle and Parrilla, 2015). This thesis 
proves that in this respect, the press is subject to focalism as other European regulatory 
objectives have a greater impact but are mostly ignored. 
This thesis objectively quantifies whether there has been some fundamental shift in the 
operating or regulatory environment of energy utilities that may explain their altered returns. 
In particular, the liberalisation and decarbonisation
1
 of the energy sector have been key policy 
issues at the EU-level over the last few decades, and they remain central to EU policy agendas 
today. The European electricity and gas sectors have undergone the world’s most extensive 
cross-border reforms of energy networks and operating structure (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
The objectives of restructuring were to liberalise and decarbonise the energy sector, fostering 
a shift towards national and international competition, and reducing sector-wide carbon 
emissions. 
The shift towards open competition removed traditional regional markets which 
protected utilities from the profit effects of cost and demand shocks (Nwaeze, 2000). The 
perception of the market is that these regulatory changes have negatively impacted the energy 
                                                 
1
 Decarbonisation is discussed under the heading of environmental objectives. 
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sector. The risks associated with open competition from sector liberalisation and the use of 
new technologies from sector decarbonisation have led to debates on the economic merits of 
restructuring the sector, particularly given the impact these reforms have had on the valuation 
and financial return of energy utilities. Further, EU utilities have also been subject to a range 
of legislations related to enhancing security of supply. This naturally leads to the question: 
how have these regulatory changes impacted the returns of EU energy utilities? This question 
matters as the EU has 503 million citizens
2
 and collectively represents the largest economy in 
the world (measured in nominal GDP).
3
 To place this perception in context requires 
understanding the impact of each restructuring objective. Accordingly, the following sections 
address the motivations for examining liberalisation and environmental objectives 
independently. 
1.2.1 The Impact of Liberalisation 
The privatisation and liberalisation of the European energy utility sector introduces a 
strong profit-motive to operations, where utilities are expected to compete on marginal cost to 
secure customers and generate revenue (Gual, 1999, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). A major 
objective of deregulation was to increase efficiency in the production, transmission, and 
distribution of electricity by phasing out inefficient firms through competition,
4
 which was 
expected to also lead to energy lower prices
5
 (Green and Newbery, 1992, von der Fehr et al., 
1993, Newbery, 1998) and increase performance (Kumbhakar et al., 2001). Literature across 
multiple sectors argues that deregulation and liberalisation can have negative short-term 
impacts on firms due to high financial costs of reorganisation, re-training, increasing brand 
awareness and cutting unit costs to gain greater market share (Gual, 1999, Nwaeze, 2000, 
Delmas and Tokat, 2005). A company that is entering the deregulated market with relatively 
higher costs will suffer more adverse effects from deregulation. As cost, supply and demand 
fluctuate in a competitive environment, the financial burden is absorbed by energy utilities, 
resulting in lower profit margins or volatile revenue streams. 
These changes alter investors’ assessment of the energy utilities. As outlined by 
Schwert (1981), as investors anticipate changes to the infrastructure of a market, the perceived 
changes in future cash flows will affect today’s pricing of an asset. Assuming rationality, if 
                                                 
2
 2014 data extracted from EUROPA: http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm  
3
 2014 data extracted from EUROPA: http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/economy/index_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/ 
4
 Directive 1996/92/EC 
5
 This typically refers to wholesale prices, which determines remuneration to utilities, through equilibrium 
analysis and assuming fair auction rules. Retail prices, which are available to consumers, may be subject to taxes 
and levies which can alter final energy price. 
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market reform is perceived positively (negatively) in the market, then additional benefits 
(detriments) will be incorporated into the company’s productive assets and the investor can 
expect to gain (lose) economic rents (Schwert, 1981, MacKinlay, 1997). The changing nature 
of energy utility asset pricing as a result of restructuring has put into question utilities’ role as 
a steady, reliable and defensive investment asset. Investors are expecting greater 
compensation for holding energy assets and taking a more active role in trading into and out 
of energy utilities positions in response to regulatory changes. 
Any increase in earnings variability reduces the ability of investors to predict the 
future cash flows of the company and future cash flow from dividends, and therefore must 
affect the market value of financial assets (Nwaeze, 2000). This increased variability makes 
financial planning difficult (Merton, 1973, Lundblad, 2007). Highly variable stocks can mean 
huge losses and gains for an investor, and therefore greater uncertainty, thereby becoming the 
classic risk-return trade-off (Merton, 1973, Lundblad, 2007, Hajizadeh et al., 2012). 
Most critically, it is difficult for underwriters to value companies characterised by high 
uncertainty; therefore, it is difficult for companies to raise capital through public offerings 
(Lowry et al., 2010). Furthermore, the decline in government intervention and increased 
privatisation of sectors limits the possibility of reactivating large-scale investment projects 
(Söderholm, 1998). This, in turn, can lead to underinvestment in the energy utility 
infrastructure. The average cost of equity capital for energy firms increases as stakeholders 
demand higher rates of return for the level of risk borne (Sharpe, 1964, Schwert, 1981, 
Nwaeze, 2000). 
There is, however, the potential that market liberalisation can have some beneficial 
effect on European energy utility companies. In regulated markets, regional electricity 
demand and the ability of the company to expand must depend on the population size and 
economic growth of the surrounding area. By removing national barriers, European energy 
utility companies are able to expand operations, enter new markets and acquire new 
consumers. The new environment brought about by liberalisation promotes a more 
competitive environment and can increase performance (Kumbhakar et al., 2001). However, 
privatised European utilities must normally yield a higher return on capital, as they can no 
longer rely on public budgets, which typically have lower interest cost (Söderholm, 1998). 
The withdrawal of government-backed debt forces privatised firms to access public equity 
markets (Megginson et al., 1994). Again, this implies an increased cost of capital for 
European energy utilities, making equity a relatively expensive source of capital to transition 
towards a new energy infrastructure. Regardless of whether the impact of regulations is 
positive or negative, energy utilities are left in a position where they are expected to provide 
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greater returns to investors and invest capital in a smart, decarbonised energy grid while 
facing increased competition at a national and international level. 
1.2.2 The Impact of Environmental Policy 
Beyond liberalisation objectives, another major EU-led reform thrust that has built up 
particular momentum over recent decades is related to environmental concerns and the desire 
for a ‘green’ energy supply. Energy utilities have been subjected to regulations aimed at 
decarbonising the energy sector and increasing their use of renewable energy-generating 
technologies, thereby exposing utilities to additional financing costs, technological risk from 
the use of relatively new generating technologies and also revenue volatility due to 
competition from renewable energy sources. 
Environmental policy and green-competition
6
 are expected to have a negative effect 
on the accounting returns of gas- and coal-fired power plants. Since electricity cannot be 
efficiently stored, grid operators are responsible for balancing supply and demand at all times 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Any electricity network must provide both power, an 
instantaneous rate of output, and energy, a cumulative output over time; power and energy are 
often defined as peak and base load, respectively (Söderholm, 2001). Traditionally, large 
power plants, such as coal or nuclear, supplied the base load power required on energy grids, 
while gas-fired plants operated during peak times to meet demand. 
In recent years, renewable energies such as solar and wind have been given ‘grid 
priority’. Grid priority ensures that renewables can utilise their generating capacity and sell 
energy to the transmission networks ahead of fossil-fuel generators. This has led to an 
inability for the traditional power plants to sell their electricity to transmitters, forcing fossil 
fuel generators to compete for residual grid capacity. These intermittent energy sources can 
only operate in favourable weather conditions and tend to generate the greatest amount of 
energy during the daytime, coinciding with the peak hours, which were historically the most 
profitable hours for combustion fuel generators (Newbery, 2015). Further, volatile weather 
conditions transfer through to wholesale spot prices (Green and Vasilakos, 2010). 
As many renewable technologies have very low short-run marginal costs, full 
participation in the wholesale market, even without grid priority, is likely to result in their full 
dispatch in normal conditions (Riesz and Milligan, 2015). As a result of the aforementioned, 
the large generating capacities of combustion fuel generators become stranded. Traditional 
                                                 
6
 Green-competition refers to competition between fossil-fuel and renewable energy utility companies. It is a 
form of competition based solely on the supply grid’s preference for ‘green’ energy, often supported by 
subsidiaries and disadvantaging fossil-fuel utility companies. 
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fossil-fuel generators are cumbersome in comparison with modern, clean energy solutions. 
Large generators have minimum loads of approximately 50-70% of the unit’s capacity, the 
lowest level a plant can operate at without completely shutting down, finding it difficult and 
costly to scale back operations (Green and Vasilakos, 2010, Riesz and Milligan, 2015). 
However, large generators are still crucial to preventing power outages and must 
remain available to generate electricity in during brief periods of scarcity. Some generators 
are incentivised to place negative bids into the wholesale market during low residual loads as 
turning off would incur additional costs and risks (DECC, 2010). This phenomena of negative 
pricing indicates the system requires flexibility improvements (Hogan, 2005). As prices are 
disconnected from opportunity costs, lower wholesale prices leave incumbents unable to 
recoup the necessary return on thermal investments and new entrants cannot establish market 
capitalisation at the necessary level to finance new base-load assets without additional 
payments beyond the energy market (Caldecott and McDaniels, 2014, Newbery, 2015, 
Robinson, 2015). 
Where market valuation is based on investor’s perception, it is also important to 
consider the social benefits of increased renewable objectives. More than ever, investors are 
monitoring the actions of managers regarding the social responsibility of a company (Ansar et 
al., 2013). The concept of socially responsible investing has also gained prominence in recent 
years, with environmental performance identified as a criterion assessing whether a firm is a 
good investment (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). The first impact regarding the cost of social 
responsibility relates to the perception that control over pollution and maximising profits are 
assumed to be mutually exclusive. Managers perceive that the two cannot co-exist and the 
former can only be achieved at the expense of the latter (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972, Walley 
and Whitehead, 1994). 
There is some empirical evidence that environmental compliance can lead to an 
increased financial burden for a firm (Gollop and Roberts, 1983, Hart and Ahuja, 1996, Koch 
and Bassen, 2013). A prominent market instrument developed in recent years is the EU ETS, 
designed to provide short- and long-term CO2 emission price signals through the trade of 
carbon allowances. The high cost of emissions should, in theory, motivate innovation and 
investment in lower-carbon energy sources. However, Robinson (2015) highlights that the 
mechanisms has been ineffective to date for three reasons: 1) a variety of parallel mechanisms 
and mandatory renewable energy source (RES) targets which undermined the EU ETS 
market; 2) an over-allocation of permits which resulted in oversupply; and 3) the EU ETS was 
not designed to deal with an economic recession, where overall energy demand and 
production declined, reducing the demand for emission allowances. 
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The reputation of the firm is also of concern, where Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) 
and Filbeck and Gorman (2004) examine the linkages between financial return and the 
environmental management of firms. While positive (negative) environmental performance 
has a positive (negative) impact on firm value, the impact of positive responses is often lower 
for firms in environmentally unfriendly industries, possibly indicating market scepticism 
about environmental efforts (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). 
 Research Objectives 1.3
In line with the research questions and motivation outlined respectively in Sections ‎1.1 
and ‎1.2, this thesis addresses four overarching objectives, namely: 1) developing an approach 
to estimating risk premia in European energy utilities; 2) refining the approach to examine 
within-sector heterogeneity, testing for time-varying risk premia and isolating the firm-
specific component of returns; 3) identifying the timing at which information regarding 
regulatory changes is incorporated into asset prices; and 4) examining the heterogeneous 
impact of four distinct restructuring streams. Specifically, the following sections discuss the 
main objectives of this thesis. 
1.3.1 A Novel Asset Pricing Model for the European Energy Sector 
The majority of asset pricing models today extend the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) specification, which finds that broad market returns are the major determinant of 
equity returns. The energy economics literature augments the CAPM to include a variety of 
risk factors, such as term premium, oil, coal, natural gas and carbon prices. Most research 
which examines the relationship between markets and commodities can typically be separated 
into three themes: the impact of commodities on (i) broad market returns (Chen et al., 1986, 
Jones and Kaul, 1996, Park and Ratti, 2008, Cunado and Perez de Gracia, 2014, Narayan and 
Gupta, 2015), (ii) multiple sectors and industries (Huang et al., 1996, Faff and Brailsford, 
1999, Nandha and Faff, 2008, Arouri, 2011), or (iii) the oil & gas sector (Manning, 1991, 
Sadorsky, 2001, El-Sharif et al., 2005, Ramos and Veiga, 2011, Elyasiani et al., 2011). Few 
papers consider energy utilities as a separate sector when estimating commodity risk 
exposure, with the only relevant papers which examine European energy utilities in isolation 
being limited to Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). El-Sharif et al. (2005) and 
Oberndorfer (2009a), argue that the energy economics literature is restricted due to its 
reliance on antiquated asset pricing models and the incorporation of standard finance risk 
factors is an avenue for further research. 
Concurrent with the energy economics literature, the finance literature also extends the 
CAPM to develop asset pricing models which can explain a greater proportion of shared stock 
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market variation. Additional stock market factors, such as size premium (Banz, 1981, Chan et 
al., 1985, Chan and Chen, 1991) and value premium (Rosenberg et al., 1985, Chan et al., 
1991) are incorporated into the CAPM specification. These factors are later consolidated into 
the three-factor asset pricing model by Fama and French (1992, 1993). Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) find momentum premium to be a significant risk factor of equity returns, which 
Carhart (1997) integrates into the three-factor model to produce the four-factor model. The 
finance asset pricing models are typically implemented at the global, market level and 
perform poorly when explaining average returns at the local, sector level (Fama and French, 
1997). 
The first objective of this thesis, addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, is to integrate the two 
bodies of literature to introduce a new asset pricing model to explain returns in the 
European energy utility sector – the AFFM.
7
 Chapter 4 utilises a global, market-level 
AFFM to examine how the returns of the energy sector behave relative to other European 
sectors. The objective is to test whether the AFFM is superior to other asset pricing model 
specifications. In Chapter 5, the model is adapted for sector-level analysis, the local AFFM, 
explaining average sector returns and within-sector return heterogeneity. 
1.3.2 Examining Time-Varying Risk Premiums 
Based on the assumption of stationarity in time series, it is often assumed that the 
parameters of the model, such as mean, variance and trend, must remain constant over time 
despite little economic rationale to support this (Chow, 1960, Andrews, 1993). Previous 
literature has shown that the estimated relationship between industry returns and risk factors is 
not stable across time, with temporal sensitivity which affects significance (Huang et al., 
1996, Fama and French, 1997, Faff and Brailsford, 1999, El-Sharif et al., 2005, Boyer and 
Filion, 2007). The inter-temporal variability in the previous literature was identified by 
separating the time series into annual (or six month) regressions, or separating the series into 
distinct periods, for example, pre- and post-war. Neither are optimum choices unless the break 
dates are known with certainty. The inclusion of surplus observations, which are not affected 
by structural breaks, will skew the mean residuals towards the expected value of zero, 
                                                 
7
 Note, the name of the three- and four-factor models pertains to the fact that there are three or four stock 
market risk factors which explain equity returns, while the augmented-CAPM modifies the CAPM to include 
term premium and various commodity risk factors (oil, coal, natural gas and carbon). Accordingly, the 
‘Augmented-four-factor Model’ title is chosen as the pricing model includes four stock market factors (market, 
size, value, momentum) and augments the model with term premium and commodity risk factors (oil, coal, 




reducing the power of any statistical tests and biasing the results against significance (Quandt, 
1960). 
The econometrics literature addresses the assumption of parameter stability, initiating 
much of the structural break literature. Structural breaks can affect the results of the model in 
a number of ways, such as a change in the relationship with the risk factor, the intercept or 
variance. Tests can be implemented in the case of a ‘pure’ structural change, where the entire 
parameter is subject to change, and for the case of ‘partial’ change, where only a component 
of the parameter vector changes. Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) develop an algorithm based on 
the principle of dynamic programming, allowing computation of estimates of the break points 
as global minimisers of the sum of squared residuals. This is achieved through partitioned 
regressions and cluster analysis, curve fitting by use of segmented straight lines (polygonal 
curves) and grouping for maximum homogeneity by minimising variance within groups; see, 
respectively, Guthery (1974), Bellman and Roth (1969) and Fisher (1958). 
The second objective of this thesis, addressed in Chapter 5, is demonstrating the 
inter-temporal variability of risk premia. First, this is achieved by implementing annual 
conditional regressions in a similar manner to El-Sharif et al. (2005). Second, the thesis 
implements the partial and pure structural break point tests of Bai and Perron (1998; 
2003) to accurately identify structural breaks in parameters through time. 
1.3.3 Capturing the Market Reaction in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
A core assumption of finance literature is that investors are expected to be rational, 
wealth-optimising individuals. When information is anticipated or becomes public 
knowledge, information is immediately impounded into stock prices; any sudden change in 
value implies that the market has changed its assessment of future cash flows or perceived 
riskiness (Schwert, 1981, Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). 
To achieve this objective, Chapter 2 of this thesis constructs a large list of 54 
regulatory events expected to affect returns in the energy sector. The chapter also presents an 
overview of the European ordinary legislative procedure, addressed in Section 2.1. The 
outline highlights the key political institutions that are pivotal in the adoption of legislation, 
the procedure by which they vote and a timeline of the legislative process. The European 
ordinary legislative procedure is the main legislative process by which directives and 
regulations are adopted at the European level. The co-decision procedure is central to the 
European Community's decision-making system, and is designed to increase the transparency, 
accountability and efficiency of the legislative process. While the legislative procedure is 
lengthy and complex, it is also well documented. The legislative procedure serves as an ideal 
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instrument to explore market efficiency within Europe, as key stages of the process, including 
public readings, voting, signing and publication, can be identified as a legislative act passes 
from proposal to adoption. To date, no papers exist on market efficiency and the timing of 
market reaction surrounding key stages of the European ordinary legislative procedure. Using 
the propositions from Chapter 2, combined with theory regarding asset pricing and the impact 
of regulatory changes, Chapter 6 implements an event study approach on key stages of the 
legislative procedure. 
The third objective of this thesis, addressed in Chapter 6, is to examine the market 
efficiency and transparency of the EU legislative procedure. This is achieved by 
implementing an event study approach to explore the timing of market reaction 
surrounding key stages of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
1.3.4 Examining the Differential Impact of the Four Restructuring Streams 
The liberalisation and decarbonisation objectives of the energy sector can be divided 
into four distinct streams, including 1) Internal Energy Market, 2) Energy Efficiency, 3) 
Renewable Energies and 4) Security of Supply. The four streams are discussed in detail in 
Section 2.2. The objective of liberalisation was to provide incentives for European utilities to 
improve their capital investment decisions, operating performance and operating efficiency, 
with the projection that end consumers would benefit from internal efficiency gains (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2000). The objectives of liberalisation were varied 
and numerous, and thus this thesis addresses the restructuring stream as a whole. 
Liberalisation’s objectives were expected to be achieved through 1) privatisation, 2) lowering 
entry barriers for new utilities, 3) increasing competition and 4) unbundling vertically 
integrated utilities. Industry privatisation also reduces the number of state-owned enterprises, 
removes government-backed debt guarantees and exposes firms to the real threat of 
bankruptcy (Megginson et al., 1994). Lowering entry barriers increases the freedom of entry 
and exit to any industry, resulting in more start-up companies and increased competition from 
large, international competitors (Beneish, 1991, Gual, 1999). Deregulated and saturated 
markets face new pressures such as international brand awareness and marketing of services 
to gain custom (Delmas and Tokat, 2005), while the unbundling of vertically integrated 
utilities also reduces insurance against fluctuations in commodity, wholesale and end-user 
price (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
Various papers examine the historical and predicted impact of increased 
environmental burdens on the operating and financial return of energy utilities (Gollop and 
Roberts, 1983, Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Some empirical papers have implemented an event 
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study approach surrounding events regarding environmental management, crises, performance 
or press releases (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996, Filbeck and Gorman, 2004, Griffin et al., 
2015). The general tenor of the results in the literature is that markets react positively 
surrounding positive environmental events, such as strong environmental management, but 
negatively surrounding events which will negatively impact future cash flows. 
The fourth objective of the thesis, addressed in Chapter 6, is to examine the impact of 
the four restructuring streams on the valuation of European energy utilities using an 
event study methodology. 
 Research Hypotheses 1.4
There is one central research question for the work of this thesis, addressed through 
three empirical chapters. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that both the academic 
literature and the press acknowledge the impact of liberalisation and environmental objectives 
on the valuation and cost of capital of stocks (see Section 1.2). The impact of regulatory 
changes in the context of EU energy utilities has, for the most part, been addressed by the 
European press in an anecdotal and superficial manner. The press has formed arguments on 
the basis of incomplete information, an unrepresentative sample of large natural gas utilities 
and little rigorous empirical evidence. Accordingly, the overarching hypothesis for this thesis 
is the following: 
 
Central hypothesis: Liberalisation and decarbonisation objectives have significantly 
affected the financial return and valuation of the European energy utility sector throughout 
sector restructuring. 
 
This is a non-directional hypothesis since the impact of regulation will depend on the 
type of regulations, as distinguished by the four streams, and the type of energy utility it 
addresses. This central hypothesis is addressed through a series of chapter-specific research 
questions, analytical foci and hypotheses. The three chapters of this thesis employ a multi-
model approach. As noted in Section 1.1, the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 are prerequisites to 
examining the impact of regulatory changes on the firm-specific component of returns, as 
current energy economic models are outdated and standard finance models perform poorly at 
explaining returns at the sector level. Chapters 4 and 5 do, however, make individual 
contributions in terms of explaining returns, developing a sector-specific asset pricing model 
and isolating the firm-specific component of returns. Chapter 6 contains five hypotheses, 
which address the timing of market reaction and the impact of regulatory changes using the 
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local AFFM developed in Chapter 5. The following paragraphs provide a brief outline the 
research questions, analytical foci and hypotheses, which are presented in Section 1.1 and 
addressed in greater detail within the respective chapters (Chapters 4 to 6). 
Chapter 4 addresses four research questions. Based on propositions of the energy 
economics and finance literature, Chapter 4 integrates standard finance risk factors, term 
premium and commodity risk factors into a single asset pricing model – the global AFFM. 
The former two research questions relate to the impact of stock market and commodity risk 
factors on the energy utility sector. The latter two research questions relate to the inter-
sectoral and inter-temporal nature of risk premia. Chapter 4’s results show that the global 
AFFM is a superior asset pricing model in comparison with existing asset pricing 
specifications. The results of Chapter 4 motivate the analysis of Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 focuses on refining the global AFFM for sector level applications. Chapter 5 
addresses four analytical foci. Based on propositions of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and 
Fama and French (1997, 2012), the unique characteristics of the energy sector are expected to 
be major determinants in explaining sector returns. The first analytical focus concerns 
whether local stock market risk factors increase explanatory power compared with global 
stock market risk factors. The purpose of the improved model, with tighter regression fits, is 
to increase the precision of estimated coefficients. The second analytical focus examines 
within-sector heterogeneity, exploring whether risk factors differ for firms grouped on 
similarity of characteristics. The third analytical focus introduces recent advances in 
econometric literature, comparing whether the inductive Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) 
structural break point test is better able to capture the structural breaks in the relationship 
between sector returns and risk premia compared with deductive annual regressions. Finally, 
the fourth analytical focus explores the ability to capture the firm-specific component of 
returns. The ability to better isolate the firm-specific component of returns has implications 
for the model selection and measurement of abnormal returns in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 utilises the local AFFM of Chapter 5 to address two overarching research 
questions relating to: 1) the timing of market reaction surrounding key stages of the legislative 
procedure and 2) the market’s unique response to the four distinct restructuring streams 
(Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply). 
The two overarching research questions are addressed through five chapter-specific 
hypotheses. 
In an efficient market, information is impounded into stock prices when it is first 
anticipated or becomes public knowledge; any sudden change in value implies that the market 
has changed its assessment of future cash flows or perceived riskiness (Schwert, 1981, 
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Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). The protracted and complex nature of the ordinary 
legislative procedure enables an investor to closely monitor the likely outcome of a legislative 
proposal. Chapter 6 examines four key stages of the regulatory procedure and predicts that 
investors will react at the early stages, when only the political institution’s votes are known, 
rather than the latter stages of the process, when the document is signed and published and no 
new informational content is available. The first hypothesis predicts: 
 
H1: Significant market reactions to regulatory changes will predominantly occur in 
the early co-decision stages of the legislative procedure. 
 
The second set of hypotheses predict that the four distinct restructuring streams will 
have a negative impact on energy sector returns and valuation. However, the impact will be 
unique depending on the stream and the energy utility analysed. To explore this impact to its 
fullest extent, the tests are implemented on 12 energy portfolios outlined in Section 1.5.4 to 
examine within-sector heterogeneity of the market reaction to the regulatory changes. These 
latter hypotheses represent the main contribution of this thesis. The four hypotheses 
concerning the impact of regulatory changes are as follows: 
 
H2: Liberalisation objectives related to the Internal Energy Market stream will 
negatively impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities, in particular large 
incumbent utilities that have historically had market power. 
 
H3: Environmental objectives related to the Energy Efficiency stream will negatively 
impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities across the entire sector since 
it reduces overall energy consumption. 
 
H4: Environmental objectives related to the Renewable Energies stream will 
negatively impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities, in particular 
natural gas and hydrocarbon-intensive utilities. 
 
H5: Measures to safeguard European energy supply, related to the Security of Supply 
stream, will negatively impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities. 
 




 Research Originality and Contributions 1.5
1.5.1 A Novel Asset Pricing Model for the European Energy Utility Sector 
El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Oberndorfer (2009a) observe that that the existing energy 
economics literature is limited, as existing asset pricing models fail to incorporate established 
finance risk factors. Thus, the asset pricing model developed in this thesis reintegrates the 
energy economics and finance literatures to develop a model which is superior at capturing 
return variability in European energy utilities - the AFFM. The stock market risk factors 
include size, value and momentum premia. 
Two versions of the AFFM are created. Chapter 4 utilises the global (market level) 
AFFM, calculating the stock market risk factors across a diverse sample of European stocks. 
This specification is comparable to Fama and French’s (2012) ‘global’ asset pricing model, 
where the stock market risk factors can be used to explain the returns across multiple sectors. 
The stock market risk factor coefficients explain energy sector returns relative to European 
stocks. For example, do returns in the energy sector behave like 1) European winners (upper 
momentum) or losers (down momentum), 2) like big or small European stocks 3) or like 
European value or growth firms? This interpretation is useful, as it also explores whether 
energy utilities have a unique exposure to risk premia compared with other sectors. Chapter 4 
also addresses whether the inclusion of stock market risk factors increases the model’s 
goodness of fit. The results show that the stock market factors are larger determinants of 
sector returns than commodity risk factors. 
Fama and French (2012) show that these ‘global’ specifications typically perform 
poorly at the ‘local’ level when explaining average returns. Chapter 5 implements a second 
version of the AFFM based on Fama and French’s (2012) ‘local’ asset pricing model. The 
chapter independently recalculates the stock market risk factors at the sector level – using 
only 88 European energy utilities. This second specification is implemented in two ways. 
First, the sector level AFFM can be used to explain average returns of the energy sector. For 
example, can the average returns of the energy sector, as a whole, be explained by the returns 
of the biggest or smallest energy utilities? The second application is to examine the within-
sector return heterogeneity, for example, 1) does risk exposure of small and big energy 
utilities differ, or 2) does risk exposure of electricity and natural gas utilities differ? The 
sector level AFFM shows much tighter regression fits and explains a greater proportion of 





1.5.2 Examines Time-Varying Risk Factors 
The thesis contributes to the literature by empirically determining the point at which 
the risk premia undergo pure or partial structural breaks, controlling for the non-linearity of 
coefficients and the evolution of risk premia through time. While the deductive method of 
breaking the series into distinct periods or implementing annual regressions has been utilised 
in the literature, econometric issues regarding this approach exist (see Section 1.3.2). This 
thesis makes a novel contribution to the literature by incorporating recent advances in the 
econometrics literature, implementing an inductive Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) structural 
break point test. The inductive break point tests are an improvement over the deductive 
approach, as it overcomes many methodological issues which can bias estimated coefficients 
and significance tests (discussed in Section 3.3.4). Further, it makes no assumptions regarding 
the break dates, and utilises a dynamic algorithm to identify unknown break points. The 
empirical results show that the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) does a better job than deductive 
methods at identifying structural breaks through time, and can dramatically improve the 
explanatory power of the asset pricing models. Further, results show inter-temporal variability 
in the risk premia through time, which demonstrates the evolving relationship between risk 
factors and returns. 
1.5.3 Improved Isolation of Firm-Specific Component of Returns 
As shown in Chapter 5, the assumption of constant risk factors forces any changes in 
the relationship between risk factors and returns into the residuals of an unconditional linear 
regression. The firm-specific component of returns can be more accurately captured through 
the use of the local AFFM and employing annual conditional regressions or inductive break 
point tests. The break point test utilises partitioned regressions and cluster analysis, curve 
fitting by use of segmented straight lines, and grouping for maximum homogeneity by 
minimising variance within groups (see, respectively, Guthery, 1974; Bellman and Roth, 
1969; Fisher, 1958). This approach is extracted from the econometrics literature and is novel 
to the energy economics literature. The two-pass method implemented in Chapter 5 is also 
novel. The results show that the assumption of constant parameters results in an inability to 
precisely isolate the firm-specific component of returns, where residuals continue to capture 
the impact of risk premia. Thesis results show that, for this thesis’ sample and time period, 
this changing relationship with risk premia accounts for 28% of the residuals’ variability. The 
inductive break point is superior at isolating the unsystematic component of returns. The 
results also show that conditional regressions, similar to that implemented by El-Sharif et al. 
(2005), can proxy for an unsophisticated alternative approach to isolating the firm-specific 
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component of returns and filtering out the impact of risk premia; however, this approach 
remains suboptimal, as it does not address the econometric criticisms. 
1.5.4 A Superior European Energy Utility Sample 
Through extensive research, this thesis dramatically increases the sample size of 
European energy utilities used in the empirical analysis relative to the existing literature. This 
thesis includes 88 European utilities, across all operations of the electricity and natural gas 
industries. In comparison, the closest sample to this thesis includes Koch and Bassen (2013) 
and Oberndorfer (2009a), where Koch and Bassen (2013) examine carbon risk exposure of 20 
publicly traded European electric utilities (excluding natural gas utilities), while Oberndorfer 
(2009a) examines 11 oil & gas firms and 11 electric utilities extracted from the STOXX® 
utilities index. Further, Oberndorfer (2009a) removes utilities whose operations are based on 
renewable energy, creating an unrepresentative sample of European energy utilities. Many of 
the companies included in the two samples represent the largest energy producers in Europe, 
and neither sample controls for survivorship bias, thus making any historical analysis of 
regulatory changes unrepresentative as, by definition, all companies in the sample have 
survived the changes in the regulatory and operating environment. 
Finally, the sample used in this thesis uses a portfolio approach to delineate energy 
utilities into groups based on firm characteristics. To date, the differential impact of risk 
premia for European energy utilities has only been studied using Koch and Bassen’s (2013) 
delineation based on carbon-emissions and Oberndorfer’s (2009a) delineation between the 
energy sector and the oil & gas sector. This thesis delineates the sector into 1) small and big 
utilities; 2) growth, neutral or value utilities; 3) upper, medium or down momentum utilities; 
and 4) electric, natural gas or multi-utilities. This is the first time European utilities have been 
delineated into such portfolios and will provide much needed insight into the heterogeneous 
peculiarities and return profiles of various European energy utilities. In particular, the return 
profile and impact of regulations on small utilities has not been analysed. This is important 
from a policy perspective, as the various legislation was expected to negatively impact big 
utilities and provide growth opportunities for smaller utilities (as discussed in Section 2.2.1). 
1.5.5 Market Reaction within the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
To date, no academic paper has examined the timing of market reaction to key stages 
of the European ordinary legislative procedure, especially from a finance perspective. To this 
end, this thesis provides a detailed understanding of market efficiency and transparency in the 
EU legislative procedure. It demonstrates that investors are reacting to information at early 
stages of the legislative procedure, sometimes before official voting positions have been 
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announced. This is expected due to the protracted and public nature of the procedure. Key 
stages of the procedure which occur later, such as the press release and the signing of the 
legislative texts, are relatively superfluous, with little to no market reaction surrounding these 
stages. This implies that the informational content has already been impounded into prices. 
1.5.6 Examination of the Impact of Different Regulatory Steams  
Finally, this thesis is the first to examine the impact of the four restructuring streams 
on the valuation of European energy utilities (see Section 1.1). While press conjectures on the 
impact of these streams, no prior research has examined the market reaction surrounding 
regulatory changes or distinguishes between Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, 
Renewable Energies and Security of Supply agendas. The market reaction surrounding the 
four streams has implications for the market’s assessment of future cash flows (Schwert, 
1981, Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996), required rates of return on investment and the 
likelihood of achieving ambitious decarbonisation goals at the European level. 
 Organisation of the Thesis 1.6
The structure of the thesis chapters, and the organisation of the chapters, is outlined in 
Figure 1.3. The thesis consists of seven chapters in total, three of which are empirical studies. 
1.6.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter represents the thesis introduction, introducing the thesis’ research 
objective by providing an overview. Further, this chapter outlines the motivation for 
examining the impact of regulatory changes, hypotheses, objectives and contribution of the 
thesis. 
1.6.2 Chapter 2: European Energy Sector Reform 
To place the thesis in context, Chapter 2 introduces the ordinary legislative procedure, 
the main legislative procedure through which the majority of European legislative proposals 
are proposed and adopted. The chapter provides a detailed outline of the legislative procedure, 
the political institutions involved in creating European legislation and the voting process of 
the political institutions. The chapter also outlines the list of restructuring legislation analysed 
later in the thesis. Throughout the chapter, key stages where information can diffuse into the 
market are highlighted, which helps develop H1 for Chapter 6 regarding the impact of 
regulatory changes and the timing of market reactions, which has implications for market 
efficiency. The chapter continues by providing an overview of the four distinct restructuring 
streams of the European energy utility sector the: Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, 
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Renewable Energies and Security of Supply streams. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
differences between the four streams, outlining the intended objectives of each stream and 
types of utilities that each stream targets. The discussion, combined with the literature review 




FIGURE 1.3: ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS CHAPTERS 
This figure presents the organisation of the thesis’ chapters. Chapter 1 presents the thesis introduction. Chapter 2 outlines the 
ordinary legislative procedure and the four distinct restructuring streams. Chapter 3 contains the overarching thesis literature 
review. Chapters 4 to 6 are the three empirical studies. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
 
1.6.3 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Chapter 3 provides a synthesis of the multiple bodies of literature the thesis draws 
upon. The literature review begins by outlining shared asset pricing models. The asset pricing 
models are taken from finance and energy economics literature, both of which extend the 
CAPM. The literature review demonstrates that the two strains of this literature begin to 
diverge from one another in the early-1990s. The finance literature develops the four-factor 
model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) which identifies stock market risk 
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develops the augmented-CAPM which identifies macroeconomic variables such as term 
premium and commodities, as additional risk factors in equity returns. The chapter 
independently reviews the current state of the finance and energy economics literatures, then 
recombines the two bodies of literature to develop the AFFM, providing the theoretical 
groundings for Chapter 4. 
Following the asset pricing model literature, the literature review continues by 
presenting research concerning measuring the impact of regulatory changes on stock 
performance, in particular, the potential impact of liberalisation and environmental objectives 
on the valuations of equities. After outlining the expected impact of regulations, the literature 
review focuses on propositions from the econometrics and statistics literature regarding the 
time-varying nature of risk premia. The section outlines theory and empirical evidence 
regarding the estimation of pure and partial break points in the relationship between stock 
returns and risk factors over long horizons. The literature review ends with a section 
concerning expected methodological limitations to asset pricing. Specifically, the section 
outlines literature concerning the portfolio approach and the impact of commodity hedging on 
significance tests. 
1.6.4 Chapters 4 to 6: The Three Empirical Studies 
The broad policy and academic objectives of this thesis are addressed through three 
empirical studies, spread across three chapters of the thesis. The three studies include 
 Chapter 4: Risk factors in energy utility returns: An Augmented-Four-Factor Model 
(AFFM), 
 Chapter 5: Refining the AFFM and exploring within-sector heterogeneity, and 
 Chapter 6: The impact of regulatory changes in energy utility returns: 
Chapters 4 to 6 form the core empirical analyses of this thesis. The chapters are 
summarised in Figure 1.3. Each chapter can be read as a standalone study, but are linked 
sequentially. Each of the three studies includes an introduction, methodology, results and 
conclusion section. As the literature review is shared across all three studies, the studies 
utilise cross-referencing to avoid a verbose thesis. Where appropriate, an additional chapter-
specific literature review or hypothesis development section is provided. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis focuses on integrating the energy economics and finance 
literatures, using propositions from both bodies of literature to develop a global
8
 augmented 
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Global risk factors are stock market risk factors calculated using a diverse sample of European stocks. Global 




version of the traditional four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
This thesis defines this novel model as the Augmented-Four-Factor Model, henceforth 
referred to as the AFFM throughout the remainder of this thesis. The chapter explains the 
behaviour of the energy sector’s returns relative to other European sectors, identifying 
whether significant risk factors represent a sector-specific relationship or market-wide 
conditions. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis, has multiple objectives. First, the chapter implements a local 
version of the AFFM to explain average returns of the energy sector as a whole; for example, 
do sector returns behave like big or small energy utilities? Second, the chapter continues by 
examining within sector heterogeneity in various portfolios of energy utilities grouped on 
similarity of characteristics, including two size portfolios, three book-to-market portfolios, 
three momentum portfolios and three industry portfolios. Third, Chapter 5 identifies time-
varying risk premia using deductive and inductive empirical approaches and is able to more 
accurately isolate the firm-specific component of returns for the European energy utility 
sector. To date, no article has developed such a model for European energy utilities. 
Chapter 6 of the thesis, contributes to the literature by implementing an event study 
analysis on a broad range of regulatory changes in the European energy utility sector. The 
chapter identifies the timing of market reaction surrounding key stages of the European 
legislative procedure, and also measures the impact of four major restructuring streams. 
Each study adopts interdisciplinary approaches across finance, energy economics, 
econometrics, accounting, and energy and environmental policy research. For instance, 
Chapter 4 is primarily based in the field of finance and energy economics, testing a variety of 
asset pricing models which are able to explain returns across various sectors. The chapter uses 
common extensions of the CAPM, and proposes the global AFFM as a novel model for this 
thesis. Prior literature has argued that ‘global’ existing asset pricing models typically result in 
poor performance at the ‘local’ level, and has found temporal variability in risk premia 
(Huang et al., 1996, Fama and French, 1997, Faff and Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, El-
Sharif et al., 2005, Boyer and Filion, 2007, Oberndorfer, 2009a). Chapter 5 incorporates 
propositions from the finance literature to address the poor performance of asset pricing 
models at the sector level, and propositions from the econometrics literature to address the 
                                                                                                                                                        
returns across a variety of sectors. In contrast, local risk factors have limited scope and are sector-specific. Local 
stock market risk factors are calculated using only the 88 European energy utilities identified in this thesis, 
therefore, are expected to better explain sector level returns. Fama and French (2012) use similar distinctions 
when calculating global versus local risk factors, explaining average returns across integrated markets and 




time-varying nature of risk premia. Chapter 5 also incorporates the Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) structural break point test from the econometrics literature. Chapter 6 studies the legal-
linguistic content of the legislation to examine the impact of legislative proposals on the 
valuation of energy utilities, incorporating propositions from the finance, energy economics, 
accounting, and energy and environmental policy literature. The hypotheses for the chapters 
are developed from a combination of existing empirical research, propositions from literature 
and ex ante expectations of impact outlined in the legislative acts. 
The three studies produce a variety of results which are of interest to both academics 
and policy-makers. The former two studies will be of interest to academics, while the third 
chapter will be of interest to policy-makers. Regarding the asset pricing model results, the 
findings of this thesis reveal that the augmented-CAPM implemented in the energy economics 
literature can benefit from the inclusion of additional stock market risk factors – extracted 
from the finance literature. These risk factors include size premium, value premium and 
momentum premium. The global AFFM in this thesis consistently has greater explanatory 
power across all tests. This explanatory power can be increased further by substituting global 
(market- level) risk factors for local (sector level) risk factors, as sector-level risk factors 
typically have tighter regression fits (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999, Fama and French, 
2012). Further, controlling for the time-varying nature of the model parameters has a greater 
impact on explanatory power than the inclusion of additional variables. As expected, the 
novel model is also superior at isolating the firm-specific component of returns. Regarding the 
policy results, the thesis shows that markets are extremely efficient and incorporate 
information into asset prices during the early stages of the legislative procedure – prior to the 
proposal’s signing. Results show that the Renewable Energies regulations have had a 
relatively limited impact on sector returns. Notably, the Energy Efficiency and Internal 
Energy Markets streams have had a significant impact on sector returns. 
1.6.5 Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Chapter 7 provides a broad conclusion for the thesis on the basis of the results drawn 
from Chapters 4 to 6 and the literature review (Chapter 3). The policy implications are 
compared with the overall policy objectives of liberalisation and decarbonisation of the 
energy sector. The chapter concludes by outlining the limitations of the thesis and suggesting 
avenues for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2  
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECTOR REFORM 
The major contribution of this thesis is to develop an asset pricing model which is able 
to capture variability in the returns of European energy utilities, and to use that model to more 
accurately examine the impact of regulatory changes on the valuation of European energy 
utilities. This is achieved by utilising an event study approach in Chapter 6 to examine how 
regulatory changes impact the firm-specific component of returns, filtering out any impact 
from stock market factors, term premium and commodity risk factors. This underlying firm-
specific component of returns is expected to vary when markets perceive that the underlying 
value of the firm has been affected by changes in the operating or regulatory environment. 
Market efficiency assumes that investors incorporate any information regarding changes to 
future cash flow, including those as a result of regulatory changes, into stock prices when the 
information is first anticipated by the market. Investors are expected to consider all possible 
scenarios, including those which are hard to value (Griffin et al., 2015). To this end, it is 
important to outline the context in which regulatory changes are proposed and implemented in 
Europe, and to outline possible points at which information can diffuse into the market. This 
section demonstrates that the legislative procedure of the EU is complex and protracted and 
involves a large number of interveners. As a result, there are many points at which investors 
can gather information regarding the likelihood of a legislative proposal successfully passing 
through the procedure and then can react accordingly. 
This chapter addresses three objectives: 1) to outline the legislative procedure, 2) to 
develop key stages at which we expect investors to anticipate that a legislative proposal will 
come to completion and 3) identify four distinct restructuring streams which are expected to 
have differential impacts on the energy sector. Section 2.1 addresses the former two 
objectives, while Section 2.2 outlines the four distinct restructuring streams, encompassing 
liberalisation and decarbonisation objectives. 
 The Ordinary Legislative Procedure 2.1
The ordinary legislative procedure is the main procedure by which the majority of EU 
laws are proposed and adopted. Within the EU, there are three independent political 
institutions jointly responsible for the creation of legislative acts: the EU Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the EU. From here on in, they are respectively 
referred to as the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Each institution reflects a 
unique role in the procedure. The Commission ensures laws are adopted across Member 
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States, the Parliament represents the interest of EU citizens, while the Council represents 
national ministers. 
Both the Parliament and the Council are responsible for voting on the adoption, 
amendment or rejection of legislative proposals. The ‘co-decision’ procedure requires that the 
political institutions are in agreement. The purpose of identifying multiple events in the policy 
formation process is to define events which may either significantly alter expectations 
regarding the effects of outcomes or the likelihood of a given outcome, or both (Schipper and 
Thompson, 1983). Typically, the first announcement to adopt or amend an act is referred to as 
the ‘1
st
 position’, while the second announcement to adopt is referred to as the ‘2
nd
 position’. 
These two stages of the legislative procedure, often referred to as the co-decision stages, will 
be examined using the event study method. The co-decision procedure was designed to ensure 
the legislative process is transparent, accountable and efficient. Further, the procedure was 
designed to reconcile differences in opinion and, where applicable, encourage the adoption of 
legislative proposals at an early stage of the procedure (European Parliament et al., 2007). The 
legislative procedure is briefly summarised in Figure 2.1, while a detailed outline is provided 
in Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.5. Both the European Parliament (2015)
9
 and the European 
Commission (2015) provide an outline of the full legislative procedure. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1: THE ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE ADAPTED FROM EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2015) 
This figure illustrates the European ordinary legislative procedure. Solid lines represent the procedure assuming the two 
political institutions are not in agreement, which can contain up to three public readings. The dashed lines represent that the 
two political institutions are in agreement at any of the three public readings, proceeding to the publication stage. 
2.1.1 The Commission’s Proposal 
The Commission is the only political institution with the ‘right of initiative’, initiating 
the legislative process by creating a proposal from public or corporate demand. The proposal 
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 An interactive, but cursory, version of the ordinary legislative procedure is provided at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/legislativeprocedure/default_en.htm 
The Commission Proposal 
• European Commission submits 
legislative proposal to the 
European Parliament. 
1st Reading at the Parliament 
and Council 
• Parliament adopts or rejects the 
Commission's proposal. 
• The Council then accepts or 
amends Parliament's 1st position. 
2nd Reading at the Parliament 
and Council 
• If amended, the Parliament approves, 
rejects, or amends Council's 1st position.  
• The Council approves or rejects 
Parliament's 2nd position. 
Conciliation 
• The Conciliation Committee 
attempts to reach agreement on 
a joint text. 
• The joint text is forwarded to 
the Parliament and Council. 
3rd Reading at the Parliament 
and Council 
• The Parliament accepts or 
rejects the joint text. 
• The Council accepts or rejects 
the joint text. 
Publication 
• If, at any one of the three 
readings, both the Parliament 
and Council agree on the 
proposal, the proposal is 




is often the result of an extensive consultation process. The Commission is able to alter the 
legislative proposal, where the legal basis adopted by the Commission determines the 
legislative procedure, for example, whether the subject of the proposal relates to energy or the 
internal market.
10
 The proposal is simultaneously submitted to the Parliament and the Council 
for its first reading.
11
 As far as possible, any draft texts submitted for discussion at 
forthcoming meetings are expected to be circulated to all participants well in advance, with 
the intention of enhancing transparency and informal discussions (European Parliament et al., 
2007). The combination of the proposal arising from public or corporate demand, the 
consultation process and ongoing informal discussions implies that the market can be fully 
aware of a potential regulatory change and anticipate its forthcoming submission. A prime 
example of this anticipation of the market can be observed in the Florence School of 
Regulation. Leading energy-policy academics
12
 and the director
13
 of the directorate-general 
(DG) for energy of the European Commission are already in informal, public discussions 
regarding a potential major regulatory change which is yet to be submitted (FSR Energy, 
2015). The major regulatory changes will dramatically change the regulatory and operating 
environment of energy utilities and will be discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
2.1.2 The Parliament and Council’s First Reading 
Both the Parliament and the Council are the two major political institutions 
responsible for adopting the legislative proposal. This section outlines first the process of the 
Parliament, then it outlines the Council’s process. The Parliament’s process is separated into 
two stages: 1) deciding a position, and 2) adopting the position. The members of the 
parliamentary committee responsible for deciding the Parliament’s position are named, along 
with any members of committees which offer opinions on the legislative proposal. Investors 
are fully aware of the individuals responsible for voting to adopt or reject a legislative 
proposal, and thus can infer some sentiment towards a legislative proposal. Rational investors 
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 The legal basis of the 83 areas of the legislative procedure can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/docs/legal_bases_en.pdf. 
11
 Note, the legislative proposal is also submitted to national parliaments and, where applicable, the Committee 
of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. The aforementioned institutions are not responsible for 
adopting a legislative proposal; however, they act as a ‘watchdog’ and can contest a proposal in the early stages 
of the decision-making process if it is not compliant with the principle of subsidiarity. If opposed, the 
Commission can decide to maintain the draft so long as they justify their actions, which then continues the 
legislative process as normal. 
12
 Prof. Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Schuman Chair, Director of the Florence School of Regulation and 
Director of Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Programme. 
13
 Klaus Dieter Borchardt, Director of the Internal Energy Market at DG Energy of the European Commission 
on market design and network codes 
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are expected to consider the interests of the voting individuals in relation to the likelihood that 
the Parliament would vote to adopt a proposal. 
First, a rapporteur prepares a report which outlines the Parliament’s position in 
advance of the vote. The position is formed on the basis of screening, private consultation and 
public debate. The parliamentary committee meets on numerous occasions to study the draft 
report which outlines the Parliament’s position and are able to amend, if necessary, the 
Commission’s legislative proposal. Amendments are put to a vote, decided by a simple 
majority, and the committee finalises the draft report outlining the Parliament’s position. 
Therefore, the Parliament’s discussions convey information regarding the likelihood that the 
Parliament will vote to adopt or reject a proposal. For the second stage, the position report is 
placed on the agenda of a plenary session. Additional amendments can be made at this stage, 
but, as a general rule, amendments must be tabled by noon of the preceding Thursday 
(European Commission, 2015). The Parliament’s position is relatively fluid until this cut-off 
point; after which it is unlikely to change. 
A plenary debate, which includes the Commissioner, is held ahead of the vote. The 
plenary vote, based on a simple majority, decides whether to adopt amendments. As no time 
limit is specified, the Parliament’s phase typically takes 13 to 15 months (European 
Commission, 2015). The Commission may then alter the legislative proposal to incorporate 
the Parliament’s amendments. The process above is relatively transparent and prolonged, 
allowing an investor plenty of time to monitor the production of the reports and gauge the 
Parliament’s general opinion towards the legislative proposal. 
The likelihood of the market reacting to the announcement of the 1
st
 position, and the 
expectation regarding the proposal’s ultimate adoption, depends on a number of factors. If the 
legislation arises from strong corporate and/or public demand, a vote to adopt sends a strong 
signal to the market that political institutions show positive sentiment towards the legislative 
proposal and aim to seek an agreement. As shown below, the Parliament and the Council are 
encouraged to reach agreement at an earlier rather than later stage, and therefore a series of 
informal discussions often occur in advance of the vote. Prior to expanding on this, this 
section continues by outlining the Council’s voting process. 
Concurrent with the Parliament’s vote, the Council also prepares its position. The 
Council prepares working parties which represent various Member States and are chaired by 
representatives of the Member State that currently holds the six-month presidency. Equally, 
the Council’s voting party is well known to investors, as are the interests of the voting 
individuals. Discussions regarding the Commission’s proposal are held in the public domain. 
The Council only makes its position known after the Parliament, where the institutions are 
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encouraged to exchange timetables and information regarding progress (European Parliament 
et al., 2007, European Commission, 2015). Consequently, investors can reasonably expect the 
Council’s position to be announced soon after the Parliament’s. Assuming the Council and the 
Parliament are in agreement, the Council can announce agreement without debate (‘A’ item) 
or agreement with debate (‘B’ item). 
Briefly, if the two political institutions are in agreement at the first stage, the 
legislative act is submitted for the signatures of the Presidents and Secretaries-General of both 
the Parliament and the Council (see Figure 2.1). The actual completion of the procedure is 
discussed shortly in Section 2.1.5; the process contains many stages which are of importance 
for finalising the text. Institutions are encouraged to reconcile their positions so that, where 
possible, acts may be adopted in the first reading (European Parliament et al., 2007). Between 
2004 and 2009, 72% of legislative proposals were agreed upon in the first reading, while 23% 
were agreed upon in the second reading (European Commission, 2009, European Parliament 
et al., 2007). Therefore, investors can infer that there is a high probability that a legislative 
proposal which reaches the first reading will be adopted. If the proposal is amended, then the 
proposal is likely to be adopted at the second reading. The following sections outline 
additional phases of the legislative procedure, assuming the two parties are not in agreement. 
2.1.3 The Parliament and Council’s Second Reading 
In some cases, the Parliament and the Council are in disagreement regarding a 
legislative proposal. Despite disagreement, this stance is denoted a ‘common position’. The 
Council establishes informal tripartite meetings, known as ‘trilogues’, between the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission (European Parliament et al., 2007). As the 
second reading at the Parliament and the Council is limited to three months per institution, the 
purpose of the trilogue is to facilitate an early agreement at the second reading of the 
proposal. Investors are, therefore, aware that the Parliament’s position after the second 
reading must be announced within 90 days. The procedure for the Parliament and the Council 
is similar to that outlined in the first reading; however, both the Parliament and the Council 
must also address amendments outlined by the other institution. For brevity, the positions in 
the second reading can be summarised as ‘agreement’, ‘rejection’ or ‘amendments’. A vote 
for agreement (rejection) results in the legislative proposal being adopted (rejected) at the 
second reading. Should the Parliament amend the document further, the Council enters a 
second reading and also has a further 90 days to announce a position. The Council may only 
accept or reject the amendments in the second reading. Acceptance adopts the legislative 
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proposal, while rejection leads to the convening of a Conciliation Committee with the 
objective of creating a joint document. 
2.1.4 The Conciliation Committee and Third Reading 
The Conciliation Committee is comprised of equal teams of negotiators from each of 
the two political institutions, where each team has a mandate for the negotiations, and 
includes representatives from the Commission. The Commission ensures that the joint text 
remains congruent with the original proposal. The Conciliation Committee must convene 
within six to eight weeks to begin the process, which may last up to six weeks in total. Once 
again, informal trilogues serve a mediating role, with the aim of resolving outstanding issues 
and creating an amicable ‘joint text’ in advance of the meeting. The joint text should be 
balanced and should satisfy both political institutions.
14
 The dates, agendas and locations of 
the Conciliation Committee’s meetings are set in advance, informing investors which topics 
will be discussed and when. As the six-week time limit is often deemed too short, informal 
negotiations often occur in advance of the Council’s second reading (European Commission, 
2015). These informal negotiations must signal that the Council are considering amending or 
rejecting the legislative proposal, and are unlikely to accept the proposal in its current form. 
Following the meeting of the Conciliation Committee, a press conference is held alerting the 
media to the outcome of the negotiations (European Commission, 2015). The Parliament and 
the Council may no longer table amendments to the proposal. The joint document is read 
publicly a third time, at which point both institutions must vote to adopt the act within eight 
weeks of receiving the joint text, followed by signatures from both political institutions, 
otherwise the act is rejected. 
The majority of European legislation follows this procedure.
15
 Table 2.1 shows a list 
of energy-specific legislation, analysed later in this thesis, which has passed the ordinary 
legislative procedure; Section 6.3.3.1 of Chapter 6 outlines the chain-sampling method used to 
                                                 
14
 As of January 2015, there have only been four cases where the committee failed to reach agreement on a 
joint text, demonstrating the Conciliation Committee’s effectiveness at solving disputes and the likelihood of a 
piece of legislation being adopted at this stage (European Parliament, 2015). The cases include ‘Voice 
Telephony’ (1994), ‘Securities Committee’ (1998), ‘Working Time Directive’ (2009) and ‘Novel Foods 
Regulation’ (2011). 
15
A case in point for the European energy utility sector, Directive 1996/92/EC concerning the common rules 
for the internal market in electricity was originally proposed in 1991. After consultations and presentations, the 
proposal was amended by the Parliament and the Council in 1993 and 1994, respectively. The Parliament agreed 
with the second revision on the 11
th
 of December 1996, while the Council agreed on the 19
th
 of December 1996. 
The proposal was also signed by both institutions on the 19
th
 December 1996. All communication documents 
were published simultaneously with the decisions being made, while the final legislation was formally published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union on the 30
th
 of January 1997, 42 days after the legislation had been 
agreed upon and signed. Access to a full timeline of the events for this example, including online decision 




construct the list. Table 2.1 also shows key dates at which the first and second political 
institutions announced their position to accept (or amend) the proposal, the signature date and 
the final publication date. The URL hyperlinks, embedded in the reference for each 
legislation, show that all of the key dates, documents and discussions are freely available to 
any investor who wishes to find such information. A rational investor, who benefits 
economically from such information, is expected to be able to locate this information in a 
similar manner to that performed by the author of this thesis. 
2.1.5 Co-decisions, Signatures and Legal-Linguistic Finalisation 
As stated previously, both political institutions must vote to agree upon a legislative 
proposal for it to pass into law. However, mutual agreement on a text does not represent the 
finalisation of the legislative procedure, as there are additional stages that occur prior to the 
text being signed by both the Parliament and the Council – at which point the text is legally 
binding. The text upon which the voting and agreement are reached by the Parliament and the 
Council is only a ‘reasonably finalised’ version of the text (European Parliament, 2012). After 
agreement on the reasonably finalised text, lawyer-linguists of both political institutions work 
together to establish a final text (European Parliament et al., 2007, European Parliament, 
2012). This is known as the legal-linguistic phase. For each text passed, the Parliament 
assigns a ‘file coordinator’, while the Council appoints a ‘chef de file’. The two institutions 
coordinate work, in tandem with experts on the file, to create a base text ahead of the final 
revision meeting. Changes may only be made to the agreed text with explicit agreement, at the 
appropriate level, from both the Parliament and the Council (European Parliament et al., 
2007). 
At the final revision meeting, referred to as the ‘jurist-linguist’ meeting, 
representatives from Member States, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission read 
through the whole text and agree upon on the final version in English; other languages are 
also addressed by Council lawyer-linguists (European Parliament, 2012). This stage of the 
procedure focuses on defining key legal terms and identification of the firms or sectors that 
will be impacted by the legislative proposal. At this point, it is difficult to improve the quality 
of the draft document due to the delicate political compromise needed to reach this stage of 
the procedure (European Parliament, 2012). However, it must be noted that this stage finalises 
the boundaries of the legislation, and cements them into the text. While the majority of the 
impact is expected to occur surrounding the votes of the political institutions, there is still the 
possibility that legislative proposals may undergo some amendments, which alter the 
informational content of the proposal, in the weeks prior to the signature date. 
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TABLE 2.1: A LIST OF RESTRUCTURING LEGISLATION FOR THE EUROPEAN ENERGY UTILITY SECTOR 
This table presents a list of 54 regulatory events expected to affect European energy utilities. The table presents the legislation title, reference and restructuring stream for each legislation. Dates regarding the key stages of the 
legislative procedure are also presented. The reference is comprised of the legislation type and its identification number. The reference also contains embedded URL hyperlinks which provide access to a full timeline of the 
legislative procedure. 










Common rules for the internal market in electricity  Directive 96/92/EC Internal Energy Market 11 Dec 1996 19 Dec 1996 19 Dec 1996 30 Jan 1997 
Energy labelling of household dishwashers Commission Directive 97/17/EC Energy Efficiency   16 Apr 1997 7 May 1997 
Energy labelling of household lamps Commission Directive 98/11/EC Energy Efficiency   27 Jan 1998 10 Mar 1998 
Common rules for the internal market in natural gas  Directive 98/30/EC Internal Energy Market 30 Apr 1998 11 May 1998 22 Jun 1998 21 Jul 1998 
Energy efficiency requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting  Directive 2000/55/EC Energy Efficiency 30 May 2000 5 Jul 2000 18 Sep 2000 1 Nov 2000 
Renewable energy: the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources Directive 2001/77/EC Renewable Energies 4 Jul 2001 7 Sep 2001 27 Sep 2001 27 Oct 2001 
Community energy efficiency labelling programme for office equipment  Regulation (EC) No 2422/2001 Energy Efficiency 30 May 2001 3 Oct 2001 6 Nov 2001 15 Dec 2001 
Energy labelling of household air-conditioners Commission Directive 2002/31/EC Energy Efficiency   22 Mar 2002 3 Apr 2002 
Energy labelling of household electric ovens Commission Directive 2002/40/EC Energy Efficiency   8 May 2002 15 May 2002 
Energy performance of buildings Directive 2002/91/EC Energy Efficiency 10 Oct 2002 25 Nov 2002 16 Dec 2002 4 Jan 2003 
Statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the 
management of Community programmes  
Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 Energy Efficiency  5 Jul 2001 19 Dec 2002 16 Jan 2003 
Establishing the European Community Energy Star Board Commission Decision 2003/168/EC Energy Efficiency   11 Mar 2003 12 Mar 2003 
Promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport  Directive 2003/30/EC Renewable Energies 12 Mar 2003 8 Apr 2003 8 May 2003 17 May 2003 
Rules of procedure of the European Community Energy Star Board Commission Decision 2003/367/EC Energy Efficiency   15 May 2003 21 May 2003 
Cross-border exchanges in electricity Regulations (EC) No 1228/2003 Internal Energy Market 4 Jun 2003 16 Jun 2003 26 Jun 2003 15 Jul 2003 
"Intelligent Energy for Europe" programme (2003-2006) Decision No 1230/2003/EC Energy Efficiency 13 May 2003 16 Jun 2003 26 Jun 2003 15 Jul 2003 
Internal market for energy (until March 2011)  Directive 2003/54/EC Internal Energy Market 4 Jun 2003 16 Jun 2003 26 Jun 2003 15 Jul 2003 
Internal market for natural gas Directive 2003/55/EC Internal Energy Market 4 Jun 2003 16 Jun 2003 26 Jun 2003 15 Jul 2003 
Trans-European energy networks Decision No 1229/2003/EC Internal Energy Market 4 Jun 2003 16 Jun 2003 26 Jun 2003 15 Jul 2003 
Greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme Directive 2003/87/EC Internal Energy Market 2 Jul 2003 22 Jul 2003 13 Oct 2003 25 Oct 2003 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas Commission Decision 2003/796/EC Internal Energy Market   11 Nov 2003 14 Nov 2003 
Cogeneration based on a useful heat demand in the internal energy market Directive 2004/8/EC  Energy Efficiency 18 Dec 2003 26 Jan 2004 11 Feb 2004 21 Feb 2004 
Rules applicable to procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors until 2016 
Directive 2004/17/EC Internal Energy Market 29 Jan 2004 3 Feb 2004 31 Mar 2004 30 Apr 2004 
Security of supply of natural gas  Council Directive 2004/67/EC Security of Supply  20 Apr 2004 26 Apr 2004 29 Apr 2004 
Ecodesign requirements for energy-using products Directive 2005/32/EC Energy Efficiency 13 Apr 2005 23 May 2005 6 Jul 2005 22 Jul 2005 
Conditions for access to the gas transmission networks Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 Internal Energy Market 8 Mar 2005 12 Jul 2005 28 Sep 2005 3 Nov 2005 
Security of supply of electricity Directive 2005/89/EC Security of Supply 5 Jul 2005 1 Dec 2005 18 Jan 2006 4 Feb 2006 
Energy end-use efficiency and energy services Directive 2006/32/EC Energy Efficiency 13 Dec 2005 14 Mar 2006 5 Apr 2006 27 Apr 2006 
Strategic Oil Stocks Council Directive 2006/67/EC Security of Supply   24 Jul 2006 8 Aug 2006 
Trans-European energy networks Decision No 1364/2006/EC Internal Energy Market 4 Apr 2006 24 Jul 2006 6 Sep 2006 22 Sep 2006 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) (2007-2013) Decision 1639/2006/EC Energy Efficiency 1 Jun 2006 12 Oct 2006 24 Oct 2006 9 Nov 2006 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 










Energy efficiency of office equipment: The Energy Star Programme (EU - US) Council Decision 2006/1005/EC Energy Efficiency   18 Dec 2006 28 Dec 2006 
Rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of the trans-European 
transport and energy networks 
Regulation (EC) No 680/2007 Energy Efficiency 22 Mar 2007 23 May 2007 20 Jun 2007 22 Jun 2007 
Framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-using products Directive 2008/28/EC Energy Efficiency 11 Jul 2007 3 Mar 2008 11 Mar 2008 20 Mar 2008 
Transparency of gas and electricity prices Directive 2008/92/EC Internal Energy Market 17 Jun 2008 25 Sep 2008 22 Oct 2008 7 Nov 2008 
Adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure laid down in Article 251 of 
the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC, with regard to the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny 
Regulation (EC) No 1137/2008 Energy Efficiency 18 Jun 2008 25 Sep 2008 22 Oct 2008 21 Nov 2008 
Ecodesign requirements for fluorescent lamps, for high intensity discharge lamps, and 
for their ballasts 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 
245/2009 
Energy Efficiency   18 Mar 2009 24 Mar 2009 
Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources Directive 2009/28/EC Renewable Energies 17 Dec 2008 6 Apr 2009 23 Apr 2009 5 Jun 2009 
Internal market in gas (from March 2011)  Directive 2009/73/EC Internal Energy Market 22 Apr 2009 25 Jun 2009 13 Jul 2009 14 Aug 2009 
Internal market in electricity (from March 2011)  Directive 2009/72/EC Internal Energy Market 22 Apr 2009 25 Jun 2009 13 Jul 2009 14 Aug 2009 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 Internal Energy Market 22 Apr 2009 25 Jun 2009 13 Jul 2009 14 Aug 2009 
Cross-border exchanges in electricity (from 2011)  Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 Internal Energy Market 22 Apr 2009 25 Jun 2009 13 Jul 2009 14 Aug 2009 
Conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks Regulation (EC) No 715/2009  Internal Energy Market 22 Apr 2009 25 Jun 2009 13 Jul 2009 14 Aug 2009 
Stocks of crude oil and petroleum products (from 2012) Council Directive 2009/119/EC Security of Supply 22 Apr 2009 12 Jun 2009 14 Sep 2009 9 Oct 2009 
Framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related products Directive 2009/125/EC Energy Efficiency 24 Apr 2009 25 Sep 2009 21 Oct 2009 31 Oct 2009 
Labelling of tyres with respect to fuel efficiency and other essential parameters Regulation (EC) No 1222/2009 Energy Efficiency 20 Nov 2009 25 Nov 2009 25 Nov 2009 22 Dec 2009 
Community financial aid to trans-European networks Regulation (EC) No 67/2010 Internal Energy Market 24 Nov 2009 26 Nov 2009 30 Nov 2009 30 Jan 2010 
Energy performance of buildings Directive 2010/31/EU Energy Efficiency 14 Apr 2010 18 May 2010 19 May 2010 18 Jun 2010 
Indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy 
and other resources by energy-related products 
Directive 2010/30/EU  Energy Efficiency 14 Apr 2010 19 May 2010 19 May 2010 18 Jun 2010 
Security of supply of natural gas Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 Security of Supply 21 Sep 2010 11 Oct 2010 20 Oct 2010 12 Nov 2010 
A comparative methodology framework for calculating cost-optimal levels of 
minimum energy performance requirements for buildings and building elements 
Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) No 244/2012  
Energy Efficiency   16 Jan 2012 21 Mar 2012 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007-2013) Regulation (EU) No 670/2012 Energy Efficiency 5 Jul 2012 10 Jul 2012 11 Jul 2012 31 Jul 2012 
Stepping up EU energy efficiency efforts Directive 2012/27/EU Energy Efficiency 12 Sep 2012 4 Oct 2012 25 Oct 2012 14 Nov 2012 
Guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 Internal Energy Market 12 Mar 2013 21 Mar 2013 17 Apr 2013 25 Apr 2013 
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Once a proposal has been agreed upon by both the Parliament and the Council, the two 
political institutions agree upon a common presentation of the text, and hold joint press 
conferences and press releases to announce the successful outcome of the legislative process. 
Following the adoption of the final text, the act is placed on the public register, sent to the 
capitals of the Member States, adopted by the Council and submitted for signing by the 
Presidents and Secretaries-General of both the Parliament and the Council. This signature date 
represents the third key stage of the ordinary legislative procedure, examined using an event 
study approach. The Presidents shall, as far as possible, sign the text together in a joint 
ceremony, organised on a monthly basis in the presence of the media. The monthly 
organisation of the meeting and signing of the document can be considered merely 
ceremonial. From an efficient market perspective, rational investors will have already 
incorporated the informational content and cash flow implications of the final text into stock 
prices at an earlier stage of the procedure. For reasons above, we must be aware that any 
impact surrounding the signature date may be capturing any changes in key definitions or 
legal terms during the finalisation stages. The jointly signed text is submitted for publication 
in The Official Journal of the European Union, the central law archive for European 
legislation. Publication in The Official Journal of the European Union normally occurs within 
two months of adoption (European Parliament et al., 2007). 
Assuming market efficiency, investors will revalue energy utilities’ stocks today based 
on perceived changes to future cash flows as a result of regulatory changes (Schwert, 1981). 
When information is anticipated or becomes public knowledge, information is immediately 
impounded into stock prices; therefore, any sudden change in value implies that the market 
has changed its assessment of future cash flows (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). In the case 
of the ordinary legislative procedure, see Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.5, there are potentially four 
important dates where investors are likely to react to informational content: the announcement 
of the 1
st
 position (usually Parliament), the announcement of the 2
nd
 position (usually 
Council), the signature date and the publication date. This thesis tests all four stages as Griffin 
et al. (2015) argue that investors may not respond to information for numerous reasons, 
including 1) remote and uncertain consequences for the firm regarding the long-term nature of 
increased investment risk, 2) the expectation of full mitigation from government policies or 3) 
the ability to mitigate risk individually. Chapter 6 posits that the market reaction will occur 
surrounding the announcement of the two positions, as the latter signing and publication dates 





FIGURE 2.2: THE TIMELINE OF A LEGISLATION’S PROPOSAL 
This figure presents the timeline of the typical ordinary legislative procedure. The Commission initiates the proposal from 
public or corporate demand. During the co-decision stage, the Parliament and the Council independently review the proposals 
and vote to adopt, amend or reject. Trilogues between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission facilitate an early 
decision. The co-decision stage can last up to three readings (see Figure 2.1). If accepted, the proposal enters the finalisation 
stage where the document is signed and published. 
 
Having extensively outlined the legislative procedure of the EU, this chapter continues 
by describing four restructuring streams which relate to the European energy utility sector. 
Each stream is relatively distinct from one another, and therefore is likely to have a unique 
impact on the sector. 
 EU Legislation and the Four Restructuring Streams 2.2
Traditionally, European energy supply was based on national and regional markets 
with vertically integrated companies that could produce, transmit and distribute energy to 
nearby consumers with natural, regional monopolies. Since 1987, the EU has begun to make 
progress towards greater European integration, allowing the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital across European borders. The overall objective was to increase 
transnational competition within the EU, thereby exposing inefficiencies in firm operations 
and slowly phasing out inefficient firms. Consequently, there have been a large number of 
legislative acts establishing common rules for a single European internal market for energy, 
replacing the national- and regional-based structures for the energy supply (Newbery, 2002, 
Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005, Green, 2006). This gradual approach was designed to enable the 
sector to adjust in a flexible and orderly manner to its new competitive environment. 
The removal of national barriers created an international market where energy utilities 
can compete on price, services and market share. In a regulated system, the demand for 
energy, such as electricity, was relatively easy to predict as utilities had exclusive rights to 
regions. When faced with competition, utilities must accommodate the additional challenge of 
determining their energy supply based on energy demand and competitors’ energy supplies. In 
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addition, the energy sector has been exposed to a number of environmental objectives aimed 
at reducing carbon emissions through policy and market mechanisms, such as the EU ETS 
Another major EU-led reform thrust that has built up particular momentum is related 
to the environmental objectives of the sector, or the ‘greening’ of the energy supply. This has 
focused on reducing demand through energy efficiency legislation and through policies that 
promote renewable energies. In addition to the liberalisation and environmental policies, EU 
utilities have also been subject to a range of legislation related to security of energy supply. 
The following sections outline four distinct restructuring streams impacting the energy sector. 
Propositions regarding their expected impacts are mostly addressed in the literature review 
(Chapter 3). 
The liberalisation and environmental objectives of the energy sector can be divided 
into four distinct streams, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. The liberalisation objectives contain one 
restructuring stream, the Internal Energy Market, which encompasses deregulation of national 
and EU energy markets and frontiers and establishes independent regulatory bodies. The 
decarbonisation objectives include two streams: 1) Energy Efficiency, which reduces end-user 
demand, and 2) Renewable Energies, which increases the use of biofuels and renewable 
energy sources in electricity generation and sets targets for the electrification of other 
European sectors. The final category includes one stream, Security of Supply. This stream is 
designed to offset or diminish the harmful effects from difficulties securing crude oil and 
petroleum products for both energy and economic activity, but also outlines steps taken to 
ensure the security of the electricity and natural gas supply within the EU. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3: HIERARCHY OF RESTRUCTURING CATEGORIES AND STREAMS. 
This figure illustrates the hierarchy of the four restructuring streams. The liberalisation objective contains one stream (Internal Energy 
Market); the decarbonisation objective is comprised of two streams (Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies); a miscellaneous objective 
contains the Security of Supply stream. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a full list of the legislation regarding the restructuring of the 
energy sector is shown in Table 2.1, which also categorises the legislation by restructuring 
stream. The table shows that the Internal Energy Market and Energy Efficiency streams have 
Streams 
Objective 









Security of Supply 
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the greatest amount of legislation. The Internal Energy Market stream was clustered in three 
periods, pre-2000, 2003 and 2009, with sporadic legislation enacted between 2003 and 2009. 
The Energy Efficiency stream is spread through time. The Renewable Energies and Security 
of Supply streams have the least amount of legislation, and are also spread through time. The 
following sections address each restructuring stream, and their potential impacts on the energy 
sector. 
2.2.1 Liberalisation Stream 
The liberalisation objectives of the energy sector are congruent with the overall goals 
of the EU community, namely, to progressively create internal markets for specific sectors, 
removing all internal frontiers. The Single European Act (1987), the first major revision of the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), aimed to allow the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital across European borders. The liberalisation stream focuses on removing frontiers to 
gradually establish internal markets for electricity and natural gas, creating a competitive 
energy market. The removal of international barriers allows European energy utilities to 
create much larger customer bases throughout Europe. Nonetheless, it also exposes the energy 
utilities to potential reductions in demand, as competitors from other EU countries can now 
compete for incumbents’ domestic customer market segments. This competitive market was 
expected to increase efficiency of production, transmission and distribution by phasing out 
inefficient incumbent energy utilities. A gradual approach to introducing EU-level 
competition was chosen, designed to enable the sector to adjust in a flexible and ordered 
manner to its new competitive environment. The legislation seeks to ensure that the 
transmission system of energy is transparent and non-discriminatory. This is achieved by 
creating independent transmission operations which prevent abnormally high or low tariffs or 
discriminatory practices. 
Within the EU legislation to liberalise the energy sector, there were three major reform 
initiatives, referred to as the ‘three packages’. The three packages represent multiple related 
regulatory or legislative changes that are argued to have significantly changed the 
infrastructure of the European electricity and gas sectors, and represent the most anticipated 
legislative changes. The three packages are as follows. 




 were published in 
1997 and 1998, respectively. The packages represent the first attempts to remove national 
barriers in the EU. The packages resulted in only minor liberalisation of the energy sector and 
                                                 
16
 Directive 1996/92/EC. Note, this legislation was agreed upon in December 1996 (see footnote 15).  
17
 Directive 1998/30/EC 
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minor commitments from Member States; only high-volume commercial consumers were 
able to switch suppliers (Eikeland, 2011). The first packages provided no clear rules on the 
transmission of energy through existing networks but required revenue unbundling of 
vertically integrated companies, recording generation and retail revenue separately. 
Regardless, vertically integrated companies still possessed monopolies over retail networks 
and therefore were able to survive any wholesale price shocks, while non-integrated 
companies became bankrupt (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). This provided an economic incentive 
for non-integrated companies to integrate generation and distribution by asset acquisition or 
merging. As a result, there was relatively little competition in the EU energy sector. 
The Second Packages: implementing the first packages were argued to have resulted 
in a variety of benefits, including increased efficiency, price reductions, higher standards of 
service and increased competitiveness.
18
 However, the sector still lacked concrete provisions 
which ensured a level playing field in generation and reduced the risk of market dominance. 
Further, Member States’ idiosyncrasies caused delays in restructuring implementation, 
allowing vertically integrated utilities to continue to impede fair competition (Eikeland, 2011, 
Erdogdu, 2014). The second packages
18
 for electricity and gas were published in 2003, with 
the objective of creating a truly open market in the EU, which allowed consumers to freely 
choose suppliers and suppliers to freely deliver to customers across Europe. The second 
packages were designed to 1) counter dominant and predatory behaviour of vertically 
integrated companies, and 2) continue to open borders to encourage national and international 
competition. By July 2007, the second packages aimed to achieve 1) legal unbundling of 
transmission system operators (TSO) and distribution system operators (DSO) from the 
remainder of the industries, 2) free entry to generation, 3) monitoring supply competition, 4) a 
fully open market enabling household customers to switch suppliers,
19
 5) promotion of 
renewable energy fuel sources, 6) strengthening of the role of the market regulators, 7) a 
single European market for energy and 8) regulated access to energy grids (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2005, Eikeland, 2011). The rationale was that a legally independent transmission 
operator would charge equitable prices to competing generators, increasing transparency of 
pricing. Further, a fully open market would allow consumers to freely choose energy 
suppliers. 
The Third Packages: the third packages,
20
 published in 2009, were designed to address 
the unachieved liberalisation objectives of the second packages (Eikeland, 2011). The 
                                                 
18
 Directive 2003/54/EC; Directive 2003/55/EC 
19
 Non-household customers could freely choose suppliers from 1 July 2004; residential from 1 July 2007. 
20
 Directive 2009/72/EC; Directive 2009/73/EC 
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legislation highlighted that the legal and functional unbundling of vertically integrated 
companies did not lead to effective unbundling of TSOs. More than two-thirds of the 
European generation market share was owned by eight large utilities (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2005). Such ownership structure resulted in continued misuse of networks, with competing 
energy generators complaining of unfair grid access and network fees (ACER, 2013). A clear 
and effective way to solve the discriminatory network access obstacle was the unbundling of 
ownership at the transmission level for vertically integrated companies, separating 
transmission and generation companies into two separate entities. Accordingly, the same 
person was no longer allowed to be a member of management boards for a transmission 
company and perform any function for a generation or supply company. Further, the 
legislation also proposed the modernisation of distribution networks into ‘smart grids’, 
encouraging decentralised generation and energy efficiency. Finally, the third packages 
addressed the issue that national regulators lacked independence from government, and had 
insufficient powers and discretion to effectively regulate the sector. 
To ensure restructuring legislation were enforced, market monitoring agencies were 
established to act as independent regulatory authorities. In 2003 and 2005,
21
 the fair rules for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity and gas were established. The European Regulatory 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)
22
 was established as a temporary solution to address 
failures of fair grid access. ERGEG sought to ensure that EU-level legislation were 
consistently applied, facilitating independent regulatory authority, consultation, coordination 
and cooperation between regulatory bodies within Member States. Despite ERGEG’s positive 
contribution, criticisms of discriminatory access to networks continued. As a result, in 2009, 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
23
 was established in 
conjunction with the third package. ACER monitors regional cooperation and executes tasks 
for the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and 
the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) ensuring 
operation transparency and efficiency; explained further below. 
The membership groups,
24
 ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G, ensure optimal cross-border 
management and trading of energy, set non-discriminatory rules for grid access and produce 
community-wide 10-year network development plans regarding security of the energy supply. 
To facilitate access to networks, various legislation defined guidelines and compensation for 
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hosting cross-border transmissions to facilitate fair access. Yet, in 2013, energy generators, 
including renewable generators, still complained about unequal access to transmission grids 
and unfair transmission fees (ACER, 2013). To address the issue, a final piece of legislation 
amalgamated and repealed all previous legislation.
25
 The legislation also defined the expected 
financial contribution to EU-level network investment and compensation for international 
transmission in the energy sector. This legislation highlighted that, to that point, there were 
still isolated energy markets in the EU and that some Member States still failed to meet 
interconnectivity targets. 
In summary, a variety of legislative changes relating to sector liberalisation have been 
published over the last two decades. Sectors are becoming increasingly liberalised despite 
resistance from big utilities. Further, regulatory agencies have been established to counteract 
sector domination by some energy utilities. The TSOs of the EU energy sector were, and still 
are, relatively regulated. However, the 2013 regulations acknowledged that the EU energy 
market was still not fully liberalised and unfair access prevailed. What is important from a 
financial market perspective is that regulations are regularly strengthening the drive towards a 
single energy market, and EU-level regulatory agencies are increasingly being given 
additional powers which will negatively impact the dominant utilities in Europe, affecting 
operating revenue and future cash flows. 
The discussion above sets the general framework and context of liberalisation; 
however, it overlooks some important details and exceptions. One important example is that 
some utilities are exempt from the legislative changes, namely, some natural gas utilities and 
small utilities. In contrast to encouraging high levels of competition within the internal market 
for electricity, the internal market for natural gas also places an emphasis on the 
interconnection and interoperability of natural gas systems. The interoperability of the 
systems ensures international gas systems can cooperate and work without special 
intervention. In contrast to the electricity industry, natural gas legislation also allows storage 
facilities and long-term contracts – so long as they do not ‘undermine’ the objectives of 
liberalisation, including the competition rules. Clearly, there is some conflict between long-
term contracts and sector competition. Major differences between the electricity and natural 
gas legislation arise from the fact that electricity cannot be stored, whereas natural gas can be 
stored in a number of ways. Further, there are derogations established for Member States 
which have no gas infrastructure, or a gas infrastructure less than 10 years old – this caveat 
suggests that only mature gas networks will be affected by liberalisation. For small utilities, 
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provisions are made to avoid disproportionate financial and administrative burdens. Member 
States could exempt small distribution companies from the legal distribution unbundling. This 
is important, as smaller distributors will not be affected by these legislative changes, while 
large distributors are exposed to regulatory risk. Accordingly, there should be little to no 
impact of Internal Energy Market legislation on small utilities and natural gas utilities. 
Beyond sector liberalisation, a second theme which has gained prominence in recent 
years is the ‘greening’ of the energy supply. Environmental objectives aim, by 2020, to boost 
renewable energy use by 20%, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% and achieve a 20% 
increase in energy efficiency, commonly referred to as the ‘2020 × 3’ or ’20-20-20’ targets. 
There are two methods to achieving climate change objectives: the economic approach and 
the regulatory approach (Dobes et al., 2014). The latter approach prescribes policies or forbids 
processes, products and activities. The regulatory approach is the major concern of this thesis. 
The next two sections examine the legislation enacted to achieve these targets.  
2.2.2 Energy Efficiency Stream 
The general scientific consensus is that there needs to be significant reductions in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to limit the likelihood of the extreme impacts of 
climate change (Dobes et al., 2014). The electricity industry is a natural place to begin 
decarbonising the economy, as it can be achieved at lower cost and with less behavioural and 
structural change relative to other sectors (Newbery, 2016). The Energy Efficiency stream 
was designed to reduce the rate of growth of internal energy consumption by encouraging the 
rational and economic use of energy, without jeopardising social and economic growth 
objectives. Ultimately, the EU is attempting the stabilisation of total carbon dioxide emission, 
whilst taking into account the growth needs of Member States. Between 1994 and 2014, the 
population of the EU grew, on average, by about 1.3 million people per year.
26
 A large 
proportion of GHG emissions, particularly carbon dioxide comes from fossil-fuel combustion 
and is the focus of most academic papers (Dobes et al., 2014). As late as 2010, 67.2% of the 
worlds’ electricity production was from generation plants burning fossil fuels (IEA, 2012). As 
electricity demand is considered relatively inelastic (Oberndorfer, 2009a), the expectation is 
that increasing population also results in increasing gross emissions. As such, it is possible 
that gross GHG emissions may rise. Therefore, the relevant variable when measuring GHG 
reduction is focusing on emissions per capita (Dobes et al., 2014). The objective of the 
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Energy Efficiency stream is to reduce energy consumption at the user end of the energy 
supply chain. The Energy Efficiency stream was implemented in two ways. 
First, the Energy Efficiency stream aimed to encourage manufacturers to make more 
energy-efficient appliances by informing the public of the energy consumption of common 
electrical household appliances. The Energy Efficiency legislation systematically identified 
energy-intensive end-user appliances and required comprehensive labelling of consumption. 
The labelling scheme implemented a standardised measure of energy efficiency, rating energy 
consumption. Appliances included space heating, air conditioning units, electric ovens, lights, 
washer, driers, refrigerators and freezers. Legislation also set a maximum electricity 
consumption allowed per appliance. The rationale behind the stream was that end users, when 
faced with choices of similar appliances, would favour the appliance which consumed the 
least energy. The incentive for end users was lowering their energy consumption and making 
economic savings on annual fuel bills over time. 
The second objectives of the Energy Efficiency Stream were related to the energy 
consumption of buildings, which accounts for 40% of the EU’s total energy consumption.
27
 
The legislation required objective information on the energy characteristics of buildings to 
help improve the transparency of the property market and encourage energy efficiency. In an 
effort to reduce emissions, the legislation required that buildings were to be billed for heating, 
air conditioning and hot water costs based on actual consumption. Similar to the appliance 
legislation above, occupants of the home were expected to self-regulate their own 
consumption and be incentivised through economic savings on fuel bills. Property legislation 
had a differential impact on old buildings compared with new buildings. Old buildings were 
to be improved through insulation, whereas new buildings were subjected to more regulation 
with the intention of being carbon-zero by 2020. Further, any new buildings must be fitted 
with thermal insulation tailored to the local climate. 
In summary, the energy efficiency legislation represents a change in the total end-user 
demand for energy in the EU. The expectation is that energy demand in Europe will fall by 
10% to 20% by 2050 as a result of legislative changes (Delarue et al., 2011). A reduction in 
energy demand will therefore affect operational performance of utilities, affecting future cash 
flows and, ultimately, sector valuation. Beyond the Energy Efficiency stream, the 
environmental objectives of sector restructuring also include the Renewable Energies 
restructuring stream, which had distinct objectives compared to the Energy Efficiency stream. 
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2.2.3 Renewable Energies Stream 
Promotion of renewable energy was important, as the EU recognised that renewables 
represented an exploitable source of energy which could contribute to the objectives of 
environmental protection and help achieve sustainability targets (Kanellakis et al., 2013). 
Similar to the Energy Efficiency stream, the Renewable Energies stream also focused on 
reducing carbon emissions in the EU. However, the stream focused on the supply side of 
energy utilities and the market itself. In 2001, Directive 2001/77/EC set an indicative target of 
22.1% of gross electricity consumption from RES by 2010. In 2003, Directive 2003/30/EC set 
national indicative targets for the increased use of biofuels in transport, at 5.75% by 2010. In 
2007, the EU endorsed a mandatory target of 20% share of final energy consumption from 
RES and a 10% minimum biofuel target in transport petrol and diesel consumption by 2020. 
Both targets led to the RES Directive 2009/28/EC (Kanellakis et al., 2013). Emission 
reductions were expected to be achieved through increased use of renewable energy sources 
in electricity generation and transport. 
The typical electricity market design assumes thermal or hydro plants would supply 
the bulk of services (Ahlstrom et al., 2015). The low marginal cost of RES and nuclear energy 
means these generators can sometimes out-bid all gas- and coal-fired generation, especially 
during periods of low-demand (Green and Vasilakos, 2010). This has been magnified by the 
renewable energy legislation, which focused on providing grid priority for electricity 
generated from RES and biofuels.
28
 Grid priority ensured that renewable energy generators 
were able to sell and transmit electricity, in accordance with connection rules, whenever the 
renewable energy source (solar, wind, hydro, etc.) became available. Put simply, they were 
afforded first access to the grid ahead of combustion fuel generators. This grid priority was 
uncapped, allowing the renewable generators to utilise their maximum capacity,
29
 reducing 
the number of operating hours for conventional generators as wind and solar tend to generate 
the greatest amount of energy during the daytime, coinciding with the peak hours which were 
historically the most profitable hours. 
Equilibrium models and empirical evidence has shown that an increasing share of 
renewable generation, with an effective marginal cost of zero, depresses day-head and 
wholesale prices (Green and Newbery, 1992, Newbery, 1998, Green and Vasilakos, 2010, 
Ahlstrom et al., 2015, FTI-CL Energy, 2015, Newbery, 2015). Recent empirical evidence 
shows that the estimated merit order effects range from 0.97 to 2.27 €/MWh for wind and 
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from 0.84 to 1.37 €/MWh for solar photovoltaic for each additional gigawatt of installed 
capacity, where the overall impacts range from 2 to 13 €/MWh (Cludius et al., 2014). Recent 
peaks in wholesale prices have declined from 14 €/MWh in 2008 to a premium of only 3 
€/MWh in 2013 (The Economist, 2013b). 
Out-of-market RES support schemes, such as feed-in tariffs and premiums, also 
incentivise RES production in hours where power prices are below avoidable costs. RES 
generators continue to produce electricity as they can claim feed-in-tariff subsidies (Fanone et 
al., 2013), creating further market distortions (FTI-CL Energy, 2015). There is a real risk that 
energy prices will converge towards the marginal cost of (effectively) zero for increasing 
periods of time (Riesz and Milligan, 2015). The RES support schemes have led to a rapid 
uptake of renewables, which must be matched by a parallel exit of conventional technology 
from the system. Without sufficient exit, there will be over-capacity in the EU energy system, 
which will further depress prices and contribute to the ongoing investment challenge. 
A ‘missing money’ issue arises when expected net revenues from sales of energy and 
ancillary services provide inadequate incentives for investment in new generating capacity, or 
do not fully account for the opportunity cost of incremental demand or operating reserves 
during periods of scarcity (Hogan, 2005, Joskow, 2013). Large generators are designed to 
work at near maximum capacity, finding it difficult and costly to scale back operations (Green 
and Vasilakos, 2010). Some generators are incentivised to place negative bids into the 
wholesale market during low residual loads, as turning off would incur additional costs and 
risks (DECC, 2010, Ahlstrom et al., 2015). These phenomenon of negative pricing where 
generators pay, rather than be paid to deliver energy, indicates the system requires flexibility 
improvements (Hogan, 2005; Riesz and Milligan, 2015). These issues were anticipated by the 
EU, as the 2009 legislation highlighted that grid reliability may be compromised and 
appropriate financial compensation may be given to energy producers.
29
 Thus, measures were 
in place to protect disproportionally affected utilities.  
The current market framework is unlikely to remunerate the fixed-costs of power 
stations and does not produce enough expected life-cycle net revenues to incentivise 
investment in generating capacity (Joskow, 2013, Robinson, 2015). As prices are 
disconnected from opportunity costs, lower wholesale prices leave incumbents unable to 
recoup the necessary return on thermal investments and new entrants cannot establish market 
capitalisation at the necessary level to finance new base-load assets without additional 
payments beyond the energy market (Caldecott and McDaniels, 2014, Newbery, 2015, 
Robinson, 2015). Reduced investment lowers the necessary properties to handle system 
failures and ensure security of supply (Energinet, 2015), especially if variable RES is not 
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supported by a constant and reliable energy source (Edenhofer et al., 2011). This implies large 
generators are still crucial to preventing power outages and must remain available to generate 
electricity during brief periods of scarcity (Green and Vasilakos, 2010). 
In superficial commentary, The Economist (2013b) argued that the renewable energy 
objectives were responsible for a decline in market capitalisation of €500 billion. Notably, this 
claim was made without any substantial empirical evidence beyond anecdotal observation of 
share prices, and also overlooked the fact that the grid priority legislation was agreed upon in 
2001,
28
 and was to be put into force no later than 27
th
 October 2003. In a rational market, it is 
unlikely that investors would respond, in 2008, to such outdated legislation. 
Where market valuation is based on investors’ perception, it is important to consider 
the social benefits of increased renewable objectives. Social investing is an increasingly 
important component of equity markets and determining equilibrium asset prices. More than 
ever, shareholders are monitoring the actions of managers regarding the social responsibility 
of the company (Ansar et al., 2013). In addition to the social implications of lower emissions 
and a cleaner environment, the increased use of renewables was expected to create local 




The renewable energies legislation contained a further objective which was expected 
to directly benefit energy utilities, thus increasing valuation. In particular, the renewable 
energies legislation
29
 focused on increasing technological improvements within energy 
utilities and, more importantly, setting targets for the electrification of neighbouring sectors. 
The purpose of the objective was to reduce the EU’s reliance on imported energy (primarily 
oil), but to also create a new potential market for energy. Specifically, the EU has set a 
mandatory target for the overall share of energy from renewable sources (both biofuel and 
viable alternatives) for the transport sector. Transport fuel accounts for more than 30% of 
final energy consumption,
30
 and is expanding as the EU community expands. Additionally, 
road transport accounts for 84% of transport-related CO2 emission.
30
 The 2020 targets
29,30
 for 
the transport sector were 1) a minimum of 20% of conventional fuels being substituted with 
alternative fuels, and 2) a minimum of 10% of energy being derived from renewable energy 
sources, applicable across all Member States. The renewable energy legislation also focused 
on decentralising renewable energy technologies, which was expected to increase the 
utilisation of local energy sources, increase the energy supply and reduce energy transmission 
losses – increasing the overall efficiency of energy generation. Naturally, such a rapid 
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expansion of renewable energy requires labour, creating local jobs for EU residents
29
 – also 
expected to increase value through corporate social responsibility. 
2.2.4 Security of Supply Stream 
Predating liberalisation and decarbonisation objectives, an existing EU policy pillar 
was ensuring security of energy supply (Kanellakis et al., 2013). The Security of Supply 
stream focused on diminishing the harmful effects from difficulties in securing crude oil and 
petroleum products, for both energy and economic activity. The legislation was based on the 
premise of dwindling supplies of oil reserves coupled with a growing global consumption of 
oil, potentially leading to difficulties in maintaining the energy supply within Europe. Any 
difficulties in the energy supply can impact economic activity and the growth of the EU 
(Costantini et al., 2007). Such disruptions pose serious community-level risks to the EU; 
therefore legislation ensured that the EU was in a position to offset any harmful effects 
(Dorian et al., 2006). 
The legislation requires Member States to maintain minimum levels of crude oil 
reserves and petroleum products, determined by various levels of inland consumption 
(Kanellakis et al., 2013). The intention was to release strategic reserves of oil into the 
international market in the event of a supply disruption that required market level intervention 
to bridge the supply gap (DECC, 2013). Supply gaps could arise through a variety of 
situations, including, but not limited to, price developments in the commodity markets or 
disruptions in the supply of natural gas. Accordingly, the Member States are obliged to 
maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, distribute these stocks to 
users, impose restrictions on oil consumption and give priority of supplies to certain groups. 
The overall objective is to grant competent authorities necessary powers to partially regulate 
oil prices in order to prevent abnormal price rises.
31
 Even the slightest imbalance between 
supply and demand has profound impact on commodity prices, which can reduce real income 
for oil-importing regions and increase risk-premiums for commodity dependent companies 
(Costantini et al., 2007). Of this energy reserve, energy utility companies are also given high 
priority for the consumption of oil stock reserves. 
The second major objective of the Security of Supply stream is to reduce the overall 
financial burden of energy costs on the final consumer.
32
 Typically, this has involved 
establishing one Central Stockholding Entity per Member State, set up for the purpose of 
holding sufficient supplies of oil stocks.
32
 The purpose of the Central Stockholding Entity is 
                                                 
31
 Council Directive 73/238/EEC 
32
 Council Directive 2009/119/EC 
D.J. Tulloch© 
49 
to also allow fuel switching in the case of disruptions, using crude oil and petrol products in 
energy production.
32
 From 2004 and 2006, legislation
33
 also began to focus on maintaining 
the security of supply of natural gas and electricity. Specifically, there is an emphasis on 
minimum targets for storage of natural gas and establishing long-term supply contracts, which 
is connected to the Internal Energy Market legislation. For electricity, the legislation focused 
on maintaining adequate generation capacity, balance between supply and demand, and 
appropriate interconnections between Member States. The legislation also established bi-
lateral oil supply agreements between Member States to ensure backup oil reserves were 
available when needed as well as the Gas Coordination Group, which facilitated the security 
of supply of natural gas at the community level in the event of major supply disruptions. To 
ensure compliance with the Security of Supply objectives, the 2009 legislation
32
 established 
an additional consulting agency comprised of representatives from Member States: the 
‘Coordination Group’ for oil and petroleum products. 
Overall, the impact of the Security of Supply stream is expected to primarily impact 
the price of oil and petroleum. Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.3.2 discuss the expected impact of oil 
price risk on oil & gas and energy utility firms. However, if there is a direct long-term and 
persistent relationship between oil prices and energy utilities, then there is likely to be a shift 
in sector valuation based on the expected changes of future cash flows as a result of long-term 
oil price changes. This impact is in excess of any contemporaneous holdings of oil, as the 
impact affects future revenues rather than current asset holdings. There is also the potential 
that the Security of Supply stream has little- to no-significant impact on sector returns for two 
reasons (1) they only have an impact during times of stress in commodity markets (i.e. they 
tend to be legislations that provide power contingent on certain event and as such may not 
have cotemporaneous effects) and (2) policies in the field of Renewable Energies, Energy 
Efficiency, and the Internal Energy Market all implicitly aim at having more secure energy 
supplies and as such may proxy for the Security of Supply Stream  (Kanellakis et al., 2013). 
However, it is still worth examining legislations singularly focused on Security of Supply as 
they are an important pillar of EU-level energy policy. 
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction 3.1
The following literature review is relevant for Chapters 4 through to 6. The review 
will help position the empirical studies in the existing bodies of both energy economics and 
finance literature. This is important, as this chapter will show that the two seemingly related 
fields have begun to diverge in recent years, integrating different risk factors into the 
empirical analysis of stock returns. The finance literature in Section 3.2.2 is primarily 
concerned with identifying significant stock market risk factors, while the energy economics 
literature in Section 3.2.3 focuses on identifying significant impacts from macroeconomic 
variables. The purpose of the review is to outline the theoretical justification as to how these 
two bodies of literature can be reintegrated into a superior asset pricing model for the 
European energy utility sector, the desire for which arises from demand from energy 
economic authors such as El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Oberndorfer (2009a). The review also 
includes literature regarding time-varying risk premia, the impact of regulatory changes and 
abnormal returns surrounding regulatory events. The literature review proceeds as follows. 
Section 3.2 introduces asset pricing models implemented in the empirical analyses of 
this thesis, including the CAPM and four-factor model from finance literature and the 
augmented-CAPM from energy economics. Importantly, a summary of empirical results and 
estimated coefficients, for papers with comparable asset pricing models to this thesis, has 
been provided in Table 3.1. Section 3.3 includes theory and literature concerning the impact 
of regulatory changes on stock value, systematic risk and abnormal returns relevant to the four 
restructuring streams in Sections 2.2. Specifically, Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 outline the 
liberalisation and environmental policy literature, while Section 3.3.4 introduces theory and 
the empirical applications of inductive structural break tests. Finally, Section 3.3.5 outlines 
methodological issues and caveats to empirical analyses of energy utility sectors, including 
commodity hedging and fuel speculation. 
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TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
This table provides a summary of estimated coefficients from existing finance and energy economics literature. The following table lists the risk factor of interest, the model specification used and the estimated coefficient 





Positive Sector/Industry Est. 
Coef. 
Negative Sector/Industry No impact Sector/Industry 
Market CAPM 0.99 Fama and French (1995)
D Broad market (Big)  
    
 
Augmented CAPM 0.98 Fama and French (1995)
 D Broad market (Small)  
    
 
Four-Factor 0.98 Faff and Brailsford (1999) Oil & gas  
    
  
0.97 Fama and French (1993) D Broad market  
    
  
0.96 Fama and French (1997) D Energy  
    
  
0.90 Carhart (1997) Broad market  
    
  
0.90 El-Sharif et al. (2005)A,C Broad market  
    
  
0.88 Ramos and Veiga (2011) Oil & gas  
    
  
0.86 Koch and Bassen (2013) Electricity  
    
  
0.82 Arouri (2011)B Oil & gas  
    
  
0.82 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Oil & gas  
    
  
0.79 Fama and French (1997)D Utilities  
    
  
0.78 Oberndorfer (2009a) Electricity  
    
  
0.76 Nandha and Faff (2008)A Oil & gas  
    
  
0.71 Sadorsky (2001) Oil & gas  
    
  
0.69 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Utilities  
    
  
0.61 Arouri (2011) Broad market  
    
  
0.55 Nandha and Faff (2008)A Electricity  
    
 
  0.11 Boyer and Filion (2007) Oil & gas          
Oil Augmented CAPM 0.33 Boyer and Filion (2007) Oil & gas -0.09 Nandha and Faff (2008)
A Electricity Koch and Bassen (2013) Electricity 
  
0.31 Sadorsky (2001) Oil & gas -0.03 Oberndorfer (2009a) Electricity Arouri (2011)B Utilities 
  
0.23 Faff and Brailsford (1999) Oil & gas  
 
 
Elyasiani et al. (2011) Utilities 
  
0.18 Arouri (2011)B Oil & gas  
 
   
  
0.16 Manning (1991) Oil & gas  
    
  
0.15 Nandha and Faff (2008)A Oil & gas  
    
  
0.14 Ramos and Veiga (2011) Oil & gas  
    
  
0.12 El-Sharif et al. (2005)A,C Broad market  
    
  0.10 Oberndorfer (2009a) Oil & gas      
 
  0.05 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Oil & gas          
Coal Augmented CAPM      -0.01 Oberndorfer (2009a) Electricity Koch and Bassen (2013)
A Electricity 
Gas Augmented CAPM 0.09 Boyer and Filion (2007) Oil & gas  
  
Oberndorfer (2009a) Electricity 
 




Table 3.1 (continued) 
Risk Factor Specification(s) Est. 
Coef. 
Positive Sector/Industry Est. 
Coef. 
Negative Sector/Industry No impact Sector/Industry 
Term  Augmented CAPM 0.80 Fama and French (1993)
D Broad market -0.21 Sadorsky (2001) Oil & gas Oberndorfer (2009a) Electricity 
 
Four-Factor 0.19 El-Sharif et al. (2005)
A,C Broad market -0.03 Boyer and Filion (2007) Oil & gas 
  
  0.11 Ramos and Veiga (2011) Oil & gas      
Carbon Augmented CAPM 0.02 Oberndorfer (2009b) Electricity 0.05
E Koch and Bassen (2013)A Electricity   
Size  Four-Factor 0.90 Fama and French (1995)
D Broad market (Small) -0.35 Fama and French (1997)D Energy 
  
  
0.60 Fama and French (1993)D Broad market -0.20 Fama and French (1997)D Utilities 
  
  
0.57 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Oil & gas -0.11 Fama and French (1995)D Broad market (Big) 
  
  
0.23 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Utilities  
    
 
  0.22 Carhart (1997) Broad markets          
Value  Four-Factor 0.98 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Oil & gas -0.05 Carhart (1997) Broad market 
  
  
0.71 Elyasiani et al. (2011) Utilities  
    
  
0.38 Fama and French (1997)D Utilities  
    
  
0.31 Fama and French (1993)D Broad market  
    
  
0.26 Fama and French (1995)D Broad market (Small)  
    
  
0.25 Fama and French (1995)D Broad market (Big)  
    
 
  0.21 Fama and French (1997)
D Energy          
Momentum Four-Factor 0.07 Carhart (1997) Broad markets          
A Country-, Industry-,  Operation, or Time-specific. 
B Evidence of non-linearity or asymmetric shock. 
C Mean coefficient. 
D For the three- and four-factor models, this table reports the middle percentile portfolio across size, value and/or momentum premium. 
E Dependent variable is ‘cost of capital’ rather than stock returns, therefore carbon negatively impacts firms by making equity costly. 
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 Asset Pricing Models 3.2
This section begins by outlining the theoretical foundations for the Modern Portfolio 
Theory (Markowitz, 1952) and the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965) in Section 3.2.1. The 
theory is the foundation of asset pricing models in both energy economics and finance 
literature. Section 3.2.2 reviews empirical analyses from the finance literature, introducing 
stock market risk factors which produce the three- and four-factor models of Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997). Section 3.2.3 reviews empirical analyses from the energy 
economics literature, which concurrently extends the CAPM parallel to the finance literature, 
augmenting the CAPM with term structure and commodity risk factors. Section 3.2 is 
concluded by proposing the AFFM – a combination of both energy economics and finance 
literature. 
3.2.1 The Mean-Variance and Capital Asset Pricing Models 
The literature review begins with Markowitz (1952), who considers two prior rules of 
investment which were argued to explain investment behaviour: 1) investors maximise 
discounted expected, or anticipated, returns; and 2) investors consider expected return to be 
desirable, while variance of return is considered undesirable. The rules suggest that investors 
would show preference for maximising return and minimising risk (measured as variance of 
return). The rule suggests that investors would place all their funds in the security with the 
greatest discounted value, ignoring the possibility that a diversified portfolio could be 
preferable to a non-diversified portfolio (Markowitz, 1952). 
While the average return across securities can be calculated as the weighted sum of 
expected values, the weighted variance must be calculated differently, as the variance of 
securities within the same industry can be interrelated, exhibiting ‘covariance’, compared with 
firms across various industries (Markowitz, 1952). Accordingly, the investor has a choice of 
numerous combinations of expected returns (𝐸) and expected variance (𝑉) which is 
determined by their choice of securities and relative weighting invested in each. The investor 
will have a preference for all efficient combinations of E-V which produce minimum 𝑉 for a 
given 𝐸, or maximum 𝐸 for a given 𝑉, known as the mean-variance (E-V) principle 
(Markowitz, 1952, Lintner, 1965). The relationship between risk and return from Markowitz’s 
(1952) paper is the basis of Modern Portfolio Theory, the systematic risk literature and much 
of the asset pricing literature to date. 
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Building on Markowitz’ work, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) extend and develop a 
theoretical asset pricing model under the conditions of risk that includes market equilibrium,
34
 
the CAPM. The CAPM begins with a similar argument that a rational investor has a 
preference for expected returns and a preference against variance of returns, ceteris paribus 
(Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965). In equilibrium, a rational investor with a diversified portfolio is 
able to obtain higher expected rates of return by incurring additional risk along the capital 
market line. This occurs as the capital market presents two prices to an investor: the price of 
time, pure interest rate with minimum level of risk, and the price of risk, the additional 
expected return per unit of risk borne. 
Sharpe (1964) argues that a relatively simple formula can relate the expected return on 
an individual asset, 𝑖, to a combination of assets, 𝑚. The combination of assets, 𝑚, represents 
the market portfolio, expected to be mean-variance-efficient. In reality, asset 𝑖 will show a 
dispersion of observations around its mean – the approximate expected value of 𝑖. This 
dispersion, or variance, is evidence of the asset’s total risk, similar to Markowitz’s (1952) 
measure of risk. However, part of the dispersion is related to the underlying relationship 
between asset 𝑖 and combination 𝑚. This common component is termed systematic risk, while 
the remainder, the dispersion around the expected value, is the unsystematic component. 
Sharpe (1964) argues that the systematic risk component can be estimated using a linear 
regression. Specifically, the CAPM predicts that the expected excess return to asset i is 
linearly related to the risk of the asset in the portfolio of all marketable assets (the market 
portfolio): 
𝐸(?̃?𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(?̃?𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓], (3.1) 
where 𝑅𝑓 is the return on the risk-free asset (such as a treasury bill), 𝑎 is the intercept, 𝐸(?̃?𝑚) 
is the expected return on the value-weighted market portfolio and 𝛽𝑖 is the 𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑖, ?̃?𝑚)/
𝜎2(?̃?𝑚) which is interpreted as the risk of asset i relative to the risk of the market portfolio. 
The covariance of ?̃?𝑖 with ?̃?𝑚, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑚), measures the contribution of asset i to the 
variance of the return to the market portfolio, 𝜎2(?̃?𝑚) (Schwert, 1981). If portfolio risk is 
measured by the variance of the rate of return, 𝛽𝑖 is a standardised measure of marginal risk. 
Therefore, only the differences among the equilibrium expected returns to assets are 
attributable to differences in systematic risk (Schwert, 1981). If the systematic component 
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explains average returns, the intercept of the CAPM should be indistinguisible from zero 
(Fama and French, 1998). 
Naturally, assets which are more sensitive to market movements have a higher market 
beta and higher expected returns, whereas assets with lower sensitivity are defensive and have 
lower returns. Given the ability to diversify across multiple assets, and avoid the unsystematic 
component of risk, rational investors are only expected to be compensated for the systematic 
component of total risk. The CAPM theory does not make predictions regarding the parameter 
values, but only about the form (linear) of the cross-sectional relationship. Thus, widely-used 
portfolio grouping procedures can still support the CAPM theory even when it is false; a 
random grouping of stocks can cancel out individual asset deviations, thus can still produce a 
spurious return/beta linearity relation (Roll, 1977). While Sharpe’s (1964) CAPM is 
theoretical, real-world data show that this underlying relationship exists. For instance, using 
data from Section 4.2.3 of this thesis, Figure 3.1 shows a linear relationship between excess 
returns in the European energy utility sector and a market portfolio of assets. Yet, the 
deviation between the expected return and the observed return suggests that the CAPM cannot 
explain all variance of returns. As shown in Table 3.1, the impact of the market on returns is 
often the greatest and consistently positive for oil & gas and energy utility firms, with papers 
finding statistically significant and positive coefficients which typically ranged from 0.99 to 
0.11, skewed towards the larger coefficients. No paper found a negative impact or no impact 
from broad market returns. The relationship with broad market returns, even in the context of 
identifying additional risk premia, is routinely found to affect returns across all sectors. The 
expectation for this thesis is that the European energy utility sector will have a significant, 
positive estimated coefficient with the market factor, but will rank among the most defensive 
sector investments with a beta less than unity. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY UTILITIES AND A MARKET PORTFOLIO 
Using daily data from Section 4.2.3, this figure illustrates a simple two-way scatter between excess returns on the European 
































Having established the theoretical foundations, the literature relevant to this thesis 
begins to diverge into two streams: the energy economics and the finance literatures. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show that there can be a reintegration between the two, and that a 
synergistic combination of the propositions from both streams of the literature can create an 
asset pricing model which is superior at explaining returns in the energy sector compared with 
either body of literature in isolation. 
First, Section 3.2.2 reviews the finance literature, which argues that the CAPM has 
insufficient power to capture all systematic risk elements and that additional stock market risk 
factors help explain a greater cross-section of return. Second, Section 3.2.2, addresses the 
energy economics literature, which augments the CAPM to include commodity risk factors 
which are argued to explain a greater cross-section of returns in energy stocks or commodity-
related industries. The augmented CAPM is the basis of the asset pricing models utilised by 
Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013) to examine returns for European energy 
utilities. The lack of stock market risk factors in the energy economics literature implies that 
the latter two papers also suffer from the CAPM’s deficiencies. One contribution of this thesis 
is the inclusion of the stock market risk factors in asset pricing for European energy utilities. 
3.2.2 Fama & French’s and Carhart’s Factor Models 
The finance literature extends the CAPM to develop an asset pricing models which 
can explain a greater proportion of shared stock market variation. The need for such asset 
pricing models arises from evidence that the cross-section of average returns in U.S. stocks 
shows little relation with market beta (𝛽), a key proposition of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965). As markets are assumed to be efficient, there should be few factors which can explain 
returns beyond the systematic market factor. Some academics question assumptions of market 
efficiency based on evidence of patterns in average returns which are not explained by the 
CAPM. These patterns in average returns – called market anomalies – may represent evidence 
of market inefficiency. 
Throughout the finance literature, a common criticism of the results is the apparent 
lack of theoretical justification for the seemingly arbitrary indicator variables found to affect 
stock returns (Fama and French, 1995). Regardless of whether the variables themselves 
represent economic relationships, or proxy for latent variables, they are consistently found to 
explain a significant proportion of stock returns. The finance literature has since attempted to 
begin filling this economic void by examining whether there is a rational explanation for the 
incorporation of these additional risk factors into asset pricing models, and whether they 
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proxy for a latent variable. The following sections outline the most influential asset pricing 
models in finance to date, the three- and four-factor models. 
An early paper regarding market inefficiency is De Bondt and Thaler (1985). De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that research in psychology suggests that individuals overreact 
to information, especially unexpected and dramatic news events. This argument was critically 
received by financial economists, who regard anomalies as statistical artefacts or 
misspecification of the CAPM. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) test a simple proposition: if 
prices systematically overshoot fundamentals, then their reversal and price corrections in the 
opposite direction should be predictable from past return data alone. Their results show clear 
evidence of an asymmetric reversal effect, with loser portfolios outperforming the market by 
an average of 19.6%, and winner portfolios earning 5% less than the market. Further, the 
average market betas of the winner portfolios were larger than the loser portfolios, suggesting 
that the loser portfolios are less risky. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) show consistencies with 
overreaction and violation of weak form efficiency. Importantly, their results suggest that 
these risk factors were not statistical artefacts or misspecification and may have a key role in 
explaining average equity returns. The finance literature began exploring the existence of such 
factors. 
The following sections, Sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2, represent important milestones in 
the finance literature, examining the impact of firm size and book-to-market ratio to explain 
average stock returns. The most important finance papers with regard to this thesis are Fama 
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), producing the three- and four-factor asset pricing 
models (see Sections 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4, respectively). 
3.2.2.1 Size risk factor 
Banz (1981) continues the CAPM literature by examining the existence of a firm ‘size 
effect’ in stock returns, measured as the relationship between a firm’s total market value of 
common equity stock and equity returns. The results show that the common stocks of small 
firms have, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns of approximately 0.4% per month 
compared with large firms. The significant effect was found to persist between 1936 and 1975 
with varying stability, suggesting that the traditional CAPM is misspecified. Chan et al. 
(1985) build on Banz (1981) to provide evidence as to why firm size represents a significant 
risk factor in returns using a multi-factor asset pricing model. Chan et al. (1985) also find 
evidence of the CAPM’s misspecification. Chan et al. (1985) create 20 portfolios based on 
firm size and implement cross-sectional regressions on a month-by-month basis. Results show 
that the returns of smaller firms exceed larger firms by a difference of 0.956% per month, 
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approximately 11.5% annually. Chan et al. (1985) find that small firms are more exposed to 
production risk and changes in risk premia. Further analysis shows that the market component 
has a greater impact on returns than other variables. Chan et al. (1985) conclude that smaller 
firms are riskier than larger firms due to greater fluctuation with economic expansion and 
contractions. Further, Kumar (2009) argues that small firms are typically more difficult to 
value, or may be informationally sparse which biases value. Overall, the higher average 
returns of smaller firms are justified by the additional risk exposure in efficient markets. 
Chan and Chen (1991) extend the literature on firm size to further understand why 
small capitalisation stocks earn higher mean returns than large-capitalisation stocks. The size 
of the firm does not necessarily imply higher risk and the difference in market capitalisation 
does not explain why firms of various sizes have different responses to economic news. Chan 
and Chen (1991) suggest that the small firm portfolios are more likely to contain ‘marginal 
firms’ which have lost market value due to poor performance, are inefficient and are likely to 
have high leverage and cash flow problems. The expectation is that these marginal firms in a 
competitive economy, with ongoing technological changes, will decrease in relative size and 
therefore fall from larger size-based portfolios into smaller portfolios. Chan and Chen’s 
(1991) analysis included the typical approach of sorting the firms into portfolios based on 
size. Importantly, the descriptive results of Chan and Chen (1991) showed that 66% of the 
bottom quintile was comprised of firms that had fallen from higher quintiles over the past 10 
years, compared with only 14% being directly listed in the bottom quintile. The interpretation 
is that the bottom quintile captures firms which have not been performing well over recent 
periods. Moreover, of firms that are forced to cut dividends, suggesting poor performance or 
an uncertain future, over 50% were also allocated in the bottom quintile. Also, firms in the 
bottom quintile have greater leverage. The results of Chan and Chen (1991) were clear: 
smaller firms have higher average monthly returns, higher leverage betas and higher dividend 
betas compared with larger firms. After capturing leverage and size effects, the market betas 
of the portfolios were indistinguishable from unity, evidence that market beta affects all firms 
but the differential responses of small and large firms can be captured by additional risk 
factors. 
3.2.2.2 Book-to-market risk factor 
Independent to the size-effect literature, Rosenberg et al. (1985) question market 
efficiency from a practical perspective. Rosenberg et al. (1985) report statistically significant 
abnormal performance of straightforward investment strategies. One strategy, originally 
known as ‘book/price’, focuses on purchasing stocks with a high ratio of book value of 
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common equity (per share) to market price (per share) and selling stocks with low book/price 
ratios. The justification for examining the book/price ratio is based on prior evidence of 
significance when testing the earnings/price ratio. However, extensive quantitative research 
on desirable anomalies, such as the earnings/price ratio, may now result in the ratios’ 
incorporation into asset prices, reducing the usefulness of the prior market anomaly 
(Rosenberg et al., 1985). The lack of prior research on book/price ratio suggests that the ratio 
may serve as an unspoiled instrument. The results show strong and significant performance 
for the book/price strategy, generating an average abnormal return of 36 basis points per 
month. After trading costs, the book/price ratio would remain profitable as portfolio turnover 
is expected to be less than 5% per month. Rosenberg et al. (1985) conclude, specific to their 
universe of companies and time period, that the success of the ratio suggests actual market 
prices were inefficient and potential profits could be made. The book/price ratio identified in 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) was the precursor to the modern book-to-market ratio, which became 
widely accepted and tested, as it was a simple method of demonstrating market inefficiency in 
the U.S. stock market. 
Chan et al. (1991) extend the research on the book-to-market ratio, exploring the 
cross-sectional predictability of equity returns in the Japanese and U.S. equity markets. The 
variables tested include earning yields, cash flow yield, firm size (measured as market 
capitalisation of equity) and book-to-market ratio. The results showed that the book-to-market 
ratio and cash flow yield had a reliable and positive impact on expected returns, while the 
impact of size was highly dependent on the model specification and time period. Across all 
variables, the book-to-market ratio was the most economically significant.  
The following sections outline the three- and four-factor models, which are 
implemented in the portfolio construction and analysis sections of this thesis (see Sections 
4.2.4 and 5.3.3). 
3.2.2.3 The three-factor model 
Fama and French (1992) also build on previous literature to evaluate the role of 
various fundamentals on the cross-section of average returns on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks between 1963 and 1990. Variables included market beta, firm size, 
earnings/price ratio, market value of equity, leverage ratios and book-to-market ratios. Fama 
and French (1992) find a lack of support for the central prediction of the CAPM, namely, that 
the average stock returns are positively related to market beta. Instead, results show that stock 
risks are multidimensional, with size and book-to-market ratios representing additional 
dimensions of risk which explain cross-sectional stock returns. 
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Fama and French (1993) extend Fama and French (1992) by expanding the set of asset 
returns to be explained, expanding the set of variables used to explain asset returns and 
adopting a different approach to testing asset pricing. The method implemented uses a time-
series approach on stocks and bonds regressed against a market portfolio of stocks and 
mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity (BE/ME) and term structure risk factors 
– with the latter expected to affect bond portfolios. As this thesis follows the research method 
extensively, a detailed explanation, the justification and rationale for this approach is provided 
in Section 4.2.4. 
Fama and French (1993) construct a 5 × 5 matrix of firms, grouped into portfolios 
based on 5 quintiles of firm size and 5 quintiles of BE/ME values. These 25 portfolios are 
used as dependent variables of the regression models. Each of the dependent variable 
portfolios are regressed against a proxy for the market factor,
35
 a size premium and a value 
premium. The size premium captures the return spread between small and big stocks, while 
the value premium captures the return spread between high-BE/ME and low-BE/ME stocks. 
Fama and French (1993) find that both the CAPM and the three-factor model are able to 
explain excess returns in equity stocks. This is due to both models containing the market 
factor, which is a value-weighted combination of returns on all stocks. The CAPM is 
proficient at explaining returns for big stocks as their market capitalisation dominates total 
market value. However, the CAPM produced various betas and regression fits for the small 
and high-BE/ME portfolios. Within the paper, Fama and French (1993) also hypothesise that 
if there are multiple common factors in stock returns, then they are buried within the market 
factor and need to be drawn out. The results showed that including the size and value premia 
increased explanatory power for the small and high-BE/ME stocks, and the market betas of all 
25 portfolios tested collapsed towards unity – implying that the market factor previously 
absorbed size and value premia. To test this proposition, they independently regress the 
market factor against the size and value premia, along with bond market factors. Results show 
that the size and value premia capture some variation in the return of the market factor, 
producing an 𝑅2 of 0.38, confirming that size and value premia are priced into the market 
factor and must be drawn out independently. 
The main results of Fama and French (1993) are clear: the CAPM cannot explain a 
cross-section of returns, as the market factor is weighted towards big firms. When using a 
time-series regression, the size and value premia capture strong common variation in equity 
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returns which are ordinarily obscured within the market factor. However, size and value 
premia in isolation are insufficient at explaining returns and must be modelled in conjunction 
with the market factor. The estimated coefficients for size and value premia can be used to 
calculate the spread in expected returns for firms of different size or book-to-market ratio. The 
predicted spread in average returns based on size shows that small firms outperform big firms 
by 0.46% per month, while the predicted spread based on book-to-market ratio shows that 
high-BE/ME stocks outperform low-BE/ME stocks by approximately 0.40% per month. 
Including all three risk factors also produces insignificant intercepts in the majority of cases, 
indicating that the risk factors absorb common time-series variations in returns and are good 
at explaining the cross-section of average returns. 
Further, Fama and French (1993) test whether bond market risk factors help explain 
average stock returns. The inclusion of both term premium and default risk have a positive 
impact on equity returns with estimated coefficients of 0.8, but the expected term premium 
varies through time with business conditions. The energy economics literature in Table 3.1 
and Section 3.2.3 also find varying impacts from term premium, with positive (El-Sharif et 
al., 2005, Ramos and Veiga, 2011), negative (Sadorsky, 2001, Boyer and Filion, 2007) or no 
impact on equity returns (Oberndorfer, 2009a). As the average return on term premium is 
small, Fama and French (1993) show that term premium is often significant in isolation but it 
explains very little of average stock returns when competing against stock market risk factors; 
the estimated coefficients often become insignificant. Fama and French (1993) conclude that 
the three stock market risk factors (market factor, size and value premia) are suitable for 
explaining average equity returns. The most striking feature of the paper is that a simple 
sorting of firms into portfolio based on similarity of characteristics can explain a large 
proportion of common returns. Naturally, the lack of economic rationale for the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model has led to a wealth of scepticism, which Fama and French 
have attempted to address in subsequent papers. 
Fama and French (1995) examine whether size and book-to-market proxy for 
behaviour of firm earnings. Their results show that firms with persistently low earnings on 
assets, at least five years before and five years after portfolio formation, tended to have high-
BE/ME ratios and positive 𝐻𝑀𝐿 slopes. In contrast, strong firms with persistently high 
earnings tended to have low-BE/ME and negative 𝐻𝑀𝐿 slopes. These results are similar to 
Chan and Chen (1991), where firm distress is not captured by market return and is 
compensated in average returns. Controlling for BE/ME ratio, firm size is also related to 
profitability of firms, with small firms tending to have lower earnings on assets than big firms. 
Interestingly, Fama and French (1995) find that small firms did not participate in the boom in 
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the middle to late 1980s, but instead suffered a prolonged earnings depression, suggesting that 
the size premium may vary across time. 
Fama and French (1996) also attempt to address criticisms that portfolios formed on 
other factors, such as earnings/price, cash flow/price, sales growth and long-term past returns, 
may uncover additional dimensions of risk. Results show that the three-factor model explains 
strong patterns in returns for portfolios formed on earnings/price ratios, cash flow/price ratios 
and sales growth. Fama and French (1996) argue that many of the average-return anomalies 
are related, and therefore can be captured by the three-factor model.  
Fama and French (1997) also examine estimated cost of capital at the industry-level 
using the CAPM and the three-factor model, providing a method of implementing the CAPM 
and three-factor model at industry-level.
36
 Their results make two contributions. First, Fama 
and French (1997) find that local versions of the three-factor model typically have greater 
explanatory power than global models. Further, they implement rolling regressions which 
show that true slopes of the risk factors change through time. This has importance in the 
context of this thesis, as it may help explain evolving returns through time as a result of inter-
temporal risk factors or the effect of regulatory changes. The stability of the relationship 
between returns and risk factors is empirically addressed in the inter-temporal analysis, 
Sections 4.3.2.2, 5.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.3 of the thesis. 
Finally, Fama and French (1998) also examine international evidence for the existence 
of the value premium in the U.S. and 12 additional countries from Europe, Australia and the 
Far East. Fama and French (1998) find that value firms (high-BE/ME) typically outperform 
growth firms (low-BE/ME) by 7.68% per annum on global portfolios. Since the value 
premium can be found out-of-sample, relative to U.S. tests, the results lend credibility to the 
argument that the additional return premium for value stocks is real (Fama and French, 1998). 
3.2.2.4 The four-factor model 
Simultaneous to the three-factor model, academics began to examine the impact of 
persistence of earnings and its role in asset returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine the 
efficiency of the stock market and profitability of various trading strategies. Similar to De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), they assume that such strategies can only be profitable if stock 
prices over- or under-react to information. The theory is extended by suggesting that there can 
be persistence to returns, in which past winners (losers) achieve positive (negative) returns in 
the future. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) form a variety of portfolios based on past returns and 
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hold the assets for various time horizons. The results show that buying past winners and 
selling past losers realises significant abnormal returns of 12.01% per year, between 1965 and 
1989. The evidence suggests that this profitability is not due to systematic elements nor lead-
lag effects from delayed stock price reactions, but rather is due to the relative strengths of 
winners and losers. 
Carhart (1997) examines the impact of persistence of earnings in mutual fund 
performance. Carhart (1997) incorporates Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) momentum variable 
into Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model, producing the four-factor model 
specification. Momentum premium
37
 is calculated as the difference between the returns on 
upper and down momentum stocks. Importantly, Carhart (1997) controls for survivorship 
bias,
38
 as about one-third of the sample cease operations. Results show that buying winners 
and selling losers yields a return of 8% per annum. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) also 
provide empirical evidence examining the impact of momentum on abnormal returns, finding 
that momentum can contribute up to 12% per annum over an intermediate horizon, dissipating 
between 12 and 24 months. Both of these results echo Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The 
importance of these papers is that the momentum strategy can be incorporated into the three-
factor model, producing a superior four-factor model of market equilibrium. 
In a more recent paper, Fama and French (2012) incorporate Carhart’s (1997) 
momentum risk factor to examine local versions of the four-factor model, where the 
mimicking portfolios are formed on a regional basis across 23 countries in North America, 
Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific. The motivation is that when securities are from the same 
region, the asset pricing regressions should typically have greater power, as the regression fits 
are tight, resulting in higher 𝑅2 values. Most regions, except Japan, exhibited strong 
momentum effects which result in difficulty capturing average returns. This finding may be 
present in the European energy utility sector, where regulatory changes are expected to 
persistently benefit or hinder firm performance. By including a momentum risk factor, the 
asset pricing model controls for possible momentum effects. Fama and French’s (2012) 
results show that value premium (𝐻𝑀𝐿) was larger for small stocks and the momentum 
spread (𝑈𝑀𝐷) decreases from smaller to big stocks. Furthermore, the results show that local 
models have greater power than global models – therefore, ideally stock market risk factors 
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should be calculated on a local basis. This thesis extends this proposition in Chapter 5, 
calculating stock market risk factors on a sectoral basis, as the characteristics of the energy 
sector are likely to be different to other European sectors. 
3.2.2.5 Concluding reflections on the finance literature 
To summarise, the market factor of the CAPM is insufficient to explain stock returns 
across a diverse set of stocks. The finance literature provides clear evidence that additional 
stock market risk factors, such as size, value (book-to-market) and momentum premia, help 
explain average returns across industries and countries. The need to incorporate these risk 
factors into the energy economics literature has been identified. As stated in Section 1.5.1, the 
reliance on outdated asset pricing models was highlighted by El-Sharif et al. (2005), while the 
desire to incorporate standard finance risk factors was suggested by Oberndorfer (2009a). 
However, these factors have still not been incorporated into European energy utility asset 
pricing models to date. Elyasiani et al. (2011) has taken steps to address this issue for the U.S. 
oil & gas industry, incorporating Fama and French’s (1993) size and value premia but has 
failed to address Carhart’s (1997) momentum premium. However, this again fails to 
acknowledge that the energy utility sector has distinct differences to the oil & gas sector. The 
latest contribution for European energy utilities, namely Koch and Bassen (2013), failed to 
address this research niche. This thesis addresses this gap by producing an asset pricing model 
which reintegrates the two bodies of literature leading to the AFFM. The following section 
outlines the development of the augmented-CAPM which is typically implemented in the 
energy economics literature. 
3.2.3 Augmented-CAPM from Energy Economics 
In a closely related field to the finance literature, the energy economics literature also 
developed various asset pricing models from the existing CAPM. As noted in Section 3.2.2, 
the finance literature is primarily concerned with searching for market anomalies which 
explain average returns across a diverse range of stocks. In contrast, the energy economics 
literature has focused on identifying macroeconomic variables which were argued to be 
systematically priced into stocks (Chen et al., 1986). While the two bodies of literature 
evolved simultaneously, they had already diverged into two distinct fields prior to establishing 
the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). Combined with the macroeconomic focus, 
this may explain why the two bodies of literature are rarely reintegrated and the stock market 
risk factors are largely ignored in the energy economics literature. 
Common extensions of the CAPM implemented in the energy economics literature 
include term premium and commodities as risk factors which are thought to affect stock 
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returns. Most energy economics research which examines the relationships between financial 
markets and commodities, primarily oil prices, can typically be separated into three themes: 
the impact of commodity risk exposure on 1) broad market returns (Chen et al., 1986, Jones 
and Kaul, 1996, Park and Ratti, 2008, Cunado and Perez de Gracia, 2014, Narayan and Gupta, 
2015), 2) multiple sectors and industries (Huang et al., 1996, Faff and Brailsford, 1999, 
Nandha and Faff, 2008, Arouri, 2011), or 3) the oil & gas sector (Manning, 1991, Sadorsky, 
2001, El-Sharif et al., 2005, Ramos and Veiga, 2011, Elyasiani et al., 2011). 
With respect to the last two categories of studies, it is evident that the majority of the 
literature includes energy utilities as a subset of the oil & gas sector. Alternatively, the energy 
utility sector is argued to be non-competitive and to have natural monopolies (see Megginson 
et al., 1994; Newbery and Pollitt, 1997), which must undoubtedly bias financial return and 
valuation pre-liberalisation. Thus, very few papers consider energy utilities as a separate 
sector when estimating commodity risk exposure. The literature has tended to assume that the 
results for the oil & gas sector hold for energy utilities. This assumption is held for various 
reasons. First, the two sectors are associated with the same commodities (crude oil and natural 
gas). Second, the input and outputs of the sectors are homogenous and traded on international 
exchanges (Oberndorfer, 2009a). Third, both sectors have high capital intensity, involving 
large sunk costs and long-term investments (Sadorsky, 2001). Given the limited number of 
prior contributions on the asset pricing of European energy utilities in isolation (Oberndorfer, 
2009a, Koch and Bassen, 2013), this literature review juxtaposes these studies with similar 
studies on the asset pricing of the oil & gas sector, where there has been considerably more 
work. Notwithstanding this, a conclusion of this chapter is that the sectors should be analysed 
independently. As noted, a summary of empirical results and estimated coefficients from the 
energy economics literature is also provided in Table 3.1. 
In reviewing the literature on asset pricing of the oil & gas and energy utility sectors, it 
is important to note from the outset that the impact of commodity risk exposure will be 
affected by regulations, market power, the ability to pass on commodity price sensitivities to 
customers and effective hedging strategies. For instance, Nwaeze (2000) argues that 
deregulation of utilities exposes them to greater systematic risk and commodity risk. 
Oberndorfer (2009a) also argues that energy utilities are expected to exhibit non-negligible 
market power, while electricity consumption is considered relatively inelastic; therefore, it is 
unclear whether changes in energy prices could be immediately and fully passed on to 
consumers. As the energy sector has been subjected to multiple liberalisation legislative 
efforts since 1996 (see Section 2.2.1), the impact of deregulation and the ability to pass on 
costs to end consumers may not be stable across time. Further, Security of Supply legislation 
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discussed in Section 2.2.4 may also alter the long-term relationship between oil price risk and 
average sector returns. 
Further, effective hedging strategies and, if present, the ability to pass on costs to end 
consumers will bias results against significance (Faff and Brailsford, 1999). Similar to the oil 
& gas sector, European energy utilities are large consumers of fossil fuels, including natural 
gas, coal and, to a lesser extent, oil. In particular, natural gas utilities, like many other 
petroleum product companies, are price takers of commodities (El-Sharif et al., 2005). The 
same may be true for European energy utilities, which may hedge to satisfy endogenous 
acceptable levels of risk taking. If hedging is widespread in the energy sector, then the 
literature would suggest that results will be biased against significance or the impact will be 
small. Hedging (and speculation) will be discussed in Section 3.3.5.2. Regardless of hedging 
strategies, the ability to detect oil or commodity price risk suggests that firms have not 
realised the full benefits of energy risk management and production hedging. 
3.2.3.1 Risk factors in broad market returns 
Using multivariate Vector Autoregression (VAR), Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity models (GARCH) and linear regressions, researchers have 
attempted to examine whether an oil risk premium exists in broad market returns. The 
rationale is that changing oil and gas prices should be incorporated into firm valuation 
(Oberndorfer, 2009a). If commodities are used as inputs to operations, an increase (decrease) 
in commodity prices will cause expected earnings to decline (increase), therefore decreasing 
(increasing) stock prices if the market efficiently capitalises the cash flow implications of the 
commodity price change (Faff and Brailsford, 1999). Similarly, if industries’ output is 
benchmarked against commodity prices, or energy generators and gas producers are holding 
large quantities of fuels benchmarked against oil, then market efficiency would suggest that 
an increase (decrease) in the commodity price will increase (decrease) firm valuation as each 
market quickly reacts to information shocks in the other markets (Huang et al., 1996). Such 
propositions are the basis of the oil price risk literature. 
Jones and Kaul (1996) examine the relationship of oil risk premium on stock returns in 
the U.S., Canada, Japan and the UK using quarterly data between 1947 and 1991. Results 
show that 1) oil shocks have a detrimental impact on the real stock returns, 2) the reaction of 
U.S. and Canadian stock is rational and can be completely accounted for by oil’s impact on 
real cash flows and 3) Japan and the UK overreact to oil price shocks. Sadorsky (1999) also 
finds that oil price changes and volatility have a significantly negative impact on real stock 
returns, with asymmetry between positive and negative shocks. Further, Park and Ratti (2008) 
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find that oil has a significantly negative impact on stock returns of the U.S. and 10 European 
countries. The impact occurs instantaneously in the same month or within one month, with the 
results being robust to varying VAR specifications. Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2014) also 
find that oil price changes have a significant and negative impact on stock market returns for 
most European countries. Narayan and Gupta (2015) find that both positive and negative oil 
price changes impact U.S. stock returns, with the negative changes being relatively more 
important. Further, Narayan and Gupta (2015) show that a long-run relationship between U.S. 
stock returns and oil prices has existed for the past 150 years. The results show support for an 
impact of oil price rises on broad market returns. 
In contrast, other researchers have also found insignificant oil risk premium in broad 
market returns. Chen et al. (1986) examine to what extent macroeconomic variables 
systematically affect U.S. stock market returns between 1958 and 1984. Chen et al. (1986) 
find that oil betas were mostly insignificant when compared with common risk factors, but 
their inclusion reduces the significance of other variables, suggesting oil has some minor 
effect on stock returns. Insignificant oil risk premia is also found by Huang et al. (1996), 
finding no relationship between daily oil futures returns and broad stock returns between 1979 
and 1990, including contemporaneous returns. However, the results show that oil price risk 
does impact petroleum and some oil company returns, suggesting a sector-specific effect. The 
likely candidate for the lack of consistency across papers is the fact that the empirical analysis 
was implemented at the market level. In reality, firms are likely to have differential impacts to 
oil price risk, particularly if the industry uses oil as an input or an output benchmark. A 
common practice in the finance literature is to perform empirical analysis on portfolios of 
firms based on similarity of characteristics. 
From a finance perspective, Faff and Brailsford (1999) respond by examining the 
sensitivity of various Australian industry returns to broad market returns and oil price 
changes, using monthly data between 1983 and 1996. They argue that industries are not 
homogenous and that different risk factors will impact industry returns uniquely. In particular, 
they predict negative oil price sensitivities will be greater for industries with a relatively high 
proportion of their costs devoted to oil-based inputs. The results showed that industries where 
the outputs are oil, or oil by-products, have positive sensitivities to oil price changes, while 
fuel-intensive industries show negative sensitivities. In the context of this thesis, Faff and 
Brailsford (1999) represents an important inter-sectoral analysis of commodity risk exposure, 
against which many of Chapter 4’s results are benchmarked. The heterogeneous impact of oil 
across industries has also been documented by Elyasiani et al. (2011), who found that oil 
futures return distributions constitute a systematic risk factor at the industry level in nine out 
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of 13 industries. Interestingly, oil-using industries were more likely to be impacted by 
changes in the volatility of oil returns than the oil returns themselves. 
3.2.3.2 Risk factors for oil-related industries 
Concurrent with the oil and market return literature, other researchers have examined 
the oil sensitivity of oil-related industries in isolation. Manning (1991) investigates the 
interaction between UK oil company share prices and the spot price of Brent Crude oil using 
weekly data between 1986 and 1988. Using cointegration and error-correction models, 
Manning (1991) found that UK oil-industry returns have positive sensitivities to unanticipated 
oil price shocks, with the sensitivity being higher for exploration companies and lower for 
integrated firms. Results are similar to those found by Elyasiani et al. (2011). These findings 
suggest that oil risk exposure, and more generally commodity risk exposure, not only differs 
across industries but also within industries (based on operational differences). Moreover, 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) also find evidence that vertical integration may protect utilities from 
unexpected fluctuations in commodity, wholesale and end-user prices, discussed shortly in 
Section 3.3.2. Such a finding is important to European energy utilities as regulatory reforms 
published in 2003 sought to unbundle vertically integrated firms to counteract market 
dominance (see Section 2.2.1). 
Sadorsky’s (2001) paper forms the basis of much of the energy economics literature 
relating to the oil & gas and the utility sectors to date. Sadorsky (2001) examines several risk 
premia in the stock returns of Canadian oil & gas companies, including: crude oil prices, 
broad market returns, exchange rate and short-term interest rate (term) premia (see Table 3.1). 
Exchange rate was included to account for changes in Canada’s currency against global oil 
prices, while term premium was included to control for borrowing costs. Sadorsky’s (2001) 
results show that market returns, oil prices and exchange- and interest-rates all have large and 
significant impacts on stock returns for the Canadian oil & gas sector. Sadorsky (2001) finds a 
positive impact for the market factor and oil returns, and a negative impact for exchange rate 
and term premium. The Canadian oil & gas sector also has a beta less than unity, being less 
risky than the market and moved pro-cyclically. 
Term premium has grown in popularity in the energy economics asset pricing models 
as a risk factor expected to affect stock returns. Term premium is calculated as the spread 
between the yields of a three- and one-month treasury bill. Term premium represents the risk-
free short-term discount rate and an indicator of the present state of the economy, which tends 
to be lower during economic downturn and higher in times of growth (Sadorsky, 2001). 
Unanticipated changes in the riskless interest rate are argued to influence the time value of 
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future cash flows, which in turn affects returns and pricing of an asset (Chen et al., 1986). 
Changes in interest rates also affect the prices charged for credit, a major influence on the 
level of corporate profit, which affects equity valuation. Moreover, changes in the cost of 
carrying margin debt influences the desire and ability for investors to speculate, dampening 
stock returns (Sadorsky, 1999). As noted in Section 3.2.2.3 and Table 3.1, the significance of 
the term premium is highly variable. The inclusion of term premium was addressed in Fama 
and French (1993), who found that its significance decreased when competing against stock 
market risk factors. It is possible that the significant term premium in the energy economics 
literature will disappear when competing against stock market risk factors. 
Continuing the energy economics literature, El-Sharif et al. (2005) extend Sadorsky’s 
(2001) research method, examining the relationship between the price of crude oil and equity 
values in the UK oil & gas sector. The analysis is performed inter-temporally, in six month 
intervals, and inter-sectorally across four additional sectors to identify whether risk factors 
evolve through time and whether they reflect market-wide or sector-specific concerns. El-
Sharif et al.’s (2005) results showed that UK oil & gas stock returns are impacted by several 
risk factors across time, including: crude oil prices, broad market returns, exchange rate and 
short-term interest rate (term) premia. Their results are similar to Faff and Brailsford (1999) 
and Sadorsky (2001), with the exception of term premium. El-Sharif et al. (2005) finds that 
term premium was mostly insignificant and negative, contrasting Sadorsky’s (2001) positive 
relationship. El-Sharif et al.’s (2005) results also indicate that the relationship between oil 
price and non–oil & gas sectors is weak, similar to Huang et al. (1996). Moreover, the 
relationship among oil & gas sector returns and risk factors varies over time and across 
sectors, with the cross-sectional impact being similar to Faff and Brailsford’s (1999) results. 
El-Sharif et al. (2005) argue that these difference suggest a lack of inter-temporal and trans-
national generalisability of results. 
Boyer and Filion (2007) also build on Sadorsky (2001), by including natural gas prices 
as an explanatory variable
39
 in explaining Canadian oil & gas sector returns between 1995 and 
2002. The sample is divided into producer or integrated oil & gas companies using dummy 
variables. Results show that broad market, oil and gas returns all have a positive impact on oil 
& gas sector returns, while exchange rate and interest rate have a negative impact. 
Fundamentally, their results are similar to Sadorsky (2001). Boyer and Filion (2007) also find 
                                                 
39
Boyer and Filion (2007) also control for an additional five fundamental risk factors related to oil & gas firm 
operations in excess of those specified by other authors, including variation in drilling success, variation in cash 
flows, variation in proven reserves, variation in production volume and variation in debt. These factors rarely 
appear in current literature and are specific to analysis for the oil & gas sector. 
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various sensitivities to risk factors across time, depending on whether the firm was an oil or 
gas company. This suggests that returns for the energy utilities sector differ from the oil & gas 
sector, and may also differ across energy utility operations. Boyer and Filion (2007) find the 
oil price risk to be greater than market risk, which contrasts with previous literature. 
Ramos and Veiga (2011) analyse the risk factors of the oil & gas sector in 34 
countries, but extend the analysis by including additional factors related to oil production. 
Results found evidence that oil price is globally incorporated into sector returns, with a 
stronger impact in developed countries. The results show that oil industry stock returns 
respond asymmetrically to oil price hikes and declines. Further, while the oil & gas sector 
showed exposure to broad market returns, local markets have greater explanatory power – 
consistent with the lack of inter-temporal and trans-national generalisability found by El-
Sharif et al. (2005). 
3.2.3.3 The returns of European energy utilities 
Given that commodity risk premia are shown to vary across countries and sectors, it is 
surprising that there is relatively little literature which focuses on asset pricing of European 
energy utilities in isolation. This is especially true since the restructuring of the European 
energy utility sector represents one of the most extensive cross-border reforms of any energy 
network globally (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005) and has received considerable political and media 
attention (see Section 1.2 and Chapter 2 more generally). The following paragraphs explain 
the differences between the oil & gas sector and the energy utility sector. The major 
differences between the sectors may affect stock returns, and therefore demands that they be 
examined independently. 
The primary difference between the oil & gas sector and the energy utility sector is the 
independent regulatory environments of the two sectors. Further, the energy sector is 
comprised of both the electricity and natural gas industries, each having unique 
characteristics. Admittedly, the natural gas industry may behave in a similar manner to the oil 
& gas industry. Oberndorfer (2009a) argues that many European energy utilities are integrated 
and, therefore, no ‘pure’ natural gas producer exists. Thus, the oil & gas literature should be 
relatively applicable to natural gas utilities. However, the electricity industry has many 
characteristics which make it unique to the natural gas industry. The electricity industry 
produces a non-storable good which is delivered via transmission networks, requiring 
instantaneous physical balancing of supply and demand (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Electricity 
generators will be sensitive to cost and demand shocks and must forecast electricity supply to 
prevent overproduction. Further, electricity generators are exposed to the rare possibility of 
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negative pricing. Such factors rarely exist in the natural gas industry or the oil & gas sector. 
Therefore, it is the intention of this thesis to analyse the sectors and industries in isolation, and 
then to provide a cross-sectoral analysis in later chapters. 
As noted previously, the literature regarding the examination of European energy 
utilities in isolation is limited to two key papers, namely, Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and 
Bassen (2013). Oberndorfer’s (2009a) paper constitutes the first analysis on the stock returns 
of European energy utilities, focusing on the impact of common and commodity risk factors 
in asset returns. Oberndorfer (2009a) implements an augmented-CAPM similar to that of 
Sadorsky (2001) and Boyer and Filion (2007). The CAPM is augmented with European 
measures of oil and gas price changes, but also includes an international measure of coal price 
changes due to its importance in electricity generation. Their results show that oil price 
changes have a positive impact on oil & gas firms and a negative impact on electricity firms. 
Overall, the positive impact outweighs the negative impact. Oil volatility negatively impacts 
oil & gas stocks. In contrast to the prior literature, gas returns have no impact. Oberndorfer 
(2009a) provides two explanations for this finding: 1) traditionally, natural gas prices are 
linked to oil prices through indexation, with only timid decoupling of prices observed in 
Europe (Siliverstovs et al., 2005); or 2) results are consistent with Haushalter’s (2000) 
findings of gas price hedging, with utilities hedging more strongly against gas price risk than 
against oil price risk. Further, the results show that coal returns negatively impacted electricity 
generators. However, the impact was relatively small in comparison with oil price risk, 
despite oil’s infrequent use in electricity production. 
On closer inspection of Oberndorfer’s (2009a) research method, the unusual result for 
coal risk may be due to the composite coal index selected. Despite using European measures 
of oil and gas, Oberndorfer (2009a) opts to calculate an equally weighted portfolio of three 
global coal prices, designed to proxy for coal prices in a global market: GI Australia Freight, 
GI Columbia Freight and GI South Africa Freight. Local markets are more likely to have 
greater explanatory power (Ramos and Veiga, 2011). Second, the coal index shows a clear 
temporary shift in average price between late-2003 and mid-2005, which must undoubtedly 
affect estimated coefficients. The suspicion is that this shift is the result of splicing multiple 
indices together. Regardless, this thesis improves the measure of coal price risk by including a 
European-specific coal index to better represent the local cost of coal. The coal index will also 
avoid splicing. See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3, for a fuller discussion of commodity risk factors 
used in this thesis. In addition, Oberndorfer (2009a) uses an unrepresentative sample of 
European energy utilities, which will be discussed shortly. 
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Koch and Bassen (2013) examine the carbon risk exposure of 20 European electricity 
utilities. The sample is delineated into portfolios of high- and low-carbon-emitting generators. 
Although the focus of the paper is carbon risk exposure, Koch and Bassen (2013) include oil, 
gas, coal and electricity prices as control variables. The results show varying impacts for oil, 
gas and coal on electricity utilities’ returns. Koch and Bassen (2013) argue that there is no 
clear-cut evidence for the direction of the impacts, as the impact on each utility, or portfolios 
of utilities, is based on their emissions profile. Their results show both positive and negative 
impacts for oil and coal price risks. Interestingly, coal appears to have a positive impact on 
low-emitting utilities, which contradicts theory.
40
 Further, gas has no significant impact on 
any utilities’ returns; again, this is possible evidence of effective hedging strategies. Although 
carbon risk is insignificant for the majority of the energy utility sector, carbon risk exposure 
was a relevant risk factor for energy utilities with an extremely high-emitting fuel mix, 
increasing the cost of capital and reducing the value of equity. 
An additional variable of recent years is the introduction of a ‘carbon price’ for 
business operations to reduce GHG emissions and avoid dangerous climate change. Emission 
pricing and abatement is expected to be achieved through market mechanisms (economic 
instruments), such as carbon tax or carbon emission trading (Pezzey and Jotzo, 2012). Despite 
being a relatively young market, the impact of carbon price risk has been a topic of intense 
debate over recent years. The EU ETS began in 2005 as a ‘cap and trade’, market-based 
mechanism to reduce community-wide GHG emissions. Participants are required to purchase 
and surrender carbon allowances to cover annual emissions. The literature suggests that the 
electricity industry is forced to incorporate European Union Allowance (EUA) prices into 
operation decisions for existing power plants and future investment decisions (Delarue et al., 
2008, Yang et al., 2008). Oberndorfer (2009b) finds a positive coefficient of 0.02 between 
carbon and European electricity firms, while Koch and Bassen (2013) find that carbon risk 
positively impacts the cost of capital for high-emitting European energy utilities with an 
estimated coefficient of 0.05, but has no significant impact on the electricity industry as a 
whole. Specifically, extremely high emitters suffered a loss of equity value of around 4–6%, 
while low-emitters did not benefit from carbon discounts. Where applicable, this thesis will 
examine carbon risk exposure on European energy utility returns. 
This thesis is most clearly positioned relative to both Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch 
and Bassen (2013), extending their research methods in a number of ways. First, the time 
series used includes the global financial crisis (GFC) between 2007 and 2009 and the 
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 Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis show that coal price risk may proxy for stock market risk factors. 
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Eurozone crisis (EUC) between 2010 and 2011.
41
 The expectation is that the relationship with 
risk factors, such as the market factor, commodities and term premia, may change as a result 
of these crises. Second, this thesis dramatically increases the sample of European energy 
utilities used in the analysis by controlling for survivorship bias, obtaining a large sample of 
88 European energy utilities across all operations. In comparison, Koch and Bassen (2013) 
examines the carbon risk exposure of 20 publicly traded European electric utilities, while 
Oberndorfer (2009a) examines 22 European energy utilities across the oil & gas and 
electricity industries. Both papers fail to control for survivorship bias. Further, Oberndorfer 
(2009a) removes utilities whose operations are based on renewable energy, creating an 
unrepresentative sample of European utilities. As this thesis examines renewable energy 
legislation, this thesis opts to include these utilities in the analysis. Moreover, the inclusion of 
policy impacts from liberalisation and environmental objectives has largely been ignored in 
the empirical analysis of the European energy utility sector. Using a more comprehensive 
sample and controlling for economic shocks reduces bias and therefore advances the 
literature. To this end, Chapter 2 provided a thorough outline of the ordinary legislative 
procedure (Section 2.1) and compiled the broadest list of 54 regulatory changes to date, across 
four major restructuring streams (Section 2.2). Further, to examine the impact of regulatory 
changes, this thesis develops the AFFM to more accurately explain returns in the European 
energy utility sector. In total, all these differences mean this thesis represents the most 
comprehensive and thorough examination of the financial return of European energy utilities 
in the context of dramatic regulatory change. 
 Measuring the Impact of Regulatory Changes 3.3
While the literature to this point has focused on asset pricing models, the following 
section outlines the theoretical frameworks and literature regarding the impact of regulatory 
changes – specifically, the theoretical framework for the impact of regulatory change on stock 
value (Section 3.3.1), the impact of liberalisation (Section 3.3.2) and environmental policy 
objectives including market reaction to environmental news (Section 3.3.3), and the time-
varying nature of risk premia using inductive structural break methods (Section 3.3.4). The 
section ends with a discussion of research method issues regarding asset pricing models 
(Section 3.3.5). 
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 The exact time line of the EUC is still in debate at the time of writing this thesis. The EUC has been 




3.3.1 Theoretical Framework for the Impact of Regulatory Changes 
The theoretical framework outlines how regulations impact the price of an asset 
through changes to cash flow and discount rate; readers familiar with finance literature may 
skip ahead to Section 3.3.2. As investors are expected to be rational, wealth-optimising 
individuals, they will revalue energy utilities’ stocks today based on perceived changes to 
future cash flows as a result of regulatory change (Schwert, 1981). Investors will be 
concerned with any changes that may affect the level or variability of utilities’ operating 
performance, which also affects the investors’ required rate of return on investment. Using the 
discounted cash flow model, Schwert (1981) shows that changes in stock prices can reflect the 
total impact of regulatory change. If changes to the regulatory and operating environment can 
affect the cash flow to an investor, there will be an associated change in the market price for 
the company’s stock, shown in Equation (3.2): 
(𝑃𝑖𝑡








where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 denotes the stocks’ current price, 𝑃𝑖𝑡
∗  denotes the expected price after regulatory 
change, 𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝑘 denotes the current cash flow, 𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝑘
∗  denotes the expected cash flow after 
regulatory change, 𝑟𝑖 denotes the discount rate and 𝑘 denotes the number of periods following 
the regulatory change. Equation (3.2) assumes a constant discount rate. However, regulatory 
changes may also affect the variability of operating performance, which can manifest as 
increased uncertainty of financial return, thereby altering the discount rate. This is illustrated 
in Equation (3.3): 
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∗ is the discount rate after the regulatory change. If market risk proxies for discount 
rate, then an increase in market risk will decrease the price of the asset and investors should 
be compensated with higher returns (Schwert, 1981, Basher and Sadorsky, 2006, Basher et al., 
2012). In reality, the cash flow in Equation (3.2) and the discount rate in Equation (3.3) may 
both vary. Overall, the total impact of regulatory change can be estimated from the change in 
stock prices around regulatory events (Schwert, 1981, Beneish, 1991). Energy utilities’ stock 
should suffer a loss (gain) in market value equal to the present value of the expected loss 
(gain) on operational performance (Nwaeze, 2000). 
It is expected that regulatory announcements are more likely to be anticipated than 
corporate announcements; this is primarily due to the size of the potential wealth transfer 
from regulatory changes (Binder, 1985). Also, Section 2.1 showed that there are extensive 
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negotiations between interest groups (energy utilities) and the regulators (EU political 
institutions) before actual voting; therefore, the outcome may be known ahead of publication 
(Binder, 1985). In an efficient market, any regulatory change that affects the future cash flows 
of a firm will cause a change in asset prices as soon as the regulatory change is anticipated in 
the market; however, it is often difficult to determine when the regulatory change is first 
anticipated (Schwert, 1981). As the beliefs of market participants are not directly observable, 
such beliefs must be inferred through market reaction and latent variables such as changes in 
stock prices (Schwert, 1981, Binder, 1985). 
3.3.2 Liberalisation and Privatisation Literature 
Section 2.2.1 showed that the objectives of liberalisation were to provide incentives 
for European utilities to improve their capital investment decisions, operating performance 
and operating efficiency, with the projection that end consumers would benefit from internal 
efficiency gains (Berger and Humphrey, 1997, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2000). Liberalisation’s 
objectives were expected to be achieved through: 1) privatisation, 2) lowering entry barriers 
for new utilities, 3) increasing competition and 4) unbundling vertically integrated utilities. 
This section addresses each target, as the effects are likely to be numerous. Further, the 
section draws parallels with the liberalisation of other sectors. 
Industry privatisation reduces the number of state-owned enterprises, removes 
government-backed debt guarantees and exposes firms to the real threat of bankruptcy 
(Megginson et al., 1994). Lowering entry barriers increases the freedom of entry and exit to 
any industry, resulting in more start-up companies and increased competition from large, 
international competitors (Beneish, 1991, Gual, 1999). Increased competition also brings 
additional expenses to operations. Deregulated and saturated markets face new pressures, such 
as high financial costs of reorganisation, re-training, increasing brand awareness and cutting 
unit costs to gain greater market share (Beneish, 1991, Gual, 1999, Nwaeze, 2000, Delmas 
and Tokat, 2005). Unbundling vertically integrated utilities also reduces insurance against 
fluctuations in commodity, wholesale and end-user price (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
Deregulation can also affect the riskiness of the sector. Nwaeze (2000) finds that deregulation 
of U.S. electric utilities reduced buffering against the profit effects of cost and demand 
shocks. As generators compete for access to transmission grids, they can no longer pass all 
additional operational expenses onto consumers, forcing utilities to absorb the financial 
burden. This is of concern, as Diaz‐Rainey et al. (2011) also find that the current shift towards 
the marketisation of the EU energy system is forcing incumbents, through competitive 
pressures, to increasingly rely on the cheapest energy sources in spot markets, rather than 
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maintaining the long-term contracts which were common in the past. The effects of 
unbundling utilities have been observed in England and Wales, where associated collapses in 
electricity wholesale prices forced some non-integrated utilities into bankruptcy (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2005). The effects of privatisation have also been observed in other sectors. 
Beneish (1991) argued that one of the most pressing concerns of deregulation of the 
U.S. aviation sector was the freedom of entry and exit in the market. The most prominent 
feature was a reduction in long-term contracts, resulting in highly variable annual revenue; 
Section 2.2.1 argued that this issue may also be present in the case of energy utilities, 
especially electricity generators. Kane and Unal (1988) focused on the impact of regulatory 
and statutory changes on the temporary variability of unsystematic risk (among other factors) 
for deposit-taking banks. They found that the bulk of risk changes were from changes to 
market-beta and unsystematic risk, measured as the regression residual variance. Kane and 
Unal (1988) utilise a regime-switching model to demonstrate that systematic risk decreased 
slowly over time. However, some periods showed a dramatic increase in market risk, causing 
all market betas to rise above unity. This was coupled with an increase in unsystematic risk 
for banks, with increasing numbers of problem and failed banks. Kane and Unal (1988) find 
that many events in the banking system resulted in negative abnormal returns for deposit 
taking institutions. 
Overall, liberalisation legislation is predicted to induce greater operating revenue 
volatility through increased competition, reduced protection from cost and demand shocks 
and a removal of government-backed debt guarantees. To compensate investors for the 
perceived increased risk borne, they will expect greater returns on utility investments and 
investors will buy or sell energy positions based on their perceived changes to future cash 
flows. Accordingly, the thesis expects negative abnormal returns for energy utilities 
surrounding regulatory events. As noted in Section 2.2, the EU energy utilities sector was not 
only impacted by EU liberalisation objectives, it has also been affected by a range of 
environmentally motivated legislative drives. 
3.3.3 Environmental Policy Literature 
The issue of climate change and the impact of climate change mitigation on firms is 
one of the most intensely discussed debates of recent decades (Dobes et al., 2014). In general, 
GHG emissions have risen over the past 150 years, with an acceleration in emissions around 
1950 from energy-related sources (Dobes et al., 2014). While global emissions of GHGs rise, 
developed countries continue to make small reductions in emissions, which represent a 
seemingly superficial attempt to disrupt the status quo (McKibben, 2012). At present, the 
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European Union is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050, 
compared with 1990 levels (Delarue et al., 2011). Targets are expected to be achieved through 
more energy-efficient appliances and homes and increased use of renewable energies. To 
reverse the historical trend in GHG emissions, the expectation is that global mitigation will 
require significant net economics costs (Dobes et al., 2014). As a result, questions have been 
risen regarding the degree of effort required to mitigate climate change. Particularly as the 
increased financial burden of meeting environmental regulations means allocating resources 
away from other goals (Dobes et al., 2014). In the case of energy utilities, this includes 
starving other important investment projects, such as equipment and plant upgrades (Walley 
and Whitehead, 1994). The following sections outline the literature concerning the impact of 
environmental regulations. Section 3.3.3.1 discusses the impact of environmental policies on 
operating performance, while Section 3.3.3.2 reviews market reaction to environmental 
policies. 
3.3.3.1 Impact on operating performance 
In terms of the existing literature on the impact of environmental objectives on 
utilities, there is a range of evidence. Many managers view environmental management as 
compliance with environmental regulations, where control over pollution and maximising 
profits are mutually exclusive; the two cannot co-exist and the former can only be achieved at 
the expense of the latter (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972, Walley and Whitehead, 1994). However, 
most of the literature regarding the cost of climate change mitigation focuses only on the cost 
of transitioning to low-carbon technologies and practices, rather than also considering the co-
benefits of mitigation (Dobes et al., 2014). Some adjustments to firm operations can translate 
into a competitive advantage, can encourage firms to re-engineer their technology and act as a 
catalyst for innovation, providing new market opportunities and wealth creation (Walley and 
Whitehead, 1994). 
Gollop and Roberts (1983) examine the effect of air pollution standards on the 
productivity of the U.S. electricity generating utilities between 1973 and 1979, finding a 
decline in productivity of 0.59 percentage points per year, increased operating costs and 
decreasing profitability. By way of contrast, Hart and Ahuja (1996) conclude that strict 
environmental regulation to lower emissions may improve competitiveness by encouraging 
efficiency and innovation. Delineating the sample, high polluters appear to derive positive 
benefits from emission reductions, as there are many simple, low-cost improvements which 
can be made. However, as ‘zero pollution’ approaches further reductions become expensive 
due to additional technological investments required (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Bragdon and 
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Marlin (1972) argue a similar point, namely, that installing pollution control equipment on an 
emergency basis, after the plant is built, can be up to three times as expensive as it would be if 
incorporated into the firm at the beginning. In the case of energy utilities, some retrofits may 
be limited by plant layout, process integration, plant age and design, emission levels required 
and the cost of control technologies. For example, air pollution control technologies for coal-
fired plants range from 5 to 150 €/kWe (IEA, 2006). Thus, retrofits to existing energy utilities 
may be costly as the EU increasingly ‘greens’ the energy supply. Regarding carbon 
allowances, Koch and Bassen (2013) find that carbon-intensive, fossil fuel dependent utilities 
are disproportionately affected by carbon risk from the EU ETS. Accordingly, it is generally 
perceived that environmental objectives increase the financial burden of operation. 
While the preceding literature focuses on the impact of environmental objectives on 
operating and financial return, the Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies streams in 
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, respectively, also affect the operating environmental of energy 
utilities. Energy efficiency objectives seek to reduce EU energy demand (see Section 2.2.2). 
Delarue et al. (2011) review three European reports which focus on the impact of energy 
efficiency on energy demand. Although high energy-consuming appliances such as ovens, 
refrigerators and lighting are already included under current legislation, there is the possibility 
of future technological advances which will further reduce energy consumption and demand. 
The overall impact is an estimated reduction in energy demand of 10% to 20% (Delarue et al., 
2011). However, this estimated reduction must also be balanced against population growth 
and the expected electrification of sectors, such as transport, which increases future energy 
demands. These are addressed under the Renewables Energies stream. 
The Renewable Energies stream (Section 2.2.3) increases technological and physical 
risk for energy utilities because 1) it forces utilities to invest in technologies that are still not 
fully mature; 2) it affords grid priority to renewables, meaning that existing energy generation 
assets are not used as efficiently as they could be; and 3) it adds uncertainty to revenues and 
operations as these variable energy sources can only operate in favourable weather conditions 
and volatile weather impacts wholesale spot prices (Green and Vasilakos, 2010, Ahlstrom et 
al., 2015, Newbery, 2015, Riesz and Milligan, 2015). Furthermore, policies such as feed-in-
tariffs and grid priority for renewables can incentivise some conventional generators to place 
negative bids into the wholesale electricity market during low residual loads, as turning off 
generation would incur additional costs and risks (DECC, 2010, Fanone et al., 2013, Ahlstrom 




3.3.3.2 Market reaction to environmental policy 
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the concept of socially responsible investing has gained 
prominence in recent years, with environmental performance identified as a criterion 
assessing whether a firm is a good investment (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). More than ever, 
investors are paying close attention to the actions of managers regarding the social 
responsibility of a company (Ansar et al., 2013). Specifically, individuals and investors are 
encouraging firms to adopt corporate practices which seek to maintain an equilibrium 
between financial return and social good. The market also responds to poor environmental 
management decisions which would create liabilities, negatively impacting firm value 
(Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). Certainly, firms are beginning to acknowledge that 
environmental performance can influence firm valuation, with many international firms now 
publishing annual environmental performance reports (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). 
However, the future impacts can be difficult to quantify, particularly as many of the climate 
change impacts are either uncertain or include qualitative, non-market impacts such as losses 
in ecological function (Dobes et al., 2014). As this thesis approaches the analysis from a 
financial perspective, it implicitly assumes that all investors are rational and consider all 
potential future scenarios, including hard to value options (Griffin et al., 2015). The following 
outlines papers regarding the market reaction to environmental events. 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) examine the linkages between financial return and 
environmental management of firms. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) hypothesise that the 
strong (weak) environmental performance of a firm will positively (negatively) affect 
financial return, which may vary across industries. Their results show significant and negative 
market responses of -0.82% to -1.50% for weak environmental management and 
environmental crises. In contrast, significant and positive market responses of 0.63% are 
found for strong environmental management, as indicated by performance award nomination. 
The impact of positive responses is lower for firms in environmentally unfriendly industries, 
possibly indicating market scepticism to environmental efforts, which is relevant to the poor 
environmental history of energy utilities. Further, their  results are similar to Karpoff and Lott 
(1993), who find press reports of allegations or investigations of corporate fraud results in an 
average stock price decrease of -1.34% ($60 million) against private parties and -5.05% ($40 
million) against government agencies. Note that the absolute decrease in value is greater for 
private firms. This may have implications for the liberalisation of the European energy utility 
sector, where energy utilities are becoming increasingly exposed to the impact of regulatory 
changes as the EU shifts towards a privatised energy sector. 
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For energy-intensive industries, Walley and Whitehead (1994) estimate that anywhere 
between one-quarter and one-half of an industry’s market valuation is vulnerable to increased 
environmental compliance costs. Filbeck and Gorman (2004) examine the relationship 
between financial return and environmental compliance for 24 electric utilities, between 1996 
and 1999. The paper focuses on positive environmental performance as a criterion of success 
factor and good investment. The sector was chosen as producers and distributers of energy 
typically have high emissions. Firms are compared with a benchmark of environmental 
performance. The results contrast with the previous literature, finding that that less compliant 
portfolios outperform compliant portfolios. Further, results show no positive relationship 
between environmental and financial return. There are several conclusions drawn in the paper. 
First, the compliance index measures how well the company is complying with existing 
regulations – market efficiency would suggest that this information has already been 
impounded into stock prices. Second, the compliance index does not measure proactive 
management beyond minimum compliance (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). Third, the electric 
utility industry has a dramatically different regulatory environment to other industries. The 
implication of this latter point is that European energy utilities may now show greater 
sensitivity to the environmental objectives as the sector has also been liberalised over recent 
decades (see Section 2.2.1). 
Griffin et al. (2015) explore the stock market’s reaction to a Nature article which 
acknowledges that only one-quarter of the world’s fossil fuel reserves can be used if society is 
to avoid dangerous climate change. The implication of the article was that much of the 
world’s fossil fuel reserve would become stranded and unburnable, making the assets 
worthless as a result of climate change response. These probable and proven reserve 
contribute a significant portion of firm valuation (Harris and Ohlson, 1987, Quirin et al., 
2000). In particular, 40% to 60% of the market capitalisation of the top 200 global energy 
companies is potentially value at risk as energy firms’ share price partially depends on their 
reserves (Spedding et al., 2013, The Economist, 2013a). Griffin et al. (2015) found that the 
publication of the 2009 article produced an average stock price decline between -1.52% and -
2.02% for the 63 largest U.S. oil and gas firms. Further, carbon tax news prompted a market 
response of -0.52%. The press later ‘discovered’ the 2009 article and produced hundreds of 
stories between 2012 and 2013. The later publications prompted small negative market 
responses of approximately -0.02%. However, the later stories did produce a delayed reaction 
in the two weeks following their publication, with abnormal returns of -0.29%. Overall, the 
results indicate rational responses and efficient markets, with investors responding to the 
relatively obscure 2009 new article; later publications were relatively unimportant, as the 
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publications contained little new information. For European energy utilities, Chapter 6 
expects the market to anticipate the regulatory change and have an immediate reaction 
surrounding the early voting stages. 
Equally, Griffin et al. (2015) also showed that the impact of regulatory changes may 
not be immediately realised by the market and may exhibit a delayed reaction. One 
explanation may be that regulatory changes are difficult to process, resulting in hard-to-value 
stocks. Kumar (2009) finds that individual investors make larger investment mistakes and 
exhibit stronger behavioural biases with hard-to-value stocks and greater market level 
uncertainty. Further, disposition, the reluctance to realise losses and overconfidence biases are 
often stronger for these stocks. 
Overall, results suggest that environmental regulations and information regarding 
environmental objectives can impact financial return. The impact is negative if the regulatory 
changes are perceived to increase financial costs, but positive if they encourage innovation 
and efficiency. The anticipation and market reaction surrounding a regulatory change is likely 
to be dependent on the informational content contained within the regulations, with a 
differential impact across the four main restructuring streams (see Section 2.2). The following 
section examines how risk factors and policy may impact the systematic and firm-specific 
component of returns over time. 
3.3.4 Structural Breaks and Break Point Tests 
3.3.4.1 Theoretical framework 
Based on the assumption of stationarity in time series, it is often assumed that the 
parameters of a model, such as mean, variance and trend, must remain constant over time 
despite little economic rationale to support this (Chow, 1960, Andrews, 1993). If the 
economic relationship is the same then the returns can be represented by the same regression 
model. However, the prior asset pricing literature in Sections 3.2 has found that the estimated 
relationship among industry returns and risk factors is not stable across time, with temporal 
sensitivity which affects significance (Huang et al., 1996, Fama and French, 1997, Faff and 
Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, El-Sharif et al., 2005, Boyer and Filion, 2007, Oberndorfer, 
2009a). Subsections within Chapters 4 and 5 will examine the inter-temporal variability in 
model parameters and its implications on asset pricing. Chapter 4 will utilise an existing 
deductive inter-temporal analysis from the energy economics literature (El-Sharif et al., 
2005), though this approach is subject to criticisms. Accordingly, Chapter 5 will apply the 
inductive Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) structural breakpoint tests to the energy utility sector. 
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The majority of the preceding literature uses the deductive approach, testing whether 
model parameters change surrounding key events. Section 1.3 shows that a key objective of 
this thesis is examining whether the relationship between average energy sector return and 
risk factors are stable through sector restructuring. Model stability can be examined using 
tests of structural breaks concerning known break dates (deductive) and unknown break dates 
(inductive). This thesis utilises both inductive and deductive approaches. 
Consider a basic regression specification, where 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, where 𝐸𝑒
2 = 𝜎2 
and 𝑒𝑡 is a time series of serially uncorrelated innovations. The model parameters are 𝛼, 𝛽 and 
𝜎2. If at least one of these parameters has changed at some date – known as the break date – 
then a structural break has occurred (Hansen, 2001). Structural breaks can affect the results of 
the model in a number of ways. First, a change in 𝛽 indicates a change in the relationship with 
the risk factor, which affects expected 𝑦𝑡. A change in intercept, α, will affect the mean 𝑦𝑡. 
Finally, any change in 𝑒𝑡 must affect the estimation of variance in the sector and the firm-
specific component returns after filtering out systematic components (Fama and French, 1993, 
Hansen, 2001). These shifts in parameters are important with regard to isolating the firm-
specific component of returns (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2.4). 
Chow (1960) develop a test which examines whether two sets of observations can be 
regarded as belonging to the same regression model. Let 𝑦 be a dependent variable and 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑝 be independent variables, 𝛽 a vector of estimated coefficients and 𝑒 to be 
independent and normally distributed error terms with a mean of zero and standard deviation 
of 𝜎. It is possible to test whether any additional observations, H, are from the same 
regression as the first sample, T, by testing whether the coefficients are identical. Put simply, 
if we expect that observations H are from the same population as observations T, then their 
estimated coefficients will be identical. If observations H are from a different population as 
observations T, their estimated coefficients will be significantly different. First, take sample 1 
with T observations, 
𝑦1 = 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝑒1, (3.4) 
where 𝑦1 and 𝑒1 are column vectors with 𝑇 elements, 𝑋1 is a 𝑇 × 𝑝 matrix and 𝛽1 is a column 









′ 𝑋1) is the cross-product of the 𝑝 𝑥’s in sample 1. Then sample 2, with 𝐻 additional 
observations, is specified as 
𝑦2 = 𝑋2𝛽2 + 𝑒2 (3.6) 
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where 𝑋2 is a 𝐻 × 𝑝 matrix, with 𝐻 representing the 𝐻 new observations of the 𝑝 explanatory 
variables. By forming the difference between the vector 𝑦2 and a vector of predicted 
observations based on the regression estimated using T observations, Chow (1960) 
incorporates (3.5) and (3.6), giving rise to 
𝑑 = 𝑦2 − 𝑋2𝑏1 = 𝑋2𝛽2 − 𝑋2𝛽1 + 𝑒2 − 𝑋2(𝑋1
′𝑋1)
−1𝑋1
′ 𝑒1. (3.7) 
Therefore, the expectation of the difference, d, between vectors is 
𝐸(𝑑) = 𝑋2𝛽2 − 𝑋2𝛽1. (3.8) 
If there is no difference between the vectors, then they must be from the same sample; 
however, if there is a difference between the vectors, then the observations must be 
independent of each other. Put simply, suppose that we expect the relationship between 
returns and risk factors for the energy utility sector to shift after a regulatory change, 
occurring during time period 𝐻, then it is possible to test whether the coefficients during the 
time period H are significantly different to the remainder of the time series (T). However, the 
limitation of the Chow (1960) test is the reliance on a priori knowledge of the known break 
dates to accurately implement an F-test on the significance of a regime change or intercept 
shift. Implicitly, the use of an a priori break date assumes that the market reacts on the break 
date which is not always appropriate – as shown in Chapter 6. 
Quandt (1960) adjusts the Chow framework to relax the assumption of a known break 
date. Using likelihood ratio and F-tests, Quandt (1960) tests the hypothesis that no break 
occurs in the parameters of a linear regression model against the alternative hypothesis that 
one unknown break occurs over all possible break dates. The method relies on arbitrarily 
dividing the observations into two groups: one of the entire sample and one which includes 
the suspected break date. The null will be rejected if either of the observed mean residuals are 
significantly different from zero. The criticism of this method is that construction of the 
second sample is guesswork and therefore likely to be invalid. In most cases, the inclusion of 
surplus observations which are not affected by structural breaks will skew the mean residuals 
towards the expected value of zero, reducing the power of any statistical tests and biasing the 
results against significance. 
Andrews (1993) proposes a test for a one-time change in the value of a parameter 
vector. Tests of structural change are considered under two conditions: 1) when the change 
point is specified to lie within some interval, and (2) when the change point is completely 
unknown. Furthermore, the tests can be implemented in the case of a ‘pure’ structural change, 
where the entire parameter changes, and for the case of ‘partial’ change, where only a 
component of the parameter vector changes. Consider a one-time structural change alternative 
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hypothesis where the break point is denoted 𝜋 ∈ (0,1), where 𝑇 is the sample size and 𝑇𝜋 is 
the time of change. For example, one might want to test structural change occurring during 
the GFC, where the start and end date are known. The one-time alternative hypothesis is 
simple, as the test is 𝐻0 versus 𝐻1𝑇(𝜋). 
When the break point is known, it is possible to form either a Wald (1942), Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) or Likelihood-ratio (LR)-like test for the null hypothesis of no break versus 
the alternative of one break (Andrews, 1993). In such a case, the tests are equivalent to the 𝐹 
tests commonly referred to as the Chow (1960), dummy variable or intercept shift-tests, 
where: 
𝐻1𝑇(𝜋): 𝛽𝑡 = {
𝛽1(𝜋) for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝜋
 𝛽2(𝜋)for 𝑡 = 𝑇𝜋 + 1, …
 
(3.9) 
for some constants 𝛽1(𝜋), 𝛽2(𝜋) ∈ 𝐵 ⊂ 𝑅
𝑝. However, testing for breaks between date 
intervals or unknown breaks complicates test statistics, as the break point parameter 𝜋 is only 
considered under the alternative hypothesis and not under the null, unlike (3.9). Therefore, 
there is a need to construct a test statistic that does not take 𝜋 as a given (Andrews, 1993). 
Consider a major regulatory event where the timing of impact is unknown but 
expected to occur within or around a restricted interval. The exogenous event has the potential 
to cause structural change either: 1) after a lag of unknown length, or 2) before the event due 
to market anticipation (Andrews, 1993). In the case of this thesis, this is complicated further 
by the protracted European legislative process, where four key event dates are identified per 
legislation (see Section 2.1). Around all key dates it is possible for information to diffuse into 
the market. Further, the market may exhibit a lagged response due to hard-to-process 
information, as found by Griffin et al. (2015). In such cases, the test statistics centres on a 
break point occurring within a known structured interval, defined as ∏ ⊂ (0,1). The interval, 
for example, using the days following the announcement of the 2
nd
 position (see Section 2.1), 
is subjected to Type II errors (false negative) if the market anticipates the regulatory change 
early. These concerns are extended further when there is no information regarding a potential 
break point, where all possible observations are of interest. Moreover, the examination of 
structural change is complicated further if there is no abrupt change in stock valuation, for 
example, shifting from one regime to a another with an interim transition period (Andrews, 
1993). Overall, the deductive dummy variable method outlined previously will only be useful 
if we can be certain that the impact occurs within the restricted interval. 
The inductive approach can overcome many of the misspecification criticisms of the 
deductive approach and allows examination of structural change where the break point is 
entirely unknown. Accordingly, Andrews et al. (1996) begin developing tests for one or more 
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break points which occur at unknown time in a multiple linear regression model, considering 
the break point vector which only occurs under the alternative hypothesis. 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) represent the most important contributions in this field, 
publishing theoretical and empirical papers with regard to estimating unknown structural 
break points. The papers focus on two problems: 1) estimating break dates, and 2) forming 
confidence intervals. Regarding the latter, the benefit of the Bai and Perron (2003) approach 
is that the data and errors may have heterogeneous distributions across segments. Consider the 
model: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑡𝛽 + 𝑧′𝑡𝛿𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡     𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗−1 + 1, … , 𝑇𝑗 (3.10) 
for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 + 1. Where 𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable at time 𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 (𝑝 × 1) and 𝑧𝑡 (𝑞 × 1) 
are vectors of covariates and 𝛽 and 𝛿𝑗 are coefficients, respectively; 𝑢𝑡 is the disturbance at 
time 𝑡. The break points, (𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚), are unknown, where 𝑇0 = 0 and 𝑇𝑚+1 = 𝑇. The Bai 
and Perron (2003) test is designed to estimate the unknown regression coefficients and break 
points when 𝑇 observations on the parameters 𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 are available. Similar to ordinary 
least squares (OLS), the associated least-squares estimates of 𝛽 and 𝛿𝑗 are obtained by 
minimising the sum of square residuals to estimate, as accurately as possible, the true value of 
the parameters, where the minimisation is taken over all partitions (break points) in the data. 
Bai and Perron (2003) achieve this goal by developing an algorithm based on the 
principle of dynamic programming, allowing computation of estimates of the break points as 
global minimisers of the sum of squared residuals. The algorithm utilises previously forgotten 
dynamic programming of pure structural change models for a more general partial structural 
change model. Specifically, partitioned regressions and cluster analysis, curve fitting by use 
of segmented straight lines (polygonal curves) and grouping for maximum homogeneity by 
minimising variance within groups (see, respectively, Guthery, 1974; Bellman and Roth, 
1969; Fisher, 1958). 
The computation of estimates is achieved by applying OLS segment by segment 
without constraints, sequentially storing the sum of squared residuals (SSR). Once the SSR is 
stored, a dynamic programming approach can evaluate which partition achieves global 
minimisation over the overall SSR. The process begins by evaluating the optimal one-break 
partition for all sub-samples, storing the optimal one-break partition and associated SSR. The 
second step searches for optimal partitions with two breaks. For each end date, the procedure 
examines which one-break partition can be reinserted to achieve minimal SSR. The method 
continues sequentially, until optimal break partitions are obtained. Finally, the method 
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compares which set of break partitions yields the lowest overall SSR when combined with 
additional segments. 
The method can also be applied in the case of partial structural change. Using an 
iterative process, the algorithm minimises the SSR for the coefficients 𝛽 and 𝜃, where 
𝜃 = (𝛿, 𝑇1, … 𝑇𝑚). The algorithm first minimises SSR with respect to 𝜃 keeping 𝛽 fixed, and 
then minimises for 𝛽 keeping 𝜃 fixed, then iterates assuring a decrease in the objective 
function. The iterations are important, as estimates of 𝛽 will deviate from true values unless 𝛿 
is already close to its true value, which is unlikely. Overall, the dynamic algorithm reports the 
date of break points for parameters of the regression model, partitioning the data into distinct 
time periods. 
The Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) break point test has been implemented in a variety of 
situations within finance, energy economics and econometrics. This method will be 
implemented in Chapter 5 to identify significant changes in the parameters of the AFFM 
through time using an inductive approach. Further, the break point test is also utilised when 
isolating the firm-specific component of returns. The following section outlines some 
empirical applications of the model. 
3.3.4.2 Empirical applications of inductive structural break point tests 
To date, no paper examines the evolving systematic risk of European energy utilities 
throughout sector restructuring. Further, none of the literature in Sections 3.2.2 or 3.2.3 use 
inductive methods to control for structural breaks. Of the few tests of structural change, all 
assume known break dates. The following paragraphs outline empirical applications of the 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) structural break point test on multivariate models or volatility of 
stock returns. 
Bai and Perron (2003) is the first paper to empirically apply the structural break point 
test, employing the test to re-evaluate two prior break point papers: Garcia and Perron (1996) 
and Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991). The first application addresses Garcia and Perron (1996), 
who examine structural breaks in the U.S. ex-post real interest rates using quarterly data 
between 1961 and 1986. The main results of Garcia and Perron (1996) find two abrupt 
structural breaks in U.S. interest rates. Bai and Perron’s (2003) re-examination detects the 
existence of a smaller third structural break. Bai and Perron (2003) conclude that their 
procedure is more powerful than previous regime switching methods due to the error 
distributions being allowed to differ across partitions. The second application of Bai and 
Perron (2003) re-evaluates Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), who examine structural breaks in 
the UK post-war inflation rate and the Phillips curve between 1947 and 1987. Alogoskoufis 
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and Smith (1991) argue the existence of a one-time structural break in the series from 1967 to 
1968. Bai and Perron (2003) empirically confirm the existence of the 1967 structural break. 
Their results also detect a second break in 1975. The conclusion is that the structural-shift in 
inflation is short-lasting, between 1967 and 1975. Post-1975, inflation rates returned to pre-
shift levels. 
Chen and Chen (2007) utilise cointegration analysis to examine the long-run 
relationship between real oil prices and exchange rates between 1972 and 2005, using data 
from the G7 countries. The Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) test of structural change is 
implemented as a preliminary analysis to identify whether oil prices and exchange rates may 
have been affected by major events. Chen and Chen (2007) find that both French and German 
real exchange rates experienced one structural break each during the time series and 
incorporate these structural breaks to improve the precision of cointegration analysis. 
Lettau et al. (2008) examine shifts in volatility and mean of consumption growth to 
calibrate a rational asset pricing model, using the Bai and Perron (2003) test as a robustness 
check. The results show the presence of structural shifts in the data. Lettau et al. (2008) later 
show that there is strong correlation between the low-frequency movements in 
macroeconomic volatility and asset prices in post-war data. The structural break test is utilised 
to detect a shift in price to earnings or dividends, where the results indicate a persistent shift 
well above their historical norms. 
Narayan and Smyth (2008) utilise the Bai and Perron (2003) test to identify structural 
breaks in the relationship between capital formation, energy consumption and real GDP in G7 
countries. Narayan and Smyth (2008) report mixed findings from the existing literature, but 
identify that a limitation of previous studies includes the failure to account for the frequent 
expected structural breaks in the relationship between energy consumption and GDP. After 
accounting for structural breaks, there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
variables which would have otherwise been obscured in the data, finding that capital 
formation and energy consumption Granger-cause GDP. 
Finally, Brandt et al. (2009) also utilise the Bai and Perron (2003) test to identify 
structural breaks in idiosyncratic volatility between 1925 and 2008. Their motivation for using 
the break point test comes from their descriptive statistics, which show that volatility trends 
depend on the estimation time period used. Superficially, there is a time trend of increasing 
idiosyncratic volatility between 1962 and 1997. The Bai and Perron (2003) test detects 
multiple break points in the series, including 1975, 1994, and 2000. Importantly, the 2000 
break point coincides with theory, where volatility during the 1990s is consistent with an 
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episode that later reversed itself post-2000; the break point test formally confirms this 
proposition. 
An observations of the research above is that the empirical tests are implemented over 
long time horizons, sometimes over several decades. As argued in Section 3.3.4, there is little 
economic rationale to assume the estimated parameters will remain stable over such a long 
period. Following the research above, this thesis will implement the Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) structural break point test to identify changes in the relationship between returns and 
risk premia through time. 
3.3.5 Methodological Issues of Measuring Effects on Valuation 
As stated in 3.1, there are methodological issues and caveats which are expected to 
plague asset pricing models. Section 3.3.5.1 outlines the use of a panel versus portfolio 
approach to analysis, while Section 3.3.5.2 focuses on the potential impact of effective 
hedging strategies on estimated coefficients; the section also addresses commodity 
speculation. 
3.3.5.1 Utilising a panel or portfolio approach 
For empirical analysis, we are able to utilise either a panel or a portfolio approach for 
the multifactor asset pricing models and the event study approach. Traditionally, the portfolio 
approach is favoured from a finance perspective. This is primarily due to the fact that the 
panel approach can often lead to inflated 𝑡-statistics. Schwert (1981) argues that the t statistic, 











where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡, ?̅?𝑖 is the historical average return on asset 𝑖 and 
𝑆(𝑅𝑖) is the historical standard deviation of return of asset 𝑖 based on 𝑇 observations. 
However, since returns within an industry are likely to be positively correlated, the impact of 
a regulation cannot be assessed on individual assets; if one 𝑡-statistic is large by chance, then 
it is also likely others will be large too (Schwert, 1981). 
To examine the impact of any regulatory change, the objective of Chapter 6, securities 
must be grouped into portfolios based on similarity of impact. This is important as a new 
regulation can transfer wealth from one half of the sector to the other firms within the same 
sector. The net impact on a sector will be null, despite the fact that individual firms 
experience large gains and losses (Schwert, 1981). The portfolio approach allows examination 














where the portfolio abnormal return (𝑅𝑝𝑡) is a weighted average of individual abnormal 
returns, but the standard deviation of the portfolio, 𝑆(𝑅𝑝), is less than or equal to the 
weighted combination of individual assets’ standard deviations (Markowitz, 1952, Schwert, 
1981). This common approach to estimating parameters also reduces the errors-in-variables 
problem (Banz, 1981, Schwert, 1981), while adopting a value-weighted approach minimises 
variance and captures return behaviours in a manner that relates to realistic investment 
opportunities (Fama and French, 1993). 
Schwert (1981) also argues that a regulation can also result in correlated residuals in a 
cross-sectional regression, where the estimated standard errors of a regulatory dummy 
variable, such as those used in the case of a known break date, are biased downwards and the 
significance tests are biased towards rejecting the null. This argument is similar to Chan et al. 
(1985), who argue that any cross-sectional regression forces the intercept term of the model, 
as well as the risk premiums, to be the same across all companies. Note, this assumption must 
also assume that the coefficient is the same over time; a proposition tested in Chapters 4 and 
5. Therefore, any violation of the pricing equation, deviations from predicted values, will be 
absorbed by the residuals. This latter point is addressed in Section 5.4.2.4. Any omitted 
variables from the model specification will also bias the estimates of regression coefficients, 
while inter-correlated disturbances will bias standard errors. Both effects result in false 
positives, spurious effects of regulation. Such specification issues are important as Chan et al. 
(1985) highlight that the residuals of the asset pricing model, assuming correct specification, 
are often interpreted as the risk-adjusted returns – necessary for the calculation of abnormal 
returns induced by regulation in Chapter 6. 
Based on the arguments above, this thesis opts to implement a time-series and 
portfolio approach which has typically been implemented by the majority of the finance 
literature outlined in Section 3.2.2. Energy utilities are grouped into portfolios based on 
similarity of characteristics to examine differential impacts of risk factors and changes in 
financial return as a result of regulatory changes.  
3.3.5.2 Speculation and hedging 
As with any empirical analysis, there are a range of behaviours which may bias the 
results against finding significance. As mentioned previously (see Section 3.2.3), the ability to 
speculate or hedge can alter endogenous risk exposure. Further, hedging and the ability to 
pass costs onto end consumers will bias the results against statistical significance. Finally, 
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energy utilities can merge and benefit from economies of scale and transmission line 
ownership. While it is not possible to control for all confounding effects, it is important to 
acknowledge that they exist and may affect results. The following sections outline research 
relating to these matters. 
If the European energy utility sector is indeed exposed to changing market risks 
through liberalisation and environmental objectives, then what strategies are available to the 
average energy utility company to alter their endogenous risk profile? Endogenous risk 
profiles can be altered through two methods: speculation or hedging. Being a dynamic 
market, across multiple operations, the energy sector may exhibit behaviours consistent with 
either of these methods. 
Söderholm (1998) also finds results consistent with the notion that European 
electricity utilities are able to substitute fuels in the short term, particularly multi-fuel fired 
plants. This substitution of fuels allows utilities to exploit fuel price differences and gives 
energy utilities negotiating power (Söderholm, 2001). Fuel switching can occur as quickly as 
one day if the alternative fuel is available, provided the generator can burn the fuel, or 
modifications can occur within weeks or months. For example, Austria’s coal/gas-fired plants, 
which operatured under long-term coal contracts, have been known to burn gas when gas 
prices are low and stockpile coal for future periods (Söderholm, 2001). Further, oil/gas-fired 
plants under long-term gas contracts can quickly switch from gas to oil if the spot price for 
gas increases above the long-term contract price (Söderholm, 2001). Crucially, this ability of 
some multi-fuel generators to switch fuels results in fuel suppliers facing a fuel price ceiling, 
as any large price increase will incentivise the multi-fuel generators to sell fuels, thus 
providing excess supply and reducing price. Clearly, these mechanisms allow an energy 
company to speculate on the price of fuel. Equally, concern has been raised that commodities 
may be overshooting market fundamentals due to speculative expectations from investors who 
buy commodities as a financial asset (Kaufmann, 2011). This is a pressing concern, as Diaz‐
Rainey et al. (2011) argue that European energy utilities are increasingly relying on spot 
markets for energy sources. This potentially exposes energy utilities to much greater 
commodity risk, particularly if the firm is unable to effectively hedge commodities, for 
example, distressed firms. 
While the preceding paragraph highlights increased risk exposure from speculation, 
fuel hedging can also decrease risk exposure. In a regulated market, any spike in the price of 
inputs for gas producers can be passed through to the end consumer with an additional supply 
charge. However, in a liberalised market there is competition, where suppliers will compete 
on price, thus reducing the elasticity of the end product’s price (Gual, 1999). Any shocks to 
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input price must be absorbed by the energy utility, reducing net profits. Highly volatile returns 
result in a higher cost of capital to investors; therefore, there is an economic incentive to 
mitigate this supply shock. 
Haulshalter (2000) investigates evidence of hedging behaviour in the returns of the 
100 oil and gas producers against price fluctuations in exchange-traded commodities, between 
1992 to 1994. Results show that the ratio of hedging increases as the financial leverage, a 
proxy for risk, increases within a company. Therefore, it can be expected that if some energy 
utilities experience periods of increased risk and input-price volatility, then they will be more 
likely to hedge to reduce financial contracting costs. However, Haushalter (2000) finds that 
gas hedging varies from zero to 97.5% in the oil & gas sector, indicating that risk 
management practices are not uniform across the sector. 
Some electricity generators openly report the profit or losses made on hedging 
contracts, broken down by commodity, and also indicate the use of future and swap contracts 
(EDF, 2009). In contrast, some companies are relatively ambigious about their hedging 
activities, simply reporting ‘fair value hedge adjustments’ (EDP, 2009). The hedging appears 
to manifest as hedging the supply shock of commodities. As the methods of hedging and 
transparency of reporting differ between operations and companies, hedging is uncontrollable 
in the case of this thesis. However, it is a theoretical point that is highlighted to explain any 
lack of significant relationship between the energy sector and commodities known to be used 
in energy production, for example, coal and natural gas. 
Having placed the thesis in the context of the existing finance and energy economics 




CHAPTER 4  
RISK FACTORS IN ENERGY UTILITY RETURNS: AN AUGMENTED-
FOUR-FACTOR MODEL (AFFM) 
 Introduction 4.1
A central theme in finance and energy economics literature is examining the 
relationship between risk and return. The European equity market has been influenced by 
global macroeconomic events such as the dot-com collapse of 2000, the GFC of 2007 to 2009 
and the EUC of 2010 to 2011. As a result, the valuation of all European stocks has been 
characterised by large price changes and associated fluctuations in interest rates which reflect 
changing economic conditions. The effects of financial crises extend beyond equity and 
commodity prices. The GFC also resulted in energy demand decreasing by 4.9% in the first 
quarter of 2009 (IEA, 2009). Simultaneously, there have been dramatic changes in the price of 
energy-related commodities, with record high prices for oil, natural gas and coal in the last 
decade (Oberndorfer, 2009a). Equally, concern has been raised that commodities may be 
overshooting market fundamentals due to speculative expectations from investors who buy 
commodities as a financial asset (Kaufmann, 2011). Institutional and retail investors are 
devoting more capital to commodity investments; a greater than 53-fold increase, from $6 
billion to $320 billion, was recorded between 2000 and 2010 (The Economist, 2010). 
Moreover, an additional risk factor of the last decade, which is expected to affect all European 
firms, is the implementation of the EU ETS, introducing carbon price risk. 
Given the importance of energy utilities to the economy and the transition to a 
decarbonised energy system (see Section 1.2), this chapter is principally concerned with the 
impact of all these risk factors and changes on energy sector returns. Accordingly, this chapter 
addresses four research questions, previously shown in Section 1.1, namely: 1) to what extent 
do commodity price changes impact the returns in the European energy utility sector, 2) could 
stock-market risk factors better explain the variation in energy utilities’ returns, 3) do the 
impacts reflect market-wide conditions or the sector-specific relationships between returns 
and risk premia and 4) are these risk premia time-varying? 
In order to address these questions, this chapter must first develop a superior asset 
pricing model to explain average returns in the European energy utility sector, as noted in the 
introduction (Section 1.5.1). The motivation for this is from the lack of sector-specific 
research which focuses on asset pricing in European energy utilities, which is largely limited 
to Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). As noted in Section 3.2.2.5, El-Sharif et 
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al. (2005) and Oberndorfer (2009a) both argue that the energy economics literature is 
relatively restricted due to its reliance on outdated asset pricing models, and both authors 
suggest that incorporating standard finance risk factors is an avenue for future research. This 
chapter addresses this niche by reintegrating the stock market risk factors of Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) from the finance literature (Section 3.2.2) with the macroeconomic 
variables identified in the energy economics literature (Section 3.2.3). This chapter proposes 
the global AFFM, which extends the four stock market risk factors (market factor, size 
premium, value premium, and momentum premium) to include term premium and 
commodities previously found to affect energy utility sector returns (oil, coal, natural gas and 
carbon). This chapter uses the global AFFM to answer the four research questions above. 
First, a comparison of the global AFFM and existing asset pricing models will explore 
whether the global AFFM is superior at capturing average returns in the energy sector. 
Second, the global AFFM will be used to answer research questions 1 and 2 of this chapter. 
The motivation for research question 3 of this chapter, the inter-sectoral analysis, extends 
from El-Sharif et al. 2005 and Faff and Brailsford (1999), who examine the macroeconomic 
risk exposure of multiple sectors. Similarly, Fama and French (1997) also examine risk 
exposure to stock market risk factors across multiple sectors. The global AFFM is 
implemented on an additional 10 European sectors to contrast against the energy sector, 
identifying whether the results for the energy utility sector are unique or observed across 
multiple sectors. This thesis also compares the estimated coefficients across sectors from the 
global AFFM to Faff and Brailsford (1999) and Fama and French (1997). The motivation for 
research question 4 of this chapter comes from the prior asset pricing literature in Sections 3.2 
which has found that the estimated relationships among industry returns and risk factors are 
not stable across time, with temporal sensitivity which affects significance (Huang et al., 
1996, Fama and French, 1997, Faff and Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, El-Sharif et al., 
2005, Boyer and Filion, 2007, Oberndorfer, 2009a). This chapter builds on El-Sharif et al. 
(2005) to employ conditional annual global AFFM regressions which explore the inter-
temporal relationship between energy sector returns and risk premia, answering research 
question 4. 
This chapter makes multiple contributions to the literature. In line with the more 
general contributions of the thesis, and as mentioned in Sections 1.5.4 and 3.3, this thesis 
constructs a superior European energy utility sample. Specifically, the sample of 88 energy 
utilities is considerably larger than that of Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013), 
who examine 22 and 20 European energy utilities, respectively. The chapter constructs a 
comprehensive sample that includes natural gas and electricity utilities (thereby reflecting the 
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focus of EU policies). The sample is derived from the EU legislation which mentioned the 
firms impacted and through membership of professional association. Further, the inclusion of 
non-active companies controls for survivorship bias, an improvement over Oberndorfer 
(2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013).  
In addition to these more general thesis contributions, there are chapter-specific 
contributions to the literature. First, this chapter employs a full-scale asset pricing test for the 
European energy utility sector, extending Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). 
Second, while the three-factor model has been implemented on the oil & gas sector by 
Elyasiani et al. (2011), to date, no authors have implemented the three- or four-factor models 
(see Sections 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4, respectively) on the European energy utility sector. 
Accordingly, this chapter serves to fill this niche. Third, this chapter examines returns 
between 1996 and 2013. This is an improvement over El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Oberndorfer 
(2009a) by including the GFC and third packages of liberalisation – expected to be a major 
regulatory reform in the sector (see Section 2.2.1). Further, this extends Koch and Bassen 
(2013) by including the EUC. Fourth, the use of 10 European sectors is an improvement over 
El-Sharif et al. (2005), who examines four additional European sectors. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the 
empirical approach, sample and data used in the analysis. Section 4.3 presents the results of 
this chapter, delineated into descriptive results (Section 4.3.1) for context and econometric 
results (Section 4.3.2) to address the research questions. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter, 
highlighting chapter contributions and limitations. 
 Methodology 4.2
The following section (4.2.1) outlines the empirical models used to address the 
research questions in Section 4.1. The sample used is addressed in Section 4.2.2, while data is 
addressed in Section 4.2.3. The calculation of the stock market risk factors from the finance 
literature is outlined in Section 4.2.4. 
4.2.1 Models and Econometric Approach 
The following outlines the asset pricing models used to address the four research 
questions of this chapter. The four asset pricing models implemented in this chapter are the 
CAPM, augmented-CAPM, four-factor model and the proposed global AFFM, outlined in the 
literature review (Section 3.2). For convenience, sector portfolio returns are denoted in the 
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generalised form 𝑹𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 denotes the excess returns
42
 over the one month UK treasury 
bill rate on the 𝑖th portfolio on day 𝑡 (see Section 4.2.3.1). The econometric modelling begins 
with the CAPM from Section 3.2.1, estimated using OLS regressions, and gradually builds 
the global AFFM. The CAPM estimates a market beta based on the relationship between the 
excess returns of the sectors and the market factor, specified as: 
𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, (4.1) 
where 𝛼𝑖 denotes the intercept, 𝑏𝑖 denotes the market factor coefficient, 𝑹𝑚,𝑡 denotes the 
excess return on the market factor at time 𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the error term of portfolio 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
The second model specification is the augmented-CAPM from the energy economics 
literature (see Section 3.2.3). The energy economics literature extends the CAPM to include a 
variety of macroeconomic variables expected to affect returns in the energy sector, including 
term premium and commodity risk factors. The specification is: 
𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡, (4.2) 
where 𝑡𝑝𝑖 denotes the term premium coefficient, 𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 denotes the term premium at time 𝑡, 𝑜𝑖 
denotes the oil price risk coefficient, 𝑅𝑜,𝑡 denotes the return on oil price at time 𝑡, 𝑐𝑖 denotes 
the coal price risk coefficient, 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 denotes the return on coal price at time 𝑡, 𝑔𝑖 denotes the 
natural gas price risk coefficient and 𝑅𝑔,𝑡 denotes the return on natural gas price at time 𝑡. 
While some energy economics authors (Faff and Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, El-
Sharif et al., 2005, Boyer and Filion, 2007, Ramos and Veiga, 2011) include exchange rate 
risk, many finance papers exclude exchange rate risk or find exchange risk to be an 
insignificant risk factor (Manning, 1991, Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1995, Carhart, 1997, 
Fama and French, 2012). This produces a potential inference problem if purchasing power 
parity are heterogeneous or assets can be used to hedge exchange risk. The majority of papers 
that use exchange rate risk focus on oil and gas exporting countries in an international 
context, which suggests that the industry may be sensitive to international currency 
fluctuations (Sadorsky, 2001). As the majority of countries in the European Union operate 
under a single currency, this obstacle is overcome by converting all variables (where possible) 
to the common currency euro (€), implicitly controlling for exchange rate risk. Further, all 
data and the commodity risk factors are from European-specific data sources and therefore 
represent European costs. 
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 Note, the notation of excess return in this thesis is consistent with Koch and Bassen (2013) and Oberndorfer 
(2009a) from the energy economics literature. In the finance literature, excess return is typically denoted 
(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡), where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change in equity price in day t and 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 denotes the risk-free rate on day t. 




For the third model, the finance literature develops an asset pricing model to improve 
the estimation of the systematic risk component of a stock’s returns (see Section 3.2.2). Fama 
and French (1992) find that Equation (4.1) is underspecified, as the market beta estimate in 
the CAPM has low power for small and high-BE/ME stocks and is insufficient at explaining a 
cross-section of expected stock returns. The CAPM in Equation (4.1) is extended to include 
additional stock market factors to produce the four-factor model specification: 
𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, (4.3) 
where 𝑠𝑖 denotes the size premium coefficient, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 denotes the size premium at time 𝑡, ℎ𝑖 
denotes the value premium coefficient, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 denotes the value premium at time 𝑡, 𝑚𝑖 
denotes the momentum premium coefficient, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 denotes the momentum premium at 
time 𝑡. The global stock market risk factors are calculated over a diverse sample of 600 
European stocks (see Section 4.2.4). 
The four-factor model is augmented to include commodity risk factors from the 
energy economics literature, leading to the main contribution of this chapter, namely, the 
global AFFM. The name is derived from the inclusion of four stock market factors, 
augmented by term premium and commodity risk factors. The resulting specification is: 
𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 
+𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , (4.4) 
which controls for stock market, term premium and commodity risk factors. The relatively 
short time series for carbon prices results in its exclusion at this stage of analysis. All 
equations, (4.1) to (4.4), will be compared inter- sectorally and estimated using Newey-West 
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation (HAC) standard errors and subject to standard 
regression diagnostic tests. Consideration was given to the use of a GARCH model 
specification to control for heteroskedasticity, but Oberndorfer (2009a), who implemented the 
augmented-CAPM on European energy utilities and oil & gas firms, found no difference 
between an OLS and GARCH specification. In the time-series regressions, coefficients and 
𝑅2 values are direct evidence of the ability of the specified risk factors in capturing common 
variation in returns (Fama and French, 1993). Accordingly, the goodness of fit will be 
determined by comparing adjusted 𝑅2 values and the significance of variables. Implementing 
Equation (4.4) on the energy utility sector will address research questions 1 and 2. 
Implementing Equation (4.4) across sectors will address research question 3. 
As noted in Section 3.3.4, the previous literature has shown that the estimated 
relationship between returns and risk factors is not stable across time, showing temporal 
sensitivity which affects significance (Huang et al., 1996, Fama and French, 1997, Faff and 
Brailsford, 1999, El-Sharif et al., 2005, Boyer and Filion, 2007). Therefore, the true slope of 
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the risk factors is also likely to change across time. To address this issue, Equation (4.4) will 
also be implemented on an annual basis, similar to El-Sharif et al. (2005). Such conditional 
models are not expected to increase regression fit (Fama and French, 1997). However, 
temporal models provide useful insight into the evolving return profile of European stock 
returns. Further, the annual regressions allow the inclusion of carbon price risk from 2006 
onwards, contributing to research question 1. Accordingly, the following specification is 
implemented on an annual basis between 1996 and 2013: 
𝑹𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔+ 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 + 𝑒𝑖 , (4.5) 
where 𝑐𝑜2𝑖 denotes the carbon price risk coefficient and 𝑅𝑐𝑜2 denotes the return on carbon. 
The conditional annual global AFFM regressions in Equation (4.5) address research question 
4. 
Consideration was given to implementing a rolling regression approach using the past 
five years of data, as Fama and French (1997) argue that a period-by-period approach can lead 
to imprecise risk loading estimates. The rolling regression is beneficial if the true slopes 
remain stationary. Any permanent changes in supply or demand conditions result in 
permanent changes in risk loading (Fama and French, 1997). Further, the rolling regression 
approach consumes the first five years of observations, omitting the first major packages of 
liberalisation for electricity and gas utilities which occur in 1996 and 1998, respectively (see 
Section 2.2.1). As the European energy utility sector is currently being restructured, 
permanent shifts in risk factor loadings are expected. Moreover, the first packages of 
liberalisation are pertinent to later chapters of this thesis which measure the impact of 
regulatory changes (Chapter 6). Therefore, the rolling regression approach is not suitable for 
analysis. 
4.2.2 Sample Selection 
The STOXX® 600 Europe Utilities index is used to provide an initial list of 28 
European utilities currently operating and traded on equity markets. All utilities whose 
primary revenue is derived from waste or water operations are removed from the sample as 
these firms may bias estimated coefficients. The sample is expanded by including all 
companies explicitly mentioned in energy sector restructuring legislation, outlined in Section 
2.2 and Table 2.1. This includes electricity utilities identified as elected members of the 
European Distribution System Operators’ Association (EDSO), ENTSO-E, or mentioned in 
annexes in the electricity-specific legislation of Table 2.1. Moreover, utilities operating in the 
natural gas industry are also identified by their membership in Gas Infrastructure Europe 
(GIE), Gas Transmission Europe (GTE), Gas Storage Europe (GSE), Gas LNG Europe 
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(GLE), ENTSO-G, Eurogas and the annexes of the natural gas–specific legislation of Table 
2.1. 
For the newly formed sample, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are 
extracted from Datastream. Research Insight is used to expand the sample further by 
including all active and non-active energy utilities registered under the same product 
segments and SICs. The inclusion of non-active companies controls for survivorship bias, an 
improvement over Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). Screening for duplicate 
entries, the sample consists of 91 European energy utility companies across both the 
electricity and natural gas industries. Due to data requirements for portfolio formation, 
identified in Section 4.2.3, three companies were removed from the sample as some 
accounting data was unavailable, leaving 88 eligible energy utilities. As mentioned in the 
introduction (Section 4.1), the sample is still considerably larger than that of Oberndorfer 
(2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). 
4.2.3 Data 
The data are a combination of daily stock market and annual accounting data. All data 
are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The daily stock prices and market 
capitalisations of the energy utilities cover the period 30 June 1995 to 28 June 2013 (4,435 
daily observations). The calculation of the momentum factor absorbs the first year of daily 
observations (251 days); therefore, the analysis uses the data from 01 July 1996 to 28 June 
2013. The goal is to ensure the time series begins prior to the onset of major regulatory 
reforms in the European energy sector, as discussed in Section 2.2 and Table 2.1. Stock prices 
are measured in euros at day close and adjusted for capital actions, such as dividends, stock 
splits and mergers. Daily returns for all stocks and risk factors are calculated as the first-log 
difference of price. Excess returns are calculated as the difference between daily returns and 
the daily yield on the one-month UK Treasury bill. The UK Treasury bill is used as the risk 
free rate of return as European bonds did not have sufficient data.
43
 Market capitalisation is 
also recorded at day close and measured in euros. Regarding the accounting data, all data are 
extracted for fiscal year-end, covering the period 1995 to 2013.
44
 To be eligible for analysis, 
and to allow portfolio rebalancing, all firms must have data on stock price, market 
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 Consideration was given to using the Euro Interbank Offer Rate (EURIBOR), similar to Oberndorfer 
(2009a). However, only monthly data were available throughout the entire time series. The daily three-month 
and one-month EURIBOR rates were available from the 30
th
 December 1998 and 4
th
 January 1999, respectively. 
These dates exclude the first packages of liberalisation (Section 2.2.1), necessary for analysis in Chapter 6. 
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 At the time of writing this thesis, the 2014 accounting data were sparse and contained omissions, preventing 
the analysis from continuing beyond 2013. 
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capitalisation and book value of equity for both year 𝑡 and year 𝑡 − 1. Similar to Fama and 
French (1993), this ensures that companies have traded for at least two years. 
Term premium is calculated as the difference between the daily yields on the three- 
and one-month UK Treasury bills, denoted 𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕. London Brent Crude Oil Index proxies for 
oil price, sourced from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), and oil returns are denoted 𝑅𝑜,𝑡. 
Coal price is measured using a European-specific steam (thermal) coal index for power and 
heat generation,
45
 sourced from the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), 
and coal returns denoted 𝑅𝑐,𝑡. Natural gas price is measured using the one-month forward 
index, also sourced from the ICE, and natural gas returns are denoted 𝑅𝑔,𝑡. The natural gas 
price begins in 1996, another contributing factor in determining the start date of the empirical 
analysis. However, the 1996 start date is adequate to provide a broad coverage of energy 
sector returns while controlling for commodity risk factors. Carbon allowance prices, 
measured as the price (in euros) per EUA, are sourced from the ICE European Climate 
Exchange (ECX). The ICE ECX Futures is one of the most liquid, pan-European platforms 
for emissions trading. Continuous settlement prices are used to represent the market price of 
carbon.
46
 Carbon returns are denoted 𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡. As stated in Section 4.2.1, the carbon series is 
only included in the inter-temporal analysis due to the relatively short time series. 
The STOXX® 600 Europe index is used as a proxy for the broad market returns. The 
STOXX® 600 Europe index represents large-, mid- and small capitalisation firms across 18 
countries of the European Union. Summary statistics regarding the 600 firms are provided in 
Table 4.1. The constituents of the STOXX® 600 Index are weighted towards firms listed in 
the UK, France and Germany. Across sectors, the index has approximately equal weighting 
with the exception of the industrial sector, which comprises 18.33% of the 600 firms. 
  
                                                 
45
 See discussion regarding the limitation of Oberndorfer’s (2009a) composite coal index (Section 3.2.3.3). 
46
 The transition between Phase I and Phase II of the EU ETS resulted in a price jump in EUAs from €0.01 to 
€20.88, 29 Feb 2008 to 03 Mar 2008, respectively. The associated return was 764.40%. This single observation 
was deleted and replaced with zero, as its inclusion resulted in unusual summary statistics and insignificant 
carbon risk exposure across all sector portfolios. Post-deletion, carbon risk exposure was detected, which was 
consistent with Koch and Bassen (2013). While carbon futures may have been preferable, sufficient data was 
unavailable. Consideration was given to using the ICE ECX continuous average settlement price, which 
minimises the large price change, but the series produced inconsistent results with the coal series. The method 
outlined above provided results consistent with theory, with minimal data manipulation, and was deemed the 
better option. From here on in, all data relating to carbon exclude the outlier observation described above. 
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TABLE 4.1: SUMMARY OF STOXX® 600 EUROPE CONSTITUENTS 
This table provides a summary of characteristics for the 600 firms of the STOXX® 600 Europe index. The two 
characteristics include 1) country and 2) sector.  
Country Obs Percentage  Sector Obs Percentage 
Austria 7 1.17%  Automobiles & Parts 15 2.50% 
Belgium 13 2.17%  Banks 47 7.83% 
Czech Republic 2 0.33%  Basic Resources 19 3.17% 
Denmark 20 3.33%  Chemicals 26 4.33% 
Finland 16 2.67%  Construction & Materials 19 3.17% 
France 84 14.00%  Financial Services 31 5.17% 
Germany 63 10.50%  Food & Beverages 24 4.00% 
Greece 4 0.67%  Healthcare 36 6.00% 
Ireland 9 1.50%  Industrial Goods & Services 110 18.33% 
Italy 31 5.17%  Insurance 38 6.33% 
Luxembourg 4 0.67%  Media 29 4.83% 
Netherlands 28 4.67%  Oil & gas 25 4.17% 
Norway 13 2.17%  Personal & Household Goods 31 5.17% 
Portugal 4 0.67%  Real Estate 25 4.17% 
Spain 29 4.83%  Retail 29 4.83% 
Sweden 38 6.33%  Technology 25 4.17% 
Switzerland 48 8.00%  Telecommunications 22 3.67% 
United Kingdom  187 31.17%  Travel & Leisure 23 3.83% 
    Utilities 26 4.33% 
Total 600 100.00%  Total 600 100.00% 
 
Various econometric factors also influenced the choice of the market proxy. First, 
unless every asset can be included, the market proxy chosen should mimic the true market 
portfolio as close as possible (Roll, 1977). Accordingly, the ‘Roll critique’, notes that 
misspecification in the ‘market’ proxy will create an estimation bias, which can result in two 
portfolios, which are both mean-variance efficient, having different betas. The STOXX® 600 
Europe index is the most relevant market factor with regard to the 11 sectors analysed, as all 
11 sectors are drawn from the STOXX® 600 Europe index (see Table 4.1). Second, rather 
than use an established stock market index, Fama and French (1993) define their market 
factor to be a value-weighted combination of all firms eligible for analysis. Fama and French 
(1993) show that the market factor is typically good at explaining returns on big, low-BE/ME 
stocks. Naturally, these stocks dominate sector valuation. Fama and French (1993) also show 
that the additional stock market risk factors are buried within the market factor. The 
mimicking portfolios of size and value premium are designed to capture shared variation in 
stock returns that is missed by the market factor. The calculation of the size and value premia 
in Fama and French (1993) is performed using the same universe of companies as the market 
factor. Thus, to calculate the global stock market factors, this chapter adopts the same 
approach. The calculation of mimicking portfolios in Section 4.2.4 uses the universe of 600 
companies in the STOXX® 600 Europe index as a proxy for European equities. This ensures 
that not only is the market factor applicable across all sectors, but the size, value and 
momentum premia calculated in Section 4.2.4 are also relevant across all 11 sectors. Note, 
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this chapter calculates ‘global’ risk factors, while Chapter 5 calculates ‘local’ risk factors 
specific to the European energy utility sector; see discussion in Section 3.2.2.4 and footnote 8. 
Appendix A will compare variables and estimates from this thesis to existing literature to 
ensure congruence. The stock market and commodity risk factors outlined to this point 
address research questions 1 and 2. 
4.2.3.1 Additional European Sectors 
To address research question 3, the inter-sectoral analysis, Equations (4.1) to (4.4) are 
employed on an additional 10 European sectors. The additional 10 sectors, extracted from the 
STOXX 600 Europe index, include the bank, oil & gas, telecommunication, industrial, 
insurance, retail, technology, media, chemical and financial sectors. Excess returns are 
calculated using the method outlined in Section 4.2.3. The time series for all sectors are 
denoted: 𝑹𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙, 𝑹𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠, 𝑹𝑂&𝐺, 𝑹𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒, 𝑹𝑖𝑛𝑑, 𝑹𝑖𝑛𝑠, 𝑹𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑹𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ, 𝑹𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎, 𝑹𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚 and 𝑹𝑓𝑖𝑛. Each 
sector will replace 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 in Equations (4.1) to (4.4), regressed independently. The comparison 
of the regression results reveals inter-sectoral differences regarding the impact of risk premia. 
The inter-sectoral analysis helps establish whether the results reported for the European 
energy utility sector reflect community-wide macroeconomic responses, or whether the results 
represent a sector-specific relationship between the risk factors and average sector returns. 
The use of 10 sectors is an improvement over El-Sharif et al. (2005), who only uses four 
additional sectors. 
The 10 additional sectors were purposefully selected to represent a broad range of 
expected sensitivities to the various risk factors in the inter-sectoral analysis. The oil & gas, 
industrial and chemical sectors were chosen as they are energy-intensive and commodity-
related sectors. The oil & gas sector is expected to be closely related to natural gas utilities; 
both sectors benchmark output prices to market prices for oil and natural gas, responding 
positively to price fluctuations; see Section 3.2.3.2. Section 3.2.3 also outlines other 
arguments regarding the similarity of the two sectors. The industrial sector has high energy 
consumption, similar to the electricity generation operation, which is negatively impacted by 
increasing fuel input prices. The chemical sector should be sensitive to carbon (or carbon 
equivalent) risk exposure; high-emitting electricity generators are negatively impacted by 
carbon price risk (Koch and Bassen, 2013). The telecommunication sector is a selected sector 
which is also dependent on transnational transmission networks. The restructuring of the 
telecommunication sector proxies for the impact of network liberalisation and induced 
competition. The banking sector was also subjected to EU sector liberalisation objectives 
(Gual, 1999). The bank, financial and insurance sectors are expected to positively respond to 
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economy-wide conditions. Further, as the bank, financial and insurance sectors have no 
exposure to commodity price risk from operations, any sensitivity must be the result of either 
direct investment in commodities or indirectly through changes in valuation of (primarily 
energy) stock investment portfolios. The former point mimics the ability of energy utilities to 
speculate on the market price of commodities (Söderholm, 2001); see Section 3.3.5.2. The 
latter point relates to various reports in which bank and financial institutions have begun to 
acknowledge their exposure to commodity risk and stranded assets (Spedding et al., 2013, 
Carney, 2014). Finally, retail, technology and media are all expected to have no direct 
relationship with any commodity risk factors and hold little to no commodities. 
4.2.4 Calculating the Size, Value and Momentum Premia 
The following steps outline the creation of the global stock market risk factors from 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). As argued in Section 3.2.2, additional stock 
market risk factors are expected to capture variation in return missed by the market factor and 
will be used in Equations (4.3) and (4.4). The factors include size, value and momentum 
premia. The former two are derived and examined in Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1997, 
1998, 2006, 2012), and the momentum factor is derived and examined in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (2012). This chapter calculates the 
global stock market risk factors, which can explain returns across a variety of sectors by 
calculating the factors using a diversified universe of 600 European stocks. These global 
factors are used to perform the inter-sectoral comparisons (see Section 4.2.3.1). The following 
paragraphs outline how the 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factors for Equations (4.3) and (4.4) are 
calculated. Chapter 5 of this thesis adapts the research method to calculate local stock market 
risk factors for sector level analysis.  
French (2015) provides access to a monthly time series for the three stock market risk 
factors for the European market. Unfortunately, monthly data are unsuitable as Chapters 5 and 
6 of this thesis require daily data to perform analysis of time-varying risk factors and to 
implement the event study approach to examine the impact of regulations. French (2015) 
provides extensive guidelines regarding the replication of the three- and four-factor models 
using daily data. Therefore, the three stock market risk factors of size, value and momentum 
premia are manually calculated using daily data. Accordingly, it is important to ensure that 
these risk factors are comparable with French’s. A brief comparison of the manually 
calculated risk factors against French’s (2015) risk factors is provided in Appendix A. The 
overall conclusion of Appendix A is that risk factors calculated in the thesis accurately 
replicate French’s and are suitable for use in analysis. Further, Appendix B also delineates the 
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600 firms into a 5 × 5 matrix to explore the effectiveness of the sorting method and for some 
descriptive statistics used later in the thesis.
47
 The following paragraphs outline the 
construction of portfolios using these risk factors in line with Fama and French (1993).  
To begin, six portfolios are formed on a simple sorting of firm size and book-to-
market ratios. In June of each year 𝑡, from 1996 to 2013, all 600 stocks listed on the 
STOXX® 600 Europe Index are ranked on market capitalisation. Each year, the median 
market capitalisation is used to split the 600 firms into two groups: small and big firms. Of the 
available 8,863 annual observations, 4,453 (50.2%) are classified as big firms while 4,410 
(49.8%) are classified as small firms. Despite having an approximately equal number of small 
and big firm observations, the combined value of small firms typically accounted for 5.84% 
of the total market value, across all firms and years. This finding is similar to Fama and 
French (1995), who found that small firms’ combined value accounted for about 7.3% of total 
market value in 1991. 
To form book-to-market portfolios, all 600 firms are ranked on their BE/ME ratios. 
The BE/ME ratio is calculated as the book value of common equity for the fiscal year 𝑡 − 1, 
scaled
48
 by market capitalisation at the end of December in year 𝑡 − 1. The energy utilities are 
allocated to groups based on Fama and French’s (1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2006, 2012) three 
break points: the top 30% (high-BE/ME), the middle 40% (mid-BE/ME) and the bottom 30% 
(low-BE/ME). In the recent literature, the three groups are often defined as value, neutral and 
growth stocks, respectively (Fama and French, 2006, Fama and French, 2012, French, 2015). 
The market capitalisation of value stocks is equal to or below the book value of equity, 
whereas growth stocks’ market capitalisation is well above their book value of equity. 
Negative BE/ME firms are rare, but are excluded from break point calculations and BE/ME 
portfolio formation; the sample only contains two negative BE/ME observations. Of the 
eligible observations, 3,240 (36.6%) are high-BE/ME, 2,963 (33.4%) are mid-BE/ME and 
2,660 (30.0%) are low-BE/ME. Manually calculating the thresholds is preferable to using 
independent thresholds; Fama and French (1993) find that independent size and BE/ME sorts 
result in the highest-BE/ME portfolios being tilted towards smallest stocks. 
To ensure the accounting variables predate the returns they are used to explain, the 
accounting data for fiscal year 𝑡 − 1 are matched with the returns for July of year 𝑡 to June of 
𝑡 + 1 (Fama and French, 1992). This six month lag is due to Alford et al. (1994), who find 
                                                 
47
 While the statistics are not strictly useful for the AFFM, it provides confirmation that the data can be reliably 
sorted on firm size and (independently) BE/ME ratio, and will provide useful data for the interpretation of results 
in for Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2.1. 
48
 Datastream provides the book value of equity in thousands and market value of equity in millions. Both were 
scaled appropriately to ensure BE/ME parity equalled 1. 
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that 19.8% of U.S. firms fail to submit their 10-K reports with the SEC within 90 days of 
fiscal year end. Conover et al. (2008) extend Alford et al. (1994) by including non-U.S. firms 
and find that European
49
 firms are typically required to submit their reports six months after 
the fiscal year-end. European firms submit their reports within a range of 102 to 186 calendar 
days after fiscal year-end. The mean percentage of late reports is 24% across all European 
countries. This supports the assertion that, in the majority of cases, accounting information 
will be available within three to six months after the fiscal year-end. The portfolios are 
rebalanced at the end of June for 𝑡 + 1. 
To calculate the size and value premiums, the intersections of the two firm size groups 
and three book-to-market groups create six portfolios: S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M and B/H. 
Based on the classifications, the S/L portfolios contain firms which are classified as small and 
low-BE/ME, whereas the B/H portfolio contains firms which are classified as big and high-
BE/ME. Daily value-weighted returns for the six portfolios are calculated from July of year 𝑡 
to June of year 𝑡 + 1, with portfolio rebalancing occurring annually at the end of June of year 
𝑡 + 1. 
The 𝑆𝑀𝐵 (small minus big) risk factor (𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) is constructed to represent size 
premium. The risk factor is calculated as the daily difference between the arithmetic average 
return of the three small portfolios (S/L, S/M and S/H) minus the arithmetic average return of 
the three big portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H). The difference should be largely free of BE/ME 
influence and isolates the size effect (Fama and French, 1993). As small stocks are expected 
to generate higher returns than big stocks, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 represents a zero sum investment which 
is long on small stocks and short on big stocks. A positive (negative) 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 factor indicates 
that small stocks outperform (underperform) big stocks. A positive (negative) 𝑠𝑖 coefficient 
indicates that the sector of interest behaves like small (big) stocks. 
The 𝐻𝑀𝐿 (high minus low) risk factor (𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) is constructed to represent value 
premium. The risk factor is calculated as the daily difference between the arithmetic average 
of the two high-BE/ME portfolios (S/H and B/H) minus the arithmetic average of the two 
low-BE/ME portfolios (S/L and B/L). The 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factor should be largely free of the size 
effect, instead focusing on the impact of BE/ME (Fama and French, 1993). A pairwise 
correlation, see Table 4.4, confirms this proposition, showing a low correlation of 0.08 
between the two risk factors. High-BE/ME stocks are expected to outperform low-BE/ME 
stocks, the 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 represents a zero sum investment which is long on high-BE/ME stocks and 
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 European countries include Great Britain, Ireland, Netherland, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and Sweden. 
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short on low-BE/ME stocks. A positive (negative) 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factor indicates that high-BE/ME 
stocks outperform (underperform) low-BE/ME stocks. A positive (negative) ℎ𝑖 coefficient 
indicates that the sector of interest behaves like high-BE/ME (low-BE/ME) stocks. 
To study momentum, daily momentum portfolios are constructed from all 600 firms of 
the STOXX® 600 Europe Index following the method of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
Carhart (1997), Fama and French (2012) and French (2015). The average excess return is 
calculated over the formation period from day 𝑡 − 251 to day 𝑡 − 21, and excludes the sort 
month. Excluding the sort month is the standard approach in momentum tests (Fama and 
French, 2012). Skipping the portfolio sort month avoids some effects of bid-ask spread, price 
pressure, lagged reactions and price reversals (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993). Based on French (2015), to be considered as an upper-momentum stock, the 
stock returns during the formation period and on 𝑡 − 21 must be positive; similarly, the stock 
returns during the formation period and return on 𝑡 − 21 must be negative for down-
momentum stocks. The 𝑡 − 21 condition ensures that the upper and down momentums 
continue until the end of the formation period and reversal has not already begun. Based on 
Carhart (1997), Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and French (2015), the break points are 
defined as the top 30% (upper momentum), the middle 40% (medium momentum) and the 
bottom 30% (down momentum). The value-weighted daily returns on the upper, medium, and 
down momentum portfolios are calculated. 
The 𝑈𝑀𝐷 (upper minus down) risk factor (𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) is constructed to measure the 
momentum premium. The risk factor is calculated as the daily difference between the returns 
of the upper momentum and down momentum portfolios. Note, it is also common to refer to 
the portfolios as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’; see Section 3.2.2.4. Originally, Carhart (1997) takes 
an equal-weight average of firms with the highest 30% 11-month returns (lagged one month) 
minus the equal-weight average of firms with the lowest 30% eleven-month returns (lagged 
on month). Fama and French (1993) argue that a value-weighted portfolio minimises variance 
and captures the difference between the return behaviours of small and big stocks, or high- 
and low-BE/ME stocks, in a manner that relates to realistic investment opportunities. 
Moreover, the dependent variables, market factor, size and value premia, are also value-
weighted measures. Therefore, this thesis adapts Carhart’s (1997) method and calculates 
value-weighted momentum portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced daily. The 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factor 
also represents a zero sum investment which is long on upper-momentum stocks and short on 
down-momentum stocks. It is worth noting that an active portfolio strategy such as 
momentum requires extremely high turnover (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). A positive 
(negative) 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factor indicates that upper-momentum stocks outperform (underperform) 
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down-momentum stocks. A positive (negative) 𝑚𝑖 coefficient indicates that the sector of 
interest behaves like upper momentum (down momentum) stocks. Consideration was given to 
filtering low-priced stocks on an annual basis; however, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) claim 
that the filtering of such stocks made no qualitative difference to their results. The following 
section presents the descriptive and econometric results of the chapter. 
 Results 4.3
This chapter asks four research questions, outlined in Section 4.1, namely: 1) do 
commodities impact returns in the European energy utility sector, 2) could stock-market risk 
factors better explain energy utilities’ returns, 3) do these impacts reflect market-wide 
conditions or sector-specific relationships and 4) are these risk premia time-varying? As 
stated in Section 4.1, to address these research questions the chapter develops an augmented 
asset pricing model which includes stock market, term premium and commodity risk factors – 
the global AFFM. 
The results section is structured as follows. Section 4.3.1 contains the descriptive 
results of the chapter. Within the descriptive results, Section 4.3.1.1 presents the return 
profiles of the sectors and risk factors through time, placing the data in context to illustrate the 
market and commodity crises that energy utilities and European stocks have experienced over 
the last two decades. Section 4.3.1.2 presents the summary statistics of the data. Section 
4.3.1.3 briefly examines the pairwise correlations among energy utilities and other European 
sectors. Section 4.3.2 presents the empirical results of this chapter, addressing the four 
research questions. 
4.3.1 Descriptive Results 
4.3.1.1 Return profiles of sectors and risk factors 
To illustrate asset pricing behaviour, Figure 4.1 plots the cumulative returns for the 
energy sector and the price indices of the remaining 10 European sectors. It is clear from 
Figure 4.1 (Plot A), that the European energy utility sector has experienced large changes in 
valuation through time, which may suggest some changes to the sector’s relationship with 
underlying risk factors or impacts from regulatory changes. Between 1996 and 1998, the 
sector increases in value, which coincides with the first packages of energy liberalisation for 
the electricity (December 1996) and natural gas (July 1998) industries (see Section 2.2.1). The 
2000 dot-com bubble has little to no impact on energy utilities. In contrast, the 
telecommunication (Plot D), technology (Plot H) and media (Plot I) sectors are severely 
impacted. Energy utilities generally decline in value until 2003, coinciding with the second 
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packages of liberalisation (see Section 2.2.1). Although the value of energy utilities increases 
in price in the following years, it cannot reliably be attributed to the regulatory changes, as 
this also coincides with the build-up to the 2007 to 2009 GFC. This increase in price is 
observed across many sectors. Post-GFC, the majority of European sectors decline in value. 
The energy utility sector suffers a prolonged depression of stock prices post-GFC. This time 
period encompasses the EUC of 2010 to 2011, the third packages of liberalisation (see Section 
2.2.1) and is also consistent with the loss in market capitalisation and the poor performance of 
energy utilities reported by The Economist (2013b) – argued to be the result of renewables. 
Daily return profiles, Figure 4.2 provide a clearer picture of the magnitude of returns across 
all 11 sectors. The dot-com crisis continues to be limited to the telecommunication, 
technology and media sectors; in contrast, the GFC is observed across most sector portfolios. 
The heterogeneity of sector portfolios gives confidence in identifying sector-specific 
relationships. 
Having addressed the return profiles of the sectors, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present 
the data and daily returns regarding the risk factors used in analysis. The sources of data were 
outlined in Section 4.2.3, while the calculation of the stock market risk factors (size, value and 
momentum premia) was outlined in Section 4.2.4. For Figure 4.3, the price index of the 
market factor (Plot D) clearly capture the impacts of the dot-com and GFC crises. While 
energy utilities appear to fluctuate with the market factor (with lower magnitude), the price 
index of the market factor recovers post-GFC, while the value of energy utilities remains low. 
If there is to be any shift in systematic risk, the post-GFC time period is a likely candidate; 




   
   
FIGURE 4.1: PRICE INDICES AND CUMULATIVE RETURNS FOR THE 11 EUROPEAN SECTOR PORTFOLIOS 
This figure presents the cumulative returns and price indices of the 11 sector portfolios analysed in this chapter. The cumulative returns are calculated for the energy utility sector while the price indices 












































































































































































































   
   
FIGURE 4.2: DAILY RETURNS FOR THE 11 EUROPEAN SECTOR PORTFOLIOS 









































































































   
  
 
























































































For Figure 4.3, the increasing 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor (Plot A) shows that small European stocks 
outperform big European stocks, consistent with the expectations of Banz (1981), Chan et al. 
(1985) and Fama and French (1993) in Section 3.2.2.1. The 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor (Plot B) shows that 
high-BE/ME European stocks outperform low-BE/ME European stocks, consistent with the 
results of Rosenberg et al. (1985), Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1993) in 
Section 3.2.2.2. The 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor appears to reverse post-GFC, where low-BE/ME European 
stocks outperform high-BE/ME stocks. This may indicate that distressed stocks performed 
poorly post-GFC. Overall, the cumulative returns of the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor is lower than the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 
and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factors, suggesting the value premium may be small for European stocks. Finally, 
the increasing 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor (Plot C) shows that upper momentum European stocks outperform 
down momentum European stocks for the majority of the time series, consistent with the 
expectations of Carhart (1997) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993; 2001). Post-GFC, the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 
factor shows that all stocks suffer a decline in value, but the momentum factor soon recovers. 
Regarding term premium (Plot E), the daily yields on the three- and one-month 
treasury bills declined post-GFC, consistent with economic downturns (Sadorsky, 2001). As 
mentioned in Section 4.1, this chapter improves on El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Oberndorfer 
(2009a) by including this change in term premium. Also noted in Section 4.1, commodities 
have experienced record high prices over the last two decades. In particular, crude oil prices 
(Plot F) experienced a five-fold increase between 1996 and 2013, while the coal index (Plot 
G) mostly followed a similar patter to oil prices. Natural gas prices (Plot H) have experienced 
rapid changes across time, increasing from €0.20 per therm in 1996 to over €1.60 per therm in 
2006; shortly after, natural gas prices decline. The carbon price (Plot I) is highly volatile. In 
late 2007, carbon prices fall to effectively zero (€0.01 per EUA) due to the expiration of 
Phase I EUAs. From March 2008, Phase II EUAs were priced at approximately €20 per EUA 
but rapidly decline thereafter. Regarding Figure 4.4, the market factor and stock market risk 
factors are generally more volatile surrounding the dot-com bubble and GFC, the term 
premium shifts post-2008 and oil, coal and natural gas returns are volatile throughout time. 
Carbon price returns show high volatility at the end of Phase I (2007), which is likely due to 




   
   
FIGURE 4.3: PRICES, PRICE INDICES AND CUMULATIVE RETURNS FOR THE RISK FACTORS 
This figure illustrates the cumulative returns, the price indices, market prices or the daily yield for the nine risk factors used as independent variables. The cumulative returns are presented for the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 
factor (Plot A), the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor (Plot B) and the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor (Plot C). The price index is shown for the market factor (Plot D) and the coal index (Plot G). The daily yields on the three and 1 month UK 




























































































































































































































(E) Treasury Bills 


























(F) Crude Oil Prices 
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(I) Carbon Allowance Price 
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FIGURE 4.4: DAILY RETURN PROFILES FOR THE RISK FACTORS 
This figure illustrates the daily returns for the nine risk factors. The calculations of the 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 risk factors (Plots A to C) are outlined in Section 4.2.4. The daily return on the market 
factor (Plot D), oil prices (Plot E), coal prices (Plot G), natural gas prices (Plot H) and carbon prices (Plot I) are calculated as the first-log difference of the price index or market price. Term premium is 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































(I) Carbon Returns 
D.J. Tulloch© 
117 
The descriptive statistics have shown that the macroeconomic and stock market risk 
factors have undergone dramatic changes over the last two decades. Importantly, the results 
suggest the existence of a size, value and momentum premia in European stock returns. Also, 
as mentioned in Section 4.1, European stocks have been impacted by a variety of stock and 
commodity crises. Clearly, there are many macroeconomic variables which must be 
controlled for to reliably explore the impact of regulatory changes in Chapter 6. 
4.3.1.2 Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics for the daily returns of the 11 sectors and nine 
risk factors. Mean daily returns are also annualised for comparisons against relevant literature. 
The t-statistics for the mean shows that the average daily excess return, across all 11 sectors, 
is not statistically different from zero. Mean daily excess returns range between -0.012% and 
0.020%; energy utilities achieve a mean daily excess return of -0.005%. For the risk factors, 
the mean daily excess return on the STOXX® 600 Europe index is 0.004%, while term 
premium, oil, coal, gas and carbon achieve daily returns of 0.026%, 0.038%, 0.016%, 0.042% 
and -0.423%, respectively. The mean daily return for carbon is statistically significant at 
𝑝 = 0.008 and term premium is significant at 𝑝 ≤ 0.001; oil, coal and natural gas were 
insignificant. 
The lack of significant daily means for the energy utility sector and commodities is 
similar to Oberndorfer (2009a). While Oberndorfer (2009a) and El-Sharif et al. (2005) find a 
lack of significance in term premium, a positive and significant term premium coefficient is 
congruent with Sadorsky (2001). The lack of consistency across papers, especially 
Oberndorfer (2009a), who performs a similar analysis on European utilities, suggests a lack of 
inter-temporal consistency. The insignificant term premium found in Oberndorfer (2009a) and 
El-Sharif et al. (2005) may be due to the time period analysed. As shown in Figure 4.3, the 
yield on treasury bills decline post-GFC, while Figure 4.4 shows that term premium, the 
spread between yields, increases post-GFC. For the stock market risk factors, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 
and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factors achieve daily returns of 0.025%, 0.002% and 0.031%, respectively. The 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 portfolio is significant at 𝑝 = 0.002, while 𝑈𝑀𝐷 is significant at 𝑝 = 0.071. The daily 
means are congruent with expectations from Fama and French (1993): small firms outperform 
big firms. High-BE/ME firms outperform low-BE/ME firms but the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor over the 
entire series is not significantly different from zero, likely due to the reversal post-GFC. 
Upper momentum firms outperform down momentum firms using market level data, 
congruent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
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TABLE 4.2: SUMMARY STATISTIC FOR THE EUROPEAN SECTORS AND RISK FACTORS 
This table presents summary statistics for the 11 sectors and nine risk factors, including: number of daily observations (N), mean daily return, the 𝑡-statistic of the mean, standard 
deviation of mean daily return, annualised mean daily return, minimum and maximum observations, skewness and kurtosis. The 𝑡-mean statistic is the ratio of the mean to its 
standard error. The 11 value-weighted sector portfolios include: energy utility (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), bank (𝑹𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔,𝒕), oil & gas (𝑹𝑶&𝑮,𝒕), telecommunication (𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒆,𝒕), industrial (𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒅,𝒕), insurance 
(𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒔,𝒕), retail (𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒕), technology (𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉,𝒕), media (𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂,𝒕), chemical (𝑹𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎,𝒕), and financial (𝑹𝒇𝒊𝒏,𝒕). The nine risk factors include: market factor (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), size premium (𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), 
value premium (𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), momentum premium (𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil price risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal price risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡), natural gas price risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡), and carbon price risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡). A 
****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔,𝒕 𝑹𝑶&𝑮,𝒕 𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒆,𝒕 𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒅,𝒕 𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒔,𝒕 𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒕 𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂,𝒕 𝑹𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎,𝒕 
N 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 
Mean Daily -0.0051% -0.0073% 0.0039% 0.0007% 0.0069% -0.0047% -0.0031% -0.0029% -0.0117% 0.0195% 
t-Mean (-0.30) (-0.28) (0.17) (0.03) (0.34) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.52) (0.94) 
Std. Dev. Daily 1.11% 1.73% 1.55% 1.58% 1.35% 1.80% 1.17% 2.05% 1.49% 1.39% 
Mean Annualized -1.31% -1.88% 1.02% 0.18% 1.80% -1.21% -0.80% -0.76% -2.99% 5.21% 
Min -8.10% -10.98% -10.05% -9.45% -9.62% -12.18% -7.44% -12.23% -8.44% -8.05% 
Max 13.60% 16.08% 11.85% 9.65% 9.97% 13.40% 7.28% 10.75% 9.51% 11.61% 
Skew 0.09 0.14 -0.09 0.06 -0.19 0.04 -0.21 -0.13 -0.05 -0.09 
Kurt 14.80 10.62 8.84 6.27 8.75 9.71 7.08 6.36 7.39 8.21 
 𝑹𝒇𝒊𝒏,𝒕 𝑹𝒎,𝒕 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 𝑅𝑜,𝑡 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 𝑅𝑔,𝑡 𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡
A
 
N 4435 4435 4436 4436 4436 4435 4435 4435 4435 2135 
Mean -0.0052% 0.0036% 0.0252% 0.0017% 0.0312% 0.0262% 0.0383% 0.0158% 0.0424% -0.4233% 
t-Mean (-0.21) (0.19) (3.06)*** (0.18) (1.81)* (11.10)**** (1.43) (0.78) (0.76) (-2.64)*** 
Std. Dev. Daily 1.65% 1.26% 0.55% 0.62% 1.15% 0.16% 1.78% 1.36% 3.73% 7.42% 
Mean Annualized -1.35% 0.95% 6.78% 0.43% 8.45% 7.04% 10.46% 4.20% 11.66% -66.81% 
Min -10.19% -7.94% -3.47% -7.29% -7.27% -0.71% -11.35% -16.08% -28.13% -138.63% 
Max 14.65% 9.40% 4.68% 4.29% 7.55% 0.36% 12.56% 19.78% 47.77% 109.86% 
Skew 0.09 -0.17 -0.29 -0.07 -0.48 -1.06 -0.27 0.80 2.57 -3.14 
Kurt 10.08 7.96 7.21 11.19 7.72 4.74 6.17 38.75 28.85 121.76 
A
 As mentioned, the statistics for the carbon series hereon in are based on the data which excludes the 764% price increase of March 2008. For comparison, the unadjusted summary 
statistics were: N = 2135, Mean = -0.0653%, t-mean = (-0.17), Std. Dev. = 18.14%, Min = -138.63%, Max = 764.40%, Skew = 34.85, Kurt = 1482.02. The unusual observation 
biased most analyses. 
D.J. Tulloch© 
119 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) (ADF) unit root tests are implemented to examine 
the data generating processes of the variables used in analysis. The ADF tests are 
implemented to test the assumption that the data-generating process of the dependent and 
independent variables are integrated to the same order, ensuring there can be a linear 
relationship between the variables. The results of the ADF test, shown in Table 4.3, confirm 
that the time series for all 11 sectors and nine risk factors are integrated to order zero, 𝐼(0) 
and stationary. 
TABLE 4.3: AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS 
This table presents the results of the ADF test for unit roots. The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, against the 
alternative of no unit root (stationarity). A ***, ** or * denotes 1%, 5% or 10% significance, respectively. The ADF test does not report 
significance greater than 1%. 
Variable ADF Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value Sig. 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 -66.04 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔,𝒕 -62.61 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝑶&𝑮,𝒕 -67.76 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒆,𝒕 -65.21 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒅,𝒕 -62.87 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒔,𝒕 -63.56 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒕 -67.76 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉,𝒕 -64.73 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂,𝒕 -61.65 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎,𝒕 -64.86 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒇𝒊𝒏,𝒕 -62.94 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒎,𝒕 -66.21 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 -68.30 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  -60.00 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  -57.56 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 -55.53 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑜,𝑡 -55.95 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑐,𝑡 -66.76 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑔,𝑡 -63.62 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 -47.63 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
Where ***, ** and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. The ADF test in stat does not test 
significance beyond 1%. 
 
The pairwise correlation matrix of daily returns, for all 11 sectors and nine risk 
factors, are shown in Table 4.4. With respect to the risk factors, the market factor shows 
positive correlation among all 11 sectors with varying magnitudes. This result is expected, as 
all portfolios must share some form of systematic risk; in addition, many of the sectors 
represent around 5% of the market factor’s constituents (shown in Table 4.1). The stock 
market risk factors have low correlations with each other, congruent with Fama and French 
(1993). Regarding the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors, both factors show statistically significant 
coefficients with sector portfolios. In the absence of competition from the market factor, the 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 are able to capture some variation in stock returns (Fama and French, 1993). 
However, drawing inference at this stage can be misleading, as Fama and French (1993, 1997) 
show that 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 do not suffice in accurately explaining average returns in isolation, 
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leaving common variation in stock returns which is better explained by the market factor. 
Both risk factors are designed to be used in conjunction with the market factor, addressing the 
CAPM’s low explanatory power for small and high-BE/ME stocks. This rule is also applied 
to the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 (momentum) factor. Further, analysis in Section 4.3.2.1 will show that the 
pairwise correlations produce biased correlation estimates for the stock market risk factors.  
Regarding term premium, the results are insignificant across all sectors and risk 
factors. Oil has a positive correlation with the oil & gas sector and term premium. Coal has a 
positive correlation with four sectors, the market factor and a negative correlation with the 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor. Interestingly, the sectors positively correlated with coal are typically technology 
and service industries. It is possible that coal may proxy for an unobserved variable relating to 
energy demand, or is capturing returns better explained by stock market factors; this 
proposition is addressed in Section 4.3.2.1. Natural gas has a positive correlation with the oil 
& gas, industrial, insurance and chemical sectors. Carbon risk is positively correlated with all 
11 sectors the economy, the market factor, the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor and natural gas. Carbon has 
negative correlations with coal and the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factors. 
Across all significant commodities, the magnitudes of the correlations are all small, 
ranging from -0.057 to 0.090. Therefore, the economic impact of commodities on a sector’s 
returns is likely to be small regardless of statistical significance, and statistical significance 
may disappear when included in multivariate regressions with more relevant stock market risk 
factors. This behaviour is well documented in Fama and French (1993), who demonstrate that 
bond-market risk factors are significant determinants of stock returns when examined in 
isolation; the significance is nullified when stock market risk factors are included as the return 
on bond factors is typically small in comparison with stock factors. 
4.3.1.3 Is the energy utility sector distinct to the oil & gas sector? 
As discussed in the introduction to the thesis (Section 1.1) and the literature review 
(Section 3.2.3), there is often the assumption that the risk exposure of the oil & gas sector 
holds for the energy utility sector, where risk factors which affect oil & gas firms are assumed 
to also impact energy utilities. This assumption can lead to incorrect inferences in equilibrium 
asset pricing for energy utilities, incorrect calculation of the cost of capital and an inability to 




TABLE 4.4: PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS 
This table presents pairwise correlations between the 11 portfolios and nine risk factors. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively.  
 Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔,𝒕 𝑹𝑶&𝑮,𝒕 𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒆,𝒕 𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒅,𝒕 𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒔,𝒕 𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒕 𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂,𝒕 𝑹𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎,𝒕 𝑹𝒇𝒊𝒏,𝒕 𝑹𝒎,𝒕 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 𝑅𝑜,𝑡 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 𝑅𝑔,𝑡 𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 1.000 
                    
                    𝑹𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔,𝒕 0.725 1.000 
                   **** 
                   𝑹𝑶&𝑮,𝒕 0.727 0.640 1.000 
                  **** **** 
                  𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒆,𝒕 0.618 0.655 0.507 1.000 
                 **** **** **** 
                 𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒅,𝒕 0.739 0.841 0.679 0.680 1.000 
                **** **** **** **** 
                𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒔,𝒕 0.748 0.895 0.651 0.665 0.833 1.000 
               **** **** **** **** **** 
               𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒕 0.689 0.738 0.610 0.657 0.782 0.749 1.000 
              **** **** **** **** **** **** 
              𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉,𝒕 0.559 0.661 0.506 0.747 0.744 0.677 0.638 1.000 
             **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
             𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂,𝒕 0.613 0.690 0.540 0.757 0.770 0.709 0.704 0.764 1.000 
            **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
            𝑹𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎,𝒕 0.725 0.739 0.677 0.580 0.817 0.769 0.693 0.622 0.623 1.000 
           **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
           𝑹𝒇𝒊𝒏,𝒕 0.753 0.988 0.665 0.680 0.868 0.948 0.768 0.689 0.720 0.771 1.000 
          **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
          𝑹𝒎,𝒕 0.818 0.899 0.760 0.808 0.923 0.900 0.841 0.807 0.830 0.830 0.928 1.000 
         **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
         𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 -0.439 -0.408 -0.427 -0.526 -0.333 -0.440 -0.362 -0.499 -0.349 -0.397 -0.424 -0.499 1.000
        **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
        𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 0.211 0.357 0.163 -0.058 0.185 0.279 0.111 -0.146 -0.054 0.203 0.332 0.128 0.086 1.000
       **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
       𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 -0.192 -0.384 -0.177 -0.169 -0.256 -0.375 -0.199 -0.205 -0.183 -0.237 -0.383 -0.248 0.126 -0.315 1.000
      **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** 
      𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 -0.007 -0.018 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014 -0.009 0.003 0.003 0.015 1.000 
     
                    𝑅𝑜,𝑡 0.020 -0.009 0.085 -0.014 0.006 -0.007 -0.024 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.025 1.000 
    
  
**** 
            
* 
    𝑅𝑐,𝑡 -0.023 0.003 0.024 0.031 0.010 -0.006 0.033 0.050 0.047 -0.002 0.002 0.027 -0.023 -0.057 0.019 0.007 0.012 1.000 
   
   
** 
  











   
* 
          𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 0.078 0.077 0.090 0.054 0.079 0.082 0.082 0.080 0.066 0.070 0.081 0.082 -0.039 0.048 -0.055 0.010 -0.029 -0.052 0.061 1.000 
 
**** **** **** ** **** **** **** **** *** *** **** **** * ** ** 
  
** *** 
 Note: Correlations between carbon and other variables are estimated over 2,135 observations to reflect the shorter time series. 
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The pairwise correlations in Table 4.4 show that all 11 sectors have positive and 
significant correlations with one another, varying from 0.506 to 0.988. For interpretation, we 
define sector correlations greater than 0.70 to represent high correlations. The threshold is 
chosen to remain consistent with the 70
th
 percentile used in the stock market factor 
constructions in Section 4.2.4. A more stringent threshold could be implemented but may 
limit discussion; ultimately, the choice is arbitrary. Based on high correlations between sector 
portfolios, a node network between sectors is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
FIGURE 4.5: NODE NETWORK OF EUROPEAN SECTOR RETURN CORRELATIONS 
This figure shows a node network of European sectors’ daily return correlations. The nodes represent each of the 11 sectors’ 
returns. The size of the node indicates the number of pairwise correlations with other sectors, as represented by the edges 
(curved lines). Larger node size indicates more edges. The node locations are estimated using the Fruchterman-Reingold 
force-directed graph drawing algorithm to minimise cross edges. The edge values are extracted from Table 4.4 to represent 
the degree of correlation between sector returns. The length of edges provide no additional information. 
 
The node network shows that many of the European sectors are inter-related and show 
high correlation with one another. The returns of the energy utility sector have a high 
correlation with six European sectors: insurance (0.75), financial (0.75), industrial (0.74), 
bank (0.73), chemicals (0.73) and oil & gas (0.73). The energy utility sector must share 
elements of risk exposure with the aforementioned sectors. In contrast, the oil & gas sector 
only has one high correlation – the energy utility sector (0.73). Therefore, it is incorrect to 
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assume that the oil & gas sector is representative of the energy utility sector, as other 
European sectors have equal or greater correlations with utilities. 
The most probable connection between the oil & gas and energy utility sectors is 
through commodity prices, specifically oil and natural gas. Table 4.4 shows that oil and 
natural gas returns have significant pairwise correlations with the oil & gas sector, while both 
commodities marginally miss significance at the 10% level for the energy utility sector, with 
𝑝 = 0.1879 and 𝑝 = 0.1118, respectively. Inter-temporal analysis may show temporary 
significance through time, similar to El-Sharif et al. (2005). Oberndorfer (2009a) argues that 
the value of energy utilities and oil & gas firms may be benchmarked against commodity 
prices, explaining the significant relationship despite the fact that oil is rarely used in energy 
production. 
4.3.2 Econometric Results 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the four asset pricing models: the CAPM (Equation 
4.1), augmented-CAPM (Equation 4.2), the four-factor (Equation 4.3) and the global AFFM 
(Equation 4.4) introduced in this chapter; as discussed in Section 4.2.1. The time period 
covered is 01 July 1996 to 28 June 2013 (4,435 daily observations). Due to the relatively short 
time series, carbon prices are not included in the full-period multifactor regression, but are 
included in the inter-temporal analysis in Section 4.3.2.2. The results of each model 
specification are presented independently. The purpose is to compare the estimated 
coefficients across specifications to identify whether the global AFFM explains a greater 
proportion of returns. 
The results of this section address the four research questions presented in Section 4.1. 
For Section 4.3.2.1, comparing the results of the global AFFM against existing asset pricing 
models will address research questions 1 and 2, regarding the impact of commodities and 
stock market risk factors, respectively. Further, comparing the estimated coefficients across 
various sector portfolios will address research question 3, the inter-sectoral comparison. The 
inter-temporal results in Section 4.3.2.2 will address research question 4, using annual global 
AFFM regressions. Regression diagnostic tests identify heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
across sector portfolios, also reported in Table 4.5. All coefficients are estimated using 
Newey-West (1987) HAC covariance matrices. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) found 




TABLE 4.5: CAPM, FAMA-FRENCH AND AUGMENTED ASSET PRICING MODELS 
This table presents the Newey-West regression output for the 11 sectors, using four model specifications. The 11 value-weighted sector portfolios include the: energy utility (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), bank (𝑹𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔,𝒕), oil & gas (𝑹𝑶&𝑮,𝒕), 
telecommunication (𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒆,𝒕), industrial (𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒅,𝒕), insurance (𝑹𝒊𝒏𝒔,𝒕), retail (𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒕,𝒕), technology (𝑹𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉,𝒕), media (𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂,𝒕), chemical (𝑹𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎,𝒕), and financial (𝑹𝒇𝒊𝒏,𝒕) sectors. The nine risk factors include: market premium 
(𝑹𝒎,𝒕), size premium (𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), value premium (𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), momentum premium (𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil price risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal price risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡) and natural gas price risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes 
significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. Reported coefficients and significances have been corrected for any autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity. Specifications are: 
Equation (4.1), CAPM: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 
Equation (4.2), Augmented-CAPM: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 
Equation (4.3), four-factor: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (4.4), global AFFM: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 denotes one of the 11 sectors as the dependent variable. 
Sector Model 𝛼𝑖  𝑏𝑖  𝑠𝑖  ℎ𝑖  𝑚𝑖  𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  𝑐𝑖  𝑔𝑖  𝑨𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = 𝒑 Mean VIF Heterosked. Autocorr. 
Energy 
Utilities 
(4.1) -0.0001  0.7218 ****               0.6696 1852.86 **** 1.00 84.95 **** 33.978 **** 
(4.2) -0.0001  0.7227 ****       -0.0017  0.0109  -0.0371 **** 0.0020  0.6717 486.99 **** 1.00 73.23 **** 31.462 **** 
(4.3) -0.0001  0.6887 **** -0.1362 **** 0.2409 **** 0.0510 ****         0.6863 520.46 **** 1.28 77.98 **** 25.058 **** 
(4.4) -0.0001  0.6896 **** -0.1369 **** 0.2368 **** 0.0512 **** -0.0117  0.0113  -0.0323 *** 0.0019  0.6879 347.80 **** 1.14 70.28 **** 23.268 **** 
Banks (4.1) -0.0001  1.2378 ****               0.8077 4726.40 **** 1.00 144.88 **** 92.766 **** 
(4.2) -0.0001  1.2385 ****       -0.1010  -0.0115  -0.0267 * 0.0012  0.8082 992.56 **** 1.00 162.53 **** 91.640 **** 
(4.3) -0.0001  1.1720 **** 0.0385  0.6011 **** -0.1623 ****         0.8773 1947.37 **** 1.28 156.26 **** 54.438 **** 
(4.4) -0.0001  1.1723 **** 0.0386  0.6004 **** -0.1619 **** -0.0982  -0.0097  -0.0067  -0.0003  0.8774 1044.05 **** 1.14 172.83 **** 52.859 **** 
Oil & Gas (4.1) 0.0000  0.9354 ****               0.5776 2404.05 **** 1.00 18.75 **** 2.913 * 
(4.2) 0.0000  0.9345 ****       -0.0277  0.0719 **** 0.0033  0.0082 ** 0.5845 537.28 **** 1.00 15.34 **** 0.507  
(4.3) 0.0000  0.8827 **** -0.2322 **** 0.2298 **** 0.0536 **         0.5878 711.32 **** 1.28 23.50 **** 2.133  
(4.4) 0.0000  0.8806 **** -0.2356 **** 0.2315 **** 0.0529 ** -0.0383  0.0724 **** 0.0076  0.0085 ** 0.5949 388.10 **** 1.14 19.13 **** 0.909  
Telecom. (4.1) 0.0000  1.0126 ****               0.6535 3552.28 **** 1.00 0.11  103.082 **** 
(4.2) 0.0000  1.0128 ****       0.0116  -0.0153 * 0.0106  -0.0066 * 0.6538 728.08 **** 1.00 0.01  99.986 **** 
(4.3) 0.0001  0.9490 **** -0.3849 **** -0.3757 **** -0.0147          0.6931 1113.95 **** 1.28 0.01  68.568 **** 
(4.4) 0.0001  0.9497 **** -0.3836 **** -0.3758 **** -0.0146  0.0181  -0.0154 * -0.0007  -0.0044  0.6932 568.98 **** 1.14 0.17  65.855 **** 
Industrial (4.1) 0.0000  0.9870 ****               0.8521 8133.39 **** 1.00 3.33 * 28.490 **** 
(4.2) 0.0000  0.9872 ****       0.0090  0.0019  -0.0151 * 0.0036 * 0.8523 1654.54 **** 1.00 3.25 * 27.982 **** 
(4.3) -0.0001  1.0638 **** 0.3991 **** 0.0840 **** -0.0207 **         0.8759 2897.96 **** 1.28 5.10 ** 21.010 **** 
(4.4) -0.0001  1.0641 **** 0.3987 **** 0.0825 **** -0.0207 ** 0.0115  0.0016  -0.0110  0.0020  0.8759 1464.94 **** 1.14 4.99 ** 20.138 **** 
Insurance (4.1) -0.0001  1.2900 ****               0.8104 6491.01 **** 1.00 3.73 * 38.745 **** 
(4.2) -0.0001  1.2910 ****       0.0344  -0.0100  -0.0393 **** 0.0041  0.8113 1318.77 **** 1.00 4.80 ** 37.853 **** 
(4.3) 0.0000  1.2125 **** -0.0466  0.3933 **** -0.1896 ****         0.8505 2343.45 **** 1.28 0.21  16.975 **** 
(4.4) 0.0000  1.2133 **** -0.0471  0.3897 **** -0.1893 **** 0.0433  -0.0085  -0.0248 *** 0.0033  0.8509 1185.47 **** 1.14 0.63  16.203 **** 
Retail (4.1) -0.0001  0.7794 ****               0.7079 5695.37 **** 1.00 10.28 *** 3.763 * 
(4.2) -0.0001  0.7792 ****       0.0113  -0.0177 *** 0.0093  0.0009  0.7084 1162.51 **** 1.00 11.00 **** 2.915 * 
(4.3) -0.0001  0.8180 **** 0.1657 **** -0.0107  0.0086          0.7122 1485.73 **** 1.28 11.04 **** 2.714 * 
(4.4) -0.0001  0.8179 **** 0.1661 **** -0.0098  0.0087  0.0117  -0.0180 *** 0.0094  0.0003  0.7128 758.31 **** 1.14 11.60 **** 1.949  
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Sector Model 𝛼𝑖  
𝑏𝑖  
𝑠𝑖  





𝑨𝒅𝒋. 𝑹𝟐 𝑭 = 𝒑 Mean VIF Heterosked. Autocorr. 
Technology (4.1) -0.0001  1.3174 ****               0.6513 2779.74 **** 1.00 0.07  7.044 *** 
(4.2) -0.0001  1.3165 ****       -0.0366  -0.0084  0.0432 *** -0.0049  0.6519 594.05 **** 1.00 0.55  7.320 *** 
(4.3) 0.0001  1.2770 **** -0.2820 **** -0.8871 **** -0.1522 ****         0.7250 981.83 **** 1.28 0.05  0.462  
(4.4) 0.0001  1.2765 **** -0.2813 **** -0.8844 **** -0.1524 **** -0.0071  -0.0091  0.0213  -0.0020  0.7250 530.28 **** 1.14 0.15  0.479  
Media (4.1) -0.0002  0.9802 ****               0.6881 4299.07 **** 1.00 0.37  92.787 **** 
(4.2) -0.0002  0.9795 ****       0.0237  -0.0039  0.0267 **** -0.0008  0.6885 870.16 **** 1.00 0.26  93.035 **** 
(4.3) -0.0002 * 1.0725 **** 0.3376 **** -0.4594 **** -0.0432 **         0.7256 1367.68 **** 1.28 0.76  64.404 **** 
(4.4) -0.0002 * 1.0721 **** 0.3380 **** -0.4575 **** -0.0434 ** 0.0386  -0.0051  0.0164 ** -0.0010  0.7256 688.55 **** 1.14 0.57  64.315 **** 
Chemicals (4.1) 0.0002  0.9143 ****               0.6890 4085.12 **** 1.00 6.42 ** 5.354 ** 
(4.2) 0.0002  0.9148 ****       0.0229  0.0009  -0.0252 ** 0.0039  0.6894 820.76 **** 1.00 7.12 *** 5.524 ** 
(4.3) 0.0002  0.9018 **** 0.0100  0.2172 **** -0.0048          0.6983 1083.48 **** 1.28 12.22 **** 3.705 * 
(4.4) 0.0002  0.9022 **** 0.0093  0.2145 **** -0.0047  0.0192  0.0014  -0.0192 * 0.0034  0.6985 541.90 **** 1.14 13.17 **** 3.845 ** 
Finance (4.1) -0.0001  1.2199 ****               0.8610 7199.18 **** 1.00 159.36 **** 100.526 **** 
(4.2) -0.0001  1.2206 ****       -0.0595  -0.0090  -0.0276 ** 0.0018  0.8615 1509.12 **** 1.00 176.75 **** 99.419 **** 
(4.3) -0.0001  1.1642 **** 0.0463  0.4936 **** -0.1549 ****         0.9172 3074.47 **** 1.28 204.27 **** 49.034 **** 
(4.4) 0.0000  1.1646 **** 0.0463  0.4922 **** -0.1545 **** -0.0551  -0.0075  -0.0107  0.0005  0.9173 1663.27 **** 1.14 223.39 **** 47.288 **** 
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4.3.2.1 The Four Asset Pricing Models 
The CAPM 
The CAPM, Equation (4.1), captures the relationship between the sector returns and 
the market factor. The coefficient 𝑏𝑖 is statistically significant across all sectors. The mean 𝑏𝑖 
is 1.036. Being close to unity, the mean 𝑏𝑖 indicates that the selection of sectors is a good 
proxy for average stock returns in Europe. Estimated coefficients range from 0.722 to 1.317, 
showing differential systematic risk exposure. The expectation is that utilities will rank among 
the most defensive European sectors, with a beta less than unity. As stated in Section 3.2.2.3, 
Fama and French (1993) show that the range between the maximum and minimum 
coefficients, multiplied by the average risk factor’s return, can be used to calculate the 
estimated spread in expected returns due to the differential impact of the risk factor; this 
method is adapted for annualised returns. The spread between high- and low-𝑏𝑖 stocks is 
0.596. The product of the coefficient spread and annualised excess market factor return of 
0.95% per annum (extracted from Table 4.2) shows that the estimated spread in expected 
returns, between the highest and lowest 𝑏𝑖 stocks, is 0.563% per annum. This small difference 
is expected as the full time period analysed includes the dot-com crisis, GFC and EUC, 
resulting in low annualised return for the market factor. High-𝑏𝑖 stocks which appreciate in 
value during economic booms also lose greater value during economic downturns. Low-𝑏𝑖 
stocks experience smaller magnitudes of gains and losses through time. Fama and French 
(1993) also find a spread in 𝑏𝑖 of 0.53 between high- and low-𝑏𝑖 stocks; however, the average 
annualised excess market return in their time period was greater (5.28% per annum), resulting 
in a large spread in estimated returns due to systematic risk exposure. The intercepts in Table 
4.5 are insignificant across all sectors analysed, showing that the CAPM captures most of the 
spread in average returns (Fama and French, 1993). 
As expected, the European energy utility sector has a 𝑏𝑖 of 0.722, making the sector a 
defensive investment. The energy sector has the lowest systematic risk of all sectors analysed 
and falls within the range of market betas shown in the previous literature (Table 3.1). The oil 
& gas sector’s estimated 𝑏𝑖 is 0.935, indicating greater systematic risk exposure which is 
closer to unity, further evidence that the two sectors have unique characteristics. 
The mean adjusted 𝑅2 of the CAPM is 72.44%, ranging from 57.76% to 86.10%. For 
the energy utility sector, the CAPM explains 66.96% of the total variation in returns. In 
comparison, Fama and French (1997) find that the CAPM explains 55% of return variance in 
utilities (which may include water and waste firms and therefore is not representative of 
energy-specific utilities). Although the market beta is expected to be the greatest determinant 
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of average energy utility returns, macroeconomic and stock market risk factors serve as likely 
candidates to explain the fraction of variance unexplained (FVU) by the CAPM. The 
following section begins to address research question 1 by examining the impact of term 
premium, oil, coal and natural gas price risk using the augmented-CAPM (see Section 3.2.2). 
 
The Augmented CAPM 
The results of the augmented-CAPM (Equation 4.2), across multiple sectors, can be 
compared with Faff and Brailsford (1999); see Section C.1 of Appendix C. The comparison 
shows that the results are qualitatively the same, with only minor differences.  
Across 10 of the sector portfolios reported in Table 4.5, the augmented-CAPM and 
CAPM specifications produce estimated 𝑏𝑖 coefficients which are identical to two decimal 
places; the 𝑏𝑖 coefficients for the media sector is identical to one decimal place. The spread 
between high- and low-𝑏𝑖 stocks is 0.594 and the market factor continues to explain a 
difference of 0.56% per annum in expected return spread. The minor change in 𝑏𝑖 indicates 
that term premium and commodities are relatively unimportant determinants of asset returns, 
but have some minor role in asset pricing (Chen et al., 1986). This can be observed from the 
mean adjusted 𝑅2, which increases to 72.56%; the term premium and commodity risk factors 
only explain an additional 0.12% of return variance. The minor impact is also evident in the 
oil & gas sector, where revenues and profitability are related to commodity prices. Despite 
statistically significant commodities and the greatest oil price risk coefficient, the adjusted 𝑅2 
for oil & gas sector only increases from 57.76% to 58.45%. The following paragraphs address 
the estimated coefficients for term premium and each commodity. The term premium results 
can be compared with various papers, while oil price risk can be compared with Faff and 
Brailsford (1999), who perform an equivalent analysis on Australian industries. Comparisons 
for the impact of natural gas and coal price risk are restricted to the energy utility and oil & 
gas literature (see Section 3.2.3 and Table 3.1). 
Term premium represents the state of the economy and the costs of borrowing funds in 
the short term (Fama and French, 1993, Sadorsky, 2001). The mean coefficient for term 
premium, 𝑡𝑝𝑖, is -0.010, ranging from -0.101 to 0.034. The coefficients for term premium are 
insignificant across all sectors, suggesting that term premium has no significant impact across 
the entire time series. Although insignificant, the coefficient spread of 0.135 shows that the 
estimated spread in expected annualised returns for sectors due to term premium is 0.95% per 
annum, small in both statistical and economic terms. The lack of significance is unsurprising, 
as previous literature shows inconsistencies in the relationship with term premium and stock 
returns, finding positive (Fama and French, 1993, Ramos and Veiga, 2011, El-Sharif et al., 
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2005), negative (Sadorsky, 2001, Boyer and Filion, 2007), and no significant impact 
(Oberndorfer, 2009a) – with the latter representing the most comparable results (see Sections 
3.2.3.2 and 3.2.3.3). 
Oil price risk shows significant impacts on three of the sectors analysed. The mean oil 
coefficient, 𝑜𝑖, is 0.001, ranging from -0.018 to 0.072. The estimated spread in expected 
returns due to oil price risk is 0.94% between high- and low-oil-sensitive sectors. Across time, 
oil price risk is insignificant for the energy utility sector. Naturally, the oil & gas sector is the 
most sensitive to oil price risk, with a positive coefficient of 0.072, 𝑝 ≤ 0.001, accounting for 
an additional 0.75% of expected returns per annum. Faff and Brailsford (1999) also find a 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.23 for oil price risk in the Australian oil & gas sector. 
The telecommunication and retail sectors show negative coefficients of -0.015 (𝑝 = 0.084) 
and -0.018 (𝑝 = 0.002), respectively. The directions of the negative coefficients are similar to 
Faff and Brailsford’s (1999) results for the communications
50
 and retail sectors, having 
coefficients of -0.09 and -0.04, respectively. In contrast, Faff and Brailsford (1999) find that 
the coefficients are insignificant relative to other risk factors. 
Coal accounts for around 32% primary energy consumption globally (ITRE 
Committee, 2014). Coal is especially important in electricity production. Accordingly, the 
impact is expected to be negative for energy-intensive sectors. The mean coefficient for coal 
price risk, 𝑐𝑖, is -0.007, ranging from -0.039 to 0.043; the spread in coal coefficients is 0.082. 
The spread in expected returns as a result of coal price risk is 0.35% per annum, small in 
economic terms. Coal is significant and negative for the energy utility sector, with a 
coefficient of -0.037, 𝑝 = 0.001, decreasing expected returns in the sector by approximately 
0.16% per annum. These results are consistent with Oberndorfer (2009a), who finds a 
significant coefficient of -0.01 for the European electricity industry. Increasing (decreasing) 
coal prices decreases (increases) operating profitability. Koch and Bassen (2013) find varying 
significance for individual firms. Surprisingly, many of the other sector portfolios also show 
significant positive and negative coal price risk. 
The result of significant coal risk across multiple sectors arouses curiosity. It is 
possible that coal price risk proxies for additional risk factors not yet specified. For example, 
increasing energy prices may negatively impact energy-intensive sectors such as the chemical 
and industrial sectors if at least some of the rising cost of coal is reflected in energy prices. It 
does not explain why coal price risk is significant for sectors which are expected to have no 
                                                 
50
 Regarding the comparison, Faff and Brailsford (1999) classify the ‘communication services’ sector within 
the ASX ‘Media’ industry. 
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commodity risk exposure, such as the bank, financial, insurance, media and technology 
sectors. Moreover, it does not explain why the results show both positive and negative 
coefficients. 
The most plausible explanation is misspecification of the asset pricing model, 
suffering from an omitted variable. This chapter posits that coal price risk is only significant 
in the absence of stock market risk factors, which typically explain a greater proportion of 
equity returns. This proposition arises from the pairwise correlation in Table 4.4 which shows 
that coal returns have a negative correlation with the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor of -0.057, where 1) the 
correlation between coal and the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor is of greater magnitude than coal’s correlation 
with any sector, and 2) the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and sector correlations are all of greater magnitude than 
coal’s correlations with sectors. The expectation is that the inclusion of the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor in the 
asset pricing model will reduce coal’s significance due to some interaction between the two 
variables. In addition, the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficients will be in the opposite direction to coal, 
congruent with the negative coal-𝐻𝑀𝐿 pairwise correlation. Referring to the literature of 
Section, 3.2.2, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) show that book-to-market typically 
relates to various characteristics of firm distress, while Fama and French (1995) show that 
high-BE/ME firms typically have persistently low earnings. This will suggest that at least 
some of the impact from coal price risk actually represents firm distress which would 
otherwise be captured by the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor. If true, then the results suggest that commodities 
which have previously been found to be significant may proxy for stock market risk factors; 
that is, previous conclusions may have been false positives. 
Natural gas is used as both a fuel in electricity generation and an output benchmark for 
gas production. The mean coefficient for natural gas price risk, 𝑔𝑖, is 0.001, ranging 
from -0.007 to 0.008. The coefficient spread is small, only 0.015. The spread in expected 
returns as a result of natural gas sensitivities is only 0.17% per annum. Results find that 
natural gas has no significant impact on the energy utility sector as a whole, congruent with 
Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). Energy utilities are expected to hedge 
against natural gas price fluctuations in the long term. The oil & gas and industrial sectors 
show significant coefficients for natural gas price changes of 0.008 (𝑝 = 0.03) and 0.004 
(𝑝 = 0.073), respectively. The increasing price of natural gas contributes an additional 0.10% 
per annum to the oil & gas industry. The telecommunication sector has a negative coefficient 
of -0.007 (𝑝 = 0.076). Despite the statistical significance, the overall economic impacts of 




Overall, the results of both Oberndorfer (2009a) and this chapter show that the risk 
exposure of the energy utility sector is different to that of the oil & gas sector, particularly 
with regard to the systematic risk and commodity risk exposure. The results above begin to 
address research question 1: term premium and commodities do have an impact on the energy 
utility sector, but the impact is small. Importantly, the ability to detect any commodity risk 
exposure suggests that energy utilities have not fully realised the benefits of energy risk 
management. The very minor increase in adjusted 𝑅2 and unusual coal price risk suggests that 
other factors may better explain return, leading to research question 2. The following section 
presents the results of the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
introduced in Section 3.2.2. Term premium and commodities are excluded as the model 
extends the original CAPM specification. 
 
The Four-Factor Model 
Table 4.5 presents the results for the four-factor model (Equation 4.3). These results 
for the four-factor model are compared with Fama and French (1997) in Section C.2 of 
Appendix C. The four-factor model includes stock market risk factors expected to affect stock 
returns, see Section 3.2.2 for a review of the literature and Section 4.2.4 for the calculation of 
the global stock market risk factors. The results for the four-factor model, Equation (4.3), 
show the same inter-sectoral variability as Fama and French (1997). While the results allow 
inter-sectoral comparison, Fama and French (1997) show that global risk factors typically 
perform poorly at the local level. Chapter 5 addresses how to adapt the four-factor model for 
industry-level analysis, increasing the goodness of fit for energy utilities in isolation. 
First, the stock market risk factors are statistically significant in the majority of cases. 
The size premium (𝑆𝑀𝐵) is significant for 7 of the 11 sector portfolios tested, the value 
premium (𝐻𝑀𝐿) is significant for 10 of the 11 portoflios tested and momentum premium 
(𝑈𝑀𝐷) is significant for 8 of the 11 portfolios tested. The significant coefficients are evidence 
that the global stock market risk factors capture returns across a variety of sectors. The 
inclusion of the stock market risk factors also increases the mean adjusted 𝑅2 from 72.44% 
with the CAPM specification to 75.90% in the four-factor specification. The additional risk 
factors are responsible for explaining an additional 3.46% of variation in equity returns, 
consistent with Fama and French (1993, 1997), implying a greater role in asset pricing than 
term premium and commodity risk factors. The inclusion of the stock market risk factors 
affects the estimated market beta coefficients. The additional risk factors must capture 
average return which was previously absorbed by the CAPM’s market factor, congruent with 
Fama and French’s (1993) argument that the market factor is a ‘hodgepodge’ of multiple 
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stock market risk factors. With the exception of the industrial, retail and media sectors, most 
market betas show a small decrease in magnitude. Fama and French (1993) find that inclusion 
of the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors typically collapses the market betas for portfolios towards unity; 
Section 3.2.2.3 discussed possible causes of this. With the inclusion of 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷, 
the mean market beta is 1.018, ranging from 0.689 to 1.277, a spread of 0.588. Despite the 
different estimated coefficients, the spread in expected returns between the most aggressive 
and defensive stocks remains consistent with the CAPM, an expected return spread of 0.56% 
per annum. For the energy utility sector, the 𝑏𝑖 coefficient is 0.689, 𝑝 ≤ 0.001, lower than the 
previous estimates, but shows that energy utilities continue to remain a defensive investment 
through time. 
The mean 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficient, 𝑠𝑖, is -0.008 across all 11 sectors, ranging between -0.385 
and 0.399, a spread of 0.784. The spread in expected returns due to the size premium is large 
in both economic and statistical terms: 5.31% per annum. For the energy utility sector, the 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficient is -0.136. The negative 𝑆𝑀𝐵 slope shows that the energy sector behaves like 
big European stocks.
51
 The expected returns are -0.92% per annum as a result of size 
premium. However, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor is measured against global market level data, and 
therefore estimates the size premium relative to all European stocks. An industry-level size 
premium may yield different results and will more accurately estimate the economic impact of 
size premium (again, this is addressed in Chapter 5). 
The 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient is highly statistically significant, but its economic effect is small. 
The mean 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient, ℎ𝑖, is 0.048, ranging from -0.887 to 0.601, a spread of 1.488. 
Despite the large coefficient spread, the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 show that the daily 
return on the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor is not significantly different from zero, with an annualised return of 
0.43%. In economic terms, the spread in expected returns across sectors due to the value 
premium is 0.64% per annum. For the energy utility sector, the estimated 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient is 
0.241, 𝑝 ≤ 0.001. The results suggest that the energy sector’s returns covary with the returns 
on high-BE/ME European stocks; behaving like distressed European stocks. Chapter 6 
examines whether regulatory changes are the source of energy sector distress. The product of 
the coefficient spread and annual return on the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor suggests that the value premium 
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 As discussed in Section 4.2.4, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor represents a zero investment portfolio which is long on small 
European stocks and short on big European stocks. As small European stocks are expected to outperform big 
European stocks, a negative 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficient shows that the returns in the European energy utility sector covary 
with the returns on big European stocks, moving opposite to the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor. The interpretation of the negative 




contributes 0.104% to annual return, small in economic terms. Again, an industry-specific 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor may provide more accurate results (see Chapter 5). 
The momentum premium has a real economic impact at the market level. The mean 
𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficient, 𝑚𝑖, is -0.057, ranging from -0.190 to 0.054, with a spread of 0.243. The 
prevalence of negative coefficients may be due to the financial crises that occurred during the 
time series, where firms that were previously performing well were negatively affected by 
global economic downturns. Despite the smaller spread, the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 risk factor produced a daily 
return of 0.031% (𝑝 = 0.071), an equivalent of 8.45% per annum. This return is congruent 
with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Carhart (1997) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), who 
find that momentum explains between 8% and 12% of returns annually. The product of the 
coefficient spread and annualised returns yields an expected return spread of 2.06% per 
annum across sectors. For the energy utility sector, the estimated 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficient was 0.051, 
𝑝 ≤ 0.001. Both Carhart (1997) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) also find significant 
momentum after controlling for size and value premia. The result suggests the returns of the 
energy utility sector behave like upper momentum European stocks. Based on market level 
𝑈𝑀𝐷, the risk factor contributed 0.43% to expected annual returns, small in economic terms. 
Addressing research question 2, the stock market risk factors explain a greater 
proportion of returns in the energy utility sector. In particular, size and momentum appear to 
be major determinants of returns. Overall, the results are also fairly consistent with Fama and 
French (1993, 1997). While the market beta continues to be the most significant risk factor in 
explaining average returns, additional stock market risk factors show strong statistical 
significance and help explain returns previously absorbed by the market factor. Moreover, the 
impact of the stock market factors also varies across sectors. In economic terms, the results 
show that the major differences between sectors’ expected returns are influenced by size and 
momentum factors. 
Further, in the case of energy utilities some interesting observations can be made. 
First, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficient shows that returns of the energy sector behave like big European 
stocks, suggesting that the returns on big energy utilities dominate energy sector returns. This 
was a major motivation for the three packages of liberalisation in Section 2.2.1, designed to 
counteract the dominant and predatory behaviour of the largest energy utilities. As late as 
2013, energy utilities still complained of misuse of networks and unfair grid access and 
network fees (ACER, 2013). Second, the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient shows that energy utilities behave 
like distressed firms relative to other European stocks. This is certainly consistent with the 
expectation of increased risk exposure from liberalisation and environmental objectives; see 
the academic literature in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. The results are also consistent with utilities 
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facing a range of policy-induced challenges which are materially affecting their financial 
return; see Section 1.1. Finally, the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficient suggests that returns of European energy 
utilities were consistent with upper momentum European stocks, possibly indicating excess 
returns and/or oligopoly power argued in Section 1.2. However, it must be acknowledged that 
this is a static picture of sector returns over the last two decades. The inter-temporal analysis 
in Section 4.3.2.2 will address the time-varying nature of these relationships. 
 
The Global AFFM 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter (Section 4.1), a principal objective of this 
chapter is to develop the global AFFM by combining the energy economics and finance asset 
pricing models, producing an asset pricing model that captures a greater proportion of sector 
returns. The results of the global AFFM, Equation (4.4), are included in Table 4.5. 
Noticeably, term and commodity premia have a minor contribution to explaining stock 
returns. The inclusion of term and commodity premia only increases the adjusted 𝑅2 of the 
CAPM by 0.12%, while global AFFM’s mean adjusted 𝑅2 is only 0.09% greater than the 
four-factor specification. Moreover, the inclusion of the stock market risk factors also reduces 
the magnitude and significance of term and commodity premia. 
Where significant, the stock market risk factor coefficients between the four-factor 
model and global AFFM are identical to two decimal places. The significant commodity 
coefficients between the augmented-CAPM and global AFFM are mostly identical to at least 
one decimal place. Term premium remains insignificant across specifications. The inclusion 
of the additional stock market risk factors (𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷) has little impact on the 
significant oil and natural gas coefficients, but affects estimated coal coefficients. For the 
energy utility sector, the coal coefficient reduces from -0.037 (𝑝 ≤ 0.001) to -0.032 (𝑝 =
0.005). Further, the inclusion of the additional stock market risk factors nullifies the 
anomalous significant coal coefficients for the bank, industrial, technology and financial 
sectors. Significance is reduced for the insurance, media and chemical sectors. Further, the 
significant 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficients for all the aforementioned sectors are opposite to the significant 
coal coefficients found previously. As argued above, coal price risk must have captured some 
element of the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor, a proxy for firm distress, and therefore becomes insignificant, or 
weakened, when modelled simultaneously.  
Overall, the global AFFM is able to incorporate both the augmented-CAPM and the 
four-factor model into a single asset pricing model. The goodness of fit of the global AFFM is 
also greater compared with the remaining model specifications in isolation. The following 
addresses research questions 1 to 3 of this chapter using the global AFFM.  
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For research question 1, the results show that coal is the only commodity to have a 
significant impact on energy sector returns, with the impact being negative. For research 
question 2, stock market risk factors explain a much greater proportion of average returns 
compared with term and commodity premia. The inclusion of the stock market risk factors 
increases the mean adjusted 𝑅2 by 3.46% for the four-factor model compared with the CAPM 
specification. The factors also collapse most market betas. Further, the inclusion of the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 
factor reduces some impact from coal price risk. Addressing research question 3, the node 
network and multivariate regression in Table 4.5 indicate that returns in the energy sector are 
different to the other European sectors. The results of the asset pricing models in Table 4.5 
show that the risk exposure among sectors varies greatly.  
Table 4.6 provides a summary of the differential impact of significant risk factors 
from the global AFFM. Table 4.6 shows that there is heterogeneous risk exposure across 
European sectors. The unique risk exposure of the energy sector suggests that sector must be 
examined in isolation for a more accurate understanding of required rates of return on 
investment and equilibrium asset pricing; this is addressed in Chapter 5. The following 
Section (0) examines results of the conditional annual global AFFM regressions, addressing 
research question 4: inter-temporal variability of the risk premia. 
 
TABLE 4.6: SUMMARY OF DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF RISK FACTORS 
This table summarizes the impact of significant risk factors from the global AFFM in Table 4.5, where a “+” indicates a 
significant positive coefficient was observed, and “−” indicates a significant negative coefficient was observed. 
 𝛼𝑖 𝑏𝑖 𝑠𝑖 ℎ𝑖 𝑚𝑖 𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  𝑐𝑖 𝑔𝑖 
Energy Utilities  + - + +   -  
Banks  +  + -     
Oil & Gas  + - + +  +  + 
Telecommunications  + - -   -   
Industrials  + + + -     
Insurance  +  + -   -  
Retail  + +    -   
Technology  + - - -     
Media - + + - -   +  
Chemical  +  +    -  
Finance  +  + -     
 
4.3.2.2 Inter-Temporal Analysis 
As stated in Section 3.3.4, previous studies have reported substantial inter-temporal, 
inter-sectoral and transnational variability in the relationship between average returns and risk 
factors (Faff and Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, El-Sharif et al., 2005, Oberndorfer, 2009a, 
Fama and French, 1997, 1998, 2012). The results reported in Table 4.5 are estimated over the 
entire time period, 1996 to 2013, yet Fama and French (1997) argue that industry risk 
loadings vary through time. To address this issue, the time series is separated into annual 
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periods and the conditional global AFFM, Equation (4.5), is implemented on a year-by-year 
basis. This method mimics the six-month conditional regressions of El-Sharif et al. (2005). 
Table 4.7 reports the coefficients for the energy utility sector, estimated using Newey-West 
HAC standard errors and subject to standard regression diagnostic tests. Figure 4.6 illustrates 
the estimated coefficients from Table 4.7 and includes the 95% confidence intervals – if the 
spread between the confidence intervals overlap zero, the coefficient is generally insignificant 
at 𝑝 = 0.05. The benefit of this approach is that carbon price risk can be included, as the time 
series begins in mid 2005. 
The inter-temporal results in Table 4.7 show that the impact of the market factor is 
consistently positive and significant through time. The market beta has also been increasing 
through time, with an upward shift in beta occurring in 2005. The result shows the energy 
utility sector is becoming increasingly exposed to systematic risk and losing its role as a 
defensive investment asset. This increase in market beta was also observed by Kane and Unal 
(1988), who found increasing market risk in the banking sector as a result of deregulation 
objectives. Chapter 6 will formally test the effect of policy on the energy sector. 
Of the 18 annual coefficients, 16 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficients are nominally negative, where 10 
are statistically significant. The negative 𝑆𝑀𝐵 slope indicates that the energy utility returns 
continue to behave like big European stocks, consistent with the argument that big utilities 
dominate the sector at the expense of small utilities. Despite regulatory changes designed to 
counteract the dominance of big energy utilities, see Section 2.2.1, the impact has generally 
become more negative, more frequent and more significant through time. The majority of 
significant coefficients occur post-2006. The removal of national barriers would allow big 
energy utilities to rapidly expand into previously isolated international markets. 
For the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficients, 13 are nominally positive. Of the seven statistically 
significant 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficients, six are positive and one is negative. The positive coefficients 
indicate that the energy utility sector behaved like high-BE/ME European stocks; suggesting 
the sector was distressed relative to other European stocks. The significant impact typically 
occurs one to two years after the three packages of liberalisation (1996 and 1998, 2003 and 
2009); see Section 2.2. In particular, the energy sector becomes extremely distressed post-
2010. Again, this coincides with the third packages of liberalisation which were expected to 
be a major regulation regarding market power and dominance issues; see Section 2.2.1. The 
only year the energy sector behaves like low-BE/ME (growth) stocks is 2009; however, all 
European stocks lost value during the GFC. 
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TABLE 4.7: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF SECTOR PORTFOLIO USING THE GLOBAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional global AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors. Due to the method of portfolio construction, see Section 4.2.4, coefficients are estimated between July 
1996 and June 2013. The value-weighted returns of the energy sector (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍) is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), size premium (𝑆𝑀𝐵), value premium (𝐻𝑀𝐿), momentum 
premium (𝑈𝑀𝐷) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term are denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 
1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 + 𝑒𝑖 . 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0001  0.7097 **** 0.0235  -0.0783  0.1261  0.4969 ** -0.0093  -0.0068  -0.0103    62.97% 28.85 **** 
1997 0.0000  0.6736 **** -0.1109 * 0.0286  0.0192  -0.0630  0.0050  -0.0217  0.0069    74.29% 94.93 **** 
1998 0.0005  0.5775 **** -0.1084  0.1805 ** -0.0203  0.1329  0.0153  -0.0675 *** -0.0022    70.80% 79.82 **** 
1999 -0.0010 *** 0.5885 **** -0.1546 * 0.0324  -0.1496 *** 0.1361  0.0028  0.0074  -0.0115    60.33% 50.42 **** 
2000 0.0006  0.4410 **** -0.0598  0.1933 ** -0.0475  -0.3820  0.0044  -0.0133  0.0013    28.54% 13.93 **** 
2001 0.0001  0.6556 **** -0.1659 ** 0.1190  0.2398 **** -0.0413  0.0231  -0.0249  -0.0002    65.77% 63.45 **** 
2002 0.0001  0.7365 **** -0.1358  0.0205  0.1708 **** -0.1153  -0.0145  0.0164  0.0017    82.00% 149.04 **** 
2003 0.0002  0.5879 **** -0.2791 ** -0.0167  -0.0666  0.3680  -0.0015  -0.0932 ** 0.0008    77.54% 113.22 **** 
2004 0.0005 * 0.6131 **** -0.1496  0.2000 * -0.0412  0.3273  0.0139  -0.0279  0.0010    60.96% 51.94 **** 
2005 0.0003  0.8039 **** 0.0025  0.3147 *** 0.0608  0.2150  -0.0188  -0.0004  -0.0010    61.52% 52.77 **** 
2006 0.0007 *** 0.7190 **** -0.3271 **** 0.0872  -0.0007  0.0427  0.0555 *** -0.0128  0.0023  0.0058  70.04% 68.29 **** 
2007 0.0002  0.5971 **** -0.2470 *** -0.0179  0.3115 **** 0.1287  0.0294  0.0046  0.0007  0.0009  70.65% 70.52 **** 
2008 0.0005  0.9639 **** -0.5269 **** -0.0322  0.3794 **** 0.4811  0.0356  -0.0596 ** 0.0038  -0.0046  85.63% 173.86 **** 
2009 -0.0003  0.9186 **** -0.2111 ** -0.4089 **** 0.0885 ** -0.1344  0.0392 ** 0.0017  -0.0026  0.0065  72.18% 75.95 **** 
2010 -0.0021  0.8687 **** -0.1156  0.0200  -0.2999 **** 0.9574  0.0512 ** -0.0435 ** 0.0014  -0.0023  84.10% 153.81 **** 
2011 -0.0001  0.8371 **** -0.3433 *** 0.4124 **** -0.0391  -0.0213  0.0080  0.0031  0.0106  -0.0002  84.90% 162.86 **** 
2012 -0.0009  0.6423 **** -0.3565 *** 0.5229 **** -0.0848  0.3064  -0.0100  -0.0069  -0.0033  0.0004  71.07% 71.96 **** 
2013 A -0.0023  1.0370 **** -0.0646  0.1194  -0.4751 **** 1.2821  -0.0787  -0.0118  -0.0507  0.0108  70.30% 34.66 **** 
Mean -0.0002  0.7206  -0.1850  0.0943  0.0095  0.2287  0.0084  -0.0198  -0.0029  0.0022  69.64%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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FIGURE 4.6: ESTIMATED GLOBAL AFFM COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS THROUGH TIME 
This figure illustrates the estimated coefficients for the nine risk factors through time, using the annual global AFFM results from Table 4.7. The solid line represents the estimated coefficient, while the 























































































































































Of the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficients, 10 are nominally negative and eight are nominally positive. 
The 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor is significant on eight occasions; three are negative and five are positive. The 
positive coefficients show that the sector generally behaves like upper momentum European 
stocks sporadically through time. The negative coefficients in 1999, 2010 and 2013 suggest 
that the energy utility sector behaves like poorly performing European stocks. The negative 
1999 coefficient coincides with the first packages of liberalisation: the expectation is that 
energy utilities which benefited (suffered) from the previous regulatory environment now lose 
(gain) market share as dominance issues are addressed, market borders are removed and 
liberalisation induces competition; see Section 2.2.1. Negative coefficients are observed 
following the second packages of liberalisation in 2003, but lack significance. The GFC, EUC 
and third packages of liberalisation (2009) also show negative estimated 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficients in 
the following years. The GFC and EUC result in an economic downturn in Europe where past 
winners are likely to have become past losers. Further, the third package of liberalisation 
addressed outstanding market dominance issues. Overall, the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor appears to capture 
the shift when past winners (losers) become losers (winners). 
Consistent with El-Sharif et al. (2005), Table 4.7 shows varying commodity risk 
exposure over time. Based on the number of significant coefficients through time, coal was 
the most significant commodity, followed by oil, term premium, then gas – where gas showed 
no significance through time. Coal price risk through time is consistent with expectations. All 
significant coefficients are negative, similar to Oberndorfer (2009a). Consistently negative 
coefficients suggest that an increase in coal prices negatively impacts the energy utility sector. 
When combined with Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 (Plot G), the results appear to show 
significant coal coefficients in the years which experience large increases in coal prices or 
increased volatility of coal returns. It is possible that the coal price sensitivity represents the 
impact of unexpected fluctuations in coal price, which would disadvantage coal-intensive 
industries. The detection of coal price risk suggests that energy utilities have not fully realised 
the benefits of coal risk management, failing to hedge against coal price fluctuations.  
Where significant, oil coefficients in Table 4.7 are always positive. The positive 
relationship between oil returns and energy utility returns suggests evidence of the long-term 
relationship between crude oil prices and firm value (El-Sharif et al., 2005, Oberndorfer, 
2009a, Narayan and Gupta, 2015). This result is unusual as the energy utilities sector rarely 
uses oil in production and generation; however, El-Sharif et al. (2005), Oberndorfer (2009a) 
and Koch and Bassen (2013) also find significant oil price risk for European oil & gas and 
energy utilities. Oberndorfer (2009a) argues that energy utilities prices may be benchmarked 
against oil prices. Term premium is only significant in the last six months of 1996 and 
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insignificant thereafter, whereas natural gas price risk is insignificant throughout the entire 
time series. Oberndorfer (2009a) finds that term premium is insignificant for European energy 
utilities. Both Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013) also find no significant 
natural gas coefficients for European energy utilities. As the price of natural gas has changed 
drastically over the time period, as shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 (Plot H), the lack of 
significance indicates effective natural gas risk management. 
A pooled regression is only valid if the economic relationship remains stable over the 
full period tested. Results from Table 4.7 show that this is not the case, as stock market, term 
premium, and commodity risk factors have intertemporal variability and evolve over time. 
The implications of the inter-temporal results are that the pooled regression in Table 4.5, 
which is often the approach in the energy economics literature, is invalid over the full period. 
However, the inter-temporal approach of El-Sharif et al. (2005) also induces a range of 
methodological issues which induce bias in coefficient estimates and significance. Chapter 5 
will introduce an inductive structural breakpoint test which more accurately identifies 
breakpoints in the relationship between sector returns and risk factors series, improving 
coefficient estimates and producing less bias significance test. 
 Conclusion 4.4
This chapter conducts an analysis on the determinants of returns in 11 European 
sectors. The aim of the chapter was to develop an asset pricing model which improves upon 
the CAPM, augmented-CAPM and four-factor models by reintegrating the energy economics 
and finance literatures. The global AFFM specifications examines the impact of four stock 
market risk factors (market factor, and the size, value and momentum premia), term premium 
and four commodities (oil, coal, natural gas and carbon). The novel global AFFM, developed 
in this chapter is used to answer the following research questions: 1) to what extent do 
commodity price changes impact the returns in the European energy utility sector, 2) could 
stock-market risk factors better explain the variation in energy utilities’ returns; 3) do the 
impacts reflect market-wide conditions or the sector-specific relationships between returns 
and risk premia and 4) are these risk premia time-varying? 
The main results regarding the model show that the stock market risk factors of the 
global AFFM are mostly significant, and their inclusion captures a greater proportion of 
variation in stock returns, across all European sectors, compared with other asset pricing 
models. The global AFFM provided the greatest goodness of fit, as judged by the mean 
adjusted 𝑅2 of 75.99%, compared with the CAPM (72.44%), the augmented-CAPM 
(72.56%), and the four-factor model (75.90%). In the case of energy utilities in isolation, the 
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global AFFM captures 68.79% of sector returns, an improvement over the 66.96% from the 
CAPM specification. The increased goodness of fit across sectors was attributable to the three 
additional stock market risk factors, which were mostly significant across all sectors tested. 
The term premium and commodity risk factors showed some statistical significance, but 
contributed less to the overall goodness of fit. Further, the economic impact on expected 
annual returns due to the differential spread in commodity risk exposure was small – typically 
less than 1% per annum. 
Answering the research questions, commodities are found to impact returns in the 
European energy utility sector, but the impact is relatively low. In particular, coal price risk 
negatively impacts the sector and oil price risk positively impacts the sector; term premium 
and natural gas are mostly insignificant. As utilities are expected to hedge against natural gas 
price fluctuations, this may be the result of effective hedging strategies. While the negative 
impact of coal is congruent with expectations in electricity production, the positive impact 
from oil price risk is unusual, since energy utilities rarely use oil in electricity production; 
however, the results are consistent with the significant oil risk exposure found by Oberndorfer 
(2009a). 
The stock market factors are routinely found to improve the goodness of fit across all 
sectors analysed. The market factor, size, value and momentum premia are mostly significant 
across all sectors – the latter three variables experienced some insignificance. Overall, the 
market factor remains the greatest determinant of sector returns. Term premium and 
commodities often lose, or show lower significance when competing against stock market 
factors. Interestingly, the results show that the returns of energy utilities continue to behave 
like big European stocks. From a policy perspective, this confirms the motivation of the three 
packages of liberalisation – published with an aim of counteracting market dominance issues 
from big energy utilities. The sector also behaves like distressed European stocks, and 
typically behave like well-performing (upper momentum) European stocks. 
By comparing the significant risk factors for all sectors, the results show that the 
impact of stock market factors, term and commodity premia are unique across sectors. This 
demonstrates that impacts reflect sector-specific relationships with risk factors. The results 
show that the risk profile of energy utilities is unique in comparison with other European 
sectors – including the oil & gas sector. In fact, the results discredit the assumption that risk 
factors which affect the oil & gas sector can be assumed true for the energy utility sector. 
Comparing the two sectors, the energy utility sector has lower systematic risk, is less sensitive 
to size premium and is sensitive to coal price risk. In contrast, the oil & gas sector has greater 
systematic risk, has greater exposure to size premium and has greater exposure to oil and 
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natural gas price risk. Energy utilities share elements of risk with many sectors of the 
economy and typically have the lowest systematic risk exposure of all sectors analysed. The 
differential impact of each sector is consistent with Faff and Brailsford (1999) and Fama and 
French (1997). 
The fourth research question addresses the stability of risk premia in the European 
energy utility sector. On a year-by-year basis, results suggest that the risk premia are time 
varying. Energy utilities appear to be losing their role as a defensive investment asset, with a 
market beta which is increasing towards unity; this suggests the sector is becoming riskier. 
The size premium shows that the dominance from big utilities has, in fact, worsened rather 
than improved as markets have become liberalised through time. The spread between big 
utilities and small utilities is increasing. This is a major blow for liberalisation policy since it 
was supposed to benefit small and new-entrant companies (see Section 2.2). The value 
premium is increasing in magnitude through time, with the European energy utility sector 
becoming increasingly distressed relative to other European stocks. The momentum premium 
shows time-varying characteristics. In most years, energy utilities were winners (upper 
momentum) relative to other European stocks. However, in 1999, 2010 and 2013, the energy 
sector performed poorly relative to European stocks. The interpretation is that the sector 
receives exogenous shocks which significantly shift the operating environment. Perhaps 
regulatory changes, formally examined in Chapter 6, result in past winners (losers) becoming 
future losers (winners). Term, oil and coal premia show sporadic significance through time. 
Term premium is only significant in late-1996, oil is significant and positive for three of the 
years analysed, while coal price risk is significant and negative for four of the years analysed. 
Natural gas and carbon price risk is consistently insignificant through time. 
4.4.1 Contribution 
This chapter contributes to the literature in many ways. Energy economics authors 
have identified that the current literature is somewhat restricted due to the reliance on limited 
explanatory variables, and that the integration of additional variables, such as the stock market 
risk factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), will be of interest to the energy 
economics literature (El-Sharif et al., 2005, Oberndorfer, 2009a). This chapter addresses this 
niche, developing an asset pricing model by reintegrating energy economics and finance 
literature which is able to capture a greater proportion of return variation and addresses many 
criticisms of estimating market beta using the CAPM and augmented-CAPM, as highlighted 
in Section 3.2.2. 
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In producing a superior asset pricing model, this chapter also makes qualitative and 
methodological contributions. Methodologically, the improved asset pricing model helps 
establish a more accurate equilibrium asset pricing function by incorporating both the 
augmented-CAPM and the four-factor model into a single asset pricing model. This model 
can be used in a variety of applications which require estimates of stock returns, and has 
implications for modelling average returns at the sector level. Further, this chapter reduces 
bias in estimated coefficients by creating a much larger sample of energy utility companies 
compared with the most relevant energy economics papers (Oberndorfer, 2009a, Koch and 
Bassen, 2013). Moreover, the sample controls for survivorship bias which ensures that the 
risk factors are estimated for the average company at the time, rather than the firms which 
have survived regulatory changes and competition. 
Qualitatively, this chapter demonstrates that sectors are not homogenous and have 
differential impacts to stock market, term premium and commodity risk factors. In particular, 
results confirm that the energy utility sector and the oil & gas sector are dissimilar and should 
be independently analysed. Lack of inter-sectoral and inter-temporal generalisability of results 
shows that the impact of risk factors is time-varying. The ability to detect commodity risk 
exposure, which varies over time, suggests that energy utilities have not fully realised the 
benefits of energy risk management and production hedging. Further, the results make a major 
contribution to energy policy by being the first to empirically show that big energy utilities do 
indeed outperform small energy utilities, unlike many other sectors, which was a motivation 
for major regulatory changes in the sector. 
From this point, the thesis can continue by further refining the global AFFM to 
calculate stock market risk factors at the industry level. This adjustment should increase the 
overall goodness of fit and provide more accurate estimations of the impacts from size, value 
and momentum premia at the sector level. This will be used to better understand which types 
of energy utilities are driving average sector returns. Chapter 5 will also examine the 
heterogeneity of 12 portfolios of energy utilities grouped on firm characteristics, including the 
whole sector; small and big utilities; value, neutral and growth utilities; upper and down 
momentum utilities; and electricity, natural gas and multi-utilities. Overall, Chapter 5 will 
provide greater insight into the risk exposure of energy utilities and various types of utilities 
within the sector. 
4.4.2 Limitations 
No empirical analysis is without limitation. The following paragraphs outline potential 
limitations and steps taken to address these limitations. Empirical models can fail due to poor 
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construction of mimicking value and momentum portfolios. To address this limitation, 
Appendix A compared the mimicking portfolios constructed in this chapter to those of French 
(2015). The mimicking risk factors constructed in this chapter are found to be comparable. 
Further, the four-factor model has been routinely implemented in empirical finance literature, 
representing one of the most robust and scrutinised research methods which has stood the test 
of time. This chapter simply extends this established model to sector-specific propositions. 
Another limitation, highlighted by Fama and French (1997, 2012), concerns the fact 
that the stock market risk factors typically have low power at the local level. To address this 
limitation, Chapter 5 calculates the risk factors using sector level data rather than market level 
data. The overall result should be stock market factors which more accurately represent the 
spread between small and big, value and growth and upper and down momentum between 
energy utilities. However, it should be noted that without market level data the industry 
comparisons would not be possible, so both analyses serve their own purpose. Qualitatively, 
the results of Chapter 5 are in the same direction as those observed in this chapter, but show 
increased goodness of fit. Consequently, a range of further diagnostics are implemented on 
the results of Chapter 5. 
From an econometrics perspective, an anticipated limitation regarding the conditional 
global AFFM is the estimation of risk factors on an annual basis. While it may be true that the 
risk premiums are time-varying, the annual regressions are tantamount to assuming that the 
risk factors undergo a structural break annually, with the break point occurring on the same 
day of each year. Econometrically this assumption is incorrect and most likely to be invalid. 
Specifically, the approach includes too few or surplus observations, depending where in fact 
the true structural break lies, which can bias estimated coefficients and result in unstable 
estimates. However, this method is implemented in the energy economics literature (see El-
Sharif et al., 2005). Empirical finance has previously attempted to overcome this obstacle 
using rolling regressions. However, Fama and French (1997) show that the rolling regression 
approach is rarely more precise than the full-period approach. Chapter 5 also shows that the 
annual regression approach contributes little to the model’s goodness of fit compared with the 
full-period regressions. Chapter 5 introduces recent econometric advances in the estimation of 
structural break points, which drastically improves the ability to detect structural breaks in 
risk factors and improves the overall model’s goodness of fit.  
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CHAPTER 5  
REFINING THE AFFM AND EXPLORING WITHIN-SECTOR 
HETEROGENEITY 
 Introduction 5.1
This chapter deepens the understanding of the risk factors in European energy utility 
returns by refining the AFFM developed in Chapter 4 for through four analytical foci, namely: 
1) calculating stock market risk factors at the sector level, creating a local AFFM; 2) applying 
the local AFFM to sub-group portfolios of European utilities so as to explore within-sector 
heterogeneity; 3) applying inductive rather than deductive structural break point tests (see 
Section 3.3.4); and 4) better isolating the firm-specific component of returns. In combination, 
addressing the four foci allows for a more nuanced understanding of the impact of risk factors 
on sector returns. 
To address foci 1 and 2, this chapter must define the difference between the global 
(market level) and local (sector level) stock market risk factors. Figure 5.1 assists with 
understanding the subtle but important difference. Chapter 4 utilises global stock market risk 
factors, calculated using all 600 European stocks (see Section 4.2.4), defining the spread in 
average returns between the smallest and largest European stocks, the highest- and lowest-
BE/ME European stocks, and upper and down momentum European stocks. The empirical 
analysis in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2) examines the relationship between the returns of each 
sector portfolio and the stock market risk factors for Europe. Using Figure 5.1, the focus of 
Chapter 4 is, therefore, between levels A and B. The global approach of Chapter 4 has the 
advantage that it allows for an understanding of how the energy sector behaves relative to 
other European stocks and sectors. However, as stated in Section 4.4.2, the ‘global’ are 
limited as they perform poorly at ‘local’ level, since local models are typically better at 
explaining local average returns (Fama and French, 1997, 2012). To examine what drives 
average returns within the energy utility sector, this chapter explores the relationship between 
the returns of the energy sector and local, sector-level risk factors. Therefore, using Figure 
5.1, this chapter is concerned with levels B and C. For example, do returns in the energy 
utility sector behave like big or small energy utilities? The literature review in Section 5.2 will 
show that there may be greater informational content within a sector, compared with 




FIGURE 5.1: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GLOBAL AND LOCAL RISK FACTORS 
This figure illustrates the levels of analysis for Chapters 4 and 5. While Chapter 4 focuses on levels A and B, the focus of 
Chapter 5 is on levels B and C. Chapter 4 utilised global stock market risk factors, while chapter 5 utilitises local stock 
market risk factors. 
 
To address foci 3 and 4, the econometrics literature in Section 3.3.4 argued that the 
deductive approach to testing break points can lead to bias significance tests, unless the breaks 
are known with certainty. Surplus observations which are unaffected by structural breaks 
skew the mean residuals towards zero, reducing the power of statistical tests and biasing 
significance tests (Quandt, 1960). Structural breaks can cause pure and partial changes in 
model parameters (see Section 3.3.1), affecting the firm-specific component returns after 
filtering out systematic components (Fama and French, 1993, Hansen, 2001). This has 
implications for isolating abnormal returns as a result of regulatory changes, the focus of 
Chapter 6. 
This chapter makes both academic and policy contributions. There are three academic 
contributions from this chapter. First, the chapter outlines a modelling approach for 
implementing sector studies regarding asset pricing. This chapter shows that local (sector 
level) stock market risk factors explain a greater proportion of sector returns compared with 
global (market level) stock market risk factors. For the energy sector, the adjusted 𝑅2 
increases from 68.79% using the global AFFM (see Table 4.5) to 72.77% using the local 
AFFM (see Table 5.5). Second, this chapter identifies within-sector heterogeneity, examining 
the risk exposure of various energy utilities grouped on similarity of characteristics. This is a 
substantial contribution over previous papers concerning asset pricing of European energy 
utilities, which have examined only portfolios of energy utilities versus oil companies 
(Oberndorfer, 2009a) or high- versus low-carbon emitters (Koch and Bassen, 2013). In total, 
this chapter examines 12 portfolios of energy utilities grouped on firm characteristics, namely: 
the energy sector as a whole; small and big utilities; high-BE/ME (value), mid-BE/ME 
A) The STOXX 600 
Europe Index 
B) The Energy 
Sector 
C) Distinct Energy 
Portfolios 
•A congolomate of multiple European sectors 
•  600 European firms used to calculate global 
stock market risk factors (Chapter 4) 
•A combination of multiple energy utilities 
•Measured relative to global stock market risk 
factors (Chapter 4) 
•88 European utilities used to calculate local stock 
market risk factors (Chapter 5) 
•Distinct portfolios of energy utilities based on 
firm characteristics 
•Measured relative to local stock market risk 
factors (Chapter 5) 
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(neutral) and low-BE/ME (growth) utilities; upper, medium and down momentum utilities; 
and electricity, natural gas and multi-utilities. Third, this chapter introduces recent 
econometric advances in the estimation of structural break points (see Section 3.3.4). The Bai 
and Perron (1998; 2003) structural break point test identifies significant structural breaks in 
the relationship between returns and risk premia through time. The inductive method of 
controlling for structural breaks improves the local AFFM’s adjusted 𝑅2 to 80.42%. Further, 
this chapter implements the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) break point test on the residuals of 
an unconditional AFFM regression, showing that almost 28% of the residuals’ variance, 
normally assumed to be the firm-specific component of returns, can be attributed to the 
changing relationship between sector returns and risk premia. Put simply, this chapter does a 
better job of isolating the firm-specific component of returns and filtering out systematic risk 
factors. 
The descriptive results show that the return profile of the 12 portfolios are distinct 
from one another. Similar to Chapter 4, the local AFFM results show that commodities 
contribute little to explaining average returns in the energy portfolios, while stock market risk 
factors such as size, book-to-market ratio and momentum are important determinants of 
average returns across the 12 portfolios. Importantly, the local AFFM has better regression fit 
using the stock market risk factors and allows deeper insight into the heterogeneous 
commodity risk exposure of various energy portfolios. Further, the inter-temporal analyses 
show a clear shift in the return profiles of energy utilities, beyond macroeconomic variables. 
There have been clear shifts in momentum surrounding the second and third packages of 
liberalisation, 2003 and 2009, respectively. The third packages have dramatic impacts on the 
magnitude and significance of most risk factors. Prior to the third packages, the energy sector 
behaves like low-BE/ME (growth) and upper momentum utilities. From 2009 onwards, the 
sector behaves like down momentum energy utilities and high-BE/ME (value) utilities, 
typically associated with firm distress. While still a defensive stock, utilities are taking on 
increasing systematic risk through time. Further, the energy sector appears to be taking on 
increasing commodity risk exposure. 
Regarding the policy contributions, there is large heterogeneity in the return profiles of 
various energy utilities based on firms’ characteristics, providing important policy 
implications with regard to understanding the evolving risk exposure of utilities. Small 
utilities have lower systematic risk than big energy utilities, but have greater commodity risk 
exposure implying that small utilities may not fully utilise the benefits of commodity hedging. 
While the size premium is expected to exist, small and big utilities also have a spread in value 
premium which shows that small utilities are typically more distressed than big utilities.  
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Regarding the industry profiles, the natural gas utility portfolio shares many 
similarities with the oil & gas sector of Chapter 4. The natural gas sector also has greater 
systematic risk compared with the electricity and multi-utility portfolios. While most utilities 
have negative momentum, only the natural gas portfolio has persistently positive returns 
across time. The electricity industry has greater cumulative returns compared with other 
industry portfolios, suggesting a greater risk-return relationship. The asset pricing models 
show that the electricity industry is distressed relative to other utilities, which is argued to be 
the impact of regulations relating to competition and renewables (see, respectively, Section 
2.2.1 and 2.2.3). This firm distress increases post-GFC. Electricity utilities have negative 
momentum in the years surrounding the second and third packages of liberalisation. Post-
GFC, the electricity industry is taking on increasing commodity risk; again, suggesting a 
failure to effectively hedge commodity risk. The overall results indicate that electricity 
utilities are riskier than the natural gas and multi-utility industries. Interestingly, the multi-
utilities showed one of the lowest cumulative abnormal returns across all portfolios – possibly 
indicating a lower risk-return relationship. The multi-utilities have less commodity risk 
exposure than both the natural gas and electricity industries. This is consistent with economy 
of scope – diversified operations allow multi-utilities to switch operations when faced with 
regulatory changes or fluctuations in commodity prices. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the chapter-specific 
literature review regarding the use of local stock market risk factors in asset pricing models, 
Section 5.3 outlines the methodology of the chapter; Section 5.4 presents the descriptive and 
econometric results of the various asset pricing models, the inter-temporal analysis and the 
structural break point test; and Section 5.5 provides a concluding discussion. 
 Literature Review: Local Stock Market Risk Factors 5.2
The following paragraphs present the prior literature relevant to this chapter regarding 
the performance of the asset pricing models at the sector level. Since Fama and French 
(1993), various papers have documented that sector level peculiarities with regard to the stock 
market risk factors can be a major influence in capturing variation in stock returns. 
Fama and French (1997) represents one of the most important papers exploring the 
sector level performance of the CAPM and the three-factor model, employing both models on 
48 U.S. industries between 1963 and 1994. They find that the choice between the two models 
can result in large differences in the valuation of investments; the cost of equity calculation 
differs by more than 2% for 17 industries and more than 3% for eight industries. Fama and 
French (1997) argue that discrepancies in the cost of equity estimates at the sector level are 
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partly caused by estimation error in the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 slopes. The most likely cause for the 
large estimation error arises from the return profiles of a sector differing to that of the market 
as a whole. This is evident in the variety of coefficients previously observed in Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5; each European sector has differential sensitivities to risk premia. 
Further motivation for examining returns using sector level data comes from Boni and 
Womack (2006), who argue that stock analysts specialise by sector. Boni and Womack (2006) 
examine momentum information signals of future relative winners and losers from sector 
specialists between 1996 and 2002, requiring analysts to create relative ranking of firms 
within their specialised sector. Results show that a sector-based momentum recommendation 
strategy substantially improves the returns relative to risk borne and reduces price momentum 
tilt relative to portfolios which ignore sector-specific information. Buying upgraded firms 
versus selling short downgraded firms yields returns of 1.23% the following month, even after 
controlling for the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) stock market risk factors. Of 
the 57 sectors analysed, 54 produced nominally positive returns, while 16 produced positive 
and statistically significant returns; none were significantly negative. The overall conclusion 
is that sector-specific analysts are good stock pickers within their sector of expertise, and 
investors acknowledge that the analysts’ information is valuable with respect to identifying 
within-sector mispricing. The implications of the results with regard to future research 
suggests that beyond controlling for stock market, term premium and commodity risk factors, 
the within-sector characteristics also need to be accounted for (Boni and Womack, 2006). 
Similar to Boni and Womack (2006), Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show that momentum 
strategies are poorly diversified, with winners and losers often being derived from the same 
sector or industry. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) examine whether sector level momentum helps 
explain average returns for 20 sector portfolios, between 1963 and 1995. The paper focuses 
on the positive persistence (momentum) of stock returns over intermediate investment 
horizons, up to 24 months. They hypothesise that sector level momentum is a major 
determinant of average returns within a sector. The results show that sector portfolios exhibit 
significant momentum, even after controlling for size, BE/ME and individual stock 
momentum. This is likely due to the fact that stocks within a sector tend to be highly 
correlated (Schwert, 1981, Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999); see Section 3.3.5.1. The high 
correlation among firms may be due to a variety of reasons, including 1) operating within the 
same regulatory environment, 2) exhibiting similar behaviour regarding corporate finance, 3) 
having similar sensitivity to macroeconomic forces and 4) having exposure to similar supply 
and demand fluctuations (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
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argue that aggregating stocks into sector portfolios for momentum calculation eliminates 
much of the firm-specific component of returns, minimising the dispersion in the 
unconditional mean. 
As noted in Section 3.2.1, and illustrated in Figure 3.1, the market beta was unable to 
capture the total dispersion of observations around its expected value. Fama and French 
(1993) argued that stock market risk factors serve as likely candidates to explain this 
(unconditional) expected return. To paraphrase, the crux of Moskowitz and Grinblatt’s (1999) 
argument is that the sector-level stock market risk factors will do a better job at capturing this 
unexplained variance. 
Fama and French (2012) compare the performance of global and local four-factor 
model specifications across four regions between 1989 and 2011, including North America, 
Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific. They conclude that asset pricing regressions on a regional 
basis typically have greater explanatory power as regression fits are tight, resulting in higher 
𝑅2 values. The calculation of global stock market risk factors is only suitable for global 
comparisons, for example, in the case of the inter-sectoral analysis in Chapter 4. To explain 
average returns at the local level, i.e. within the energy sector, the use of a local model is 
preferable. While this may lose generalisability to other sectors, calculating the stock market 
risk factors at the sector level reduces dispersion in the unconditional mean for the risk factors 
and provides a more accurate measurement of the impact of size, value and momentum on 
average returns.  
This chapter presents a similar argument: the informational content in the sector-level 
risk factors have greater relevance to explaining sector returns compared with global risk 
factors, which must inevitably include stocks outside the sector which have different firm 
characteristics. 
 Methodology 5.3
The following section outlines the model and econometric approach to exploring 
returns at the sector level. Section 5.3.1 outlines the econometric models and approach used to 
answer the four analytical foci. Section 5.3.2 presents the sample and data used. Section 
5.3.2.1 outlines the construction of the 12 portfolios used as dependent variables in the local 
AFFM. In contrast, Section 5.3.3 outlines the calculation of the local stock market risk factors 
used as independent variables of the local AFFM. 
5.3.1 Models and Econometric Approach 
The analysis in Chapter 4 shows that the global AFFM is better at explaining returns 
in the energy utility sector in comparison with existing asset pricing models (see Table 4.5 
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and chapter contributions in Section 4.4.1). To examine returns at the sector level, this chapter 
develops the local AFFM. The local AFFM of this chapter will be used to answer analytical 
foci 1 and 2. To answer focus 1, this chapter will compare the adjusted 𝑅2 values between the 
global and local AFFMs of Chapter 4 and 5, respectively. To answer focus 2, this chapter will 
explore within-sector heterogeneity by examining the returns across 12 European energy 
utility portfolios. For convenience, energy portfolio returns are denoted in the generalised 
form 𝑹𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 denotes the excess return over the one month UK treasury bill for the 𝑖
th 
portfolio on day 𝑡 (see forthcoming Section 5.4.1.1). The econometric modelling begins with 
the local AFFM, estimated using OLS regressions: 
𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 
+𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡, (5.1) 
where 𝛼𝑖 denotes the intercept, 𝑏𝑖 denotes the market coefficient, 𝑹𝑚,𝑡 denotes the excess 
return on the market factor at time 𝑡, 𝑠𝑖 denotes the local 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficient, 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 denotes the 
local size premium at time 𝑡, ℎ𝑖 denotes the local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 denotes the local 
value premium at time 𝑡, 𝑚𝑖 denotes the local 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficient, 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 denotes the local 
momentum premium at time 𝑡, 𝑡𝑝𝑖 denotes the term premium coefficient, 𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 denotes the 
term premium at time 𝑡, 𝑜𝑖 denotes the oil price risk coefficient, 𝑅𝑜,𝑡 denotes the return on oil 
price at time 𝑡, 𝑐𝑖 denotes the coal price risk coefficient, 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 denotes the return on coal price 
at time 𝑡, 𝑔𝑖 denotes the natural gas price risk coefficient and 𝑅𝑔,𝑡 denotes the return on 
natural gas price at time 𝑡. 
Despite superficially similar model specifications, there are two major differences 
between the global and local AFFMs. First, the global AFFM of Chapter 4, Equation (4.4), is 
used to explain returns across 11 distinct sectors of European stocks (see Section 4.2.3.1). In 
contrast, the local AFFM in Equation (5.1) is used to explain returns across 12 portfolios of 
European energy utilities grouped on similarity of characteristics (see Section 5.3.2.1). 
Second, the global AFFM in Equation (4.4) uses global stock market risk factors calculated 
across a diversified sample of 600 European stocks as independent variables, with the 
objective of creating an integrated global AFFM which can be applied across sectors; see 
Section 4.2.4 for 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 calculations. In contrast, the local AFFM in 
Equation (5.1) will calculate stock market risk factors using the 88 European energy utilities 
as independent variables, with the objective of more accurately explaining within-sector 
returns; see Section 5.3.3 for the 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 calculations. 
For completeness and comparability between Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter will also 
report the econometric results of the CAPM, augmented-CAPM and four-factor model (using 
D.J. Tulloch© 
151 
local stock market risk factors 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡). For brevity, we utilise the same 
model specifications as Chapter 4: Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), respectively. Conditional 
annual local AFFM regressions are implemented to remain consistent with Chapter 4 and 
examine time-varying risk premia. Further, the conditional regressions allow comparison of 
the deductive approach against the inductive approach of estimating unknown break dates 
using the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) test, discussed below. Accordingly, the following 
equation is implemented on an annual basis between 1996 and 2013: 
𝑹𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 
+𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒𝑖 (5.2) 
where 𝑐𝑜2𝑖 denotes the carbon price risk coefficient and 𝑅𝑐𝑜2 denotes the return on carbon. 
Similar to Chapter 4, the regressions are estimated using Newey-West HAC standard errors, 
and subject to standard regression diagnostic tests. 
Research foci 3 and 4 focus on addressing parameter stability and isolation of the 
firm-specific components of returns using an inductive approach. To this end, this chapter 
employs the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) structural break point test to examine the presence 
of multiple structural changes in model parameters (discussed in Section 3.3.4). The Bai and 
Perron (1998; 2003) break point test is implemented using EViews and contains two stages: 1) 
a post-hoc multiple break point test and 2) the break point regression; explains below. 
The first stage implements post-hoc stability diagnostic tests on the results of the local 
AFFM in Equation (5.1). The multiple break point test identifies whether there are potential 
break points in the unconditional AFFM’s model parameters. The break specification is 
sequential, testing the null of ℓ versus the alternative of ℓ + 1 breaks. The information 
criterion is set to allow up to 18 structural breaks, the maximum available, and employs a 
trimming percentage of 5%. As the dataset consists of 4,435 observations, the trimming value 
implies that regimes must have at least 222 observations to be considered a structural break; 
this was the minimum period permissible by the model. The significance level is 𝑝 ≤ 10%, 
and error distributions are allowed to differ across breaks to control for heterogeneity. The 
results of the test report an estimate for the number of potential breaks in the sample and the 
estimated break dates. 
The second stage implements a break point regression specifying the local AFFM as 
the mean equation (Equation 5.1). The break point regression estimates a linear regression 
where the parameters are subject to structural change. The algorithm obtains global 
minimisers of the SSR based on dynamic programming. Based on evidence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, Newey-West HAC standard errors for the coefficient 
covariance matrix are used and error distribution is allowed to differ across breaks to account 
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for heterogeneity of time periods. The results of Bai and Perron (2003) showed that this 
allowed for detection of smaller break which were otherwise obscured in the data (see Section 
3.3.4.2). The HAC coefficient covariance matrix automatically determines optimised lag 
structuring using the Akaike Information Criterion
52
 (AIC). The kernel bandwidth is 
automatically determined using Andrew’s AR(1) method and uses quadratic-spectral kernels. 
To remain congruent with the first stage, the break specification is also sequential, testing the 
null of ℓ versus the alternative of ℓ + 1 breaks. The information criterion is also set to allow a 
maximum of 18 structural breaks, employs a trimming percentage of 5% and tests 
significance at 𝑝 ≤ 10%. The test will estimate the date of structural breaks in the 
relationship between returns in the energy sector and the risk premia of the local AFFM. The 
results also report the estimated coefficients across each of the break dates, allowing 
examination of the changing relationship with risk premia through time.  
In Section 5.4.2.4, the isolation of the firm-specific component of returns is explored 
using the unconditional local AFFM (Equation 5.1), using the conditional annual local AFFM 
(Equation 5.2) and using the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) structural break point test. 
5.3.2 Sample Selection and Data 
The data used in this chapter are the same as that used in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2.3) 
with one addition, namely the use of SICs to group energy utilities based on their industry 
sub-grouping. For the classification of European energy utilities by industry (electricity, 
natural gas or multi-utility), SICs for the years 1996 to 2013 were obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream and allow for the creation of industry-portfolios, defined by the primary 
source of revenue for a firm within a given year. As a requirement to be eligible for analysis, 
all energy utilities must have data on stock price, market capitalisation, book value of equity 
for years 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 and SICs for year 𝑡. This did not affect the number of companies used in 
the sample. For consistency across chapters, the sample of European energy utility companies 
used in this chapter are the same 88 energy utilities outlined in Section 4.2.2. As stated earlier 
(see Sections 1.5 and 4.1), the sample is still considerably larger than that of Oberndorfer 




                                                 
52
 Note, three alternative lag structures were also tested but made no difference to estimates: 1) no lag 
specification, 2) Schwarz information criterion and 3) Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. 
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5.3.2.1 Returns to be explained: the 12 energy portfolios 
In Chapter 4, the focus of the global AFFM was to examine returns for the energy 
utility sector as a whole, where the size, value and momentum premia were only used as 
explanatory variables on the RHS of the regression models (see Equation 4.4). In contrast, 
focus 2 of this chapter (Section 5.1) seeks to identify within-sector heterogeneity for the 
European energy utility sector. To this end, beyond examining average returns for the energy 
sector as a whole, the 88 European energy utilities are also sorted into various portfolios 
based on similarity of characteristics. The groupings, outlined in the following paragraphs, 
produce a further two portfolios based on size, three portfolios based on BE/ME ratios, and 
three portfolios based on momentum and three portfolios based on firm industry. In total, 12 
portfolios are examined. This method of industry grouping is a novel contribution to the 
energy economics literature and is also an improvement on Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch 
and Bassen (2013). 
The value-weighted returns of the 12 portfolios become dependent variables on the 
LHS of the local AFFM in Equation (5.1) (see Section 5.3.1) and the three ancillary asset 
pricing models: CAPM, augmented-CAPM and local four-factor model. The purpose of the 
portfolio approach is to examine the within-sector heterogeneity of energy utility returns 
based on firm characteristics. The benefit of this approach is the ability to examine risk 
exposure of particular utilities in isolation; for example, the risk exposure of small utilities. 
Whereas the method of portfolio construction in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4) creates the size, 
value and momentum premia for use as independent variables, the method is adapted in this 
chapter to create 12 energy portfolios for use as dependent variables. The rest of this section 
outlines portfolios constructed for use as dependent variables, while Section 5.3.3 outlines 
portfolios used as independent variables. 
The following paragraph constructs the two size portfolios. At the end of June of each 
year 𝑡, from 1996 to 2013, all European energy utilities are ranked on market capitalisation to 
proxy for size. Annually, the median market capitalisation is used as the break point to 
allocate the energy utility stocks into two portfolios: small or big energy utilities. Value-
weighted returns are calculated for the small and big portfolios from July of year 𝑡 to end of 
June for 𝑡 + 1, denoted 𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 and 𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈. The portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of 
June for 𝑡 + 1. Visual inspection showed that the two portfolios were well balanced each 
year, containing approximately equal numbers of energy utilities with a maximum difference 
of one firm when the sample contained an odd number of energy utilities. The median number 
of energy utilities in the 𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 and 𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈 portfolios, across all years, was 22.5. Although 
balanced, big energy utilities typically dominated sector valuation. Between 1996 and 2013, 
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the combined value of small energy utilities accounted for 6.4% of total sector valuation. This 
is consistent with Chapter 4 and Fama and French (1995). For the portfolio of 600 European 
firms in Chapter 4, small firms typically accounted for 5.84% of the total market value, across 
all firms and years. Similarly, Fama and French (1995) found that small firms accounted for 
about 7.3% of total market value in 1991. The 𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 and 𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈 portfolios will be used as 
dependent variables in Equation (5.1) to examine heterogeneous risk exposure based on utility 
size. 
To form the three BE/ME portfolios, all energy utilities are ranked on their BE/ME 
ratios annually. The BE/ME ratio is calculated as the book value of common equity for the 
fiscal year ending in calendar year 𝑡 − 1, scaled48 by market capitalisation at the end of 
December in year 𝑡 − 1. The energy utilities are allocated to groups based on Fama and 
French’s (1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2006, 2012) three break points: the top 30% (high-
BE/ME), the middle 40% (mid-BE/ME) and the bottom 30% (low-BE/ME). The three groups 
represent value, neutral and growth stocks, respectively (Fama and French, 2006, 2012, 
French, 2015). Negative BE/ME firms are excluded from break point calculations and BE/ME 
portfolio formation; the sample only contained two negative BE/ME observations. The high, 
mid and low BE/ME portfolios contain a median of 13, 18 and 13.5 firms, respectively, across 
all years. Value-weighted returns are calculated for the high-BE/ME, mid-BE/ME and low-
BE/ME portfolios, denoted 𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉, 𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅 and 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘, respectively. The portfolios are rebalanced 
at the end of June for 𝑡 + 1. The three portfolios will be used as dependent variables in 
Equation (5.1) to examine heterogeneous risk exposure based on book-to-market ratio. 
Similar to Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4), to ensure the accounting variables predate the 
returns they are used to explain, the accounting data for fiscal year 𝑡 − 1 are matched with the 
returns for July of year 𝑡 to June of 𝑡 + 1 (Fama and French, 1992). As discussed in Section 
4.2.4, this six month lag is based on research by Alford et al. (1994) and Conover et al. (2008) 
regarding the lag between the fiscal year end and the publication of annual reports. 
To form the three momentum portfolios, the average excess return for all 88 European 
energy utilities is calculated daily over the formation period from day 𝑡 − 251 to day 𝑡 − 21 
and excludes the sort month. To be considered as an upper momentum utility, the energy 
stock’s returns during the formation period and on 𝑡 − 21 must be positive; similarly, the 
stock returns during the formation period and return on 𝑡 − 21 must be negative for down 
momentum utilities. The 𝑡 − 21 condition ensures that the upper and down momentums 
continue until the end of the formation period and reversal has not already begun. The daily 
break points are defined as the top 30% (upper momentum), the middle 40% (medium 
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momentum) and the bottom 30% (down momentum). The value-weighted daily returns on the 
upper, medium and down momentum portfolios are calculated, rebalanced daily, and denoted 
𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓, 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎 and 𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏, respectively. The 𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓, 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎 and 𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 portfolios will 
be used as dependent variables in Equation (5.1) to identify whether the risk factors for 
energy utilities differ based on momentum. Based on Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Boni 
and Womack (2006) and Fama and French (2012), the three momentum portfolios are 
expected, by definition, to have extreme momentum tilt and thus the local AFFM may have 
difficulty capturing average returns. This issue is addressed in Section 5.4.2.1. 
To form the three industry portfolios, up to 10 SICs for each energy utility are 
obtained, annually, between 1996 and 2013.
53
 The SIC system is designed to categorise 
industries
54
 using a four-digit code, where the former digits represent the major sectors to 
which a firm belongs, while the latter digits represent industries and sub-classifications 
(operations) within industries. The SIC groupings are similar to that employed by Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999), who use a two-digit classification system. When multiple SICs are 
available, the SICs are ranked from most important source of revenue to least important. 
The SICs of each utility are categorised, annually, as: electricity industry, natural gas 
industry, multi-utility industry, or ‘other’ operations – denoting any operation outside of the 
energy sector. The categories are based on SIC descriptions,
55
 shown in Table 5.1. Due to lack 
of detail in the SIC system, it is not possible to further delineate the electricity industry into 
generation, transmission and/or distribution operations. Therefore, the analysis is restricted at 
the industry level rather than the operation level. Some utilities contained secondary 
operations outside of the energy sector and ancillary operations beyond the primary source of 
revenue, for example, electricity line maintenance. As these are auxiliary operations, they are 
not expected to significantly impact returns. 
  
                                                 
53
 Due to the significant data omissions for 2014, 2013 was the most comprehensive end date possible and 
therefore also determined the end date of the analysis. 
54
 There are various definitions for sector, industry and operations. For example, see the conflict between the 
Global Industry Classification Standard, the Industry Classification Benchmark and Standard Industrial 
Classification (which only includes industry). For clarity, it is important to distinguish between the definitions of 
sector, industry and operation for this thesis as the three are often used interchangeably when, in fact, differences 
exist. This thesis defines sector as a large segment of the economy, for example, the energy sector. Industry 
describes a more specific group of companies within the sector with similar activities, for example, the 
electricity, natural gas and multi-utility industries. Operation describes even more detailed processes within the 
industry: for example, electricity generation, electricity transmission and electricity distribution. 
55
 Descriptions can be found at: http://siccode.com/en/siccode/list/directory 
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TABLE 5.1: SIC CODES, INDUSTRY AND OPERATIONS 
This table presents the SIC codes used to classify the 88 European energy utilities into three portfolios based on industry: electricity, 
natural gas and multi-utility. 
Industry SIC Operation 
Electricity 4910 Electric Services 
4911 Electric Services 
4931 Electric and other Services Combined 
Natural Gas 1311 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
1321 Natural Gas Liquids 
1382 Oil and Gas Field Exploration Services 
1389 Oil and Gas Field Services, not elsewhere classified 
2813 Industrial Gases 
2911 Petroleum Refining 
4920 Gas Production and Distribution 
4922 Natural Gas Transmission 
4923 Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution 
4924 Natural Gas Distribution 
4925 Mixed, Manufactured, or Liquefied Petroleum Gas Production and/or Distribution 
4932 Gas and other Services Combined 
5172 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Wholesalers, except Bulk Stations and Terminals 
Multi-Utility 4900 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
4939 Combination Utilities, not elsewhere classified 
 
Based on the SICs, utilities categorised within the electricity industry exclusively 
contain electricity operations and ‘other’ operations, the natural gas industry exclusively 
contain natural gas operations and ‘other’ operations, while the multi-utility industry is 
identified by its SIC or contains operations from both the electricity and natural gas industries. 
The natural gas industry contained some operations which overlap with the oil and petroleum 
industry. The natural gas industry may show some similarities to the oil & gas sector results in 
Chapter 4 (see related discussion in Section 3.2.3.3 and results in Table 4.5). 
As SIC codes define the business operations which generate the highest revenue for 
the firm in the past year (𝑡), SIC codes for year 𝑡 are matched56 to returns for July of year 𝑡 to 
June of 𝑡 + 1. The value-weighted daily returns on the electricity, natural gas and multi-utility 
portfolios are calculated, denoted 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍, 𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍 and 𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊, respectively. The portfolios 
are rebalanced annually in June of year 𝑡 + 1 to control for utilities which change operations 
or industries. This is an improvement over Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013), 
who do not rebalance portfolios. This could be a major issue in the case of company mergers, 
where the acquiring firm shifts operations from, say, electricity to multi-utility operations. 
Although rare, some of the SICs of utilities changed across years, but were mostly confined to 
ancillary operations rather than primary operations. The rebalancing will also assist in Chapter 
6 of the thesis when measuring the sensitivity of an industry to a new regulatory change, 
ensuring that the industry portfolios are correctly categorised. The 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍, 𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍 and 
                                                 
56
Matching SICs of year 𝑡 − 1 to returns of year 𝑡 only made minor differences to the cumulative returns of the 
natural gas and multi-utility portfolios. The overall trend of the three portfolios did not change. 
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𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊 portfolios will be used as dependent variables in Equation (5.1) to identify the 
heterogeneous risk exposure of energy utilities based on industry. 
As noted in this section and Sections 5.3.1, the 12 portfolios defined above will be 
used as dependent variables for analysis in Equation (5.1), where 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕, 𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕, 
𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕, 𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕, 𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕, 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕 , 𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕, 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕, 𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕, 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕, 𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 or 𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕. 
Each portfolio will be regressed independently. The following section explains the 
construction of the local stock market risk factors used as independent variables in Equation 
(5.1). 
5.3.3 The Local Stock Market Risk Factors: Size, Value and Momentum Premia 
For the independent variables, local stock market risk factors are calculated in a 
similar manner to global factors in Chapter 4. While Chapter 4 uses a diversified portfolio of 
600 European stocks (see Section 4.2.4) to create the global stock market risk factors, this 
chapter only uses the 88 European energy utilities to create the local stock market risk factors. 
As stated in the chapter’s introduction (Section 5.1), the use of local stock market risk factors 
is expected to improve regression fit and is necessary to examine within-sector heterogeneity. 
The sector level mimicking portfolios are used as explanatory variables on the RHS of this 
chapter’s regression models (see Section 5.3.1). The method to construct the variables is 
outlined extensively in Section 4.2.4, the following paragraphs present definitions and 
interpretations of the local stock market risk factors for interpretation of forthcoming results. 
The local 𝑆𝑀𝐵 (small minus big) risk factor (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) mimics the risk factor in returns 
which is related to energy utility firm size, representing local size premium. The 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 
represents a zero sum investment which is long on small energy utilities and short on big 
energy utilities. Small energy utilities are expected to generate higher returns than big energy 
utilities. A positive (negative) 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 factor in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2 indicates that small 
energy utilities outperform (underperform) big energy utilities. A positive (negative) 𝑠𝑖 
coefficient in Table 5.5 indicates that the energy portfolio of interest behaves like small (big) 
energy utilities. 
The local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 (high minus low) risk factor (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) mimics the risk factor in returns 
which is related to energy utility book-to-market ratio. The 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 represents a zero sum 
investment which is long on high-BE/ME (value) energy utilities and short on low-BE/ME 
(growth) energy utilities, representing local value premium. High-BE/ME utilities are 
expected to generate higher returns than low-BE/ME utilities. A positive (negative) 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
factor in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2 indicates that high-BE/ME energy utilities outperform 
(underperform) low-BE/ME energy utilities stocks. A positive (negative) ℎ𝑖 coefficient in 
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Table 5.5 indicates that the energy portfolio of interest behaves like high-BE/ME (low-
BE/ME) energy utilities. 
The local 𝑈𝑀𝐷 (upper minus down) risk factor (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) mimics the risk factor in 
returns which is related to energy utility persistence of earnings (momentum). The 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 
represents a zero sum investment which is long on upper momentum energy utilities and short 
on down momentum energy utilities and represents the momentum premium. Upper 
momentum energy utilities are expected to generate higher returns than down momentum 
energy utilities. A positive (negative) 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factor in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2 indicates that 
upper momentum energy utilities outperform (underperform) down momentum energy 
utilities stocks. A positive (negative) 𝑚𝑖 coefficient in Table 5.5 indicates that the energy 
portfolio of interest behaves like upper momentum (down momentum) energy utilities. 
 Results 5.4
This chapter explores the four analytical foci outlined in Section 5.1, namely: 1) 
refining the AFFM to produce the local AFFM, 2) examining within-sector heterogeneity 
across sub-groups of European energy utilities, 3) applying inductive structural break point 
tests and 4) better isolating the firm-specific component of returns. 
The following results section is structured as follows. Section 5.4.1 presents the 
descriptive results of this chapter. Within the descriptive results, Section 5.4.1.1 presents the 
return profiles of the 12 energy utility portfolios (outlined previously in Section 5.3.2.1) and 
risk factors for context, while Section 5.4.1.2 reports the summary statistics of the data. 
Section 5.4.2 presents the econometric results for this chapter. Within the econometric results, 
Section 5.4.2.1 presents the results of the local AFFM for the energy utility sector as a whole, 
addressing the first analytical focus. The local AFFM is also implemented on the 12 energy 
portfolios to examine within-sector heterogeneity, addressing the 2
nd
 analytical focus. For 
completeness and comparability across chapters, Section 5.4.2.1 also reports the results of the 
three alternative asset pricing models (CAPM, augmented-CAPM and local four-factor 
model), while Section 5.4.2.2 reports the inter-temporal regressions using the local AFFM. To 
address analytical focus 3, Section 5.4.2.3 reports the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) inductive 
structural break point test. Finally, Section 5.4.2.4 addresses analytical focus 4 by outlining a 
method to better isolate the firm-specific component of returns from the residuals of the asset 
pricing models.  
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5.4.1 Descriptive Results 
5.4.1.1 Return profiles of energy utilities and risk factors 
The results section begins with a description of the return profiles of the 12 energy 
utility portfolios constructed in Section 5.3.2.1. The cumulative returns of all 12 energy 
portfolios can be observed in Figure 5.2. The daily returns, used in empirical analysis, can 
also be observed in Figure 5.3. For both cumulative returns and daily returns, the observations 
are calculated between 01 July 1996 and 28 June 2013. 
Figure 5.2 (Plot A) compares the cumulative returns for the energy sector and the two 
size portfolios: small and big energy utilities. As expected, the small energy utilities have 
higher cumulative returns than the large energy utilities, illustrating a clear size effect. As 
argued in Section 3.2.2.1, small utilities are expected to generate higher returns than larger 
utilities due to additional risk exposure and from the effect of being marginal firms (Banz, 
1981, Chan et al., 1985, Chan and Chen, 1991). The cumulative returns of the big energy 
utilities are barely indistinguishable from the sector. Section 5.3.2.1 showed that big energy 
utilities account for 96.3% of total sector valuation; their large market capitalisations have a 
greater influence on overall sector returns.
57
 An implication of this result is that any inference 
regarding impacts on energy sector valuation as a whole are implicitly discussing the impact 
on big utilities’ valuation. Small utilities are obscured at sector level, have less contribution to 
overall sector valuation and have a unique return profile. 
Plot B of Figure 5.2 shows the cumulative return profiles for the three BE/ME 
portfolios. The high-BE/ME (value) energy utilities have higher cumulative returns than mid-
BE/ME (neutral) energy utilities, and low-BE/ME (growth) energy utilities have the lowest 
cumulative returns overall. The cumulative returns are consistent with the literature in Section 
3.2.2.2; high-BE/ME utilities are expected to outperform low-BE/ME utilities (Rosenberg et 
al., 1985, Chan et al., 1991, Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1998). The value premium is 
often criticised for being an empirically determined variable, but the literature in Section 
3.2.2.3 argues that high-BE/ME companies are riskier, less profitable and often have 
characteristics consistent with firm distress, requiring greater return on investment (Chan et 
al., 1991, Fama and French, 1995, 1996). Regardless, a large value premium is observed in 
the energy utility sector. 
                                                 
57
 Section 3.3.5.1 argued that value-weighted portfolios are preferable as they represent realistic investment 





FIGURE 5.2: CUMULATIVE RETURN FOR THE 12 ENERGY PORTFOLIOS. 
This figure presents the cumulative return profile of the 12 energy utility portfolios constructed in Section 5.3.2.1. Plot A contains the whole energy sector, small utilities and big utilities. Plot B contains 
the three portfolios formed on book-to-market: high-, mid- and low-BE/ME. The portfolios represent value, nautral and growth stocks, respectively. Plot C contains the three momentum portfolios: 
































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
FIGURE 5.3: DAILY RETURN SERIES FOR THE 12 ENERGY PORTFOLIOS 































































































































































































































































































































































   
































































































































































































































































































































































Plot C of Figure 5.2 illustrates the cumulative returns for the three momentum 
portfolios. Naturally, the upper momentum portfolio dramatically outperforms the medium 
and down momentum portfolios. Interestingly, there is almost no difference in the three 
momentum portfolios until 2000, when the portfolios begin to diverge. This date occurs soon 
after the first packages of liberalisation. Momentum may only exist in liberalised markets 
with competition. This is a logical inference, as Section 2.2 argued that the previously 
regulated energy markets contained vertically integrated utilities with natural, regional 
monopolies, preventing any competition. Utilities could not gain or lose market share to 
competitors; thus, profitability would have been tied to the surrounding population’s energy 
consumption which is assumed to be relatively inelastic (see Oberndorfer, 2009a). As isolated 
markets and unfair grid access is still a major concern of liberalisation objectives in Section 
2.2.1, we expect momentum premium shifts surrounding these legislation. 
Finally, Plot D of Figure 5.2 presents the cumulative returns for the three industry 
portfolios. The results show that the electricity utility portfolio generated the greatest 
cumulative returns across time, indicating a higher risk-return relationship. In contrast, the 
natural gas and multi-utility portfolios show similar returns through time. The multi-utilities 
showed one of the lowest cumulative abnormal returns across all portfolios – possibly 
indicating a lower risk-return relationship. This is consistent with economy of scope, where 
multi-utilities provide customers in the same region with electricity, gas and other services 
such as waste and water. A diversified portfolio of operations is less likely to be exposed to 
the regulatory and operational risks of single utilities. Further, if a regulation is found to 
negatively impact one operation or industry, for example, electricity generation, the multi-
utility can shift costs from the affected operation to the more profitable operation or industry. 
The variety of services result in a less risky revenue stream; therefore, investors will require 
lower return on investment. The risk exposure of each industry portfolio will be addressed in 
Section Table 5.5 to address this proposition. 
The market factor, term premium and commodity risk factors were covered 
extensively in Section 4.3.1, and are, therefore, not outlined here for brevity. Instead, the 
following paragraphs provide a discussion of the returns associated with the local stock 
market risk factors: 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡. For comparison, Figure 5.4 compares the 
local stock market risk factors of this chapter with the global stock market risk factors of 




   
FIGURE 5.4: COMPARISON OF CUMULATIVE RETURNS FOR GLOBAL AND LOCAL STOCK MARKET RISK FACTORS 
This figure presents the cumulative returns of the three stock market risk factors in Chapters 4 and 5: the size, value and momentum premia. The black line represents local stock market risk factors of 
Chapter 5, specific to energy utilities, including 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡.  The grey line represents global stock market risk factors of Chapter 4, for European stocks generally, including 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡. 
   
FIGURE 5.5: DAILY RETURNS FOR THE LOCAL STOCK MARKET RISK FACTORS 
















































































































































































































































































































































(C) LUMDt Factor 
D.J. Tulloch© 
165 
First, Figure 5.4 (Plot A) shows the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factors are relatively consistent between the 
two chapters. The positive local 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) shows that there is a constant spread in 
returns between the small and big energy utilities. Further, Figure 5.5 (Plot A) shows no 
major changes in returns around the dot-com bubble, GFC or EUC. Plot B of Figure 5.4 
shows that the local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) is far more prominent than the global 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor 
(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡). There is relatively little difference between the two value premia until 2003, when 
the local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor shows that high-BE/ME (value) energy utilities dramatically outperform 
low-BE/ME (growth) energy utilities. This divergence coincides with the second packages of 
liberalisation (see Section 2.2.1). Post 2009, there is a large shift in value premium, where the 
negative 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor shows that low-BE/ME energy utilities begin to outperform high-
BE/ME. This occurs post-GFC and around the third packages of liberalisation, possibly 
indicating that relatively distressed (high-BE/ME) utilities performed poorly and growth firms 
dominate sector returns. Plot B of Figure 5.5 shows that the impact of the GFC is also evident 
in the daily returns of the local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor. Finally, Plot C of Figure 5.4 shows that the local 
𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor for energy utilities (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) behaves similar to the global 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor for 
European stocks (𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡). Plot C of Figure 5.5 show some clustering of volatility across time, 
with the major clustering occurring in 2003 and 2009, the locations of the second and third 
packages of liberalisation (see Section 2.2.1 and Table 2.1). 
The important implications for the results above are that the local and global stock 
market risk factors differ. While the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 risk factors are similar between chapters, 
the cumulative return profiles are not identical. The results of Table 5.5 will show that this has 
some impact on the estimated 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficients. Further, the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors are 
dramatically different between the two chapters. Importantly, the use of global stock market 
risk factors would obscure the true underlying (local) 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor for energy utilities. The 
results in Table 5.5 will show that this has major implications on the estimated coefficients. 
Superficially, there is some support for analytical focus 1, that the AFFM can be refined by 
calculating local stock market risk factors. 
5.4.1.2 Summary statistics 
The summary statistics for all 12 portfolios and nine risk factors are presented in Table 
5.2. Most of the returns across all portfolios and risk factors are not statistically different from 
zero, with the exception of upper momentum utilities, the 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 risk factor, 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 risk 
factor, term premium and carbon risk. The summary statistics indicate that the mean daily 
return for the energy sector is -0.0051%, losing value over time. Small utilities achieve a 
greater mean return (0.0155%) compared with big utilities (-0.0062%), reflecting the greater 
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risk-return relationship of small utilities. Big utilities lose value over time. Regarding book-
to-market portfolios, high-BE/ME utilities achieve greater mean returns (0.0102%) compared 
with mid- and low-BE/ME utilities (-0.0027% and -0.0131%, respectively). For momentum 
portfolios, the upper momentum portfolio achieves a mean return of 0.0291%, significant at 
𝑝 ≤ 0.01 and greater than the medium and down momentum portfolios (0.0095% 
and -0.0022%, respectively). When categorising portfolios by operations, the electricity and 
natural gas industries achieve mean returns of 0.0136% and 0.0127%, respectively. Multi-
utilities only achieved a mean return of 0.0006%, consistent with the lower perceived risk and 
economy of scope argument presented above. 
The market factor, term premium, oil, coal, natural gas and carbon were addressed 
previously in Section 4.3.1.2 (Table 4.2), the summary statistics for these risk factors remain 
unchanged. The following paragraph addresses the local stock market risk factors, which 
produce differing results in comparison with Table 4.2. 
Regarding the risk factors, the 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 factor shows there is a significant spread in 
daily returns of 0.0309% (𝑝 = 0.015) between small and big energy utilities. The 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 
factor is marginally greater than the global 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 of Table 4.2 (0.0252%, 𝑝 ≤ 0.01). The 
return spread is interesting in its own right, as the energy sector was heavily dominated by big 
utilities until 2003. When big utilities were unbundled and pan-European competition was 
introduced, small utilities could begin to take market share and expand into previously 
dominated markets. The significant size premium is consistent with Fama and French (1993, 
1995, 1997, 2012). The 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factor shows a daily premium of 0.0184% for high-BE/ME 
(value) energy utilities compared with low-BE/ME (growth) energy utilities. This result 
contrasts the insignificant global 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factor of Table 4.2. As posited in Section 5.4.1.1, 
energy utilities have a greater value premium than most European stocks. The 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factor 
shows daily return spread of 0.0313% (𝑝 = 0.041) between upper and down momentum 
utilities. The 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factor is near identical to the 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 presented in Table 4.2 (0.0312%, 
𝑝 ≤0.05). As stated in Section 5.4.1.1, the differences between the local and global stock 
market risk factors lend some support to analytical focus 1, the existence of sector level 
peculiarities, suggesting the local stock market risk factors may have a better goodness of fit 
in the AFFM specification. 
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TABLE 5.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE PORTFOLIOS AND RISK FACTORS 
Summary statistics for the 12 portfolios and nine risk factors, including: number of daily observations (N), mean daily return, 𝑡-statistic of the mean, annualised mean return, 
standard deviation, minimum observation, maximum observation, skewness, kurtosis, mean market capitalisation, mean book value of equity and book-to-market ratio. The t-mean 
statistic is the ratio of the mean daily return to its standard error. The 12 value-weighted portfolios include: the energy sector (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), high-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕), mid-BE/ME 
utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕), low-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕), upper momentum utilities (𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕), medium momentum utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕), down momentum utilities (𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕), electricity utilities 
(𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), natural gas utilities (𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), multi-utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕), small utilities (𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕) and big utilities (𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕). The nine risk factors include: the market factor (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), local 
size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡), gas risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡) and carbon risk 
(𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡). Mean market capitalisation and book value of equity are calculated across all years for each portfolio, shown in €millions. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 
1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕 𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕 𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕 𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕 
N 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 
Mean -0.0051% 0.0102% -0.0027% -0.0131% 0.0291% 0.0095% -0.0022% 0.0136% 0.0127% 0.0006% 0.0155% 
t-Mean (-0.30) (0.53) (-0.15) (-0.80) (2.85)*** (0.56) (-0.16) (0.81) (0.58) (0.03) (1.12) 
Std. Dev. Daily 1.11% 1.29% 1.23% 1.09% 0.67% 1.14% 0.90% 1.10% 1.49% 1.20% 0.89% 
Mean Annualised -1.32% 2.69% -0.70% -3.35% 7.86% 2.50% -0.57% 3.60% 3.36% 0.16% 4.11% 
Min -8.10% -9.53% -8.29% -8.34% -5.48% -8.46% -7.98% -9.49% -10.48% -9.80% -10.53% 
Max 13.60% 8.04% 14.38% 13.22% 6.85% 14.70% 5.83% 13.00% 12.96% 16.13% 7.71% 
Skew 0.09 -0.43 0.15 0.11 0.53 0.24 -0.58 0.03 0.20 0.20 -0.86 
Kurt 14.80 8.85 12.93 15.03 14.70 15.49 14.63 16.51 10.18 15.68 14.36 
Mean Market Cap. 7,869.25 3,383.21 12,722.44 11,599.21 7,318.08 11,553.89 9,208.67 6,381.02 14,954.77 13,489.90 1,201.88 
Mean Book Value 5,134.55 3,831.36 7,482.48 3,661.81 3,730.04 6,315.23 5,253.09 6,469.90 2,747.28 2,693.20 1,046.02 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.65 1.13 0.59 0.32 0.51 0.55 0.57 1.01 0.18 0.20 0.87 
            
 𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕 𝑹𝒎,𝒕 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 𝑅𝑜,𝑡 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 𝑅𝑔,𝑡 𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡  
N 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 4435 2135  
Mean -0.0062% 0.0036% 0.0309% 0.0184% 0.0313% 0.0262% 0.0383% 0.0158% 0.0424% -0.4233%  
t-Mean (-0.36) (0.19) (2.50)** (1.18) (2.04)** (7.90)**** (1.32) (0.78) (0.74) (-2.64)***  
Std. Dev. Daily 1.15% 1.26% 0.85% 1.06% 1.01% 0.16% 1.78% 1.36% 3.73% 7.42%  
Mean Annualised -1.60% 0.94% 8.35% 4.91% 8.48% 7.05% 10.47% 4.19% 11.65% -66.81%  
Min -8.45% -7.94% -6.46% -9.42% -5.68% -0.71% -11.35% -16.08% -28.13% -138.63%  
Max 14.09% 9.40% 4.94% 8.00% 7.49% 0.36% 12.56% 19.78% 47.77% 109.86%  
Skew 0.12 -0.17 -0.13 -0.15 0.43 -1.06 -0.27 0.80 2.58 -3.14  
Kurt 15.06 7.96 5.71 9.07 10.19 4.74 6.17 38.75 28.85 121.76  
Mean Market Cap. 17,696.09           
Mean Book Value 9,266.01           
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.52                  
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The following paragraphs outline the preliminary statistics addressing standard 
assumptions of a linear regressions. First, similar to Section 4.3.1.2, Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1979) (ADF) unit root tests were implemented to confirm the stationarity of the time 
series, ensuring the dependent and independent variables were integrated to the same order 
and that a linear relationship can exist between the variables. The results of the ADF test, 
shown in Table 5.3, confirm that the time series is integrated to order zero, 𝐼(0), and 
stationary. 
TABLE 5.3: AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS 
This table presents the results of the ADF test for unit roots. The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, against the 
alternative of no unit root (stationarity). A ***, ** or * denotes 1%, 5% or 10% significance, respectively. The ADF test does not report 
significance greater than 1%. 
Variable ADF Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value Sig. 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 -66.04 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕 -67.55 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕 -66.93 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕 -65.79 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕 -65.30 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕 -67.51 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕 -63.20 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 -64.42 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 -70.44 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕 -64.56 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕 -62.49 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕 -66.23 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒎,𝒕 -66.21 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  -70.73 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  -68.55 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  -65.11 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 -7.73 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑜,𝑡 -55.95 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑐,𝑡 -66.76 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑔,𝑡 -63.62 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 -47.63 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 *** 
 
Second, Table 5.4 presents the pairwise correlations between all portfolios and risk 
factors, with corresponding significance tests. The energy portfolios, are included as they the 
correlations will be useful for interpretations in 5.4.2. For the 12 energy portfolios, the most 
prominent observation is the high correlation between the energy sector and big utilities. As 
recent as 2015, a small number of energy giants still dominate the energy sector, colloquially 
known as the ‘big six’ energy suppliers. Also, the portfolio formation in Section 5.3.2.1 
highlighted that big utilities accounted for the majority of sector market capitalisation. The 
correlations also suggest that returns in the low- and mid-BE/ME portfolios show higher 
correlation with the energy sector than the high-BE/ME portfolio. The medium momentum, 
electricity- and multi-utility portfolios also show higher correlation with the energy sector. 
These sectors typically have higher market capitalisation than other energy portfolios. 
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TABLE 5.4: PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PORTFOLIOS AND RISK FACTORS 
This table presents pairwise correlations between the 12 portfolios and eight risk factors. The 12 value-weighted portfolios include: the energy sector (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), small utilities (𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕), big utilities (𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕), low-BE/ME 
utilities (𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕), mid-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕), high-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕), upper momentum utilities (𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕), medium momentum utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕), down momentum utilities (𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕), electricity utilities 
(𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), natural gas utilities (𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕) and multi-utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕). The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), local momentum premium 
(𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil price risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal price risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡), natural gas price risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡) and carbon price risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
 𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕 𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕 𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕 𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕 𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕 𝑹𝒎,𝒕 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 𝑅𝑜,𝑡 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 𝑅𝑔,𝑡 𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 1.000       
      
          
 
 
       
      
          
 
𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕 0.605 1.000      
      
          
 
 ****                                        
𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕 0.968 0.541 1.000     
      
          
 
 **** ****                                      
𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕 0.884 0.476 0.767 1.000    
      
          
 
 **** **** ****                                    
𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕 0.543 0.351 0.523 0.469 1.000   
      
          
 
 **** **** **** ****                                  
𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕 0.927 0.573 0.905 0.815 0.457 1.000  
      
          
 
 **** **** **** **** ****                                
𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕 0.718 0.430 0.686 0.658 0.209 0.584 1.000                 
 
 **** **** **** **** **** ****                              
𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 0.894 0.554 0.856 0.822 0.479 0.827 0.647 1.000                          
 **** **** **** **** **** **** ****                            
𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕 0.793 0.417 0.798 0.658 0.455 0.759 0.523 0.634 1.000                        
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****                          
𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕 0.899 0.515 0.873 0.811 0.482 0.830 0.662 0.729 0.601 1.000                      
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****                        
𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕 0.631 0.572 0.587 0.564 0.390 0.590 0.435 0.605 0.457 0.556 1.000          
 
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****                      
𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕 0.999 0.596 0.969 0.883 0.540 0.926 0.718 0.892 0.794 0.899 0.601 1.000         
 
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****                    
𝑹𝒎,𝒕 0.818 0.517 0.800 0.718 0.450 0.749 0.603 0.739 0.691 0.717 0.547 0.816 1.000        
 
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****                  
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  -0.507 -0.422 -0.485 -0.457 -0.237 -0.476 -0.385 -0.412 -0.410 -0.460 0.123 -0.528 -0.384 1.000 
 
     
 
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****               
𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  -0.102 0.531 -0.079 -0.285 -0.021 -0.091 -0.080 -0.107 -0.104 -0.130 0.075 -0.110 -0.027 -0.060 1.000      
 
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** * ****              
𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  -0.281 -0.151 -0.266 -0.277 0.481 -0.218 -0.757 -0.260 -0.165 -0.272 -0.130 -0.282 -0.240 0.187 0.058 1.000     
 
 **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****            
𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 -0.007 -0.016 -0.013 0.004 -0.018 -0.006 0.009 -0.011 0.003 -0.009 -0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.022 -0.021 1.000    
 
                                          
𝑅𝑜,𝑡 0.020 0.031 0.006 0.034 0.018 0.008 0.050 0.026 0.039 -0.003 0.029 0.018 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.033 0.025 1.000   
 
   **   **     **** * **   *         ** *        
𝑅𝑐,𝑡 -0.023 -0.011 -0.027 -0.007 0.004 -0.033 0.002 -0.010 0.001 -0.033 -0.027 -0.023 0.027 -0.017 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.012 1.000  
 
     *     **       ** *   *                
𝑅𝑔,𝑡 0.024 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.032 0.044 0.044 0.028 0.011 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.008 0.010 -0.039 0.004 0.005 -0.007 1.000  
   *       ** *** *** *   **         **          
𝑅𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 0.078 0.043 0.074 0.085 0.035 0.062 0.058 0.085 0.071 0.065 0.077 0.077 0.082 -0.012 -0.027 -0.031 0.010 -0.029 -0.052 0.061 1.000 
 *** ** *** ***  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***      ** ***  
Note: Correlations between carbon and other variables are estimated over 2,135 observations to reflect the shorter time series. 
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Regarding the risk factors in Table 5.4, the market beta suggests that the sector is 
relatively defensive, with a market beta less than unity. The market beta varies across the 12 
portfolios, indicating heterogeneous systematic risk exposure. As stated in Sections 3.2.2.3 
and 4.3.1, the stock market factors are designed to be modelled in conjunction with the market 
factor to draw out characteristics buried within the market factor (Fama and French, 1993). 
Therefore, a detailed interpretation of the pairwise correlations is not presented, as this may 
result in misleading inferences. Term premium is insignificant across all variables tested. 
Based on the previous literature, the oil price sensitivity is expected. However, there is 
unusual significance for some portfolios, such as electricity utilities which rarely use oil in 
electricity generation. Coal return is expected to have a negative impact as expensive fuel 
decreases energy utilities’ profits. The significance of the natural gas returns has similarities 
with the oil returns. Oberndorfer (2009a) suggests that stock market participants may be using 
commodity prices as a main indicator of energy price developments. Carbon risk has a 
positive correlation with most portfolios tested, the market factor and natural gas, but a 
negative correlation with coal. Overall, the results are reasonably similar to the variety of 
coefficients presented Table 3.1. 
The magnitude and significance of the pairwise correlations with the risk factors 
suggest that the majority of portfolios have a differential impact to the risk premia, motivating 
analytical focus 2. Noticeably, the 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factors have significant 
correlations across all energy portfolios, while the commodity risk factors have impacts on 
each energy portfolio. To address the assumptions of Fama and French (1993), the 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 
and 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factors have low pairwise correlations (-0.060). The 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 factors 
also have low correlation (0.058). The analysis continues with the main results of this chapter. 
5.4.2 Econometric Results 
This section presents the results of Chapter 5, used to explore the four analytical foci 
in Section 5.1, including 1) refining the AFFM to produce the local AFFM, 2) examining 
within-sector heterogeneity across sub-groups of European energy utilities, 3) applying 
inductive structural break point tests and 4) better isolating the firm-specific component of 
returns. 
5.4.2.1 The local AFFM 
Refining the AFFM 
The first two analytical foci concern refining the AFFM for explaining returns at the 
sector level and identifying within-sector heterogeneity. As argued in Section 5.2, the use of 
local stock market risk factors is expected to have greater explanatory power as regression fits 
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are tight, resulting in higher 𝑅2 values (Fama and French, 2012). The results of the local 
AFFM are presented in Table 5.5. As highlighted in Section 5.3.1, Table 5.5 also presents the 
results of the CAPM, augmented-CAPM and (local) four-factor model for completeness and 
comparability with Chapter 4. Coefficients are estimated between 01 July 1996 and 28 June 
2013 (4,435 daily observations). Similar to Chapter 4, carbon price risk will be examined in 
the inter-temporal analysis (see Section 5.4.2.2). To address assumptions of the linear 
regression, regression diagnostic tests identified heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
residuals, which are reported in Table 5.5 and corrected for. All coefficients are estimated 
using the Newey-West (1987) HAC covariance matrices. The VIFs found no evidence of 
multicollinearity among variables. 
Addressing the first analytical focus, the use of local stock market risk factors captures 
a greater proportion of returns, further improving the AFFM’s goodness of fit. The adjusted 
𝑅2 for the energy sector as a whole is 72.77% using the local AFFM (Table 5.5), compared 
with 68.79% using the global AFFM in Chapter 4 (Table 4.5). These results are congruent 
with Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Fama and French (2012). Further, the local AFFM 
continues to produce the highest adjusted 𝑅2 in comparison with existing asset pricing 
models: the CAPM (66.96%), the augmented-CAPM (67.17%) and the (local) four-factor 
model (72.56%). Congruent with the results of Chapter 4, the inclusion of commodities 
continues to explain only a small proportion of returns, while stock market risk factors have a 
greater impact on returns.  
The following two paragraphs expand on the local AFFM results as the estimated 
coefficient show some differences relative to the global AFFM results in Table 4.5. For the 
energy sector as a whole, the local AFFM of Table 5.5 shows that the sector is relatively 
defensive over the whole time period, with a market beta of 0.6306 (𝑝 ≤ 0.001). Further, the 
energy sector’s returns covary with the returns on big energy utilities (they have a large 
negative slope on the 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 factor), are marginally tilted towards behaving like low-BE/ME 
(growth) stocks (they have a small negative slope on the 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factor) and are tilted towards 
behaving like down momentum utilities (they have a marginally negative slope on the 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 
factor). Similar to the results in Table 4.5, coal is the only statistically significant commodity 
which affects returns at the sector level, with a marginally negative slope. 
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TABLE 5.5: CAPM, FOUR-FACTOR AND LOCAL AUGMENTED ASSET PRICING MODELS 
This table presents the Newey-West regression output for the 12 energy portfolios against eight risk factors, using four model specifications. The 12 value-weighted portfolios 
include: the energy sector (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), high-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉,𝒕), mid-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅,𝒕), low-BE/ME utilities (𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘,𝒕), upper momentum utilities (𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓,𝒕), medium 
momentum utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎,𝒕), down momentum utilities (𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏,𝒕), electricity utilities (𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), natural gas utilities (𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍,𝒕), multi-utilities (𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊,𝒕), small utilities 
(𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍,𝒕) and big utilities (𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈,𝒕). The eight risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), local momentum 
premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡) and gas risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
Specifications are: 
Model 1, CAPM: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 
Model 2, augmented-CAPM: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 
Model 3, local four-factor model: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
Model 4, local AFFM: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 
Where 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 denotes one of the 12 portfolios as the dependent variable.  
 
For comparison, the global AFFM (Chapter 4, Table 4.5) is included for the energy sector as a whole. 
Model (4.4), the global AFFM of Chapter 4: 𝑹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 
Portfolio Model 𝛼𝑖  
𝑏𝑖  
𝑠𝑖  
ℎ𝑖  𝑚𝑖  
𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  
𝑐𝑖  
𝑔𝑖  
𝑨𝒅𝒋. 𝑹𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. Mean VIF Heterosked. Autocorr. 
Energy Sector 1 -0.0001  0.7218 ****                    0.6696 1852.86 **** 1.00 84.95 **** 33.98 **** 
2 -0.0001  0.7227 ****       -0.0017  0.0109  -0.0371 **** 0.0020  0.6717 486.99 **** 1.00 73.23 **** 31.46 **** 
3 0.0001  0.6298 **** -0.2964 **** -0.0975 **** -0.0673 ***         0.7256 1105.38 **** 1.12 88.34 **** 34.17 **** 
4 0.0001  0.6306 **** -0.2975 **** -0.0973 **** -0.0661 **** -0.0430  0.0103  -0.0370 **** 0.0028  0.7277 579.51 **** 1.06 79.29 **** 30.14 **** 
Energy Sector (4.4) -0.0001  0.6896 **** -0.1369 **** 0.2368 **** 0.0512 **** -0.0117  0.0113  -0.0323 *** 0.0019  0.6879 347.80 **** 1.14 70.28 **** 23.268 **** 
High-BE/ME 
(value) 
1 0.0001  0.5320 ****               0.2675 712.75 **** 1.00 12.92 **** 5.72 ** 
2 0.0001  0.5320 ****       -0.0963  0.0215 ** -0.0235 * 0.0064 * 0.2688 145.24 **** 1.00 14.97 **** 6.22 ** 
3 0.0001  0.4530 **** -0.3274 **** 0.6504 **** -0.0465 **         0.6063 531.82 **** 1.12 114.41 **** 10.17 *** 
4 0.0001  0.4535 **** -0.3287 **** 0.6503 **** -0.0442 * -0.0256  0.0203 ** -0.0311 ** 0.0053 * 0.6081 269.88 **** 1.06 113.44 **** 8.56 *** 
Mid-BE/ME 
(neutral) 
1 -0.0001  0.7802 ****               0.6390 1917.89 **** 1.00 85.58 **** 13.47 **** 
2 0.0000  0.7813 ****       -0.0436  0.0027  -0.0436 **** 0.0019  0.6411 482.67 **** 1.00 74.66 **** 12.37 **** 
3 0.0001  0.6878 **** -0.3010 **** -0.0806 **** -0.0655 ***         0.6837 981.78 **** 1.12 88.56 **** 10.88 **** 
4 0.0001  0.6887 **** -0.3020 **** -0.0804 **** -0.0648 *** -0.0825  0.0021  -0.0437 **** 0.0026  0.6859 514.33 **** 1.06 79.78 **** 9.40 *** 
Low-BE/ME 
(growth) 
1 -0.0002  0.6225 ****               0.5159 971.76 **** 1.00 43.44 **** 9.54 *** 
2 -0.0002  0.6229 ****       0.0693  0.0193 ** -0.0217  0.0022  0.5173 251.26 **** 1.00 37.10 **** 8.38 *** 
3 0.0000  0.5252 **** -0.2925 **** -0.2866 **** -0.0783 ****         0.6384 581.12 **** 1.12 49.46 **** 13.63 **** 
4 0.0000  0.5255 **** -0.2934 **** -0.2866 **** -0.0765 **** -0.0012  0.0188 *** -0.0197 * 0.0034  0.6398 308.26 **** 1.06 46.43 **** 11.35 **** 
Upper 
momentum 
1 0.0003 *** 0.2409 ****               0.2020 268.08 **** 1.00 74.67 **** 2.84 * 
2 0.0003 **** 0.2410 ****       -0.0628  0.0063  -0.0043  -0.0014  0.2019 59.94 **** 1.00 75.08 **** 2.62  
3 0.0002 *** 0.2919 **** -0.1197 **** -0.0336 **** 0.4294 ****         0.5905 451.10 **** 1.12 81.60 **** 15.54 **** 
4 0.0002 *** 0.2919 **** -0.1204 **** -0.0338 **** 0.4308 **** -0.0144  0.0142 **** -0.0068  0.0030 * 0.5920 233.31 **** 1.06 78.27 **** 14.02 **** 
Medium 
momentum 
1 0.0001  0.6806 ****               0.5610 1113.38 **** 1.00 98.61 **** 11.87 **** 
2 0.0001  0.6816 ****       0.0065  0.0040  -0.0445 **** 0.0048  0.5636 290.75 **** 1.00 90.27 **** 11.28 **** 
3 0.0002 * 0.5965 **** -0.3055 **** -0.0929 **** -0.0152          0.6100 573.05 **** 1.12 84.18 **** 18.86 **** 
4 0.0002 * 0.5973 **** -0.3069 **** -0.0927 **** -0.0137  -0.0273  0.0043  -0.0448 **** 0.0061 ** 0.6129 301.30 **** 1.06 77.32 **** 17.75 **** 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
Portfolio Model 𝛼𝑖  
𝑏𝑖  
𝑠𝑖  
ℎ𝑖  𝑚𝑖  
𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  
𝑐𝑖  
𝑔𝑖  
𝑨𝒅𝒋. 𝑹𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. Mean VIF Heterosked. Autocorr. 
Down momentum 1 0.0000  0.4336 ****               0.3635 618.59 **** 1.00 32.29 **** 12.04 **** 
2 -0.0001  0.4333 ****       0.0778  0.0242 *** -0.0096  0.0076 *** 0.3666 130.77 **** 1.00 43.90 **** 11.59 **** 
3 0.0002 *** 0.2919 **** -0.1197 **** -0.0336 **** -0.5706 ****         0.7727 1213.72 **** 1.12 37.91 **** 15.54 **** 
4 0.0002 *** 0.2919 **** -0.1204 **** -0.0338 **** -0.5692 **** -0.0144  0.0142 **** -0.0068  0.0030 * 0.7736 615.33 **** 1.06 38.89 **** 14.02 **** 
Electricity  1 0.0001  0.6466 ****               0.5459 993.46 **** 1.00 54.79 **** 19.52 **** 
2 0.0001  0.6467 ****       -0.0352  0.0149 * -0.0244 * 0.0083 *** 0.5478 261.29 **** 1.00 54.45 **** 17.55 **** 
3 0.0002 * 0.5798 **** -0.1946 **** -0.0978 **** -0.0737 ***         0.5785 509.46 **** 1.12 61.26 **** 17.70 **** 
4 0.0002 ** 0.5798 **** -0.1963 **** -0.0982 **** -0.0715 *** -0.0714  0.0140 * -0.0239 * 0.0087 *** 0.5805 268.04 **** 1.06 63.61 **** 15.36 **** 
Natural gas  1 0.0001  0.8210 ****               0.4776 1617.64 **** 1.00 78.95 **** 3.23 * 
2 0.0001  0.8212 ****       0.0755  0.0304 *** -0.0201  0.0055  0.4790 353.59 **** 1.00 73.78 **** 5.44 ** 
3 0.0002  0.7428 **** -0.3171 **** -0.1404 **** 0.0364          0.5117 533.94 **** 1.12 71.41 **** 1.25  
4 0.0002  0.7431 **** -0.3186 **** -0.1406 **** 0.0398 * 0.0415  0.0318 *** -0.0203  0.0074 * 0.5134 281.39 **** 1.06 69.10 **** 3.13 * 
Multi-utilities 1 0.0000  0.6855 ****               0.5141 1025.87 **** 1.00 57.21 **** 35.51 **** 
2 0.0000  0.6869 ****       -0.0161  -0.0035  -0.0459 *** -0.0012  0.5163 269.74 **** 1.00 52.61 **** 34.23 **** 
3 0.0001  0.5846 **** -0.3096 **** -0.1386 **** -0.0915 ***         0.5752 563.13 **** 1.12 57.84 **** 21.51 **** 
4 0.0002  0.5857 **** -0.3102 **** -0.1381 **** -0.0917 **** -0.0678  -0.0044  -0.0453 *** -0.0005  0.5775 291.09 **** 1.06 57.67 **** 20.04 **** 
Small utilities 1 0.0001  0.3880 ****               0.2990 706.55 **** 1.00 10.43 *** 19.70 **** 
2 0.0002  0.3884 ****       -0.0677  0.0137 * -0.0276 *** 0.0045 * 0.3014 147.27 **** 1.00 10.17 *** 17.31 **** 
3 0.0000  0.4934 **** 0.4280 **** 0.1014 **** -0.0400 **         0.4449 367.18 **** 1.12 31.76 **** 30.17 **** 
4 0.0000  0.4940 **** 0.4271 **** 0.1015 **** -0.0388 ** -0.0329  0.0122 * -0.0266 *** 0.0023  0.4468 194.94 **** 1.06 32.18 **** 28.15 **** 
Big utilities 1 -0.0001  0.7439 ****               0.6652 1778.54 **** 1.00 88.83 **** 31.39 **** 
2 -0.0001  0.7448 ****       0.0033  0.0103  -0.0383 *** 0.0018  0.6672 469.94 **** 1.00 76.24 **** 29.17 **** 
3 0.0001  0.6392 **** -0.3432 **** -0.1109 **** -0.0691 ***         0.7336 1133.70 **** 1.12 95.00 **** 32.77 **** 
4 0.0001  0.6400 **** -0.3442 **** -0.1107 **** -0.0679 *** -0.0430  0.0098  -0.0383 **** 0.0028  0.7357 594.18 **** 1.06 84.80 **** 28.86 **** 
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Before continuing with the second analytical focus of the chapter, the differences 
between the estimated coefficients of Chapters 4 and 5 are addressed. As stated in Section 5.1 
and shown in Figure 5.1, the global approach of Chapter 4 asks how the energy sector 
behaves relative to other European stocks and sectors (levels A and B), while the local 
approach of Chapter 5 explores how the energy portfolio behaves relative to other European 
energy utilities (level B and C).  
The largest difference between Tables 5.5 and 4.5 occur in the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 slopes; thus, this 
paragraph concentrates on explaining this difference. Chapter 4 (Table 4.5) showed that the 
energy utility sector behaved like high-BE/ME European stocks based on the global risk 
factors, typically associated with distressed firms. In contrast, Chapter 5 (Table 5.5) shows 
that there is a slightly negative coefficient with the 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 factor, suggesting a marginal tilt 
towards the low-BE/ME (growth) utilities. To address the former result for Chapter 4, the 
discussion of firm characteristics in Appendix B shows that the BE/ME ratios of most energy 
utility portfolios (Table B.2) are higher than those observed for European stocks (Table B.1). 
The implication is that the market perceives utilities to be a riskier investment compared with 
the average European stock. Therefore, the energy sector should be tilted towards high-
BE/ME coefficients when measured against global stock market risk factors, explaining the 
positive 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 slope in Table 4.5. When exploring within sector returns, and to address the 
results of Chapter 5, the pairwise correlations in Table 5.4 show that the energy sector as a 
whole has a correlation of 0.968 with the mid-BE/ME (neutral) energy portfolio, and a higher 
correlation with the low-BE/ME (growth) portfolio (0.884) compared with the high-BE/ME 
(value) portfolio (0.605). The interpretation of this data is that the sector as a whole behave 
like mid-BE/ME utilities, but is marginally tilted towards behaving like low-BE/ME utilities 
in comparison with high-BE/ME utilities. 
Concluding the implications for the first analytical focus, the AFFM can be refined in 
two ways. First, the use of local stock market risk factors explains a greater proportion of 
returns at the sector level, a distinct improvement over the global stock market risk factors of 
Chapter 4. Second, by using various portfolios of energy utilities, a greater understanding of 
the impact of risk factors on sector returns can be achieved. In particular, the paragraph above 
showed sector level peculiarities which would otherwise have been obscured if relying on the 
local risk factor in isolation. Relevant to the latter point, the following paragraphs outline 





The second analytical foci of this chapter is concerned with identifying within-sector 
heterogeneity. Accordingly, this section first examines the spread in returns across various 
energy portfolios grouped on characteristics to investigate whether the return profiles of 
mutually exclusive portfolios are indeed different. Following this, the second analytical foci is 
addressed directly by implementing the local AFFM (Equation 5.1) to examine the risk 
exposure at the portfolio-level. Across the 12 portfolios tested, the local AFFM produces a 
variety of coefficient magnitudes and significance tests. The policy implication of the varying 
coefficients suggests that the risk exposure of energy utilities depends on firm characteristics. 
Table 5.6 presents the spread in expected returns as a result of the estimated coefficient spread 
using the method of Fama and French (1993) outlined in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.1. The 
following paragraph addresses each coefficient. 
TABLE 5.6: EXPECTED SPREAD IN RETURNS 
This table presents the estimated spread in returns as a result of the spread in estimated coefficients (from Table 5.5). In line with Fama 
and French (1993), the expected spread in return is the difference between the greatest- and smallest-estimated coefficients for each risk 
factor. The annualised risk factors are extracted from Table 5.2 and include: the market factor (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), local 
value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡) and gas risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡). The 
coefficient spread, multiplied by the risk factor’s annualised return can predict the spread in average returns between the two portfolios 
with the greatest and least sensitivity to the risk factor. 
  Estimated Coefficient    
Row Coefficient Min 
Coef. 
Portfolio  Max 
Coef. 






  (a)  (b)  (a)-(b) (d) [(a)-(b)] × (d) 
(A) 𝑏𝑖 0.292 Upper and  
Down momentum 
0.743 Natural Gas utilities 0.451 0.95% 
 
0.43% 
(B) 𝑠𝑖 -0.344 Big utilities 
 
0.427 Small utilities 0.771 8.35% 6.44% 
(C) ℎ𝑖 -0.287 Low-BE/ME 0.650 High-BE/ME utilities 0.937 4.91% 
 
4.60% 
(D) 𝑚𝑖 -0.569 Down momentum 0.431 Upper momentum 1.000 8.48% 
 
8.48% 
(E) 𝑡𝑝𝑖 -0.082 Mid-BE/ME utilities 0.041 Natural Gas utilities 0.124 7.04% 
 
0.87% 
(F) 𝑜𝑖 -0.004 Multi-utilities 0.032 Natural Gas utilities 0.036 10.46% 
 
0.38% 









First, row (A) of Table 5.6 shows a spread in market beta (𝑏𝑖) of 0.451, however, the 
overall spread in expected return of 0.43% is small due to the market factor having an 
annualised return close to zero (0.95%). This is congruent with the results in Section 4.3.2.1. 
Rows (B) to (D) show that there are large spreads in expected returns between portfolios as a 
result of the stock market risk factors. The spread in returns vary from 4.60-8.48%. Naturally, 
the mutually exclusive size, value and momentum portfolios show the greatest sensitivity with 
the stock market risk factors. Chapter 4 found that the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor was also not significantly 
different from zero, resulting in an expected spread in returns of only 0.64% per annum. In 
contrast, Chapter 5 (Table 5.2) showed a significant local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor for energy utilities of 
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4.60% per annum suggesting much greater value premium in the energy utility sector in 
comparison with other European stocks. The policy implication of this result is that the energy 
sector is distressed relative to other European stocks. The following paragraph addresses the 
term premium and commodity risk factors. 
Chapter 4 showed that the expected spread in returns as a result of term premium and 
commodities was small in comparison with the global stock market risk factors. Despite 
refining the AFFM to improve the accuracy of estimated coefficients, the overall result of this 
chapter are qualitatively the same as Chapter 4: commodity risk factors contribute little to 
explaining returns in the energy sector. Rows (E) to (H) of Table 5.6 show that term premium 
and commodities explain less than 0.87% spread in expected returns. The additional 
contribution of this chapter is showing that, for the most part, the industry portfolios have the 
greatest sensitivities to the commodity risk factors, but the commodities themselves still play 
a minor role in asset pricing. 
As argued in Section 3.3.5.2, the small impact of commodities may be the result of 
hedging behaviour but still warrants discussion. The detection of oil price risk may indicate 
that various utilities are either using oil in production, are holding quantities of (or have 
investments in) oil that have changed in value and therefore affected firm value (Söderholm, 
2001); or that market participants must be benchmarking sector performance against oil price 
changes (Oberndorfer, 2009a). The results for coal are relatively consistent with Oberndorfer 
(2009a); there’s a negative relationship with coal prices and coal risk has a smaller impact 
than oil risk. The surprising finding is the small impact for natural gas. Two possible 
explanations for this small impact for natural gas exist: 1) energy firms are expected to hedge 
against natural gas price risk (Haushalter, 2000) or 2) it is possible that the oil returns are 
capturing some of the gas impact. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the 
indexing of natural gas prices to oil prices (Siliverstovs et al., 2005) 
The following paragraphs address the second analytical foci directly by examining the 
results of the 12 energy portfolios in their mutually exclusive groupings: the two size 
portfolios, the three book-to-market portfolios, the three momentum portfolios, and the three 
industry portfolios. As the regulatory changes in Section 2.2 are expected to predominantly 
affect firms based on size and industry, the results section primarily focuses on these two 
groupings. The first observation regarding the energy portfolios is that it is rare for portfolios 
to experience extreme size, value or momentum tilt. That is to say, using momentum as an 
example, no portfolio’s returns are solely explained by upper or down momentum. In reality, 
Table 4.4 shows that all portfolios have the greatest covariance with medium momentum, but 
are only slightly tilted towards upper or down momentum, which can be determined by the 
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size of the upper and down momentum’s coefficients.
58
 The previous interpretation will be 
useful for within-sector heterogeneity. A summary of the heterogeneous impact of risk factors 
from Table 5.5, delineated by portfolios, is provided in Table 5.7 and discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
TABLE 5.7: SUMMARY OF HETEROGENEOUS IMPACT OF RISK FACTORS 
This table summarizes the impact of significant risk factors from the local AFFM in Table 5.5, where a “+” 
indicates a significant positive coefficient was observed and “−” indicates a significant negative coefficient was 
observed.  
Portfolio 𝛼𝑖 𝑏𝑖 𝑠𝑖 ℎ𝑖 𝑚𝑖 𝑡𝑝𝑖 𝑜𝑖 𝑐𝑖 𝑔𝑖 
Energy Sector  + - - -   -  
High-BE/ME  + - + -  + - + 
Mid-BE/ME  + - - -   -  
Low-BE/ME  + - - -  + -  
Upper momentum + + - - +  +   
Medium momentum  + - -    - + 
Down momentum + + - - -  -   
Electricity utilities + + - - -  + - + 
Natural gas utilities  + - -   + - + 
Multi-utilities  + - - -   -  
Small utilities  + + + -  + -  
Big utilities  + - - -   -  
 
Addressing the two size portfolios in Table 5.7, the interpretation for big utilities is 
similar to the sector as a whole. Big utilities have a market beta of 0.640 and have a negative 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 slope, which is expected. Big utilities are tilted towards behaving like low-BE/ME 
utilities (a negative ℎ𝑖 coefficient) and tilted towards down momentum (negative 𝑚𝑖 
coefficient). Coal is the only significant commodity risk factor for big utilities, with a 
negative impact. The local AFFM typically performs poorly at explaining the returns on small 
energy utilities, with an adjusted 𝑅2 of 44.68%, consistent with the argument that smaller 
firms are typically harder to value and often informationally sparse (Kumar, 2009). Overall, 
small energy utilities are still defensive investments, with a market beta of 0.494, but are 
exposed a larger number of stock market and commodity risk factors in comparison with big 
utilities. Naturally the small utilities are expected to have a positive 𝑆𝑀𝐵 slope, but they also 
behave like high-BE/ME (value) utilities (positive ℎ𝑖 coefficient) and are marginally tilted 
towards down momentum (negative 𝑚𝑖 coefficient). The positive size and value premia are 
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 To illustrate, consider the big energy utility portfolio. Table 5.4 shows that big utilities have the greatest 
covariance with the medium momentum portfolio (0.926). Between the extreme momentum portfolios, big 
utilities have higher covariance with the down momentum portfolio in comparison with the upper momentum, a 
covariance of 0.718 in comparison with 0.540, respectively. Momentum for big utilities is tilted towards down 
momentum. This is congruent with the local AFFM results in Table 5.5, where the 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 coefficient of -0.068 
shows that big utilities are marginally tilted towards down momentum. The pairwise correlation in Table 5.4 
allow greater insight into the results of the local AFFM. 
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consistent with utilities being distressed and/or marginal firms, requiring greater return on 
investment. Small utilities have positive oil risk and negative coal risk. The increased 
commodity risk exposure suggests that small utilities do not effectively hedge against 
commodity risk. 
Regarding the three book-to-market portfolios, the mid-BE/ME (neutral) energy 
utilities have the greatest systematic risk, in comparison with high-BE/ME (value) and low-
BE/ME (growth) utilities. The size premium suggests that the three portfolios behave like big 
energy utilities, while the momentum premium shows that the portfolios show some tilt 
towards down momentum. Interestingly, the high-BE/ME utilities, which are typically 
associated with firm distress and fallen angels, show sensitivities to all commodities: oil, coal 
and natural gas risk. In contrast, the mid- and low-BE/ME portfolios show less commodity 
risk exposure. The significant commodity risk of the high-BE/ME and small utilities is 
consistent with Oberndorfer’s (2009a) and Kumar’s (2009) propositions: commodities serve 
as informational signals for price developments in the energy sector when less information is 
available. 
Due to econometric reasons, this chapter chooses to withhold from drawing inferences 
regarding the three momentum portfolios. The first reason relates to Fama and French (2012), 
who argue that local models have difficulty when capturing average returns for portfolios with 
extreme momentum. Extreme momentum tilts are rare in reality, but the upper and down 





 percentile) momentums. Second, Sections 4.2.4 and 5.3.3 noted that the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 risk factors 
were rebalanced daily; an active portfolio strategy such as momentum requires extremely high 
turnover (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). The momentum strategy does not represent a 
realistically viable investment opportunity, as trading costs would have a negative impact on 
the strategy’s performance (Rosenberg et al., 1985). Moreover, the daily rebalancing suggests 
that the upper and down momentum portfolios should be mostly explained by the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 
factor. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that significance of industry momentum is 
greater than all other stock market risk factors, including individual firm momentum. 
Evidence for this is shown in Table 5.5.  With the exception of the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor, the estimated 
coefficients for the upper and down momentum portfolios are all identical to each other. 
Further, the spread between the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficients for the upper and down momentum 
portfolios equals 1; this effect remains throughout the upcoming inter-temporal analysis. 
Note, none of the criticisms above affect the use of the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 risk factor when used to explain 
returns on other energy portfolios. In summary, the 𝑈𝑀𝐷 risk factor is useful as an 
independent variable but encounters known econometric issues as a dependent variable. 
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The following addresses the three industry portfolios in Table 5.7. First, the electricity 
industry has the lowest market beta, is tilted towards big stock (negative 𝑠𝑖 coefficient), is 
marginally tilted towards low-BE/ME (negative ℎ𝑖 coefficient) and also marginally tilted 
towards down momentum (negative 𝑚𝑖 coefficient). The electricity industry has the greatest 
commodity risk exposure of all three industries; all commodities are statistically significant. 
Second, the natural gas industry has the highest market beta of the three industries, showing 
increased systematic risk. Natural gas utilities behave like big utilities (negative 𝑠𝑖 
coefficient), are tilted towards low-BE/ME (growth) utilities (negative ℎ𝑖 coefficient) and 
tilted towards upper momentum (positive 𝑚𝑖 coefficient). The natural gas industry is the only 
industry with positive momentum, possibly indicating excess profiteering (see Section 1.2). 
Unsurprisingly, the natural gas sector has positive relationships with oil and natural gas 
prices. The implications for the sector are that they generally perform well relative to other 
utilities and have a larger market capitalisation. Finally, the multi-utility sector, 
unsurprisingly, shares risk exposure with both electricity and natural gas utilities. Table 5.5 
shows that the multi-utility portfolio shares similar market beta, 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 and coal price 
coefficients with the electricity industry, and similar 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 and 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 coefficients with 
natural gas industry. This result is expected as the multi-utilities contain a combination of 
electricity and natural gas operations (see Section 5.3.2.1). Interestingly, the multi-utility 
industry has little commodity risk exposure, suggesting either effective hedging strategies or 
economy of scope; diversified operations allows energy utilities to switch operations when 
faced with regulatory changes or commodity price fluctuations. 
Concluding the implications for the second analytical focus, the results of the local 
AFFM show within-sector heterogeneity with regard to stock market, term premium and 
commodity risk factors. The majority of previous inferences regarding the energy utility 
sector, such as those presented by commentators in Section 1.2, has implicitly referred to the 
impact on big utilities. As shown above, big utilities represent the sector as a whole, while 
small utilities have a dramatically different return profile and risk exposure. In particular, 
small utilities are more sensitive to commodity risk. Second, inferences regarding the impact 
from regulations or renewables on the energy sector are inherently biased and 
unrepresentative if the energy sample primarily contains the natural gas majors, for example, 
The Economist (2013a, b, c, 2015) and The BBC (2013). With the exception of value 
premium, the risk premia for the natural gas utilities are similar to those observed for the oil 
& gas sector in Chapter 4 (Table 4.5). Section 3.2.3.3 argued that many European energy 
utilities are integrated and, therefore, no ‘pure’ natural gas producer exists (Oberndorfer, 
2009a). Further, Table 5.1 shows that many operations between the two sectors are integrated 
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or overlap. This is a pressing issue as many of the regulatory changes in Section 2.2 were 
designed to reduce reliance on hydrocarbon fuel sources, which must negatively impact the 
natural gas industry but provide growth opportunities for the electricity industry. Forthcoming 
results in Chapter 6 also show that natural gas utilities typically have strong negative reaction 
to regulatory changes. The impact is mostly independent to those observed for electricity 
utilities and multi-utilities. 
Another observation of the results is the insignificance of term premium across all 
portfolios tested. The mean coefficient for term premium, 𝑡𝑖, is -0.008, ranging from -0.096 to 
0.078; all are insignificant, which suggests that borrowing costs have no impact on all 12 
portfolios. This result is consistent with Chapter 4 and Oberndorfer (2009a). 
The following two sections outline tests concerning the evolving relationship with risk 
premia through time. The deductive conditional annual regressions are presented in Section 
5.4.2.2, while the inductive structural break point tests are presented in Section 5.4.2.3. 
Although the conditional regressions do not directly address the analytical foci of this chapter, 
they are included for various reasons. First, the conditional regressions are comparable with 
those presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2.2). Second, the annual regressions allow the 
inclusion of carbon prices from 2006 onwards. Third, the conditional regressions represent a 
model utilised in current literature (see El-Sharif et al., 2005). Thus, the conditional annual 
local AFFM in Section 5.4.2.2 explores the performance of an existing approach to measuring 
parameter stability. Section 5.4.2.3 addresses the third analytical focus of the chapter: 
applying inductive rather than deductive structural break point tests, which improves the 
AFFM’s goodness of fit and estimation of break dates. 
5.4.2.2 Inter-temporal analysis 
As noted previously (see Section 3.3.4 and 4.3.2.2), the established literature has 
reported substantial inter-temporal and inter-sectoral variability in the relationships between 
average returns and risk factors (Faff and Brailsford, 1999, Sadorsky, 2001, El-Sharif et al., 
2005, Oberndorfer, 2009a, Fama and French, 1997, 1998, 2012). To address time-varying risk 
loadings, the time series is separated into annual periods and the local AFFM, Equation (5.2), 
is implemented annually. This provides results comparable with Chapter 4 and El-Sharif et al. 
(2005). Following this, we improve the estimates of time-varying risk loading using the Bai 
and Perron (1998; 2003) inductive structural breakpoint tests. Table 5.8 reports the annual 
regression results for the energy sector portfolio, estimated using Newey-West HAC standard 
errors. Regression coefficients through time and 95% confidence intervals are shown in 
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Figure 5.6. For comparison, regression output for the remaining 11 portfolios and plots of 
evolving coefficients, including confidence intervals, are reported in Appendix D.  
Overall, the results indicate evolving risk premia over the entire time series. Further, 
the inter-temporal AFFM improves the goodness of fit, from an adjusted 𝑅2 of 72.77% in the 
unconditional regression of Table 5.5 to a mean adjusted 𝑅2 of 74.52% in Table 5.8. The use 
of local risk factors also improves the goodness of fit compared with global risk factors, 
producing a mean adjusted 𝑅2 of 74.52% (Table 5.8) compared with 69.64% (Table 4.7).  
The conditional regressions show a significant intercept between 2003 and 2007, 
suggesting the sector generated abnormal return pre-GFC, but is also consistent with the 
interim period between the second and third liberalisation packages. Further, the market betas 
are consistently positive and significant through time, but marginally lower than the market 
betas observed in Table 4.7. This is due to the poor performance of the global stock market 
risk factors in Chapter 4, failing to accurately capture local size, value and momentum-premia 
at the sector level. Further, the estimated coefficients in Chapter 4 are relative to all European 
stocks; the risk factors continue to be absorbed by the market factor, making the sector appear 
to have greater systematic risk than the true underlying market beta. The results in Table 5.8 
show the energy sector’s beta is defensive and relatively volatile until 2004, fluctuating 
around 0.45. There is an upward shift in market beta occurring in 2005, congruent with results 
in Section 4.3.2.2. Post-2005, the beta is relatively stable, fluctuating round 0.72. 
The local 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficients are negative and significant for all 18 years tested. The 
results show that the average returns in the energy sector behave like big energy utilities 
through time. The relationship is not stable through time; there are years where the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 
coefficient becomes more negative, suggesting that the returns of big utilities have greater 
influence on overall sector returns. The size results are consistent with those observed in 
Table 4.7, but with greater significance. For Table 4.7, the global 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficients become 
more negative from 2008 onwards, indicating that energy sector returns behave like the 
biggest European stocks. In Table 5.8, the magnitude of negative coefficients is large around 
1999 and 2008; the biggest utilities have a large influence on energy sector returns in these 
years. The spread between big utilities and small utilities is increasing, which suggests that 
liberalisation policy, which was supposed to benefit small and new-entrant companies (see 
Section 2.2), has been ineffective and large utilities continue to dominate sector returns. 
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TABLE 5.8: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF SECTOR PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the energy sector (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍) is used as the 
dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural 
gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒. 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0000 
 
0.5148 **** -0.4256 **** 0.0776 * 0.0748 
 




-0.0081    73.58% 46.60 **** 
1997 0.0001 
 
0.5709 **** -0.3323 **** 0.0470 
 






0.0076    80.27% 133.24 **** 
1998 0.0003 
 








-0.0803 **** 0.0003    77.83% 115.07 **** 
1999 -0.0003 
 








0.0314 *** -0.0015    80.79% 137.68 **** 
2000 0.0006 
 










-0.0015    45.83% 28.39 **** 
2001 0.0003 
 










0.0055    67.36% 68.08 **** 
2002 0.0000 
 
0.5029 **** -0.3191 **** 0.0404 
 






0.0030    84.76% 181.73 **** 




-0.0718 ** -0.0022    85.15% 187.37 **** 








0.0038    66.06% 64.51 **** 
2005 0.0004 
 








-0.0005    61.90% 53.59 **** 




0.0551 **** -0.0046 
 
0.0021  0.0093 ** 71.08% 71.72 **** 




0.0605 ** -0.0071 
 
-0.0042  0.0006 * 67.23% 60.27 **** 
2008 0.0001 
 






-0.0517 ** 0.0238 * -0.0032  85.03% 165.69 **** 
2009 0.0002 
 




0.0306 * -0.0051  0.0011  78.67% 107.53 **** 
2010 -0.0080 
 
0.7551 **** -0.2447 **** -0.1819 **** -0.1251 **** 4.3887 
 
0.0410 ** -0.0460 ** 0.0064  -0.0084  85.34% 169.15 **** 
2011 0.0000 
 
0.8207 **** -0.3054 **** 0.0723 
 






0.0073  0.0064  84.06% 152.74 **** 
2012 0.0000 
 






-0.0164  0.0114  74.35% 84.75 **** 
2013 A -0.0020 
 






-0.0285  0.0043  72.04% 37.65 **** 
Mean: -0.0003  0.5851  -0.3244  -0.0421  -0.0228  0.2913  0.0083  -0.0178  -0.0005  0.0027  74.52%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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FIGURE 5.6: LOCAL AFFM ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OVER TIME 
This figure illustrates the estimated coefficients for the nine risk factors through time, using the annual local AFFM results from Table 5.8. The solid line represents the estimated coefficient, while the 
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The local 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficients are nominally negative for 10 of the 18 years tested, eight 
of which were significant. This indicates that average returns in the energy sector covary with 
those of the low-BE/ME (growth) utilities through time.
59
 However, the years 2011 to 2013 
show a shift in the 𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient, with 2012 and 2013 being positive and significant. This 
shows that average returns in the energy utility sector behave like high-BE/ME (value) stocks 
between 2011 and 2013, typically associated with firm distress. This effect is not isolated, 
Appendix D and Figure D.3 show that many European portfolios all experience this shift. 
Further, the inter-temporal analysis in Table 4.7 of Chapter 4 also showed that the energy 
utility sector showed greater firm distress from 2011 and 2012, relative to other European 
stocks. This may indicate an exogenous shock that made European energy utilities a relatively 
riskier investment. 
The global 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficient in Table 4.7 showed that the energy utility sector 
performed well relative to other European stocks until 2009. After 2009, the sector performed 
poorly in comparison with European stocks. The local 𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficients in Table 5.8 show a 
similar pattern. The average returns of the utility sector are rarely affected by momentum. The 
energy sector as a whole only behaved like upper momentum utilities in 1997. Of the 18 years 
tested, only seven years produce results consistent with the energy sector behaving like down 
momentum utilities. In particular, down momentum utilities explain average sector returns in 
2002 and 2003, and from 2009 onwards. Again, this is consistent with an exogenous shock to 
the energy sector which negatively impacted financial return. The timing of these two shocks 
coincide with the second and third packages of liberalisation, 2003 and 2009, respectively 
(see Section 2.2.1). 
The results of the stock market risk factors above show a clear trend. Average returns 
in the energy sector are typically explained by defensive, big, low-BE/ME (growth) and upper 
momentum energy utilities until 2009/2010. Around this period, the energy sector begins to 
take on increasing systematic risk and average returns begin to be explained by big, high-
BE/ME (value) and down momentum energy utilities. This could be consistent with one of 
two major events which occur during this time period. First, the results would be consistent 
with poor performance post-GFC and during the EUC; however, macroeconomic factors are 
controlled for by including the market factor. Second, the results are consistent with the 
publication of the third packages of liberalisation, designed to counter market dominance 
from big energy utilities (see Section 2.2.1). The latter is the most plausible explanation; 
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 For clarity, this result does not conflict with those in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.2. While growth utilities 




Chapter 6 will test the impact of regulatory changes on financial return. The following 
paragraph addresses commodity risk exposure through time. 
For the most part, commodities continue to explain very little in energy sector returns. 
The commodity risk factors presented in Table 5.8 are mostly consistent with those presented 
in Chapter 4 (Table 4.7), with some minor differences. Natural gas produces one marginally 
significant coefficient in 2008, remaining insignificant otherwise; indicating effective hedging 
strategies over time. The carbon becomes significant in 2006 and 2007; insignificant 
thereafter. Results are consistent with El-Sharif et al. (2005); there is varying commodity risk 
exposure across time. The number of significant commodity coefficients increases in later 
years, possibly reflecting the uncertainty of rapidly changing commodity prices observed in 
Figure 4.3. Appendix D shows that these patterns of significance were not constant across 
portfolios; each portfolio exhibits its own pattern of evolving risk exposure and significance.  
In summary, the comparison of results between Chapter 5 (Table 5.8) and Chapter 4 
(Table 4.7) show that the direction, magnitude and significance of stock market, term 
premium and commodities varies depending on the use of global or local stock market risk 
factors. Having explored the performance of the local AFFM using a deductive method of 
examining parameter stability, the following section utilises the inductive Bai and Perron 
(1998; 2003) structural break point test, addressing analytical focus 3 of the chapter. 
5.4.2.3 Structural break point tests 
Sections 4.3.2.2 and 5.4.2.2 examine time-varying risk premia using a deductive 
approach of defining annual break points, which has been implemented in prior literature (see 
El-Sharif et al., 2005). Section 3.3.3.2 and 5.1 highlighted that this method can bias estimated 
coefficients by including excess observations. An alternative approach is an inductive 
approach which detects unknown structural changes in the relationship between sector returns 
and risk premia. To this end, this section implements the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) 
parameter stability diagnostic test and break point regression. The Bai and Perron (1998; 
2003) tests are implemented using EViews and outlined in detail in Section 5.3.1. Daily 
returns in the energy sector, between 01 July 1996 and 28 June 2013, are used for all 
structural break point tests. The break point test is implemented using the local AFFM 
(Equation 5.1), rather than the global AFFM of Chapter 4, as the local stock market risk 
factors have tighter regression fits. The results in Table 5.9 present the stability diagnostic 
tests, while the results in Table 5.10 present the results of the break point regression. The 
break conditions of the two tests are also outlined in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10. The following 
paragraph addresses the first stage of analysis: the post-hoc stability diagnostic test.  
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Parameter stability in the local AFFM (Section 5.4.2.1, Table 5.5) is examined using 
the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) parameter stability diagnostic test. The diagnostic test 
identifies the potential number of structural breaks in all parameters of the local AFFM 
regression. The sequential procedure tests the hypothesis of ℓ versus ℓ + 1 breaks. The results 
are presented in Table 5.9. The results of the 𝐹-tests are all significant between one and eight 
breaks, indicating a minimum of one and a maximum of eight structural breaks in the time 
series. The 𝐹-stat diminishes as the ninth break appears. The repartition dates serve as likely 
candidates for the eight structural breaks, where one or more of the parameters have shifted. 
Based on evidence of the existence of structural breaks the local AFFM, the second stage of 
the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) test is implemented: the break point regression. 
The second stage implements the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) break point regression, 
specifying the local AFFM (Equation 5.1) as the mean equation. Using the method outlined in 
3.3.4.1, the break point regression minimises the SSR using a dynamic algorithm, subject to 
break conditions outlined in Table 5.10. The sequential procedure also tests the hypothesis of 
ℓ versus ℓ + 1 breaks, the information criterion is set to allow a maximum of 18 structural 
breaks, employs a trimming percentage of 5% and significance at 𝑝 ≤ 10%. The result of the 
break point regression is shown in Table 5.10. The result show that the estimated break points 
are identical to those in Table 5.9, identifying eight structural breaks in the time series. 
The Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) break point regression provides marked 
improvements to regression fits for the energy sector. The initial full-period global AFFM of 
Chapter 4 produced an adjusted 𝑅2 of 68.79% (Table 4.5). The adjusted 𝑅2 of the inter-
temporal global AFFM varied between 28.24% and 85.63%, with a mean of 69.64% (Table 
4.7). For Chapter 5, the full-period local AFFM in Table 5.5 produced an adjusted 𝑅2 of 
72.77%. The adjusted 𝑅2 values of the annual regressions in Table 5.8 fluctuate between 
45.83% and 85.34%, with a mean of 74.52%. When controlling for inductive structural 
breaks, the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) break point regression increases the adjusted 𝑅2 of 
the AFFM to 80.42%. Addressing analytical focus 3, the use of local stock market risk factors 
and utilising the inductive method of controlling for structural breaks improves the goodness 
of fit compared with all other specifications tested. The following paragraph continues by 
interpreting the results. 
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TABLE 5.9: LOCAL AFFM STABILITY DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
This table presents the stability diagnostic tests for Equation (5.1) and results of Section 5.4.2.1. The results are 
estimated using sequential evaluation, a maximum of 18 breaks and a trimming percentage of 5%. Repartition 
are suspected break dates. 
* Significance at 𝑝 ≤ 10% 
** Critical values from Bai and Perron (2003).  




 Sequential Repartition 
0 vs. 1 * 23.49 187.89 22.92 
 
01/11/2004 01/09/1998 
1 vs. 2 * 15.22 121.76 25.15 
 
01/09/1998 30/03/2000 
2 vs. 3 * 10.73 85.83 26.38 
 
07/07/2010 10/09/2001 
3 vs. 4 * 15.72 125.73 27.09 
 
18/06/2008 01/09/2004 
4 vs. 5 * 8.44 67.54 27.77 
 
18/05/2001 25/07/2007 
5 vs. 6 * 5.03 40.21 28.15 
 
30/03/2000 18/06/2008 
6 vs. 7 * 4.97 39.80 28.61 
 
28/04/2009 28/04/2009 
7 vs. 8 * 4.34 34.69 28.90 
 
25/07/2007 01/02/2011 




TABLE 5.10: RESULTS OF THE LOCAL AFFM BREAK POINT REGRESSION 
This table presents the results of the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) sequential multiple partial break point tests. The HAC coefficient covariance matrix automatically determines optimised lag structuring using Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). Kernel bandwidth is automatically determined using Andrew’s AR(1) method and uses quadratic-spectral kernels. The break specification is sequential, testing the null of ℓ versus the alternative 
of ℓ + 1 breaks. The information criterion is set to allow a maximum of 18 structural breaks, employs a trimming percentage of 5%, and significance at 𝑝 ≤ 10%. The value-weighted returns of the energy sector (𝑹𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍) is 
used as the dependent variable. The eight risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), 
coal risk (𝑅𝑐,𝑡) and gas risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡). The intercept and error is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙,𝑡, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙,𝑡, 
Partition Start End 𝛼𝑖  𝑏𝑖  𝑠𝑖  ℎ𝑖  𝑚𝑖  𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  𝑐𝑖  𝑔𝑖  Obs 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 Sig. 
1 01/07/1996 31/08/1998 0.0001  0.6084 **** -0.2877 **** 0.0262  0.1097 **** 0.1037  -0.0038  -0.0339 ** 0.0035  566 0.8042 228.59 **** 
2 01/09/1998 29/03/2000 0.0001  0.3011 **** -0.6225 **** 0.0905 ** -0.0423  0.0194  -0.0109  0.0070  0.0058  412    
3 30/03/2000 07/09/2001 0.0003  0.2759 **** -0.3497 **** -0.0849 ** 0.0727 * 0.0493  0.0159  0.0078  -0.0076  377    
4 10/09/2001 31/08/2004 0.0001  0.4956 **** -0.3391 **** -0.0416 * -0.0784 **** 0.3948 *** -0.0109  -0.0301 ** 0.0019  777    
5 01/09/2004 24/07/2007 0.0004 *** 0.7495 **** -0.1390 **** -0.0705 **** 0.0655 ** 0.0506  0.0218 ** -0.0088  0.0028  755    
6 25/07/2007 17/06/2008 0.0007  0.6502 **** -0.3026 *** -0.0187  0.0828 * 0.3420  0.1284 *** -0.0215  -0.0004  235    
7 18/06/2008 27/04/2009 -0.0010  0.5448 **** -0.4062 **** -0.5345 **** -0.0088  0.5015  0.0004  -0.0331 * 0.0093  224    
8 28/04/2009 31/01/2011 -0.0010  0.6914 **** -0.2985 **** -0.1402 **** -0.1297 **** 0.4890  0.0094  -0.0288 ** -0.0088  460    
9 01/02/2011 28/06/2013 -0.0001  0.7964 **** -0.2577 **** 0.1394 **** -0.1270 **** -0.1037  -0.0063  -0.0061  0.0048  629    
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Similar to the annual regressions, the results of the partial break point tests show that 
the market beta is increasing towards unity through time with some fluctuation, indicating 
increasing systematic risk. Between 1998 and 2007, the market beta increases from 0.33 to 
0.75. The upward shift in market beta, occurring late-2004, is consistent with that observed in 
Sections 4.3.2.2 and 5.4.2.2. The size premium coefficient (𝑠𝑖) is consistently negative, 
indicating that the average returns in the energy utility sector behave like big energy utilities, 
with a greater impact in partition 2 (September 1998 to March 2000) and partition 7 (June 
2008 to April 2009). The greater impact in 2008 onwards is of concern, as liberalisation 
objectives were introduced to counteract market dominance from big utilities (see Section 
2.2.1); this negative 𝑠𝑖 coefficient suggests the regulations were ineffective. The value 
premium coefficient (ℎ𝑖) shows that average returns in the energy sector mostly behave like 
low-BE/ME (growth stocks). However, there are two partitions where average returns behave 
like high-BE/ME (value) stocks: partition 2 (September 1998 to March 2000) and partition 9 
(February 2011 to June 2013). The partial break point test shows that average returns in the 
energy sector are explained by both upper and down momentum over time. Energy utilities 
behave like down-momentum stocks in partition 4 (September 2001 to August 2004) and 
partitions 8 and 9 (April 2009 onwards). There is a clear shift in the risk profile of energy 
utilities from 2009 onwards (beyond macroeconomic risk factors). Similar to the inter-
temporal analysis of Section 5.4.2.2, after 2009 the sector is characterised by big, high-
BE/ME, down momentum utilities which are taking on increased systematic risk. Chapter 6 
will examine if liberalisation and environmental objectives are the cause for this negative 
impact on financial return. 
Regarding the term premium and commodity risk factors, the results also show 
changing significance through time. Term premium becomes temporarily significant in 
partition 4 (September 2001 to August 2004), which encompasses the second packages of 
liberalisation and the lead up to the GFC, indicating a significant relationship between 
borrowing costs and returns. Oil price risk shows increased significance immediately before 
the GFC, showing that returns in the energy sector were highly sensitive to oil price risk. Coal 
price risk has sporadic significance across time which continues to be negative (when 
significant). Natural gas price risk continues to be insignificant through time, again, indicating 
effective hedging strategies. The differences between these results and the deductive method 
of Table 5.8 are manifestations of Quandt’s (1960) criticisms: unless the break points are 
known with certainty, the significance tests and estimated coefficients are likely to be biased. 
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The following section addresses analytical focus 4 of this chapter, examining the 
isolation of the firm-specific component of returns. This is achieved through the use of the 
local AFFM and the inductive structural break point tests. 
5.4.2.4 Regression residuals and isolating the firm-specific returns 
The regression results of this chapter can be used in applications that require estimates 
of expected stock return, including 1) portfolio selection, 2) evaluating portfolios 
performance, 3) estimates of cost of capital and 4) measuring abnormal return in event studies 
(Fama and French, 1993). Specifically, Chapter 6 of this thesis utilises the latter, performing 
an event study analysis on key stages of the European ordinary legislative procedure and 
examining abnormal returns induced by four distinct restructuring streams. One method 
includes extracting the residuals from a regression, for example, the unconditional CAPM, 
where the residuals are assumed to be the unsystematic, or firm-specific, component of 
returns (Chan et al., 1985, Fama and French, 1993). However, any omitted variables from the 
model specification will bias the estimates of regression coefficients, while inter-correlated 
disturbances will bias standard errors; both result in false positive, a spurious effect of 
regulation. The results of this robustness check will help identify a suitable method isolating 
the firm-specific component of returns for analysing abnormal returns in Chapter 6, or more 
generally. Accordingly, this section addresses analytical focus 4 of the chapter. 
Typically, the three- and four-factor models capture common returns across a variety 
of stocks and are better at isolating the firm-specific components of returns (Fama and French, 
1993). Chapters 4 and 5 also showed that term premium and commodity risk factors also have 
some impact on equity returns too, but are sensitive to the stock market risk factors specified. 
The assumption that these parameters are stable can result in spurious significant correlations 
between residuals and exogenous risk factors. Fama and French (1993) have also drawn 
inferences based on this fallacy, performing residual diagnostic tests with constant slopes; 
however, the authors acknowledge that the assumption on constant slopes may be a 
misconception but do not investigate the claim further. The following paragraph demonstrates 
the consequences of this erroneous assumption. 
The residuals of the local AFFM model are extracted using three different methods, 
including: 1) the assumption of constant parameters in the unconditional local AFFM 
regression of Table 5.5 – similar to Fama and French (1993); 2) the time-varying parameters 
of the conditional annual local AFFM regressions in Table 5.8 – similar to the El-Sharif et al. 
(2005), who did not perform additional residual diagnostic tests; and 3) time-varying 
parameters of the local AFFM sequential break point test in Table 5.10 – based on the 
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minimisation of the SSR from Bai and Perron (2003). The latter two assume time-varying 
parameters. 
The cumulative and daily residuals through time are shown in Figure 5.7. The first 
observation is that the residuals of method (1), the unconditional constant parameter 
assumption, differ greatly from the other two, time-varying assumption – methods (2) and (3). 
For method (1), the assumption of constant parameters results in the cumulative residuals for 
energy utilities reaching 200% by mid-2008. The first invalid inference would be that this 
represents a firm-specific component to returns, increasing from 2003 to the GFC, and 
decreasing thereafter. It could be hastily concluded that this represents a structural break after 
the second packages of liberalisation (2003), expected to be a major regulatory event (see 
Section 2.1.1). Further, empirical tests will also identify significant breaks in returns which 
coincide with such an interpretation, in 2003 and 2008, as shown in Table 5.11. 
 
TABLE 5.11: BAI AND PERRON (2003) BREAK POINT TEST 
This table presents the results of the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) sequential multiple ‘pure’ break point tests. The HAC coefficient 
covariance matrix automatically determines optimised lag structuring using AIC. Kernel bandwidth is automatically determined using 
Andrew’s AR(1) method and uses quadratic-spectral kernels. The break specification is sequential, testing the null of ℓ versus the alternative 
of ℓ + 1 breaks. The information criterion is set to allow a maximum of 18 structural breaks, employs a trimming percentage of 5%, and 
significance at 𝑝 ≤ 10%. The mean equation only includes the constant as a regressor.  
Method Partition Start End 𝛼𝑖 Sig. 𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
(1) Unconditional regression 1 01/07/1996 29/10/2003 0.0000  0.61% 13.69 **** 
 2 30/10/2003 09/06/2008 0.0006 ****    
 3 10/06/2008 28/06/2013 -0.0006 ***    
         
(2) Conditional annual regressions 1 01/07/1996 28/06/2013 0.0000  00.00% - - 
         
(3) Sequential break points 1 01/07/1996 28/06/2013 0.0000  00.00% - - 
 
Although the structural breaks are significant, the adjusted 𝑅2 shows that these breaks 
explain a small proportion of the variation in the residuals, the FVU. In contrast to the 
significant structural breaks in the unconditional method (1), the time-varying methods (2) 
and (3) find no structural breaks. How can this result be reconciled? This chapter posits that 
the residuals of the unconditional approach in method (1), in fact, contain systematic risk 
factors beyond the firm-specific components of returns. This chapter also posits that the 
residuals reflect the changing relationship between the stock returns and the risk factors. This 
can be demonstrated in two ways. First, the time-varying methods, (2) and (3), both allow the 
risk factors to vary across time, capturing parameter shifts. Table 5.11 and Figure 5.7 show 
that the residuals in these two methods fall close to zero, suggesting few impacts from factors 
beyond those specified in the mean equation. Second, the expectation is that the residuals of 
the unconditional regression should have filtered out the impact of all risk premia, leaving an 






FIGURE 5.7: CUMULATIVE AND DAILY RESIDUALS OF REGRESSION SPECIFICATIONS 
This figure illustrates the daily and cumulative residuals of three different local AFFM specifications: 1) the unconditional 
local AFFM (Plots 1A and B), the conditional annual local AFFMs (Plots 2A and 2B) and the sequential structural break 
point tests (Plots 3A and 3B). 
 
A Note, vertical axis intentionally truncated between 80% and 115%. This is not intended to misrepresent data, but designed 
to better visualise the small differences between Plots (2A) and (3A). For both methods (2) and (3), the cumulative residuals 









































































































































































































































































































































































(3B) Sequential Break Points 
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A second pass of the unconditional residuals in method (1), using either linear 
regressions or sequential break points model specifications, is expected to have no 
relationship with the risk factors, as they should have been filtered out in the first pass. 
However, this is not the case. To demonstrate, a second sequential break point test is 
employed on the unconditional residuals of method (1) against the market factor, local stock 
market risk factors, term premium and commodity risk factors; results are shown in Table 
5.12. The first observation is the presence of significant relationships between the 
unconditional residuals and the risk factors. The adjusted 𝑅2 shows that the unconditional 
full-period regression is insufficient at removing the risk premia, explaining 27.95% of 
residual variation, the FVU. The economic rationale is simple, a linear relationship is 
insufficient to capture time-varying common risk over long horizons; the polygonal approach 
of Bellman and Roth (1969) and Bai and Perron (2003) is able to control for the non-linearity 
and partial breaks across time. 
The dates of the sequential break points in Table 5.12 are identical to those in Table 
5.9 and Table 5.10, giving confidence that the residuals are capturing a shift in the 
relationship with risk premia. The estimated coefficients in Table 5.12 represents the 
difference between the estimated coefficients of the unconditional, full-period local AFFM 
(Table 5.5) and the estimated coefficients of the local AFFM break point regression (Table 
5.10). Put simply, the estimated coefficient in Table 5.12 represent the increasing or 
decreasing relationship between average returns and the risk premia during the partition. For 
example, the long term market beta in Table 5.5 (also shown in Table 5.12) is 0.6306, while 
partition 2 of Table 5.12 estimates that the market beta experienced a statistically significant 
downwards shift of -0.3297, providing an overall market beta of 0.3009. Allowing for 
rounding, this value matches the estimated market beta of partition 2 in Table 5.10. In fact, 
the difference between each coefficient in Table 5.12 and the unconditional estimate equals 
the coefficient in Table 5.10. 
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TABLE 5.12: SECOND-PASS SEQUENTIAL BREAK POINT TEST ON RESIDUALS 
This table presents the results of the Bai and Perron (2003) sequential multiple partial break point tests on the residuals of the constant slope regression. The HAC coefficient covariance matrix automatically determines 
optimised lag structuring using AIC. Kernel bandwidth is automatically determined using Andrew’s AR(1) method and uses quadratic-spectral kernels. The break specification is sequential, testing the null of ℓ versus the 
alternative of ℓ + 1 breaks. The information criterion is set to allow a maximum of 18 structural breaks, employs a trimming percentage of 5%, and significance at 𝑝 ≤ 10%. The residuals of the constant slope regression is used 
as the dependent variable. The eight risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎,𝒕), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕), oil risk (𝑅𝑜,𝑡), coal risk 
(𝑅𝑐,𝑡) and gas risk (𝑅𝑔,𝑡). The intercept is denoted 𝛼𝑖. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝒆𝒕 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡. 
Where 𝜇𝑡 represents the true firm-specific component of returns. 
Partition Start End 𝛼𝑖  𝑏𝑖  𝑠𝑖  ℎ𝑖  𝑚𝑖  𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  𝑐𝑖  𝑔𝑖  Obs Adj. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 Sig. 
1 01/07/1996 31/08/1998 0.0000  -0.0223  0.0097  0.1233 **** 0.1756 **** 0.1037  -0.0140  0.0032  0.0008  566 27.95% 22.50 **** 
2 01/09/1998 29/03/2000 0.0000  -0.3297 **** -0.3251 **** 0.1877 **** 0.0237  0.0194  -0.0211 * 0.0441 ** 0.0031  412    
3 30/03/2000 07/09/2001 0.0002  -0.3549 **** -0.0523  0.0123  0.1387 **** 0.0493  0.0057  0.0449 * -0.0104  377    
4 10/09/2001 31/08/2004 0.0000  -0.1351 **** -0.0417  0.0555 ** -0.0125  0.3948 *** -0.0211 ** 0.0070  -0.0008  777    
5 01/09/2004 24/07/2007 0.0003 ** 0.1188 **** 0.1584 **** 0.0267  0.1315 **** 0.0506  0.0116  0.0283 *** 0.0000  755    
6 25/07/2007 17/06/2008 0.0006  0.0195  -0.0052  0.0784  0.1487 *** 0.3420  0.1182 *** 0.0155  -0.0031  235    
7 18/06/2008 27/04/2009 -0.0011  -0.0859 ** -0.1089  -0.4373 **** 0.0571  0.5015  -0.0098  0.0040  0.0066  224    
8 28/04/2009 31/01/2011 -0.0011  0.0607 ** -0.0012  -0.0431  -0.0638 ** 0.4890  -0.0008  0.0083  -0.0115 ** 460    
9 01/02/2011 28/06/2013 -0.0002  0.1657 **** 0.0396  0.2366 **** -0.0611 ** -0.1037  -0.0165  0.0310 ** 0.0021  629    
                         
                         
   Estimated AFFM coefficients extracted from Table 5.5.       
   𝛼𝑖  𝑏𝑖  𝑠𝑖  ℎ𝑖  𝑚𝑖  𝑡𝑝𝑖  𝑜𝑖  𝑐𝑖  𝑔𝑖      
                         




This has implications for Chapter 6 as it suggests that the econometric approach 
adopted must control for time-varying risk parameters, as the residuals of the unconditional 
regression still contain risk premia, failing to accurately represent the firm-specific 
component of returns over long horizons. Appendix E develops this proposition further and 
shows, algebraically, that a fraction of variance unexplained (FVU) in the unconditional 
residuals can be accounted for by the changing relationship with the risk premia. These results 
show that the method of analysis of Chapter 6 must control for this changing relationship with 
premia over time to better isolate the firm-specific component of returns, necessary to 
calculate abnormal performance as a result of regulatory changes. Further, Appendix E 
examines the presence of January seasonals in the time series of this chapter which can also 
affect residuals. 
The overall results indicate that structural break points in parameters, previously 
ignored in the unconditional model assuming constant slopes, account for around 28% of the 
residuals which were previously assumed to be the firm-specific element of excess returns. 
The benefit of the above analysis is twofold. First, this chapter demonstrates that the 
sequential partial break point approach has much greater ability to filter out systematic 
elements of returns. This method will better isolate the firm-specific component of returns, 
addressing analytical focus 4 of this chapter. Second, the results in Table 5.10 and Table 5.12 
show that there are significant structural breaks in returns across time, primarily caused by 
changing relationships with the systematic risk factors. In fact, the only time period when 
energy utilities generated abnormal returns above their equilibrium values was partition 5. 
During partition 5, the intercept of the model shows that energy utilities generated an 
abnormal return of 0.03% per day between 2004 and 2007. This is the period preceding the 
GFC and is consistent with the rapid increase in returns observed in Figure 4.1 and Figure 5.2. 
The following section concludes the chapter. 
 Conclusion 5.5
This chapter focused on refining the global AFFM of Chapter 4 for sector level 
analysis to allow for a more nuanced understanding of the impact of risk factors on sector 
returns. This is achieved through the four analytical foci of the chapter, namely: 1) refining 
the global AFFM developed in Chapter 4 by calculating stock market risk factors at the sector 
level, creating a local AFFM; 2) applying the local AFFM to the sub-group portfolios of 
European utilities so as to explore within-sector heterogeneity; 3) applying inductive rather 
than deductive structural break point tests; and 4) better isolating the firm-specific component 
of returns. For each analytical foci of the chapter, the main results are as follows.  
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For analytical focus 1, the use of local stock market risk factors, specific to the energy 
utility sector, improves the performance of the global AFFM developed in Chapter 4. The 
global AFFM of Chapter 4, which calculated global stock market risk factors across a 
diversified sample of European stocks (see Section 4.2.4), resulted in an adjusted 𝑅2 of 
68.79%. In contrast, this chapter utilised the local AFFM, calculating local stock market risk 
factors which are specific to European energy utilities. The results showed that the local 
AFFM increased adjusted 𝑅2 to 72.77% for the energy sector. Overall, the results showed that 
the local AFFM captures a greater proportion of sector level returns. Further, the use of local 
stock market risk factors allowed examination of returns at the energy sector level, 
Addressing analytical focus 2, the local AFFM showed substantial heterogeneity 
across the 12 energy portfolios tested. First, the spread in estimated coefficients showed that 
the heterogeneous sensitivity to size, value and momentum premia were the largest 
determinants for the differences in expected returns across various energy portfolios; expected 
returns varied by 4.60-8.48% per annum between portfolios. In contrast, term premium and 
commodity risk factors showed relatively little impact, with the difference in expected returns 
across portfolios all being less than 0.87% per annum.  
The third analytical focus concerns the use of the deductive conditional annual 
regressions and the inductive Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) structural break point tests (see 
Section 3.3.4). The annual regressions, using the local AFFM, resulted in a mean adjusted 𝑅2 
of 74.52%. The inductive method improves the local AFFM’s goodness of fit further, 
producing an adjusted 𝑅2 of 80.42%. The interpretations of the time-varying methods were 
qualitatively the same. The energy sector’s market beta has been increasing towards unity 
through time, suggesting the sector is taking on increasing systematic risk. The size premium 
coefficient indicates that market returns of big utilities continue to dominate sector returns, 
suggesting that liberalisation objectives have been relatively ineffective. While the sector 
mostly behaves like growth utilities, from 2011 to 2013 the energy sector behaves like 
distressed utilities, with the latter two years being statistically significant. Momentum 
coefficients show significant and negative momentum in the years following major regulatory 
changes. In particular, the third packages of liberalisation in 2009 have resulted in persistent 
negative performance, consistent with the decline in market capitalisation observed in the 
following years. Term premia and commodities show sporadic significant though time, with 
coal and oil being the most important two commodities in explaining sector returns. 
Finally, analytical focus 4 explores the isolation of the firm-specific component of 
returns using the residuals of the unconditional regressions, conditional annual regressions 
and inductive structural break point test. This chapter demonstrates that the common method 
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of isolating the residuals of the unconditional regressions, such as the method implemented by 
Fama and French (1993), performs poorly at capturing the firm-specific components of 
returns. This chapter shows that structural breaks in the residuals of an unconditional 
regression correlate with structural breaks in the relationship between sector returns and risk 
premia. Using the unconditional local AFFM and the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) structural 
break point regression, and specific to this chapter’s energy sample and time period, the 
results show that 28% of the residuals variance is related to the changing relationship between 
sector returns and risk factors. The results of this chapter influenced the econometric approach 
adopted for Chapter 6. 
5.5.1 Contributions 
The results of this chapter make both academic and policy contributions. The 
following outlines the academic contributions. First, by demonstrating that the local stock 
market risk factors capture a greater proportion of returns relative to global stock market risk 
factors, this chapter shows that there is greater informational content within a sector, 
compared with informational content across an entire market. This approach helps improve 
the accuracy of estimated coefficients with regard to risk premia in the energy utility sector, 
which can be used in a variety of scenarios which require estimates of expected stock return 
(see Section 5.4.2.4). More generally, this chapter suggests an approach to developing a 
sector-specific asset pricing model and shows that local models explain a greater proportion 
of sector returns in comparison with inter-sectoral global models. Further, this chapter 
introduces industry portfolios and allows for portfolio rebalancing, an improvement over 
Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). Portfolio rebalancing is important in the 
case of mergers and acquisitions which can affect operations.  
Second, the combination of the local AFFM and 12 energy portfolios (see Section 
5.3.2.1) enabled a detailed examination of sector level returns and within-sector 
heterogeneity. As noted in the introduction to this thesis (Section 1.5), an asset pricing test 
which includes stock market risk factors has not been conducted in the European energy 
utility sector, addressing the avenue for further research previously highlighted by El-Sharif et 
al. (2005) and Oberndorfer (2009a). The results show that the risk profiles of energy utilities 
vary dramatically depending on firm characteristics. The ability to detect commodity risk 
across a variety of energy portfolios suggests that the portfolios have not fully realised the 
benefit of commodity risk hedging or find hedging difficult. 
Third, this chapter extends the asset pricing literature by including modern advances 
from the econometrics literature, namely, the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) inductive structural 
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break point test. The Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) tests are utilised in two ways: 1) as a post-
hoc stability diagnostic tool and 2) as a break point regression. The latter test can be used to 
explain evolving relationships between sector returns and risk factors through time and avoids 
many of the econometric criticisms of deductive break point tests (see Section 3.3.4.1).  
Fourth, this chapter demonstrates that residuals of an unconditional regression, which 
were previously thought to be the firm specific component of returns, continue to retain 
systematic risk factors. The inference of this result is that failure to control for this time-
varying nature of model parameters forces the systematic risk into the model’s residuals. This 
chapter demonstrates a method of utilising conditional annual regressions or an inductive 
break point regression to better isolate the firm-specific component of return and construct an 
orthogonalised firm-specific return series. This method of application is novel and makes a 
large contribution to the asset pricing literature in terms of identifying unsystematic, firm-
specific components of return. Moreover, this chapter provides a flexible tool which can be 
adapted to other sectors, since it suggests a method of more accurately examining time-
varying risk premia and isolating the firm-specific component of returns for any sector. 
The following outlines the policy contributions. As a corollary to the second academic 
contribution above, the results of this chapter show heterogeneity of risk factors in the energy 
utility sector based on firm characteristics. Regarding the size portfolios, small utilities have 
lower systematic risk than big energy utilities, but have greater commodity risk exposure 
which implies that small utilities have not fully utilise the benefits of commodity hedging. As 
highlighted in Section 3.2.2.1, Chan and Chen (1991) argued that the small size quintile 
captures ‘fallen angels’ and marginal firms. It is possible that the small energy utility portfolio 
is also capturing these poorly performing utilities. This would be consistent with the 
significant value premium for small utilities, which shows that small utilities are also 
distressed firms. Further, it may indicate that small utilities are, for a variety of reasons, 
unable to access derivative markets for commodity hedging, or lack the capital or expertise to 
hedge effectively. It could also show that commodities play a key role as an indicator for 
energy price developments when valuing informationally sparse stocks, such a small utilities; 
see Kumar (2009) and Oberndorfer (2009a). 
Regarding the industry portfolios, the electricity industry has greater cumulative 
returns than other industry portfolios, suggesting a greater risk-return relationship. The local 
AFFM shows that the electricity industry is distressed relative to other utilities, which is 
argued to be the impact of regulations relating to competition and renewables. The electricity 
industry is also taking on increasing commodity risk; again, suggesting a failure to effectively 
hedge commodity risk. While most portfolios performed like down momentum utilities, the 
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natural gas industry is the only portfolio with positive momentum, possibly indicating excess 
profiteering. The natural gas sector also showed greater similarity with the oil & gas sector of 
Chapter 4, likely due to integrated and overlapping operations and the lack of ‘pure’ natural 
gas firms; congruent with Oberndorfer (2009a). Interestingly, the multi-utilities showed one 
of the lowest cumulative abnormal returns across all portfolios – indicating a lower risk-return 
relationship. The multi-utilities have less commodity risk exposure than both the natural gas 
and electricity industries, indicating economy of scope – diversified operations allow multi-
utilities to switch operations when faced with regulatory changes or fluctuations in 
commodity prices. 
More importantly, the policy implications above show that the energy sector’s 
coverage in press has been subject to focalism. Many commentators, such as The Economist 
(2013a, b, c, 2015) and The BBC (2013), use case studies of big, natural gas utilities to 
exemplify perceived excess profiteering and highlight the impact of renewables and 
regulatory changes on the European energy utility sector. In particular, competition and 
renewable objectives have been a topic of intense debate in recent years. Liberalisation and 
environmental objectives in Section 2.2 are designed to counter market dominance from big 
utilities and reduce the EU’s reliance on hydrocarbons. Naturally, the market is expected to 
devalue big, natural gas utilities which lose market dominance and revenue stream. The error 
of press is extrapolating these impacts to the energy sector as a whole. Such a narrow view 
ignores the growth opportunities afforded to small utilities through removal of national 
borders, or potential increase in demand for electricity utilities from the electrification of the 
transport sector. While focusing on risk exposure, the local AFFM and portfolio approach of 
this chapter has shown that there is substantial heterogeneity across various energy utilities.  
5.5.2 Limitations 
The major limitation of the thesis so far, and alluded to in the preceding section, is that 
the empirical chapters’ contributions have primarily focused on developing the AFFM for 
European energy utility stocks; there has been no explicit examination or treatment of policy. 
The asset pricing models have only shown large changes in systematic risk which coincide in 
close proximity to known major regulatory changes. Thus, there has been no formal 
examination of the ordinary legislative procedure (Section 2.1), the broad range of 
restructuring events between 1996 and 2013 (see Table 2.1), and the four distinct restructuring 
streams (Section 2.2). To this end, Chapter 6 utilises the local AFFM to conduct an event 
study analysis of the timing of market reaction during the ordinary legislative procedure and 
examines the differential impact of the four distinct restructuring streams on abnormal returns.  
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CHAPTER 6  
THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY CHANGES IN ENERGY UTILITY 
RETURNS 
 Introduction 6.1
As noted in Section 1.1, commentators have argued that renewable energy objectives 
have negatively impacted the valuation of the EU energy utility sector. However, the impact 
of regulations beyond renewables, which may also be responsible for affecting sector 
valuation, are rarely considered. For example, the EU’s efforts to create a single European 
energy market through liberalisation legislation has transformed the energy sector from one 
largely dominated by state owned enterprises, with vertically integrated structure and regional 
monopolies, to an unbundled, competitive, privately-owned energy sector (see Section 2.2.1). 
Another major EU-led reform thrust that has built up particular momentum over the last 
decade is related to the environmental objectives of the sector and the ‘greening’ of the energy 
supply. This has focused on reducing energy demand through legislation promoting energy 
efficiency and renewable energy objectives (see, respectively, Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3). In 
addition to the liberalisation and environmental policies, energy utilities have also been 
subject to a range of legislation related to security of supply (see Section 2.2.4). Further, as 
was noted in Section 2.1, these policies are subject to protracted and complex legislative 
processes. This leads to two questions which are explored in this chapter: 1) At what stage of 
the ordinary legislative procedure do investors incorporate information about regulatory 
change? 2) How have these regulatory changes impacted the financial returns and valuation of 
EU energy utilities? With respect to the latter question, corollary questions concern the 
relative impact of the four policy streams (liberalisation, energy efficiency, renewables and 
security of supply) on returns and whether the policy streams have differential impact on 
firms (i.e. does the heterogeneity apparent in Chapter 5 expend to policy impacts). 
If EU policies significantly impact the valuation of European utilities this can, in turn, 
affect utilities’ cost of capital and capital-raising ability, as investors may require greater 
returns on investment in terms of dividends. As is well known, policy makers are asking 
utilities to increase their use of green-energy technologies and to make investments in a smart, 
decarbonised energy grid – the EU transition is estimated to cost $2.2 trillion between 2014 
and 2035 (IEA, 2014). Put differently, policies may conflict. For instance, liberalisation 
policies may negatively impact the valuation of utilities, which, in turn, makes it more 
difficult to meet ambitious ‘green’ investment targets. 
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This chapter makes both academic and policy contributions by building on the asset 
pricing models developed in Chapters 4 and 5. It utilises an event study approach to examine 
how the valuation of EU energy utilities has been impacted by the myriad of regulatory 
changes described above. To this end, the chapter tests five hypotheses, developed in Section 
6.2. The first, concerns market efficiency. The latter four concern the four restructuring 
streams. As stated in Section 1.5, the chapter 1) uses a large sample of 88 European energy 
utilities which controls for survivorship bias, 2) compiles a broad range of 54 regulatory 
changes, extracted from European law archives (see Chapter 2 and Table 2.1) and 3) conducts 
the most extensive test of the timing of information incorporation regarding European 
regulatory changes between 1996 and 2013. Only two papers have addressed related issues in 
the context of European energy utilities (Oberndorfer, 2009a; Koch and Bassen, 2013); 
however, no known paper has explored the magnitude and impact of the four restructuring 
streams over this period on such a large sample (see Section 3.2.3.3). As such, this chapter 
represents the most thorough investigation to date of the policy implications of the evolving 
financial return of European energy utilities. 
In terms of academic contribution, this chapter examines the timing of market reaction 
surrounding key stages of the ordinary legislative procedure (see Section 2.1), finding that 
market reaction generally occurs at the early voting stages of the legislative procedure. This 
suggests strong market efficiency and a rational response from market participants, who 
impound information into asset prices at the earliest available opportunity. From a policy 
perspective, this chapter also shows that the Internal Energy Market and Energy Efficiency 
stream have a significant impact across the entire energy sector, while the Renewable 
Energies and Security of Supply streams have limited, firm-specific impacts. More 
importantly, it shows that the impact of regulatory changes can be hetergeneic depending on 
the underlying firm affected. The following section developes the five hypotheses tested. 
 Research Hypotheses 6.2
6.2.1 Timing of Market Reaction 
The first stage of the analysis identifies the timing of market reaction within the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Market efficiency, outlined in Section 3.3.1, argues that 
investors are expected to be rational, wealth-optimising individuals. Investors will revalue 
energy utilities’ stocks today based on perceived changes to future cash flows as a result of 
regulatory changes (Schwert, 1981). When information is anticipated or becomes public 
knowledge, information is immediately impounded into stock prices; any sudden change in 
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value implies that the market has changed its assessment of future cash flows (Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996). 
The co-decision procedure, as shown in Figure 2.2, requires two political institutions, 
the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, to independently agree upon the 
Commission’s legislative proposal for it to pass into law (see Section 2.1). The process can be 
protracted and complex, while informational content is continually diffusing into the market. 
Investors will use this information to determine the probability that a regulation will become 
law, continually adjusting the probability and adjusting asset prices accordingly (Schwert, 
1981). In the case of the ordinary legislative procedure, there are four potentially important 
event dates, per legislative proposal. The four dates considered include the announcement of 
the 1
st
 position, the announcement of the 2
nd
 position, the signature date and the publication 
date (see Section 2.1). 
The announcement of the 1
st
 position represents the date at which the first political 
institution (usually the Parliament) has principally agreed upon or amended a legislative 
proposal. The announcement of the 2
nd
 position represents the date at which the second 
political institution (usually the Council) has also principally agreed upon the legislative 
proposal (or prior amendments). The 2
nd
 position represents the date at which it is known with 
certainty that a proposal will become law. This chapter posits that the market reaction will 
occur surrounding the announcement of these two positions. However, we temper this 
proposition with caution. As Schwert (1981) notes, the assumption of market efficiency does 
not imply that investors have perfect information or foresight regarding the future effect of a 
regulation. It is possible that the ex-post realised effect of the regulation is different to the ex-
ante¸ anticipated effect. Further, investors often exhibit a lagged response for a variety of 
reasons, including investor inattention (Dyck and Zingales, 2003, Dellavigna and Pollet, 
2009); investor bias, including overconfidence and self-attribution (Daniel et al., 1998, 
Hirshleifer, 2001); hard-to-value information, including hard (quantitative) and soft 
(qualitative) information (Demers and Vega, 2008, Engelberg, 2008, Kumar, 2009); and 
media coverage and bias (Solomon, 2012). Griffin et al. (2015) also argue investors may not 
respond to information for numerous reasons, including 1) remote and uncertain 
consequences for the firm regarding the long-term nature of increased investment risk, 2) the 
expectation of full mitigation from government policies or 3) the ability to mitigate risk 
individually. Moreover, in many cases, the agreed-upon text is not the finalised version. 
Accordingly, information may also be impounded into asset prices in the interim period 
between the 2
nd
 position and the signature date or during the legal-linguistic finalisation phase 
at which the final interpretations, definitions and revisions of the text are made (see Section 
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2.1.5). While substantial changes are unlikely to be made at this point, it is important that the 
analysis can capture these effects. 
To address these issues, and ensure completeness of the analysis, two further event 
dates are tested. The third event date, the signature date, represents the point at which the two 
institutions meet, at a pre-scheduled monthly meeting, to sign the agreed-upon legislation and 
the legislative proposal is formally adopted. The fourth event date, the publication date, 
represents the legislation’s formal publication in The Official Journal of the European Union. 
As the informational content at the signature and publication dates is mostly unchanged (see 
Section 2.1.5), there should be little to no reaction at these later stages of the procedure. 
Further, as all events are public and scheduled, it is assumed that the market can coordinate 
their trading in anticipation of the outcome regarding the regulatory change. Accordingly, the 
first hypothesis which focuses on the timing of information in asset prices predicts: 
 
H1: Significant market reactions to regulatory changes will predominantly occur in 
the early co-decision stages of the legislative procedure (i.e. 1
st





The null hypothesis is that there will be no significant reaction at the early co-decision 
stages of the procedure. The second set of hypotheses relate to the impact of each regulatory 
stream. 
6.2.2 The Impact of the Four Restructuring Streams 
Section 2.2 outlines the four distinct restructuring streams related to the regulation of 
the European energy utility sector. The first stream addresses liberalisation objectives of the 
energy sector, the Internal Energy Market stream (Section ‎2.2.1). The second and third 
streams address environmental objectives of the sector; the Energy Efficiency (Section 2.2.2) 
streams. The fourth stream focuses on security of the oil and energy supply in the EU, the 
Security of Supply stream (Section 2.2.4). The following paragraphs develop hypotheses for 
each stream. 
Briefly, the liberalisation literature in Section 3.3.2 argued that deregulation of 
markets is expected to lower entry barriers, increase competition from large international 
competitors and expose energy utilities to the real threat of bankruptcy (Beneish, 1991, Gual, 
1999, Megginson et al., 1994). Deregulation also brings additional expenses such as 
reorganisation costs, increased brand awareness and cutting unit costs to gain market share 
(Beneish, 1991, Gual, 1999, Nwaeze, 2000, Delmas and Tokat, 2005). Further, liberalisation 
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is expected to increase revenue volatility through reducing the use of long-term contracts, 
while vertically unbundling utilities (see Section 2.2.1) is expected to reduce insurance 
against fluctuations in commodities and the buffering effect from cost and demand shocks 
(Beneish, 1991, Nwaeze, 2000, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). For the banking sector, Kane and 
Unal (1998) document increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk, an increased 
number of failed and problem banks and negative abnormal returns as a result of regulatory 
changes. Among other risk factors, Chapters 4 and 5 showed increasing systematic risk 
increasing firm distress and decreasing momentum through time (see Table 4.7 and Table 5.8, 
respectively). 
The expectation is that the market will react negatively to the Internal Energy Market 
stream. Energy utilities now lose the natural regional monopolies and are now forced to 
compete on price and services with a large number of competitors. Accordingly, the second 
hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Liberalisation objectives related to the Internal Energy Market stream will 
negatively impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities, in particular large 
incumbent utilities that have historically had market power. 
 
The environmental objectives are addressed through two streams the: Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energies streams. The environmental policy literature in Section 
3.3.3 found mixed results with respect to the impact of environmental objectives on operating 
performance, which has implications on future cash flows. Some authors found that 
compliance with environmental regulations decreased productivity or argued that retrofitting 
existing energy plants is costly (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972, Gollop and Roberts, 1983). 
Further, the financial burden of environmental objectives means allocating resources away 
from other goals, including investment projects and plant upgrades (Walley and Whitehead, 
1994, Dobes et al., 2014). In contrast, other researchers argued that environmental regulations 
can increase productivity, as it encourages firms to innovate, provides new market 
opportunities and encourages firms to make low-cost savings (Walley and Whitehead, 1994, 
Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Further, technological innovation, the social benefit of renewable 
energies and lower firm emissions may increase firm value as socially responsible investors 
reward these firms through increased investment (see Section 3.3.3.2). The likely impact of 




Section 2.2.2 addresses the Energy Efficiency restructuring stream specifically. To 
summarise, the Energy Efficiency stream focuses on reducing energy consumption from the 
most energy-intensive end-user appliances in the EU. Further, legislation also focuses on 
improving the energy efficiency of homes, with the objective of building carbon-zero homes 
by 2020. However, this must be balanced against population growth which is likely to 
increase energy demand. The overall impact is improved energy efficiency resulting in a 
decline in energy demand by about 10% to 20% (Delarue et al., 2011). The third hypothesis 
tested states: 
 
H3: Environmental objectives related to the Energy Efficiency stream will negatively 
impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities across the entire sector since 
it reduces overall energy consumption. 
 
The second stream relating to environmental objectives is the Renewable Energies 
stream (see Section 2.2.3). As noted in Sections 1.2 and 2.2.3, renewable energy sources are 
afforded grid priority at the expense of combustion fuel generators. Grid priority has resulted 
in renewable energies being able to sell energy at the expense of combustion fuel generators. 
Renewable energy generators typically operate during peak hours, when the renewable energy 
sources are available, which have historically been the most profitable hours for combustion 
fuel generators. However, this intraday disadvantage must be counterbalanced by the second 
objectives of Renewable Energies legislation. The legislation also focuses on electrification of 
the transport sector, where at least 10% of transport must be electrified across all Member 
States by 2020. Importantly, the electrification of other sectors, such as transport, is expected 
to decrease energy demand for hydrocarbon sources (see Section 2.2.3). If there is to be any 
impact from the Renewable Energies legislation, the impact will predominantly have a 
negative impact on natural gas utilities through the decreased use of hydrocarbons. Electric 
utilities that are unable to adapt may also experience a negative impact, although this impact 
is expected to be smaller, as Söderholm (1998, 2001) reports short- and long-term fuel-
flexibility in EU electricity generators (see Section 3.3.5.2). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis 
tested is: 
 
H4: Environmental objectives related to the Renewable Energies stream will 
negatively impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities, in particular 




Finally, the fourth restructuring stream relates to securing oil and energy supply at 
EU-level. The Security of Supply stream focuses on diminishing the harmful effects from 
difficulties in securing crude oil and petroleum products; see Section 2.2.4. The overall 
objective is to provide authorities with powers to partially regulate oil prices in order to 
prevent abnormal price rises
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and maintain sufficient oil and gas inventories to mitigate 
physical interruptions in supply and to use existing inventories strategically by giving energy 
utility companies priority with respect to the consumption of these reserves. Although the 
stream does not affect energy utilities directly, the impact is expected to affect oil prices. As 
argued by Huang et al. (1996) and Faff and Brailsford (1999), investors are expected to 
efficiently capitalise the cash flow implications of any industry which uses oil as an input or 
output to operations, or where oil is related to sector valuation. The existing literature in 
Section 3.2.3.2 and Table 3.1 showed that the majority of papers find a positive relationship 
between equity values and oil prices. The empirical evidence in Section 3.2.3.2 showed that 
decreasing volatility and/or declining oil prices negatively impact industries where oil is a 
major output, such as the oil & gas sector, mining and electricity industries (Scholtens and 
Yurtsever, 2012). Chapters 4 of this thesis showed that oil price risk has a positive 
relationship between oil and sector returns through time (see Table 4.7). Further, the 
differential impacts of oil on various portfolios of energy utilities in Chapter 5 are also mostly 
positive, with natural gas utilities having the greatest risk exposure (see Table 5.5). A priori, 
based on the expected positive relationship between sector returns and oil prices, regulations 
which prevent abnormal price rises should also negatively impact the energy sector. In 
particular, there should a large decline in the value of natural gas utilities. Accordingly, this 
chapter tests the following hypothesis. 
 
H5: Measures to safeguard the European energy supply, related to the Security of 
Supply stream, will negatively impact the financial return and market value of energy utilities.  
 





In order to address the hypotheses developed above, this chapter adapts the local 
AFFM developed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.3) using event study techniques. As stated in 
Section 3.2.2 and shown in Chapter 4, the inclusion of stock market risk factors typically 
explains a greater proportion of average stock returns compared with existing asset pricing 
models, congruent with Fama and French (1993). Further, Chapter 5 showed that the local 
versions of the stock market risk factors typically have greater regression fits and are better 
able to explain returns at local levels, congruent with Fama and French (2012). To explore 
this impact to its fullest extent, the tests are implemented on 12 energy portfolios outlined in 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.2.1) to examine within-sector heterogeneity of market reaction to the 
regulatory changes. The rest of this section expands on the research method implemented; the 
related sub-sections outline the models implemented and econometric approach (Section 
6.3.1), the sample (Sections 6.3.2) and the list of regulatory events examined (Section 6.3.3). 
6.3.1 Models and Econometric Approach 
The impact of an economic event can be estimated by examining rates of return to 
shareholders of firms during a period of regulatory change (Schipper and Thompson, 1983). 
To assess the impact of a regulatory change, an event study approach is typically comprised 
of two parts, as shown in Figure 6.1: establishing normal returns over an estimation window, 
then measuring abnormal returns during an event window. Following MacKinlay (1997), 
returns are indexed in event time using 𝜏, where 𝜏 = 0 is defined as the event date. The event 
window is defined as 𝜏 = 𝑇1 + 1 to 𝜏 = 𝑇2, while 𝜏 = 𝑇0 + 1 to 𝜏 = 𝑇1 defines the estimation 
window. Let 𝐿1 = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 and 𝐿2 = 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 be the length of the estimation window and the 
event window, respectively. The event study approach relies on the assumption that the 
event’s impact is captured by the abnormal returns. Therefore, the estimation window and the 
event window cannot overlap, ensuring that the estimators for the parameters of the normal 
return model are not influenced by the returns around the event, which could significantly 
influence the normal return measure (MacKinlay, 1997). The following sub-sections outline 
the method of estimating normal return (Section 6.3.1.1) and the isolation of abnormal return 




FIGURE 6.1: TIME-LINE OF AN EVENT STUDY APPROACH 
This figure illustrates the time-line of an event study approach, relative to an event on day zero. The estimation window 
represents the period over which normal returns are established. The event window represents the period over which 
abnormal returns are measured, preceding and following an event. Figure adapted from MacKinlay (1997) and Event Study 
Metrics (2015) 
 
6.3.1.1 Estimating normal returns 
To establish normal returns over the event window, this chapter adopts an economic 
approach, as opposed to the statistical approach,
60
 concerning investors’ behaviour. The 
advantage of the economic approach is the more precise measure of normal return using 
economic restrictions (MacKinlay, 1997). The economic model implemented in this chapter is 
the local AFFM developed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.3). The model specification is: 
𝑹𝑖,𝐿1 = 𝛼𝑖,𝐿1 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝐿1 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐿1 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐿1 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝐿1 
+𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝐿1 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝐿1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝐿1 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝐿1 +  𝑒𝑖,𝐿1 , (6.1) 
estimated over the estimation window (𝐿1) preceding each event window (𝐿2), see Figure 6.1, 
where: 𝛼𝑖,𝐿1 denotes the intercept over 𝐿1, 𝑏𝑖 denotes the market factor coefficient, 𝑹𝑚,𝐿1 
denotes the excess return on the market factor over 𝐿1, 𝑠𝑖 denotes the 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficient, 
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐿1 denotes the local size premium over 𝐿1, ℎ𝑖 denotes the 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 coefficient, 𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐿1 
denotes the value premium over 𝐿1, 𝑚𝑖 denotes the 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 coefficient, and 𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝐿1 denotes 
the momentum premium over 𝐿1, 𝑡𝑝𝑖 denotes the term premium coefficient, 𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝐿1 denotes the 
term premium over 𝐿1, 𝑜𝑖 denotes the oil price risk coefficient, 𝑅𝑜,𝐿1 denotes the return on oil 
price over 𝐿1, 𝑐𝑖 denotes the coal price risk coefficient, 𝑅𝑐,𝐿1 denotes the return on coal price 
over 𝐿1, 𝑔𝑖 denotes the natural gas price risk coefficient and 𝑅𝑔,𝐿1 denotes the return on 
natural gas price over 𝐿1. The restructuring events are listed in Table 2.1. 
The estimation window (𝐿1) is set to 100 days. While MacKinlay (1997) recommends 
120 days for daily data, the choice of 100 days was made as the first packages of liberalisation 
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 Statistical approaches include the Constant Mean Return Model and the Market Model, while economic 




(see Section 2.2.1) occur 123 days after the beginning of the time series and is expected to be 
a major regulatory event – allowing a maximum estimation period of 103 days combined with 
a ±20-day event window (discussed further below). The purpose of estimating the parameters 
prior to each window is a standard approach to estimating model parameters (Meznar et al., 
1994, Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995, MacKinlay, 1997). Moreover, the method also accounts 
for the time-varying nature of risk factors observed in Chapter 5, Sections 5.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.3, 
giving a more precise estimation of risk premia and better isolating the firm-specific 
component of returns. Under general conditions, OLS is a consistent estimation procedure 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
There is often an inherent assumption of parameter stability with regard to an event 
study, which is problematic over long windows (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The approach 
of this chapter assumes short-term stability in the risk parameters, and extrapolates normal 
return over the event window of (up to) ±20-days. Plot 2A and 3A of Figure 5.7 shows that 
the cumulative residuals of a time-varying approach rarely deviate from 100%, so this chapter 
can be reasonably certain of parameter stability in the short-term, for event windows less than 
40 days. 
Griffin et al. (2015) argue that the inclusion of variables, such as crude oil price 
changes, can result in both Type I and Type II errors. Including too many commodities can 
obscure some of the energy-related impacts the chapter seeks to identify, while excluding the 
commodities can incorrectly attribute market reactions to regulatory changes which are, in 
fact, commodity impacts. Table 3.1 and the results of Chapter 5 (Table 5.5) find significant 
commodity risk exposure within the energy sector. Oberndorfer (2009a) argues that investors 
may benchmark utilities prices against seemingly related commodities, using oil as a proxy 
for developments in the energy market as a whole. This econometric issue may be 
exacerbated when faced with uncertainty regarding regulatory changes. If true, then it is 
possible that commodities may lessen the abnormal return surrounding the regulatory change. 
Diagnostic tests in Section 6.4.3.2 will explore the influence of commodities and stock market 
risk factors on the abnormal return surrounding regulatory changes. 
6.3.1.2 Isolating abnormal returns 
If the regulatory event conveys information to investors, the underlying principle of 
the event study approach is that the impact on stock valuation will depend on the magnitude 
of the unexpected component of the regulatory change. As the normal return for a stock is 
defined as the hypothetical expected return without conditioning of the event occurring 
(MacKinlay, 1997), the measure of abnormal return is the actual ex-post return of the stock, 
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during the event window, which is in excess of the normal return. Abnormal return is 
specified as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑥𝜏) (6.2) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏, 𝑅𝑖𝜏 and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑥𝜏) are the respective abnormal, realised and normal (expected) 
returns for the 𝑖th portfolio over the event period, 𝜏, and 𝑥𝜏 denotes the conditioning 
information for the normal return. As stated in Section 6.3.1.1, the AFFM is used to estimate 
normal return in the estimation window and is extrapolated to the event window. The 
residuals of the model are forecast errors from the AFFM which correspond to conventional 
measures of abnormal returns (Schipper and Thompson, 1983). Econometrically, to measure 
abnormal returns of portfolio 𝑖, let 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 be the sample of abnormal returns in the event 
window 𝐿2. Abnormal return, with regard to event date 𝜏, can be defined as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖𝜏 (6.3) 
where 
?̂?𝑖𝜏 = ?̂?𝑖,𝜏 + ?̂?𝑖𝑹𝑚,𝜏 + ?̂?𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝜏 + ℎ̂𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝜏 + ?̂?𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝜏 
+𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝,𝜏 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑜,𝜏 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑐,𝜏 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑔,𝜏. (6.4) 
The standard approach to exploring abnormal returns is to define the event window 
surrounding an event (see Figure 6.1) to be larger than the specific period of interest (Meznar 
et al., 1994). The purpose is to allow examination of periods surrounding the suspected event. 
This also captures the possibility of investors acquiring information prior to the actual 
announcement, any event effects which occur after stock market closes on announcement day 
or delayed impacts (MacKinlay, 1997). Section 2.1 highlights multiple points at which 
information may leak into the market early, while Section 6.2.1 highlights a variety of reasons 
why the market may exhibit a lagged response. Further, the protracted legislative procedure 
outlined in Section 2.1 shows that the legislative procedure is a multifarious process. Thus, 
the market reaction will depend on the type of legislation (regulation, directive or decision), 
the stream (see Section 2.2), the stage of the legislative procedure (see Section 2.1) or the type 
of firm likely to be impacted (see Section 5.3.2.1). 
To this end, the research method tests a variety of event windows surrounding a 
proposed legislation, denoted (𝑇1, 𝑇2) where 𝑇1 denotes the beginning of the event window 
and 𝑇2 denotes the end; see Figure 6.1. This chapter tests eight event windows, divided into 
three groups. The full event window, (−20,20), test the impact over a long-horizon 
surrounding the event. Four short windows are tested, (−20, −1), (−10, −1), (1,10) and 
(1,20), which capture the impact in the weeks preceding or following the event – excluding 
the event date. Finally, three narrow windows (0,0),(−1,1) and (−2,2) are tested to examine 
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the impact immediately surrounding the event. Similar to Meznar et al. (1994) and Agrawal 
and Kamakura (1995), this chapter utilises the (𝑇1, 𝑇2) convention when referring to specific 
event windows, and conducts significance tests over each event window (Section 6.4.2).  
Because the event study is conducted over multiple events per portfolio, for various 
calendar dates, the abnormal returns observations can be aggregated across events (cross-
sectionally) and through time (temporally) over the event period to construct inferences 
regarding the impact of events (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995, MacKinlay, 1997). The 
analysis would otherwise exclusively focus on the event date itself and ignore any anticipation 
or lagged effects. The abnormal returns are transformed using two methods. 
First, since the direction of price change is not specified in H1, an unsigned expectant 
model is implemented to examine return variance in the days surrounding the four key stages. 
Using Beaver’s (1968) method, the abnormal returns are computed for each day during the 
event window T0 to T2 for each event. The average abnormal returns, cross-sectionally, is 
calculated for each day (𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜏). The average abnormal returns are squared (𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜏
2 ) and divided 
by the variance of the abnormal returns (𝑠𝑖





2  (6.5) 
where 𝑈𝜏 provides a ratio of return variance within the event window relative to the variance 
observed over the estimation period. When 𝑈𝜏 is 1, there’s no change in volatility as 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜏
2  and 
𝑠𝑖
2 are in parity.
61
 If the legislation contain informational content, the return variance during 
the event window, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
2 , greater than that observed during the estimation period, 𝑠𝑖
2. 
Accordingly, the ratio 𝑈𝜏 will be greater than parity (1). 
Second, a modern event-study approach performs significance tests on cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs), defined as:  





where 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 is the cumulative average abnormal return for portfolio 𝑖, over the event 
window 𝑇1 to 𝑇2, and 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜏 is the average abnormal return for portfolio 𝑖 across all regulatory 
events tested. For the econometric results in Section 6.4.2, we test the null hypothesis that 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 0 during the eight event windows, against the alternative that cumulative returns 
                                                 
61
 Beaver (1968) provides no formal test of significance for 𝑈𝜏. Accordingly, significant tests are included in 
the forthcoming CAAR analysis. 
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are significantly different from zero. The results identify whether the market reaction 
surrounding the regulatory event is significantly different from zero. 
The CAARs will be used to answer the five hypotheses of this chapter. To test H1, 
CAARs surrounding the four key stages of the legislative procedure, across all legislation in 
Table 2.1, will be used to measure the timing of market reaction (see Section 6.2.1). To test 
H2 to H5, the CAARs are tested on all four stages of the legislative procedure, delineated into 
the four restructuring streams; see Section 6.2.2. 
A variety of alternative significance test statistics for the CAAR and single-period AR 
have been developed over the years. Tests include the standardised abnormal residual test of 
Patell (1976) and Patell and Wolfson (1979), which tests the null that CAAR =  0. However, 
Boehmer et al. (1991) show that Patell’s test is more likely to reject the null in cases where 
return variance increases around the event. Brown and Warner (1980) develop a cross-
sectional 𝑡-test which is robust to event-induced increases in variance. Boehmer et al. (1991) 
combine elements of the previous two tests to develop a test which is robust to induced stock 
variance and based on a cross-section of event-window abnormal returns. Boehmer and 
Warner’s (1991) test is generally superior to Brown and Warner (1980). The tests primarily 
focus on cross-sectional event studies, but have implications for time-series event studies too. 
While the discussion of significance tests is still ongoing, this chapter reports standard 𝑡-tests 
in line with similar event study papers, such as Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) and Griffin et 
al. (2015). This chapter mitigates the possibility of changing variance through time by 
controlling for heteroskedasticity using pre-Whitened residuals. The use of robust standard 
errors is recommended by Princeton University (2008). 
The econometric analysis is performed in STATA, with an example of the command 
(.do file) provided in Appendix F. The framework of the STATA code is based on one outlined 
by Princeton University (2008), accommodating multiple events per portfolio, 
heteroskedasticity and (implicitly) time-varying risk parameters. 
6.3.2 Sample 
This chapter utilises the same 12 energy utility portfolios constructed in Chapter 5. 
The method of portfolio construction is outlined in Section 5.4.1.1. As Chapter 5 examines 
systematic risk and time-varying risk premia using the local AFFM, this chapter is a natural 
progression to examine the firm-specific component of returns. Further, this chapter examine 
within-sector heterogeneity of portfolios to various regulatory changes. Briefly, the analysis is 
conducted on the excess returns of 88 European energy utilities, operating in the electricity 
and/or natural gas industries. The energy utilities are grouped into 12 portfolios based on 
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similarity of characteristics, namely: the energy utility sector as a whole, high-BE/ME, mid-
BE/ME, low-BE/ME, upper momentum, medium momentum, down momentum, electric-
utility, natural gas-utility, multi- utility and small and big energy utility portfolios. 
6.3.3 Data 
Regarding the data, this chapter also utilises the same data as Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. 
Briefly, the STOXX® 600 Europe index is used as a measure of broad market returns. Local 
stock market risk factors are calculated using daily data, including size premium, value 
premium and momentum premium; see Section 5.3.3. Term premium and commodity risk 
factors (oil, coal and natural gas price changes) are also included in the analysis (see Section 
4.2.3). 
6.3.3.1 Measuring regulatory changes 
The regulatory changes used in analysis are listed in Table 2.1, identified through 
chain sampling. This chapter constructs a broad range of regulatory changes to date. This is 
achieved by identify an overview
62
 of EU energy utility legislation which is currently in force, 
produced by the Department (Directorate-General) for Energy (DG ENER), forming the 
initial sample of legislation. This sample is expanded further by extracting summaries
63
 of 
energy-specific legislation from the EUROPA website, dedicated to archiving EU. Using 
EUROPA
64
 and The Official Journal of the European Union, the list of legislation is expanded 
through chain sampling. Chain sampling includes searching EUROPA for all repeals, 
amendments and linked documents. As noted in Chapter 2, 54 eligible regulatory changes are 
identified, published over 45 unique dates between July 1996 and June 2013. The regulatory 
changes are categorised these into four streams (see Figure 2.3). 
To test H1, the first stage of the event study will examine the timing of market 





position, signature date and publication date. The dates for the key stages are obtained from 
the historical timeline of each legislation, outlined in the central European law archive 
(EUROPA)
65
 and discussed in detail in Section 2.1. Typically, the EU Parliament announces 
their position first, while the Council of the EU announces their position second. Exceptions 
to this rule occur if either political institution amends the proposal. Of 54 pieces of legislation, 
                                                 
62
 DG ENER’s latest publication is available at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/energy_legislation_by_policy_areas.pdf [updated April 2014] 
63
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/energy.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED=18  
64
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/  
65
 As noted in Section 2.1.4, the URL hyperlinks embedded in Table 2.1, for each legislation, show all of the 
key dates, documents and discussions regarding each piece of legislation. The information is freely available to 
any investor who wishes to find such information. 
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there are 32 events regarding the announcement of the 1
st
 position, 34 events regarding the 




 44 events regarding a piece of legislation’s signature date 










 position and signature dates were all located on trading days. For the publication 
dates, nine were located on non-trading days and therefore assumed to impact on the next 
trading day (Meznar et al., 1994).
67
 
To address H2 through to H5, the second stage of the event study focuses on the four 
restructuring streams (see Section 2.2). For measures of regulatory changes regarding 
liberalisation objectives, all restructuring events relating to the Internal Energy Market, are 
included (see Section 2.2.1). In total, 19 pieces of legislation relate to liberalisation objectives. 
For measures of regulatory changes regarding environmental objectives, two restructuring 
streams are identified the: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies streams. The two are 
delineated due to their content (see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, respectively). The Energy 
Efficiency stream contains 27 pieces of legislation, while the Renewable Energies stream 
contains three. A miscellaneous category relates to the security of energy supply in the EU. 
The Security of Supply stream contains five pieces of legislation. The following section 
addresses issues regarding the event study approach. 
6.3.3.2 Challenges arising from the data 




 positions were 
lower than the number of signature and publication dates. This is the result of Commission 
Directives, which do not follow the standard co-decision process of the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Consideration was given to omitting these regulatory changes. However, upon 
inspection these included key regulatory changes, including establishing the regulatory 
agency EREG, strategic oil stocks and implementations of major Energy Efficiency 
legislation. These are expected to have a major influence on liberalisation and environmental 
objectives of the energy sector. Further, the Commission Directives focus on implementing 
the decarbonisation objectives, affecting underlying electricity demand and thus the electricity 
industry. The inclusion of these events represents the realistic impact of regulatory changes 
                                                 
66
 This is the result of one Council regulation and one Council directive – which differs from the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The 1
st
 position of Council is implicitly a vote to adopt, while the 2
nd
 position relates to the 
European Parliament’s vote. 
67
 This is standard practice if the event is to be included in analysis; further analysis shows that publication 
dates are relatively unimportant. 
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that energy utilities and investors would experience in the market. Therefore, the regulatory 
changes were included in the analysis. 
The second research issue relates to confounding events, which, as Foster (1980) 
argues, can have a broad definition. This thesis defines confounding events as events from 
multiple streams occurring on the same day. Failing to control for confounding events can 
affect the validity of the empirical results and calls into question the true impact of each 
regulation on stock prices (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, Konchitchki and O'Leary, 2011). 
The first step in a systematic approach is to document the number of potentially confounding 
events; the second step is to rank the events on importance. There are two overlapping 
streams in the list of regulatory changes, shown in Table 6.1. The third step is to adopt an 
experimental design to explicitly control for the confounding events. 
 
TABLE 6.1: STREAM OVERLAPS 
This table presents the confounding events, across all four key stages, from the 54 regulatory changes in Table 2.1. 
 Overlap 1 Overlap 2 
Date: 16 June 2003, 26th June & 15th July 2003 22 April 2009 
Key Stage: 2nd Position, Signature date, & Publication Date 1st Position 
Stream #1: Internal Energy Market Internal Energy Market 
Content:  Internal market for electricity (second package) 
 Internal market for natural gas (second package) 
 Cross-border exchanges in electricity 
 Trans-European energy networks 
 Internal market for electricity (third package) 
 Internal market for gas (third package) 
 Establishing ACER 
 Cross-border exchanges in electricity 
 Conditions for access to natural gas networks 
Policy Importance High High 
   
Stream #2: Energy Efficiency Security of Supply 
Content:  “Intelligent energy for Europe” programme  Minimum stocks of Crude oil and Petroleum products 
Policy Importance Mid Mid 
 
Foster (1980) suggests five methods to control for confounding events. From an 
econometrics perspective, consideration was given to the deletion method, omitting the 
confounding event entirely. However, this is a suboptimal approach and unpalatable from a 
policy perspective. In both circumstances, the Internal Energy Market stream overlaps with a 
neighbouring stream. Unfortunately, the contemporaneous observation includes the second 
and third packages of liberalisation (see Section 2.2.1), overlapping with a legislation from 
another stream. The second and third packages are the main catalysts for energy sector 
liberalisation. Of all the streams examined, the Internal Energy Market stream is expected to 
have greater policy importance. Thus, an alternative experimental design is necessary to fully 
examine the impact of liberalisation. 
This thesis opts to adopt Foster’s (1980) third and fifth solutions. First, the analysis 
will continue assuming the confounding event has little to no impact. The argument for this 
approach is that each event is centred on day 0, creating a portfolio of abnormal returns which 
are averaged across all events; therefore, the net effect of the single confounding event will be 
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minimal (Foster, 1980). The second approach is to delete an ‘appropriate’ time surrounding 
the confounding event. The diagnostic tests in Section 6.4.3.1 performs a separate analysis to 
examine to what extent the significance tests change when excluding the contemporaneous 
observations. This latter control of deleting observations surrounding the confounding event 
been adopted, or recommended, by Dyckman and Smith (1979), Meznar et al. (1994), 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) and Konchitchki and O'Leary (2011). Overall, results of this 
chapter show little different in CAARs and significance tests. 
A further anticipated criticism of the econometric approach is the possibility of event 
clustering (overlapping events). In reality, multiple legislation are concurrently being 
discussed, amended and voted upon. Table 6.2 shows that the mean lag between any two 
events is 29.6 days. While the 100-day estimation window and series of smaller event 
windows are adopted to minimise clustering, clustering cannot be completely nullified due to 
the protracted and complex nature of the ordinary legislative procedure (Section 2.1). The 
percentage of clustered events remains high regardless of estimation period length, as shown 
in Figure 6.2. Further, the clustered events shown in Figure 6.2 are known regulatory events 
which affect the energy sector. Other unobservable events or variables may also affect energy 
sector valuation. As noted in Section 4.1, despite the decline in market capitalisation as a 
result of the GFC, a further impact of the GFC was energy demand decreasing by 4.9% in the 
first quarter of 2009 (IEA, 2009). While this chapter controls for a broad range of 
macroeconomic variables and regulatory events, such latent variables are difficult to predict 
and exist regardless of any empirical approach adopted. One positive observation regarding 
the regulatory changes is that no two events occur within 2 days of each other. This ensures 
that the narrow event windows surrounding the event will not be contaminated. 
 
TABLE 6.2: SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION STATISTICS 
Table 6.2 provides summary statistics of the legislative procedures, including the mean lag between events, median lag, standard deviation, 
25th percentile, 75th percentile, minimum and maximum lags. The unit of measurement is trading days.  
 Mean Lag Median Lag Standard Deviation 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Min Max 
1st Position 137.7 102.0 139.0 37.0 181.0 2.0 544.0 
2nd Position 129.5 95.0 133.7 47.0 149.0 2.0 563.0 
Signature Dates 100.0 67.0 108.3 33.5 124.0 4.0 586.0 
Publication Dates 97.0 68.5 110.7 35.8 101.5 2.0 597.0 





FIGURE 6.2: PERCENTAGE OF CLUSTERED EVENTS BASED ON ESTIMATION PERIOD LENGTH 
This figure illustrates the percentage of clustered avents, for the four restructuring streams, across various estimation periods. 
 
Clustered events can mask or reinforce abnormal returns surrounding an event of 
interest. From an econometric perspective, clustering also affects the calculation of variance 
of the aggregated sample’s cumulative abnormal returns as the covariance across securities 
are not zero (MacKinlay, 1997). This covariance across securities can lead to inflated 𝑡-
statistics, also highlighted by Schwert (1981). Reducing the estimation period will reduce 
clustering, but will also reduce the robustness of the parameters in the normal performance 
model, which ultimately affects the estimates of abnormal return. The clustering of events and 
inflated 𝑡-statistics can be accommodated by creating a portfolio of abnormal returns 
portfolios (Schwert, 1981, Bernard, 1987, MacKinlay, 1997). Accordingly, the portfolio 
approach implemented in Chapters 4 and 5 will control for cross-correlation of abnormal 
returns. Further, the short event windows surrounding the event can minimise this clustering 
effect (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). 
A potential problem of using daily returns is thin trading. Thin trading can have 
numerous impacts, including: 1) causing statistical tests to be poorly specified, as there are 
many observations of zero returns and large non-zero returns (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996); 2) 
distorting variance estimates required for standardized abnormal return tests (Patell, 1976, 
Campbell and Wesley, 1993); and 3) being more affected by nonsynchronous return periods 
for the stock and market index (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996). The latter issue results in biased 
model parameters in an OLS model (Dimson, 1979). Thin trading is typically an issue for 
small stocks, where Cowan and Sergeant observe 43.9% (4.9 million) zero daily return 
observations on the 1993 CRSP NASDAQ sample at the firm-level. Thin trading is unlikely 
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213,842 observations) zero daily returns were observed between 1996 and 2013. Further, 
Section 4.3.2.1 shows that the sector as a whole behaves like big European stocks. To 
investigate nonsynchronous trading, the mean model parameters in the event study will be 
compared to those obtained using the local AFFM in Table 5.5. 
Further potential criticisms include markets over- or under-estimating the impact of 
any regulation on financial return (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, Klassen and McLaughlin, 
1996, Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001) or the impact of ‘insider information’, where a small 
number of individuals have advanced knowledge regarding the likely outcome of a regulatory 
change. These confounding variables are also unobservable. The separation of the estimation 
and the event windows limits any contamination from insider trading (Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996). 
 Results 6.4
This chapter addresses two overarching research objectives, namely: 1) At what stage 
of the ordinary legislative procedure do investors incorporate information about regulatory 
change? 2) How have these regulatory changes impacted the financial returns and valuation of 
EU energy utilities? The two research objectives are addressed through five hypotheses. 
The results section of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.4.1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the chapter, focusing on the regulatory changes. Section 6.4.2 presents 
the econometric results of the event study. Specifically, Section 6.3.3.1 presents the results 
regarding the timing of market reaction surrounding regulatory changes, addressing H1. 
Section 6.3.1.2 presents the results regarding the impact of the four distinct restructuring 
streams, addressing H2 to H5. 
6.4.1 Descriptive Results 
For descriptive and summary statistics regarding the 12 stock portfolios and the risk 
factors used in the analysis, see Sections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2, respectively. Table 6.3 presents 
descriptive statistics regarding regulatory changes. The mean number of trading days between 
the 1
st
 position and the 2
nd
 position is 58 days, with a standard deviation of 51.2 days. The 
maximum and minimum ranges show that the time between both political institutions 
agreeing on a legislative proposal can vary between two days to a little under a year.
68
 The 
unadjusted descriptive statistics regarding the lag between the announcement of the 2
nd
 
position and the signature date are biased by a single outlier (532 days). The adjusted 
                                                 
68
 As outlined in Section 2.1.5, the first reading at the Parliament and the Council has no time limit. The 90-day 
time limit only applies to the second reading. Up to 72% of legislative proposals are agreed upon at the first 
reading (European Parliament et al., 2007). 
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summary statistics show that the mean lag is much shorter. Typically, there is just over a one-
month lag between the 2
nd
 position and the signature date. As shown in Section 2.1.5, in most 
cases, the agreed upon legislation is only a reasonably finalised text which requires legal-
linguistic finalisation. In some cases, the proposal is agreed upon and signed on the same day, 
indicating that the texts in these circumstances is already finalised. The lag between the 
signature date and the publication date is typically 22.8 days, well within the expected two-
month limit (see Section 2.1.5). The lag between each key stage lends some support to the 
ability to examine the impact at each stage of the ordinary legislative procedure, related to H1. 
TABLE 6.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS REGARDING REGULATORY CHANGES 
Descriptive statistics regarding the four stages of the ordinary legislative procedure   
 1st Position to 2nd Position Lag 
(days) 
2nd Position to Signature Lag 
(days) 
Signature to Publication Date 
Lag 
(days) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted  
Mean 58.0 37.1 25.3 22.8 
Median 40.0 18.0 18.0 20.5 
Standard Deviation 51.2 78.8 22.8 14.1 
25th Percentile 12.0 10.0 10.0 10.5 
75th Percentile 91.0 32.0 29.5 31.5 
Minimum 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Maximum 236.0 532.0 94.0 65.0 
 
Using the signature date, Figure 6.3 shows the cumulative number of regulatory 
changes that occur through time, both delineated by the restructuring stream and the aggregate 
amount. For all regulatory changes, the figure shows a relatively linear relationship through 
time, with an unusually large amount of legislation being signed in 2003 and 2009. The 
Internal Energy Market stream is responsible for the increased number of regulatory changes 
in 2003 and 2009, surrounding the second and third packages of liberalisation. The 
Renewable Energies and Security of Supply streams contain relatively few publications, 
which are sporadic and infrequent through time. 
 
FIGURE 6.3: NUMBER OF REGULATORY EVENTS THROUGH TIME 
Figure 6.3 represents the cumulative number of regulatory events between 01 July 1996 and 28 June 2013. The signature date 
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6.4.2 Main Results of the Event Study 
This section presents the econometric results of the event study approach. The event 
study will answer the five hypotheses of this chapter. Section 6.4.2.1 answers the first 
hypothesis regarding the timing of market reaction. Section 6.4.2.2 answers four hypotheses 
regarding the restructuring streams. The following section presents the results regarding the 
timing of market reaction. 
6.4.2.1 The timing of market reaction 
The first stage of the analysis focuses on the timing of market reaction surrounding 
four key stages of the legislative procedure: the announcement of the 1
st
 position, the 
announcement of the 2
nd
 position, the signature date and the publication date. The timing of 
market reaction is important as market inefficiency creates arbitrage opportunities which can 
negatively impact uninformed market participants and the valuation of firms (Griffin et al., 
2015). 
First, Beaver’s (1968) 𝑈𝑡 return variance ratios surrounding the four key stages of the 
ordinary legislative procedure are presented in Figure 6.4. Plot A of Figure 6.4 shows the 
peak in return variance is on day -1 preceding the announcement of the 1
st
 position. The 
magnitude of return variance is 4.46 times greater than the average during the estimation 
window. The above-normal price activity is congruent with expected changes in equilibrium 
prices as a result of regulatory changes, where the 1
st
 position possesses informational of 
value to investors. There are various interpretations for the low return variance prior to the 
announcement, including: 1) investors postponing trading until more informational content is 
released (Beaver, 1968), or 2) de-risking prior to an announcement. The return variance ratios, 
both before and following the announcement, are consistent with Beaver’s (1968) empirical 
results and interpretation. 
The announcement of the 2
nd
 position (Plot B) shows a large increase in return 
variance in both the weeks preceding and the days following the announcement of the 2
nd
 
position. This date represents the point at which the 2
nd
 political institution agrees upon the 
legislative proposal and the document will transition to the signing procedure. Thus, this date 
represents the effective point at which the proposal will pass into law. The return variance 
ratio is up to 8.14 times greater surrounding the 2
nd
 position compared to the estimation 
window. There is little to no market reaction surrounding both the Signature (Plot C) and 
Publication dates (Plot D), which is consistent with both dates having little to no new 
informational content and being merely ceremonial. Overall, the results are consistent with 
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FIGURE 6.4: BEAVER’S PRICE RESIDUAL ANALYSIS SURROUNDING THE FOUR EVENT DATES 
This figure presents the measure of 𝑈𝑡 for the energy utility sector, as a whole, surrounding the four key stages of the 
ordinary legislative procedure. The 𝑈𝑡 values are plot relative to day zero for the: announcement of the 1
st position (Plot A), 
announcement of the 2nd position (Plot B), signature date (Plot C) and the publication date (Plot D). A measure of 𝑈𝑡 = 1 is 
illustrated using a dashed line. A value of 𝑈𝑡 above the dashed line indicates greater return variance and is consistent with the 
incorporation of new information. 
 
To measure direction and significance, Figure 6.5 presents the CAARs for the energy 
sector as a whole surrounding each of the four stages of the legislative procedure (Plots A to 
D). Tests of significance across the eight event windows are presented in Table 6.4. Appendix 
G presents the underlying abnormal returns (ARs), and associated significance surrounding 
the four stages, through time; Tables G.1 to G.4. The results are consistent with those 
observed in Figure 6.4. Panel B of Appendix G also presents the mean model parameters, 
which are similar to those obtained in Table 5.5, further supporting that nonsynchronous 
trading and thin trading were not econometric issues in the dataset. 
The first observation is the abnormal returns of utilities are declining across time. 
Regarding the 1
st
 position (Figure 6.5., Plot A), there is a significant and negative market 
reaction in the 10 days preceding the announcement. The (−10, −1) window surrounding the 
1
st
 position has CAARs of -0.66% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1), with the majority of this market reaction 
occurring in the narrow (−1,1) and (−2,2) event windows, with CAARs of -0.41% 
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experience negative and significant negative ARs on day -1 preceding the announcement of 
the 1
st
 position – congruent with the Beaver’s price residual analysis. Where significant, the 
negative ARs range between -0.05% and -0.34% on day -1. These results, combined with 
those presented in Table G.1, show that the market responds narrowly around the 
announcement. From day -3 to day 0, CAARs decline from -0.38% to -0.80%. This could be 
due to information leakage from the public readings and consultations or speculation on the 
likely outcome of a vote. Although the CAARs continue to decline after day 0, Table 6.4 
shows that these CAARs are not significantly different from zero. As shown in Figure 2.1, 
Figure 2.2 and outlined in Section 2.1, the announcement of the 1
st
 position often occurs after 
lengthy consultations and trilogues. Further, Section 2.1.2 noted that 72% of legislative 
proposals were agreed upon in the first reading, while 23% were agreed upon in the second 
reading (European Commission, 2009, European Parliament et al., 2007). The first 
announcement to accept or amend a piece of legislation is a strong indicator that the 




FIGURE 6.5: CAARS OF THE EVENT WINDOWS SURROUNDING THE FOUR EVENT DATES 
This figure presents the CAARs for the energy utility sector, as a whole, surrounding the four key stages of the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The CAARs are plot relative to day zero for the: announcement of the 1st position (Plot A), 
announcement of the 2nd position (Plot B), signature date (Plot C) and the publication date (Plot D). Tables G.1 to G.4 in 
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TABLE 6.4: CAARS FOR WINDOWS SURROUNDING EVENT DAYS 
This table presents the CAARs for various event windows surrounding the event day for the four key stages of the legislative procedure: 
announcement of the 1st position, announcement of the 2nd position, signature date and publication date. While Figure 6.4 reports the 
CAARs day-by-day, this table reports the CAARs over the event window specified. A 𝑡-test identifies whether the reported CAAR is 
















(-20,20) -1.27%  -1.32%  -0.47%  0.09%  
(-20,-1) -0.72%  -1.08% * -0.74%  0.25%  
(-10,-1) -0.66% * -0.62% ** -0.23%  -0.04%  
(0,0) -0.08%  0.14% * 0.05%  -0.02%  
(-1,1) -0.41% * 0.13%  0.08%  -0.14%  
(-2,2) -0.48% * -0.24%  0.08%  0.08%  
(1,10) -0.48%  -0.91%  -0.10%  0.06%  
(1,20) -0.47%  -0.39%  0.22%  -0.13%  
 
The CAARs of the 2
nd
 position (Figure 6.5, Plot B) also show statistical significance 
in the weeks preceding the announcement. Table 6.4 shows negative CAARs occurring in the 
(−20, −1) and (−10, −1) event windows, with CAARs of -1.08% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) and -0.62% 
(𝑝 ≤ 0.05), respectively. Table G.2 shows that significant and negative ARs occur between 
days -19 and -15. Negative ARs are also observed in the weeks preceding the announcement 
of the 2
nd
 position; from day -8 to -1. Where significant, negative ARs range from -0.08% to -
0.33%. There is a minor positive and significant impact on day 0, with a CAAR of 0.14% 
(𝑝 ≤ 0.1), but it suggests only a minor correction to prices at the announcement. This may 
also be consistent with a stock rebound following an overreaction in the lead up to the 
announcement or, alternatively, selling stocks prior to the announcement in an effort to de-
risk and then re-risking once the full impact of the announcement is known. The significance 
before the announcement is again likely due to investors closely monitoring the public 
readings and consultations, outlined in Section 2.1. The significant change in price prior to the 
announcement suggests that investors anticipate this 2
nd
 position announcement or speculate 
on the likely outcome of the vote. Rationally, this is expected, as it represents the point at 
which the two political institutions vote to adopt a reasonably finalised version of the 
legislative proposal and investors will be aware that a policy is in gestation, as was evident 
from their reaction to the 1
st
 position. Table G.2 shows that the significant and negative ARs 
following the announcement, from day 2 onwards, continue to decrease prices and result in 
the negative CAARs observed. Table 6.4 shows the (1,10) event window following the 
announcement shows negative CAARs of -0.91%, with marginal significance at 𝑝 = 0.1079. 
This may represent some lagged reaction, or possible adjustment during the legal-linguistic 
stage of the legislative procedure. 
Regarding the signature date (Figure 6.5, Plot C), the results show no significant 
impact across all event windows. However, the (−20, −1) event window only marginally 
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misses significance, 𝑝 = 0.1083; beyond this, 𝑝-values were all greater than 0.4486 for the 
remaining event windows. Table G.3 shows some significant and negative ARs between days 
-20 and -6 for the energy sector as a whole. Table 6.4 shows that there is almost no market 
reaction surrounding the signature date, with CAARs being almost zero. This is also observed 
by the stable CAARs in Figure 6.5 and the lack of significant ARs between days -6 and 6 in 
Table G.3. The interim period between the 2
nd
 position and the signature date represents the 
point at which the Parliament and the Council issues a press release that an agreement has 
been reached, the document is finalised and they (ceremonially) sign the document at a 
monthly meeting. The CAARs in the (1,20) event window after the 2nd position and the 
(−20, −1) event window preceding the signature date may possibly capture the same market 
reaction. The adjusted descriptive statistics in Table 6.3 show that the events are separated by 
an average of 25.3 days; therefore, the ±20 event windows have some minor overlap. 
The lack of significant CAARs continues in the event windows surrounding the 
publication date (Plot D). This suggests that all information has already been incorporated 
into stock prices before the publication date. The CAARs surrounding the publication date are 
almost zero, with no statistical significance. Table G.4 shows a similar pattern, with no 
significant ARs occurring between days -3 and 6. 
Addressing H1, Figure 6.5, Table 6.4 and Appendix G show results consistent with 
market reactions occurring surrounding the early stages of the legislative procedure. In 




 position, while the 
signature and publication dates show no significant market reaction. The results are consistent 
with finance theory on asset pricing and the impact of regulatory changes (see Sections 3.2.1 
and 3.3.1, respectively). In particular, investors appear to anticipate information at the early 
stages of the legislative procedure and have already incorporated the majority of the 
information by the announcement of the 2
nd
 position – representing the point at which a piece 
of legislation has been agreed upon. At this point, there is a high probability that the 
legislation will pass into law due to the lengthy trilogues which facilitate early agreement (see 
Section 2.1.3). There is also a small impact occurring in the interim period between the 
announcement of the 2
nd
 position and the signature date; as noted in Section 2.1.5, some 
informational content in the legislation can change during the legal-linguistic period. Finally, 
there is no significant market reaction once information is public. The press release, signature 
and publication dates have little impact of stock prices as these stages contain no new 
informational content and are mostly ceremonial. 
Referring to the propositions in Section 3.2, measuring the impact on the sector does 
not allow for within-sector heterogeneity, obscuring important peculiarities regarding market 
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responses. Chapter 5 showed that the energy sector as a whole typically represents big, low-
BE/ME energy utilities. To further address H1, the analysis continues by implementing the 
event study approach on the 12 energy portfolios, examining the differential timing of market 
response based on firm characteristics. The timing of market response, surrounding the four 
key stages of the legislative procedure, is explored for the 12 sector portfolios outlined in 
Section 5.3.2.1. The purpose is to examine whether the timing of response is sector-wide or 
depends on firm characteristics. The results for the 12 portfolios are shown in Figure 6.6, 
across the four key stages of the legislative procedure (Plots A to D). Table 6.5 presents the 
tests of significance across the eight event windows defined in Section 6.3.1.2. ARs for all 12 
portfolios are also presented in Tables G.1 to G.4 in Appendix G. Fundamentally, the results 
are congruent to those in Table 6.4. 
Addressing the 1
st
 position in Table 6.5 (Panel A), while there is some negative 
reaction in the weeks preceding the announcement, the majority of impact primarily occur in 
the narrow event windows surrounding the announcement, event windows (−1,1) and 
(−2,2). Of the 12 portfolios tested, six portfolios have significant and negative impacts within 
these narrow event windows. Across all event windows, the market reaction for big utilities is 
similar to that of the energy sector as a whole – unsurprising as Section 5.3.2.1 shows that big 
energy utilities typically represent 93.6% of sector valuation. Note, the mid-BE/ME portfolios 
also experience large negative impacts. Table 5.2 showed that the mid-BE/ME portfolio 
typically has large market capitalisation and large book value of equity, potentially indicating 
asset stranding as a result of regulatory changes. Small and high-BE/ME portfolios experience 
some negative market reactions around the 1
st
 position; these portfolios are expected to be 
relatively riskier investments. All momentum portfolios also show some significant impact 
surrounding the 1
st
 position, suggesting the impact that persistent winners and losers are also 
affected by regulatory changes. Importantly, the natural gas sector shows the largest negative 
reaction of all utility portfolios, with CAARs of -4.71% in the (−20,20) event window. This 
is consistent with the negative impact of regulatory changes reported by The Economist 
(2013a, b, c) (see Section 1.2). The results show the market reaction surrounding the 
announcement of the 1
st
 position is generally negative and large, suggesting that factors 







FIGURE 6.6 CAARS FOR THE FOUR EVENT DATES, ACROSS 12 PORTFOLIOS 
This figure presents the CAARs for the 12 energy sector portfolios surrounding the four key stages of the ordinary legislative procedure. This figure extends Figure 6.4, showing the heterogeneous 































































































































































(D) Publication Date 
Energy Utilities High-BE/ME Mid-BE/ME Low-BE/ME Upper Medium
Down Electric Natural Gas Multi-Utility Small Big
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TABLE 6.5: CAARS SURROUNDING REGULATORY EVENTS BY PORTFOLIOS 




 position, signature date and publication dates. The results are presented in Panels A, B, C 
and D, respectively. The CAARs are estimated using the local AAFM outlined in Equation (6.1). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Panel A: CAARs Surrounding the 1
st








(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -1.27%  -0.72%  -0.66% * -0.08%  -0.41% * -0.48% * -0.48%  -0.47%  
High-BE/ME -0.68%  0.39%  -0.24%  -0.22%  -0.24%  -0.53% ** -0.79% * -0.85%  
Mid-BE/ME -2.14% ** -1.21% ** -0.80% * -0.09%  -0.64% ** -0.60% * -0.65% * -0.84%  
Low-BE/ME 0.01%  -0.33%  -0.48%  -0.01%  -0.03%  -0.28%  -0.08%  0.35%  
Upper -0.85%  -0.49%  -0.62% ** -0.01%  -0.28% * -0.32%  -0.17%  -0.34%  
Medium -2.28% ** -1.28% ** -0.66%  -0.19%  -0.50% ** -0.70% ** -0.63%  -0.81%  
Down -0.85%  -0.49%  -0.62% ** -0.01%  -0.28% * -0.32%  -0.17%  -0.34%  
Electric 0.09%  -0.05%  -0.37%  -0.06%  -0.46%  -0.40%  0.09%  0.21%  
Natural Gas -4.71% * -2.34% * -0.63%  -0.06%  -0.36%  -0.80%  -1.28% * -2.31%  
Multi-Utility -1.18%  -0.61%  -0.53%  -0.09%  -0.21%  -0.32%  -0.44%  -0.47%  
Small -1.41%  -0.64%  -0.62%  -0.20%  -0.35%  -0.52% ** -0.35%  -0.57%  
Big -1.27%  -0.72%  -0.66% * -0.07%  -0.42% * -0.48% * -0.49%  -0.47%  
                 
  
 Panel B: CAARs Surrounding the 2
nd
 Position Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -1.32%   -1.08% ** -0.62% ** 0.14% * 0.13%   -0.24%   -0.91%   -0.39%   
High-BE/ME -1.83%   -1.43% ** -0.64% * 0.25%   0.16%   -0.24%   -0.84%   -0.64%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.59%   -0.90%   -0.56%   0.15%   0.18%   -0.16%   -1.17% * -0.84%   
Low-BE/ME -1.00%   -1.19% ** -0.72% * 0.08%   0.02%   -0.46%   -0.29%   0.11%   
Upper -0.96%   -0.62% * -0.19%   0.07%   0.11%   -0.03%   -0.36%   -0.41%   
Medium -1.36%   -1.14% * -0.81% ** 0.12%   0.04%   -0.31%   -0.90%   -0.34%   
Down -0.96%   -0.62% * -0.19%   0.07%   0.11%   -0.03%   -0.36%   -0.41%   
Electric -2.18% * -1.35% ** -0.84% ** 0.21% * 0.18%   -0.24%   -0.99%   -1.04%   
Natural Gas -0.74%   -0.47%   0.22%   0.18%   0.21%   -0.44%   -1.47%   -0.45%   
Multi-Utility -0.75%   -1.21% ** -0.87% ** 0.05%   0.09%   -0.20%   -0.50%   0.41%   
Small -1.66% * -1.37% ** -0.50%   0.11%   0.13%   -0.26%   -0.68%   -0.40%   
Big -1.33%   -1.06% ** -0.64% ** 0.14% * 0.14%   -0.24%   -0.93%   -0.41%   
D.J. Tulloch© 
227 
Table 6.5 (continued) 








(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.47%   -0.74%   -0.23%   0.05%   0.08%   0.08%   -0.10%   0.22%   
High-BE/ME 0.60%   -0.08%   0.17%   0.11%   0.03%   0.19%   0.06%   0.57%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.47%   -1.45% ** -0.60%   0.08%   0.03%   -0.16%   -0.26%   -0.10%   
Low-BE/ME 0.77%   0.16%   0.25%   -0.06%   0.05%   0.25%   0.20%   0.68%   
Upper -1.20% * -0.90% * -0.68% ** 0.02%   0.01%   0.00%   -0.40% * -0.32%   
Medium -0.45%   -0.93% * -0.05%   0.17%   0.35% ** 0.28%   0.19%   0.31%   
Down -1.20% * -0.90% * -0.68% ** 0.02%   0.01%   0.00%   -0.40% * -0.32%   
Electric 0.02%   -0.40%   -0.13%   -0.06%   -0.27%   -0.29%   -0.05%   0.47%   
Natural Gas -2.14%   -1.47%   -0.51%   0.23%   0.61% * 0.19%   -0.34%   -0.90%   
Multi-Utility -0.62%   -0.99% * -0.42%   0.12%   0.19%   0.25%   -0.21%   0.25%   
Small 1.02%   -0.25%   0.17%   0.01%   0.12%   0.21%   0.59% * 1.25% * 
Big -0.57%   -0.77%   -0.26%   0.05%   0.08%   0.07%   -0.14%   0.15%   
                 
  
 Panel D: CAARs Surrounding the Publication Date Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities 0.09%   0.25%   -0.04%   -0.02%   -0.14%   0.08%   0.06%   -0.13%   
High-BE/ME 0.99%   0.51%   0.09%   -0.05%   -0.18%   0.08%   0.30%   0.53%   
Mid-BE/ME 0.05%   0.13%   0.00%   0.01%   -0.12%   0.14%   0.03%   -0.09%   
Low-BE/ME -0.04%   0.24%   -0.16%   -0.05%   -0.22%   0.01%   0.05%   -0.22%   
Upper -0.52%   -0.11%   0.04%   -0.05%   -0.09%   0.05%   0.00%   -0.36%   
Medium -0.10%   0.17%   -0.19%   0.01%   -0.19%   -0.06%   -0.05%   -0.29%   
Down -0.52%   -0.11%   0.04%   -0.05%   -0.09%   0.05%   0.00%   -0.36%   
Electric 0.76%   0.21%   -0.16%   -0.02%   -0.38% ** -0.11%   0.35%   0.57%   
Natural Gas -0.72%   -0.55%   -0.37%   -0.03%   -0.04%   -0.08%   -0.01%   -0.14%   
Multi-Utility 0.20%   0.52%   0.25%   0.02%   0.01%   0.22%   -0.11%   -0.34%   
Small 0.84%   0.92% * 0.38%   0.02%   0.02%   0.32% * 0.17%   -0.10%   
Big 0.05%   0.21%   -0.07%   -0.02%   -0.15%   0.06%   0.06%   -0.14%   
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For the signature date in Table 6.5 (Panel C), the number and magnitude of significant 





Momentum portfolios show some negative impact, all approximately 0.90%, in the weeks 
preceding the signature date. For the upper and down momentum portfolios, the impact 
continues in the (1,10) event window. Multi-utilities and mid-BE/ME utilities also have 
negative CAARs in the (−20, −1) event window preceding the signature date. As noted 
previously, the weeks preceding the signature date may also capture some lagged impact after 
the 2
nd
 position. Natural gas and medium momentum utilities experience some minor 
correction, of 0.61% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) and 0.35% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05), respectively. The most important 
feature of the signature date is that small utilities experience a large and positive shift 
following the signature date, with CAARs up to 1.25% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1). The positive CAARs 
almost completely correct the negative CAARs experienced preceding the 2
nd
 position. This 
may be evidence of hard-to-process information, where the full impact of the regulatory 
change is difficult to judge for small utilities, which are typically associated with less 
information compared with larger utilities (Kumar, 2009). This is consistent with the soft 
information in Demers and Vega (2008) and Engelberg (2008), where the qualitative nature of 
the regulatory change is difficult to process and results in lagged responses and larger 
investment mistakes (Kumar, 2009) (see Section 6.2.1). 
Finally, the publication date in Table 6.5 (Panel D) results in very few statistically 
significant CAARs. Rationally, the majority of the informational context regarding the 
regulatory change is expected to already be impounded into stock prices. Results show that 
electric utilities experience a negative market reaction of -0.38% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05) in the (−1,1) 
event window surrounding the publication date. In contrast, small utilities experience large 
and positive CAARs of 0.92 (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) for the (−20, −1) event window, and an additional 
positive impact of 0.32% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) in the narrow (−2,2) event window – further evidence of 
the delayed positive impact for small utilities. The results are consistent with the expected 
impact of regulatory changes, where liberalisation objectives benefit small utilities (see 
Section 2.2.1). Although the abnormal returns of small utilities initially decline in tandem 
with other portfolios, it may be evidence of overreaction. Similar to Oberndorfer’s (2009a) 
interpretation for oil, hard-to-value small utilities may be benchmarked against the rest of the 
sector, where price developments of the sector are assumed to affect small utilities. Market 
prices are corrected when the full extent of the regulatory changes for small utilities is 
realised. 
Overall, the results are congruent with those for the sector as a whole, but provide 
greater detail regarding the within-sector heterogeneity regarding market responses. Overall, 
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the results show support for H1: the market reaction primarily occurs surrounding the 




 positions. Again, this is congruent with market efficiency and 
rational investors, who incorporate information as soon as it is anticipated (see Sections 3.2 
and 3.3.1). There is some evidence of lagged response for small utilities. The implications of 
these results are that equity markets are efficient at pricing regulatory change into the value of 
energy utilities with the one exception being the smaller utilities which, like most small 
companies, are subject to high levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty This result is 
unsurprising for finance and energy economic academics, but is a novel and important policy 
contribution regarding the design of the EU ordinary legislative procedure and information 
diffusion through a protracted legislative procedure. 
From a policy context, the results make a contribution by identifying the timing at 
which the market reacts to information regarding regulatory changes in the energy sector. 
That is, if a researcher assumes markets will anticipate a regulatory change following the 
signing, or publication, of a legislative act, then all statistical inferences will be misleading 
and subject to Type II errors – a false negative. As shown above, there is little reaction after 
the document is signed; therefore, one would incorrectly fail to reject the null of no impact for 
the alternative of a significant market reaction. In fact, the models also fail to reject the null 
assuming the market reaction following the announcement of the 2
nd
 position. The market 




 positions shows that information is 
diffusing into the market prior to announcement or investors are speculating on the likely 
outcome of the votes. Further, if one were to assume the impact occurs only in the narrow 
window surrounding event day zero, statistical inference would mostly miss the negative 
market reactions evolving in the weeks prior to the event date. The smaller impacts at the 
signature date may be evidence of a lagged response. Lagged responses are also reported by 
Griffin et al. (2015), who find significant (but smaller) market reactions up to a two-week lag 
following some events. 
The price discovery process is consistent with the differential impact expected from 
the informational content of the regulatory changes; see Section 2.2.1. The differential impact 
of the portfolios can be summarised as follows: regulatory changes negatively impact the 
energy utility sector as a whole, but transfer market power away from big utilities, countering 
market dominance and predatory behaviour. Natural gas utilities are disproportionately 
affected by the regulatory changes, as they are typically affected by legislation which aims to 
reduce reliance on hydrocarbon fuel sources. As expected, the underlying price of small 
utilities increases as a result of opportunities to take market share. Further, Section 2.2.1 
highlights that some small utilities were exempt from the regulatory changes. 
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With a comprehensive analysis of the timing of market reaction surrounding key 
stages of the regulatory process, the chapter can continue with the second-stage of the analysis 
by examining the impact of each of the restructuring streams: Internal Energy Market, Energy 
Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply. 
6.4.2.2 The market’s response to the four regulatory streams 
The second stage of the analysis addresses H2 through to H5, namely: the impact of 
the Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply 
streams. The structure of this section is as follows. First, Figure 6.7 (Plots A to D) and Table 
6.6 present the CAARs of the energy sector as a whole surrounding each of the four stages of 
the legislative procedure. The CAARs are delineated by restructuring the streams to illustrate 
each steam’s unique impact at each key stage of the procedure. Second, the section continues 
by examining the within-sector heterogeneity across the 12 portfolios. The oversize tables 
concerning the eight CAAR significance tests, for all 12 portfolios and across the four 
restructuring streams, are reported in Appendix H, Tables H.1 to H.4. The following 
paragraphs address the overall impacts of each restructuring stream on the energy sector as a 
whole. 
Table 6.6 shows that each restructuring stream produces distinct abnormal returns 
surrounding key stages of the legislative procedure. The Internal Energy Market produces 
negative CAARs in some of the event windows tested. The majority of the impact occurs in 
both the weeks preceding and the narrow event windows surrounding the announcement of 
the 1
st
 position. There is no significant impact for the Internal Energy Market stream at the 
sector-level beyond the 2
nd
 position, suggesting that investors efficiently incorporate the cash 
flow implications of the stream. The majority of the impact for the Energy Efficiency stream 
occurs in the weeks preceding the 2
nd
 position, with no significant impact in any window at 
the sector level. In contrast to the assertions by the press (see Section 1.2), the Renewable 
Energies stream has no significant impact at the sector-level. The Security of Supply stream 
has a significant impact surrounding the announcement of the 1
st
 position and delayed impacts 
occurring around the signature and publication dates; possibly evidence of hard-to-process 







FIGURE 6.7: CAARS FOR THE FOUR RESTRUCTURING STREAMS 
Delineating the CAARs into the four distinct restructuring streams, this figure presents the CAARs for the energy utility 
sector surrounding the four key stages of the ordinary legislative procedure. The CAARs are plot relative to day zero for the 
announcement of the 1st position (Plot A), announcement of the 2nd position (Plot B), signature date (Plot C) and the 
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TABLE 6.6: CAARS SIGNIFICANCE TESTS FOR THE FOUR RESTRUCTURING STREAMS 
Delineated by restructuring stream, this table presents the CAARs for various event windows surrounding the event day for the four key stages of the legislative procedure: announcement of the 1st position, announcement of 
the 2nd position, signature date and publication date. While Figure 6.6 reports the CAARs day-by-day, this table reports the CAARs over the event window specified. A 𝑡-test identifies whether the reported CAAR is 
statistically different from zero. A ****, ***, * or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
  Panel C: CAARs Surrounding the Signature Date Event Windows and Significance Tests 






(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
1st Position Internal Energy Market -1.85%  -1.32% * -1.04% ** -0.32% ** -0.62% ** -0.53%  -0.47%  -0.21%  
 Energy Efficiency -0.52%  0.18%  -0.28%  0.08%  -0.15%  -0.19%  -0.39%  -0.77%  
 Renewable Energies -2.65%  -2.50%  -1.08%  -0.13%  -0.82%  -1.49%  -0.75%  -0.01%  
 Security of Supply -0.97%  -1.41%  -1.16%  -0.12%  -1.02%  -1.28% ** -0.52%  0.56%  
                  
2nd Position Internal Energy Market -0.83%  -1.46%  -0.27%  0.32% ** 0.28%  -0.15%  -1.12%  0.31%  
 Energy Efficiency -2.13%  -1.60% ** -1.07% ** 0.01%  0.25%  -0.19%  -1.22%  -0.54%  
 Renewable Energies -3.35%  -0.59%  0.51%  0.22%  -0.30%  -1.19%  -3.48%  -2.98%  
 Security of Supply -0.64%  0.44%  -0.46%  0.11%  -0.41% * -0.42%  -0.24%  -1.20%  
                  
Signature Date Internal Energy Market 0.16%  -0.51%  0.08%  0.11%  0.23%  0.30%  0.31%  0.56%  
 Energy Efficiency -0.18%  -0.86%  -0.18%  0.03%  -0.03%  -0.05%  -0.12%  0.65%  
 Renewable Energies -4.23%  -4.90%  -2.77%  0.07%  0.38%  0.13%  0.34%  0.60%  
 Security of Supply 0.42%  1.59% * 0.54%  0.02%  0.29%  0.50%  -0.26%  -1.19%  
                  
Publication Date Internal Energy Market 0.24%  0.58%  0.15%  0.09%  -0.19%  0.04%  0.50%  -0.43%  
 Energy Efficiency 0.29%  -0.06%  -0.04%  -0.10%  -0.07%  0.24%  0.31%  0.45%  
 Renewable Energies -0.85%  0.31%  -0.14%  0.20%  -0.30%  -0.61%  -1.08%  -1.37%  
 Security of Supply -0.99%  0.69%  -0.38%  -0.04%  -0.26%  -0.14%  -1.60% ** -1.64% ** 
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The significant abnormal returns previously reported in Figure 6.5 and Table 6.4 are 
clearly driven by the Internal Energy Market and Energy Efficiency streams. In particular, the 
Internal Energy Market influences the CAARs surrounding the 1
st
 position, while the Energy 
Efficiency Stream influences the CAARs surrounding the 2
nd
 position. Despite the large 
CAARs observed in the Renewable Energies stream, the significance tests show that the 
impact is not significantly different from zero for the energy sector as a whole. The analysis 
below will show that this is due to the impact of the Renewable Energies stream being 
concentrated on the natural gas industry, and does not reflect a sector-wide impact. The same 
is true for the Security of Supply stream, with very few market reactions across all portfolios. 
As shown above, examining the abnormal returns at the sector-level obscures much of 
the impact of regulatory changes. Many of the regulations in Section 2.2 were designed to 
target specific energy utilities. As noted in Section 4.2.2, the annexes of some legislation 
identified the energy utilities expected to be impacted. Accordingly, there is likely to be 
within sector heterogeneity. The following paragraphs examine the impact of the regulatory 
changes on 12 portfolios of energy utilities (see Section 5.3.2.1), providing much needed 
insight into the heterogeneous return profiles of various types European energy utilities. The 
following paragraphs address H2 to H5. 
The first results relate to the Internal Energy Market stream. The Internal Energy 
Market stream represents sector liberalisation and induced competition objectives (see Section 
2.2.1). As noted before, the stream has three overarching objectives: 1) to open national 
borders, allowing access to previously isolated markets; 2) to legally unbundle vertically 
integrated utilities, both operationally and in terms of ownership; and 3) to induce competition 
into the energy sector, addressing market dominance issues. Overall, the stream is expected to 
have major impacts on future cash flows, particularly for large utilities which lose access to 
transmission networks and are forced to compete for grid access. As a result, big utilities have 
an increased risk of asset stranding due to large baseload capacities being underutilised and 
the inability to scale back operations. The stream is expected to be the most anticipated stream 
since it results in large changes in the regulatory and operating environment of the energy 
sector. 
For the Internal Energy Market stream, the results in Table H.1 of Appendix H show 
large and significant negative market reactions in both the weeks preceding and narrow event 
windows surrounding the announcement of the 1
st
 position (Panel A). In the (−20, −1) and 
(−10, −1) event windows, CAARs for the sector are -1.32% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) and -1.04% (𝑝 ≤
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0.05), respectively. These significant and negative CAARs are primarily the result of 
negative CAARs observed in the big, medium momentum, and mid-BE/ME
69
 utility 
portfolios. The market reaction for the big utilities begins in the week preceding the 1
st
 
position as the impact is expected to affect utilities with larger market capitalisations. In 
contrast, small utilities have insignificant CAARs in the weeks preceding the announcement 
and only experience significant and negative CAARs in the narrow event window 
surrounding the 1
st
 position. Further, the overall impact is lower than big utilities. Similarly, 
there are negative impacts in the electric and multi-utility industries. The electricity industry 
is expected to be negatively impacted by induced competition (see Section 3.3.2). Although 
the natural gas utility portfolio experiences negative CAARs of -6.26% in event window 
(−20,20), all event windows are insignificant. The lack of significance suggests the CAARs 
are not abnormal relative to past returns and may be evidence of high volatility in the series. 
This is congruent with Table 5.2, which shows that the natural gas portfolio has the highest 
standard deviation relative to other energy portfolios. 
Addressing H2 for the Internal Energy Market stream (Table H.1), the majority of the 
impact occurs surrounding the 1
st
 position (Panel A), with little to no impact surrounding the 
2
nd
 position (Panel B), signature date and publication date (Panels C and D, respectively). 
From a policy perspective, the results are expected. The Internal Energy Market legislative 
acts are the result of lengthy discussions with the industry, academics and policy makers (see 
an example in footnote 15, Section 6.4.2.2). Further and as discussed in Section 2.1.1, in 
March 2015 academics and the director of the internal energy market initiated informal 
discussions regarding a possible fourth package for the Internal Energy Market, despite no 
legislative proposal existing to date and it being unlikely to be tabled for some time yet; 
potentially years away (see FSR Energy, 2015). The discussion outlines potential directions 
for the 4
th
 package of liberalisation, including the types of utilities which are likely to be 
affected. When it does come, the announcement of the 1
st
 position will send a strong signal to 
the market that the legislation is near finalisation and political institutions show positive 
sentiment towards accepting the proposal. As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, informal trilogues 
facilitate an early agreement of the proposal, while Section 2.1.2 showed that 72% of all 
legislative acts are accepted in the first reading. 
The Energy Efficiency stream is designed to reduce overall energy consumption in the 
EU by increasing the efficiency of energy-intensive end-user appliances and reducing energy 
                                                 
69
 As shown in Table 5.2, for the European energy utility sector, the mid-BE/ME portfolios represent the largest 
energy utilities as measured by market capitalisation and book value of equity. 
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demands from buildings (see Section 2.2.2). Accordingly, energy demand is estimated to 
decline between 10% to 20% (Delarue et al., 2011). Unlike the Internal Energy Market stream 
the impact is expected to negatively impact all portfolios as the legislation is designed to 
decrease energy consumption within the EU. 
The results of the Energy Efficiency stream show sparse significance surrounding the 
1
st
 position (see Panel A of Table H.2, Appendix H). Typically, small, high-BE/ME and 
natural gas utilities show some negative CAARs across event windows. The market reaction 
occurs in the weeks following the announcement of the 2
nd
 position and in the narrow event 
windows surrounding the announcement date (See Panel B of Table H.2). Similar to the 
results in Section 6.4.2.1, there is a large impact in the weeks preceding the announcement of 
the 2
nd
 position. Specifically, the (−20, −1) and (−10, −1) event windows. The impact is 
observed cross-sectionally across the energy sector, where most portfolios experience 
significant and negative CAARs, up to -2.44% preceding the 2
nd
 announcement, some 
significant at 𝑝 ≤ 0.01. In particular, small, high-BE/ME, and electric utilities are 
disproportionately affected by the Energy Efficiency stream. The results show that investors 
anticipate the negative impact prior to the 2
nd
 vote, subsiding thereafter. The negative impact 
is large enough to be detected within the energy sector as a whole, and are generally 
consistent with the results shown in Table 6.5. Surrounding the signature date, there is some 
price correction for the low-BE/ME and small utility portfolios. There is also some minor 
price correction for the high-BE/ME and electric utility portfolios following the publication 
date. 
Addressing H3 for environmental objectives, as measured by the Energy Efficiency 
stream, the results show a cross-sectional market reaction to the stream which is mostly 
negative and occurs in the event window surrounding the 2
nd
 position. Further, the overall 
impact of regulatory changes observed in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 is mostly the result of the 
Energy Efficiency stream. This is hardly surprising, as the stream represents over half of all 
legislation tested, 27 in total (see Table 2.1). When examining the Energy Efficiency Stream 
in isolation, the majority of the reaction occurs at an early stage of the legislative procedure, 
preceding the 2
nd
 position. The reason is evident after reviewing the legislative acts. Whereas 
the Internal Energy Market legislation requires substantial negotiations among political 
institutions and lengthy legal-linguistic finalisation, including definitions of which utilities 
may be impacted by the legislation, the content of the Energy Efficiency legislation is 
fundamentally different. From the onset, the legislative act identifies an energy-related issue 
regarding an appliance or property, and therefore results in a potentially narrow, well-defined 
impact which is easier to process for investors. Further, the legislation reduces energy demand 
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from the user end, which affects all energy utilities simultaneously. As stated in the 
hypothesis development (Section 6.2.1), the numerical targets for overall energy consumption 
reductions, are akin to the hard information in Demers and Vega (2008) and Engelberg 
(2008). The quantitative nature of the legislation means investors are less prone to the 
investment mistakes suggested by Kumar (2009). 
The Renewable Energies stream also addresses environmental objectives through 
increased use of renewable energy sources and the electrification of the transport sector (see 
Section 2.2.3). Overall, the Renewable Energies stream is expected to have a negative impact 
on the natural gas sector, which potentially loses revenue through the electrification of the 
transport sector – at least 10% of the transport sector must be electrified by 2020.
30
 
The results in Table H.3 show almost no significant impact across the 12 portfolios 
surrounding the announcement of the 1
st
 position (Panel A). The only portfolio affected is 
natural gas utilities, which experiences negative CAARs of -6.25% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) in the (1,10) 
event window. The majority of this impact occurs in the narrow (−2,2) event window, where 
CAARs are -5.36% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05). The market reacts to the potential loss of revenue to natural 
gas utilities. There is no significant impact regarding the remaining 11 portfolios surrounding 
the 1
st
 position. The (−20, −1) event window prior to the 2nd position shows a significant and 
negative impact for electric utilities, with CAARs of -2.11% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05), and a small 
correction on the announcement date of 0.44% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1). Surrounding the signature and 
publication dates, natural gas utilities experience large price corrections. This may represent 
the market correcting prices once the full extent of the legislative act is defined in the legal-
linguistic stage. Multi-utilities experience positive impacts surrounding the signature date, 
with CAARs up to 1.72% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05). As discussed in the descriptive results of Chapter 5 
(Section 5.4.1.1), multi-utilities have economy of scope, where diverse business operations 
are less likely to be exposed to the negative regulatory and operational risks of single utilities. 
Multi-utilities can switch business operations between the electric and natural gas industries. 
Low-BE/ME utilities also show some positive significance surrounding the publication date, 
with CAARs of 1.69% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05). As noted in Section 5.4.1 and Table 5.2, this portfolio 
typically represents relatively small companies which trade above their BE – these growth 
utilities are the most likely group which can adapt to the regulatory changes and scale up 
operations rapidly. Overall, the results are congruent with the propositions outlined in this 
chapter and Section 2.2.3: firms which are able to adapt experience positive market reactions, 
while natural gas firms experience a negative market reaction. 
Addressing H4, the results show some large abnormal returns in the natural gas 
industry surrounding the Renewable Energies legislation. Most reactions are negative and the 
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magnitude of CAARs are among the largest across all four restructuring streams. Contrary to 
claims, such as The Economist’s (2013b), the Renewable Energy legislation has had little 
impact on the sector, but in fact has specific impacts based on firm characteristics. To their 
credit, the article in The Economist (2013b) mostly considers the impact of renewables on a 
selection of large, combination-fuel generators,
70
 which also have large stakes in the natural 
gas industry or use carbon-intensive fuels such as coal. The results of this chapter show the 
impact of renewable energies is isolated to particular portfolios which are at risk of having 
stranded assets as a result of increased penetration of renewable energies. Some large utilities 
have acknowledged the declining role of hydrocarbons in energy generation. For example, 
Drax has begun making considerable efforts to move away from coal-based generation to a 
predominantly biomass-fuelled generation (Drax Group plc, 2015). 
The Security of Supply restructuring stream is expected to have a positive impact on 
the most European equities, but a negative impact on energy utilities. The restructuring 
stream’s objectives include ensuring the EU maintains a minimum supply of oil stocks to 
diminish the harmful effects of disruption to the energy supply, and to ensure that adequate 
stock is available to enable energy utilities to fuel-switch during fuel crises (see Section 
2.2.4). Naturally, industries where oil represents a major output, or the output is benchmarked 
against oil prices, will suffer a decline in value as a result of decreasing revenue and future 
cash flows. 
As noted in Table 6.1, the 1
st
 position of the Security of Supply stream should be 
tempered with caution. One of the five Security of Supply legislation shares a 1
st
 position 
announcement date with the third packages of liberalisation. This impact will be addressed in 
Section 6.4.3.1. The remaining three key stages are unaffected. 
The announcement of the 1
st
 position (Table H.4, Panel A) shows a negative market 
reaction for the energy sector in the narrow (−2,2) event window surrounding the 
announcement date, with CAARs of -1.28% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05). This impact is primarily the result of 
mid-BE/ME, electric and big utilities. There is also a negative market response for low-
BE/ME utilities in the (1,10) window following the announcement, with CAARs of -1.43% 
(𝑝 ≤ 0.05). The negative market reaction is also present surrounding the announcement of 
the 2
nd
 position (Panel B). High-BE/ME and natural gas utilities experience CAARs of -
1.02% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05) and -5.18% (𝑝 ≤ 0.05), respectively. Moreover, the sector as a whole 
experience negative CAARs of -0.41% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1) in the narrow (−1,1) event window 
surrounding the 2
nd
 announcement, primarily the result of the underlying impact from big 
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 E.ON, RWE, Drax, GDF Suez, and EnBW 
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utilities. There is some positive impact preceding the signature date for the energy sector 
(Panel C), with CAARs of 1.59% (𝑝 ≤ 0.1). This is mostly price corrections from natural gas 
and big utilities. However, the publication date (Panel D) has a negative impact across most 
portfolios, with CAARs up to -2.55% following publication.  
Addressing H5, the overall results show that the Security of Supply stream is 
negatively perceived by the market, but the impact is less clear compared with the other three 
streams. The results show a variety of positive and negative impacts through time, and there is 
no cross-sectional impact across portfolios. This suggests that the Security of Supply stream is 
difficult to process and that the impact is not fully known by the market; this is expected, as 
the legislation does not affect utilities directly.  
6.4.3 Robustness Tests 
6.4.3.1 Excluding confounding events 
As highlighted in Section 6.3.3.1, some contemporaneous regulatory changes exist. 
Table 6.1 shows that the Internal Energy Market stream shares some stages of the regulatory 
process with neighbouring restructuring streams, such as the Energy Efficiency and Security 
of Supply streams. Contemporaneous regulatory changes have the potential for contaminating 
estimates of CAARs surrounding regulatory events. As argued, one remedy would be to 
delete the contemporaneous regulatory changes. However, this is unsatisfactory from a policy 
perspective, as the Internal Energy Market stream would lose both the second and third 
packages of liberalisation. Accordingly, the analysis continued with the contemporaneous 
observations to estimate market response in the days surrounding the announcement. This 
section of the diagnostic and robustness tests addresses the issue of contemporaneous 
observations. 
The event study approach was repeated, omitting the event dates which had 
contemporaneous contaminations across restructuring streams; see Table 6.1. The results of 
the CAARs, tested across the same eight event windows, are presented in Table H.5 in 
Appendix H. In summary, the contemporaneous observations made little difference to the 
estimates of CAARs. Across the 64 significance tests, the results are qualitatively the same as 
those obtained, including the contemporaneous observations. Only five significance tests 
resulted in the magnitude of significance changing, but the results and direction remained 
consistent. Of the 64 tests, only two tests produced inconsistent results, discussed below. 
The first inconsistent results relate to the removal of the third package of 
liberalisation, of which the announcement of the 1
st
 position is contemporaneous to a Security 
of Supply announcement. When the event date is removed, the Internal Energy Market stream 
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loses significance in the (−1,1) event window surrounding the 1st position, and has a minor 
impact on the significance of two other CAAR estimates too. Overall, the impact is minor, as 
there is still significance on event day 0 and in the weeks preceding the announcement of the 
1
st
 position. This is due to the stream still containing the first and second packages of 
liberalisation. As stated previously, the third package is a major regulatory reform which is 
expected to have a large impact on internal competition in the energy sector. Accordingly, 
removing this package was expected to reduce the significance surrounding the announcement 
dates – observed in Table H.5. The removal of the date has a minor impact on the Security of 
Supply stream, but did not produce inconsistent results. The overall conclusion is that the 
legislation is weighted towards affecting the Internal Energy Market stream and had little 
impact on the Security of Supply stream (which was insignificant regardless). 
The second inconsistent result relates to a series of Internal Energy Market and Energy 
Efficiency legislation which was contemporaneously voted, signed and published together. 
These events include the second packages of liberalisation, legislation regarding trans-
national exchanges in energy and developing an energy efficiency programme for Europe. 
From a policy perspective, this chapter expects the internal energy legislation to be the most 
anticipated of the two competing streams. The results are congruent with expectations. When 
deleting the Energy Efficiency dates, the results are qualitatively unaffected. However, 
deleting the Internal Energy Market date resulted in a change in significance for the estimated 
coefficients.  Removing the publication of the second packages of liberalisation resulted in the 
(0,0) event window becoming significant at 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. Beyond these minor impacts, the results 
are generally consistent with those outlined previously. 
6.4.3.2 Comparison of alternative models to the AFFM 
Throughout this thesis, the econometric modelling has demonstrated that the local 
AFFM is superior in capturing variability in stock returns, for the European energy utility 
sector, in comparison with alternative specifications. Overall, the AFFM was superior at 
isolating the firm-specific component of returns in excess of the risk factors, controlling for a 
variety of stock market and commodity risk factors 
As argued by Griffin et al. (2015) in Section 6.3.1.2, the number of control variables 
can influence the likelihood of Type I or Type II errors occurring. This section compares 
results from the AFFM specifications against those obtained using the CAPM, augmented-
CAPM, and local four-factor model; see Section 5.3.1. The purpose is to examine the 
influence of commodities and/or stock market risk factors on the CAARs surrounding the four 
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key stages of the ordinary legislative procedure. Fama and French (1993) argue that the stock 
market risk factors would be superior at isolating the firm-specific component of returns.  
The CAARs surrounding each key stage are presented in Figure 6.8. The first 
observation regarding the results, across all key stages, is that there are two different distinct 
CAAR patterns produced depending on model specification. The CAPM and four-factor 
models produce similar CAARs to one another, while the augmented-CAPM and AFFM also 
produce similar CAARs. This leads to the conclusion that major differences in abnormal 
returns occur from the inclusion or exclusion of commodities, while the inclusion of stock 
market risk factors has almost no impact. 
For the 1
st
 position (Plot A), the comparison of the four asset pricing models shows 
that commodities have a large role in determining abnormal returns surrounding the event. 
For both the CAPM and four-factor specification, the CAARs fluctuate close to zero through 
the entire event window and would result in a false negative – where results would indicate no 
abnormal performance surrounding the 1
st
 position. Controlling for commodity risk factors, 
using the augmented-CAPM and AFFM shows that CAARs have greater negativity 
surrounding the 1
st
 position. Moreover, the stock market risk factors also appear to influence 
CAARs in the weeks prior to the announcement. The results indicate that firm characteristics, 
as measured by stock market factors, are important determinants of expected returns prior to 
the announcement and commodities have an increasing role in performance after the 
announcement. The difference between CAARs of the CAPM and Augmented-CAPM is -
1.19%, while the difference between the four-factor and AFFM is -1.21%. In both cases, the 
difference is determined by including or excluding term premium and commodity variables. 
This would be consistent with Oberndorfer (2009a), who argues that investors benchmark 
utilities against commodities. This may also be associated with periods where investors are 
processing the likely impact of the potential regulatory change, and therefore seek risk factors 
which may determine expected returns. Commodities appear to ‘support’ energy utility stock 







FIGURE 6.8: COMPARISON OF EVENT STUDY USING VARIOUS ASSET PRICING MODELS 
The figure shows the CAARs extracted from the event study approach for the energy sector portfolio, using four different 
asset pricing specifications: the CAPM, augmented-CAPM, local four-factor model, and the localAFFM. Specifications 
which include term premium and commodities are represented with a solid line, while specifications which omit term 
premium and commodities are represented with a dotted line. Grey lines represent the CAPM specification and the 




 position (Plot B), the impact of stock market factors and 
commodities is less pronounced. Overall, the four asset pricing models produce similar 
results. The CAPM and four-factor models are near identical through time, whereas the 
augmented-CAPM and AFFM begin to differentiate after the announcement of the 2
nd
 
position. Overall, the greatest difference in CAARs is -0.68%, were the AFFM produces the 
most negative CAARs. By the 2
nd
 position, the market has had time to process the information 
content of the regulatory change, and commodities lose their benchmarking role in stock 
valuation. 
Surrounding the signature date (Plot C), there is some minor decoupling between stock 
market factors and commodity factors. This occurs during the legal-linguistic stage, where 
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uncertainty regarding the finalisation of the legislative text during this event window. In the 
weeks preceding the signature date, there is some minor impact from stock market factors and 
commodities. However, the four specifications do not deviate more than 0.75% from each 
other, and the CAARs remain relatively stable after the signature date. 
The publication date (Plot D) is expected to have little to no impact on CAARs, as all 
the informational content regarding the regulatory change should already be impounded into 
stock prices. As expected, all four model specifications produce similar CAARs, showing that 
stock market and commodity risk factors are relatively unimportant at this stage. 
Overall, the robustness tests above show support for Griffin et al. (2015), namely that 
the controls specified can increase the likelihood of errors. However, the majority of this 
impact, for this thesis, will occur surrounding the 1
st
 position and, to a lesser extent, the 
signature date. We are inclined to conclude that the AFFM is the most accurate specification 
regarding how regulatory changes affect the firm-specific component of returns. There is a 
wealth of literature in Chapter 3, combined with the results of Chapters 4 and 5, that shows 
commodities have sustained or sporadic significance through time – depending on their use in 
energy production – and that commodities affect asset valuation of commodity-related 
industries. Further, the results of the local AFFM capture the greatest proportion of returns 
through time. To isolate the impact of the regulatory changes on a firm, the commodities must 
be controlled for during the event study procedure. As demonstrated above, a failure to 
control for commodities will often result in false negative results. 
 Conclusions and Policy Implications 6.5
This chapter presented an empirical model which links the impact of regulatory 
changes to the stock returns of energy utilities. Specifically, this chapter examined the timing 
of the market’s response surrounding key stages of the EU ordinary legislative procedure and 
explores the market’s unique response to the four distinct restructuring streams: Internal 
Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply. The event 
study was implemented using the local AFFM developed in Chapter 5. This asset pricing 
model controls for stock market risk factors (the market factor, size premium, value premium 
and momentum premium), term premium and commodities (oil, coal and natural gas). This 
chapter addressed two sets of hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that the market’s 
reaction will occur surrounding the early co-decision stages of the legislative procedure. The 




Consistent with the first hypothesis, the results showed the market reaction regarding 
regulatory changes in the energy sector is found to predominantly occur surrounding the early 





The later stages of the legislative procedure, including the signature and publication dates, 
have no significant impact on the energy sector as a whole. While there was some within-
sector heterogeneity, the results imply that the market efficiently prices regulatory risk for 
energy utilities. Investors are closely monitoring the legislative procedure and efficiently 
incorporating information into asset prices. This is an important methodological and academic 
contribution, as it has implications regarding measuring the impact of regulatory changes in 
the context of the EU’s ordinary legislative procedures more generally (i.e. beyond the current 
focus on the energy sector). The results in this chapter show that the majority of the impact 
occurs prior to the political institutions’ announcing their voting positions, implying that the 
market is either anticipating information early or speculating on the likely outcome of the 
vote. These results are consistent with the open, transparent objectives of the legislative 
procedure (see Section 2.1), but suggests that the informational content of the legislative 
proposal is irrelevant by the time it is press released. 
The second set of hypotheses test the differential market reaction surrounding the four 
restructuring streams, each expected to have a unique impact on the stock prices of European 
energy utilities. The first restructuring stream, the Internal Energy Market stream, is typically 
associated with liberalisation objectives. This chapter hypothesised that the stream would 
have a negative impact on energy utilities. The results for the Internal Energy Market Stream 
show that the negative market reaction primarily occurs in the weeks surrounding the 
announcement of the 1
st
 position. The efficiency of market reaction is due to the lengthy 
consultation process, which may last years, and the potential impact on firm valuation – 
especially in the case of legally unbundling companies. This stream fundamentally changes 
the regulatory and operating environment of utilities, and is therefore the most likely to be 
anticipated. The announcement of the 1
st
 position sends a strong signal to the market that the 
proposal, trilogues and consultations are near finalisation, and the finalised text is agreeable 
between the two voting political institutions (the Parliament and the Council). Unsurprisingly, 
the negative impact is principally focused on big and natural gas utilities, which lose market 
dominance and are at risk of asset stranding. 
The second stream, the Energy Efficiency stream, focuses on reducing energy demand 
by reducing the energy consumption of appliances and properties at the user end of the supply 
chain. The chapter hypothesised a negative impact due to the reduction in potential future 
revenue. The Energy Efficiency stream has a negative impact on nearly all utilities tested, and 
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the impact primarily occurs prior to the announcement of the 2
nd
 position. Results are 
congruent with expectations that the declining size of the energy market will decrease 
potential revenue in the future. 
The Renewable Energies stream is designed to increase use of renewable energies in 
energy production, and also sets minimum targets for the electrification of the transport sector 
by 2020. The renewable energy objectives are frequently cited as the primary reason energy 
utilities have lost value over recent decades (see Section 1.2). This chapter hypothesised a 
negative impact from renewable energy objectives due to the decreased reliance on 
hydrocarbons, but included a caveat that the impact is likely to be contained within natural 
gas utilities as electricity utilities can adapt operations. Unsurprisingly, very few energy 
portfolios were affected by the renewable energy legislation, with the impact mostly being 
limited to natural gas utilities. Natural gas utilities lose potential market share from the 
electrification of transport, while any gas-fired electricity-generating plants may be 
underutilised as consumers switch to renewables suppliers, or the plants are forced to invest in 
renewable energy–based technology which they have little experience of. Some electricity 
and multi-utilities experienced a negative market reaction, but the reaction either showed 
some correction in subsequent windows or was still relatively small compared with the losses 
from the natural gas industry. 
Finally, the Security of Supply stream focuses on diminishing the harmful effects of 
securing oil and petroleum (including by-products) within Europe. While the intention of the 
regulatory changes is designed to benefit society, prior empirical evidence has shown that the 
returns of energy utilities have a positive relationship with oil prices and volatility, despite oil 
rarely being used in energy production. Accordingly, this chapter hypothesised that regulation 
to limit abnormal oil price increases will negatively impact the energy sector. The main 
results show that the impact of the Security of Supply stream was relatively low in 
comparison with the remaining three streams. Empirical results from the event study 
demonstrate that the market negatively reacts to legislation concerning security of the oil 
supply. Results mostly show negative market reactions surrounding the announcement of the 
1
st
 position and following the publication date. There is some minor price correction occurring 
between these dates. The conclusion is that the impact is difficult to gauge, as it does not 
affect utilities directly. 
Addressing the overarching results, the results of this chapter are consistent with the 
existing energy economics and regulation literature in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. As expected, 
the liberalisation objectives (see Section 2.2.1) mostly had a negative impact on the energy 
sector. Liberalisation and deregulation have brought about competition, additional expenses to 
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operations and exposed utilities to the real threat of bankruptcy. However, small utilities 
eventually benefit from these regulatory changes, either from their exclusion from the 
legislation or from the new regulatory environment which encourages entry into markets by 
small new competitors which are often renewables-only companies. Overall, liberalisation 
objectives appear to be diminishing the market power of big utilities by encouraging entry by 
some of their small/new entrant rivals. However, the objectives are far from complete, and 
there is already demand for a fourth package of liberalisation; see FSR Energy (2015). 
The environmental objectives (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) have also negatively impacted 
the sector as a whole. However, in contrast to press assertions, the results have found that the 
Energy Efficiency stream was the most significant determinant of negative abnormal returns 
rather than renewables. Unsurprisingly, the reduction in energy consumption per capita as a 
result of the Energy Efficiency stream will intensify competition for the energy supply, where 
the impact is realised cross-sectionally in the energy sector. In contrast to the press’s critical 
claims regarding the impact of renewables on the energy supply (see Section 1.2), the impact 
of renewables generally had lower significance and was mostly limited to natural gas utilities. 
This impact for natural gas utilities is likely due to their undiversified operations and limited 
options to adapt operations. By way of contrast, prior studies have shown that fuel-switching 
has been a viable option for the electricity sector, with such behaviour being apparent in 
Western Europe since the 1960s (see Söderholm, 1998; 2001). Interestingly, natural gas 
utilities were generally the most negatively impacted portfolio across most regulatory 
changes. 
This latter point indicates that the press is subject to focalism, where the negative 
impact for the gas-majors are erroneously extrapolated to the entire energy sector. 
Superficially, this bias can be justified to some extent as the gas majors typically represent 
some of the largest energy utilities in the EU; therefore, any impact to their valuation can also 
influence total sector valuation. However, as one utility falls out of favour, another will take 
its place. Rather than solely focusing on the myopic impacts of regulation today, the questions 
regarding the regulation of the sector should be framed in the context of designing the energy 
system of the future – namely, which utilities have the potential to grow and fulfil the EU’s 
future energy demand? With this perspective, the results of this chapter suggest a viable future 
for small utilities in the EU energy utility sector, which have already begun to see increasing 
share prices as a result of regulatory changes. Clearly, the market has also begun to recognise 





Placing this research in a broader context, it is noteworthy that the European utilities 
sector has been subject to wide spread criticism in the popular media because it is perceived 
that it has been profiteering at the expense of end consumers (see Section 1.2). The evidence 
presented shows that their risk-return trade-off has fundamentally changed as a result of sector 
liberalisation and environmental policies. The restructuring of the energy sector has induced 
additional elements of risk into the sector. As such  this chapter has provided rigorous support 
(to some extent) to the claims made by The Economist (2013b), in their article ‘How to lose 
half a trillion euros’, that utilities now face a range of policy induced challenges that are 
materially affecting their financial return. However, it is not only renewable energy policies 
which affect financial return, but also liberalisation, energy efficiency and security of supply 
policies too. 
Critically, the impact of the policy streams implies an increased cost of equity capital 
for energy utilities, negatively impacting their ability to raise the estimated $2.2 trillion of 
total power sector investment needed in the EU between 2014 and 2035 (IEA, 2014). Thus, 
this chapter highlights a tension between policy objectives, in particular liberalisation and 
environmental objectives. The point is not to abandon liberalisation or even environmental 
objectives, nor is it to recommend an overhaul of the legislative procedure, but it is important 
to acknowledge that tension exists between different pieces of legislation and within the 
legislation procedure. EU institutions should bear in mind that the policy mix utilities are 
being exposed to is making it harder to achieve decarbonisation goals. There are potentially 
many ways Brussels can help, ranging from providing a stable regulatory environment to 
ensuring governments are co-investors or underwriters of projects. This chapter does not 
recommend any one particular solution; rather, the aim is to highlight that Brussels needs to 
ensure its policies are consistent across different policy goals. This thesis’ evidence suggests 
this is not the case currently. 
From a more academic and more general policy perspective, this chapter has 
contributed to the literature by providing a better understanding of how and when stock prices 
are generally affected by regulatory changes, but especially in the context of the EU ordinary 
legislative procedure – a procedure that affects 503 million EU citizens
71
 and represents the 
largest economy in the world.
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 The results of the chapter suggest markets are efficient at 
incorporating the effect of regulatory change and that rational heterogeneous market reactions 
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exist depending on the types of legislation proposed and the company affected. The overall 
conclusion of market efficiency is important, since inefficient markets create arbitrage 
opportunities which can negatively impact uninformed market participants and the valuation 
of firms (Griffin et al., 2015). 
6.5.2 Limitations  
As demonstrated in the robustness tests (Section 6.4.3), this event study approach is 
not without criticism. The ordinary legislative procedure is lengthy, complex and entirely 
public; therefore, it is not possible to examine the impact of ‘pure’ events. Information will 
continually filter into the market, and so the impact is not as distinct as one would desire for 
econometric analysis. Further, legislation from different restructuring streams is 
simultaneously discussed, voted upon, amended and published. While this is a limitation, it 
should not be an obstacle to empirical analysis. This criticism will exist regardless of the 
empirical modelling technique adopted. As researchers, the best option is to acknowledge that 
such limitations exist when analysing real world data and attempt to control for these 
confounding variables as thoroughly as possible. This chapter has implemented the most 
comprehensive analysis of the ordinary legislative procedure, narrowing the timing of 
information incorporation into four suspected event dates.  
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
 Introduction 7.1
This research contributes to a better understanding of how risk factors are affecting the 
returns of European energy utilities. From a policy perspective, this thesis focuses on the 
liberalisation and decarbonisation of the energy sector, which represent two key policy issues 
at the EU level over the last few decades and remain central to EU policy agendas today. The 
risks associated with sector liberalisation and decarbonisation have led to debates on the 
economic merits of restructuring the sector, particularly given the impact these reforms are 
argued to have had on the valuation and financial return of energy utilities. 
From an academic perspective, this thesis expands the asset pricing literature by 
reintegrating macroeconomic variables and stock market risk factors from the energy 
economics and finance literatures, respectively. The thesis extends the asset pricing model 
further by including recent advances in the econometrics literature to examine the assumption 
of parameter stability, including deductive annual regressions and the inductive Bai and 
Perron (1998; 2003) structural break point test. This thesis enhances the understanding of risk 
premia in the European energy utility sector by: 1) providing a full outline of the ordinary 
legislative procedure for the European Union (Section 2.1); 2) outlining four distinct 
restructuring streams (Section 2.2); 3) integrating the finance (Section 3.2.2), energy 
economics (Section 3.2.3) and econometrics (Section 3.3.4) literatures to produce a superior 
asset pricing model for the energy sector; and 4) conducting an event study analysis on the 
timing of market reaction in the ordinary legislative procedure and measuring the impact of 
the four restructuring streams. Using a broad sample and list of regulatory events, the thesis 
conducts three empirical studies, including: 
1) Risk factors in energy utility returns: an augmented-four-factor model 
(AFFM), 
2) Refining the AFFM and exploring within-sector heterogeneity, 
3) The impact of regulatory changes in energy utility returns. 
This concluding chapter summarises the three empirical chapters and outlines 
academic and policy contributions of the thesis. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 
7.2 provides a brief summary of the chapters. Section 7.3 outlines the academic contributions 
of the thesis, while Section 7.4 outlines the policy contributions. This chapter concludes by 
outlining thesis limitations and avenues for further research (Section 7.5). 
D.J. Tulloch© 
249 
 Summary of the Three Empirical Chapters 7.2
The three empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) are discussed in turn. Chapter 4 
develops a global AFFM by reintegrating energy economic and finance asset pricing models 
to answer four research questions, namely: 1) To what extent do commodity price changes 
impact the returns in the European energy utility sector? 2) Could stock-market risk factors 
better explain the variation in energy utilities’ returns? 3) Do the impacts reflect market-wide 
conditions or the sector-specific relationships between returns and risk premia? and 4) Are 
these risk premia time-varying? The motivation for Chapter 4 came from El-Sharif et al. 
(2005) and Oberndorfer (2009a), who argue that the energy economics literature is restricted 
due to its reliance on antiquated asset pricing models. Both studies identify that the 
incorporation of standard finance risk factors as an avenue for further research. The 
motivation for the inter-sectoral approach is based on evidence of heterogeneous impacts of 
risk factors across multiple industries, also identified by Fama and French (1997), Faff and 
Brailsford (1999), El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Elyasiani et al. (2011). Further, the inter-
temporal approach is motivated by evidence of temporal sensitivity to risk factors, affecting 
significance (Huang et al., 1996; Fama and French, 1997; Faff and Brailsford, 1999; 
Sadorsky, 2001; El-Sharif et al., 2005; Boyer and Filion, 2007; Oberndorfer, 2009a). Chapter 
4 develops the global AFFM by calculating risk factors across a diversified sample of 600 
European firms (see Section 4.2.4). An unconditional global AFFM is applied between 1996 
and 2013 across 11 European sectors (see Section 4.2.3.1), identifying inter-sectoral 
sensitivity to risk factors. The conditional global AFFM is applied annually between 1996 and 
2013 to identify inter-temporal sensitivity. The results are extensively discussed in Section 
4.3. Having defined the global AFFM, Chapter 5 focuses on refining the AFFM and 
improving the model’s goodness of fit through four analytical foci – producing the local 
AFFM. 
Chapter 5 further enhances the understanding of energy sector asset pricing through 
four analytical foci that develop a more nuanced understanding of the impact of risk factors 
on sector returns, namely: 1) refining the global AFFM by calculating stock market risk 
factors at the sector level, creating a local AFFM; 2) applying the local AFFM to sub-group 
portfolios of European utilities to explore within-sector heterogeneity; 3) applying inductive 
rather than deductive structural break point tests (see Section 3.3.4); and 4) better isolating the 
firm-specific component of returns. The motivation for the sector level analysis came from 
the literature review in Section 5.2, which argued there may be greater informational content 
within a sector compared with informational content across an entire market. Prior literature 
found evidence that global models typically perform poorly at explaining sector level returns 
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and local models improve the model’s goodness of fit (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Fama 
and French, 2012). Further, the motivation for an inductive break point test came from 
econometrics literature which argues that the deductive approach biases significance tests 
(Quandt, 1960). Chapter 5 introduced recent advances in econometrics which develop an 
inductive method of estimating pure and partial structural break points in model parameters 
(see Section 3.3.1), which better controls for systematic risk and is better at isolating the firm-
specific component of returns (Fama and French, 1993; Hansen, 2001). The results of Chapter 
5 are discussed extensively in Section 5.4. For the European energy utility sector, the local 
AFFM is found to have tighter regression fits than the global AFFM and existing asset pricing 
model specifications. For this reason, Chapter 6 utilises the local AFFM to analyse the impact 
of regulatory changes on sector returns. 
Chapter 6 utilises an event study approach to examine how the returns of the energy 
utility sector have been impacted by a myriad of regulatory changes. The motivation for 
Chapter 6 came from the need to objectively quantify whether there has been some 
fundamental shift in the operating or regulatory environment of energy utilities that may 
explain their altered returns. Importantly, the EU has begun to transform the energy sector 
from one largely dominated by vertically integrated, state-owned enterprises with regional 
monopolies, to an unbundled, privately-owned and competitive energy sector. Environmental 
objectives of the EU include: 1) reducing overall EU energy consumption by increasing the 
efficiency of end-user appliances and homes, with an expected decrease of energy demand of 
10% to 20% by 2050 (Delarue et al., 2011); and 2) reducing EU-wide carbon emissions by 
increasing the use of renewable energy sources. Finally, security of supply objectives has 
attempted to partially regulate oil prices and diminish the harmful effects of securing oil and 
petroleum at the EU level. 
All the regulatory changes above are subject to a protracted and complex legislative 
procedure (see Section 2.1). To examine the impact of regulatory changes with precision, the 
timing of market reaction surrounding regulatory announcements must first be explored. 
Accordingly, Chapter 6 addresses two research objectives: 1) exploring the timing of market 
reaction surrounding key stages of the legislative procedure and 2) exploring the market’s 
unique response to the four distinct restructuring streams identified in Section 2.2 (namely, 
the Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energies and Security of Supply). 
The two overall research objectives are addressed through five hypotheses: the first 
hypothesis predicts that the market’s reaction will occur surrounding the early co-decision 
stages of the legislative procedure (the voting stages); the latter four hypotheses predict 
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negative impacts for each of the four restructuring streams, addressed independently. The 
results of Chapter 6 are discussed in Section 6.4. 
The following sections outline the cross-chapter thesis contributions. Section 7.3 
presents the academic contributions, delineated into methodological and general 
contributions. The policy contributions are presented in Section 7.4, including sector-wide 
policy implications for the energy sector (Section 7.4.1) and heterogeneous implications 
regarding energy utilities (Section 7.4.2). 
 Academic Contributions 7.3
This section contains the overarching discussion of the academic contributions of the 
three empirical studies. The following paragraphs presents the methodological contributions 
with regard to the asset pricing models and impact of regulatory changes at the sector level. 
The final paragraph presents more general contributions from the thesis. 
Methodologically, Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by developing the AFFM. 
Compared with existing asset pricing models, the global AFFM of Chapter 4 provides the best 
overall goodness of fit across various European sectors, with a mean adjusted 𝑅2 of 75.99%, 
compared with the CAPM (72.44%), the augmented-CAPM (72.56%) and the four-factor 
model (75.90%). The inter-sectoral comparison using the global AFFM found varying 
coefficients for risk factors across sectors. Results for the energy utility sector shows sector-
specific relationships with risk premia, rather than market-wide conditions across all sectors. 
Importantly, the returns profile of the energy sector is distinct to the oil & gas sector and 
warrants independent analysis. The most striking feature is that a simple sorting according to 
firm size, book-to-market ratio and momentum draws out important stock market risk factors 
which were previously obscured within the market factor. Overall, the global AFFM helps 
establish a more accurate equilibrium asset pricing function, allows inter-sectoral comparison 
of risk premia and has implications for modelling average returns at the sector level. 
When examining the energy sector in isolation, the local stock market risk factors of 
Chapter 5 improve the AFFM further, explaining a greater proportion of energy sector returns 
compared with global (market level) stock market risk factors. The adjusted 𝑅2 for the energy 
sector increases from 68.79% using the global AFFM to 72.77% using the local AFFM. The 
results of Chapter 5 contribute to the literature by showing that there is greater informational 
content within a sector, compared with informational content across an entire market. This 
approach helps improve the accuracy of estimated coefficients with regard to risk premia in 
the energy utility sector. Second, the combination of the local AFFM and 12 energy portfolios 
(see Section 5.3.2.1) enabled a detailed examination of sector level returns and within-sector 
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heterogeneity, which shows that the risk profiles of energy utilities vary dramatically 
depending on firm characteristics. The improved asset pricing model helps establish a more 
accurate equilibrium asset pricing function, for the sector as a whole or for individual energy 
portfolios. 
Chapter 5 also shows that the assumption of parameter stability is incorrect. Chapter 5 
extends the asset pricing literature by including modern advances from the econometrics 
literature, namely, the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) inductive structural break point test. The 
Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) inductive structural break point test overcomes many of the 
existing criticisms regarding the use of deductive methods to control for parameter instability. 
This chapter utilises the Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) test in two ways.  
First, the local AFFM break point regression shows significant structural breaks in the 
relationship between energy sector returns and risk premia. Addressing parameter stability, 
the inductive method improves the local AFFM’s goodness of fit further, producing an 
adjusted 𝑅2 of 80.42%, compared with the mean adjusted of 𝑅2 of 74.52% for the deductive 
annual regressions using the local AFFM (Chapter 5), and 69.64% for the annual regressions 
using the global AFFM (Chapter 4). Second, Chapter 5 utilises the inductive structural break 
point test on the local AFFM’s residuals, showing that up to 28% of residual variance from an 
unconditional regression on energy utilities is explained by systematic risk factors (previously 
assumed to be filtered out). The inference of this result is that failure to control for this time-
varying nature in the relationship between average returns and risk premia leads to incorrect 
inferences on the firm-specific component of returns. Chapter 5 makes a novel contribution to 
the asset pricing literature in terms of identifying unsystematic, firm-specific components of 
return. Moreover, this chapter provides a flexible tool which can be adapted to other sectors, 
since it suggests a method of more accurately examining time-varying risk premia and 
isolating the firm-specific component of returns for any sector. Overall, the local AFFM can 
be used in applications that require estimates of expected stock return, including 1) portfolio 
selection, 2) evaluating portfolios performance, 3) estimates of cost of capital and 4) 
measuring abnormal return in event studies (Fama and French, 1993). 
Chapter 6 makes two academic contributions. First, results showed the market reaction 
regarding regulatory changes in the energy sector predominantly occurs during the early 





positions. While there was some within-sector heterogeneity, the results imply that investors 
are closely monitoring the legislative procedure and efficiently price regulatory risk for 
energy utilities. This has implications regarding measuring the impact of regulatory changes 
in the context of the EU’s ordinary legislative procedures more generally (i.e. beyond the 
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current focus on the energy sector). Second, the chapter shows that the energy sector’s risk-
return trade-off has fundamentally changed as a result of sector liberalisation and 
environmental policies, which shows that utilities now face a range of policy-induced 
challenges that are materially affecting their financial return. 
Finally, this thesis has also made more general contributions beyond the econometric 
results. First, Chapter 2 presents an overview of the European ordinary legislative procedure, 
and examines the timing of market reaction and market efficiency. The complexity of the 
procedure has been simplified into four key stages and examined using appropriate event 
study methods. Second, Table 2.1 represents a broad range of regulatory changes to date, 
allowing thorough examination of the impact of legislation on energy sector returns. Third, 
this thesis dramatically increases the sample size of European energy utilities used in the 
empirical analysis relative to the existing literature. The thesis includes 88 European utilities, 
across all operations of the electricity and natural gas industries, which also controls for 
survivorship bias. The analysis is also conducted between 1996 and 2013. This represents a 
marked improvement of sample size and time period analysed relative to existing literature, 
including El-Sharif et al. (2005), Oberndorfer (2009a) and Koch and Bassen (2013). Further, 
the energy sector as a whole is compared with other European sectors, extending El-Sharif et 
al. (2005). Fourth, this thesis delineates the 88 energy utilities into various portfolios grouped 
on firm characteristics, and rebalances the portfolios over time. In particular, this thesis 
introduced the industry portfolios, delineating energy utilities in electricity, natural gas and 
multi-utilities. The 12 energy portfolios of Chapter 5 represent the most in-depth analysis of 
returns in the energy sector to date. 
 Policy Contributions 7.4
The following section outlines the policy contributions of the thesis. Section 7.4.1 
presents the sector-wide contributions with regard to the entire energy sector, while Section 
7.4.2 presents contributions based on firm characteristics. 
7.4.1 Sector-wide Contributions 
As stated in Section 1.2, the energy utility sector has been a topic of intense debate 
about perceived excess accounting returns and oligopoly power in the European energy 
sector. It is argued that these energy companies are making excess returns at the expense of 
the consumers, but often the risk borne by energy utilities is overlooked. The objective of this 
thesis is to quantify whether there has been some fundamental shift in the operating or 
regulatory environment of energy utilities that may explain their altered returns. The thesis 
examined new risks arising from liberalisation and environmental objectives. 
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The analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 have empirically shown that the energy utility sector 
is taking on increasing systematic risk over time, as indicated by the market beta increasing 
towards unity. The changing nature of the energy sector as a result of restructuring has put 
into question utilities’ role as a steady, reliable and defensive investment asset. As such, 
investors are expecting greater compensation for holding energy assets and taking a more 
active role in trading into and out of energy utility positions in response to regulatory changes. 
The intertemporal analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 show that this coincides with major changes in 
systematic risk. This would suggest that the higher returns afforded to energy utilities may, in 
some part, be explained by increased market risk. However, the following paragraphs show 
that energy utilities have also been exposed to additional risks beyond the market factor. 
The analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 (Tables 4.7, 5.8 and 5.10) show that the impacts of 
stock market risk factors have also changed over time. In contrast to the objectives of 
liberalisation, aimed at countering market dominance from big utilities, the big energy utilities 
continue to dominate sector returns with an increasing impact over time. This is a major blow 
for liberalisation policy (see Section 2.2), since it was supposed to benefit small and new-
entrant companies. The empirical results suggest that the regulations have been ineffective 
and large utilities continue to dominate sector returns. This lack of effectiveness is already 
recognised by academics, with FSR Energy (2015) already conducting informal debates with 
respect to a fourth package of liberalisation – continuing to address unachieved liberalisation 
objectives. 
From a policy perspective, the value premium coefficient shows that the energy utility 
sector, as a whole, is relatively distressed in comparison with other European sectors (see 
Table 4.5). This was also shown in Section B.2 of Appendix B. Further, Table 4.7 shows that 
there is increasing value premium over time, relative to other European stocks, suggesting that 
the sector has become even more distressed since 2011. 
The local momentum premium in Figure 5.2 (Plot C) shows that prior to 2000 there 
were few differences between winners and losers, but as liberalisation progressed there has 
been a growing gap between winners and losers in the energy sector. However, the inter-
temporal momentum coefficients (Tables 4.7 and 5.8) show that the sector performs poorly in 
the years following major regulatory changes, suggesting that regulations are having an 
impact on sector returns. This suggests that, to some extent, competitive pressures are 
achieving their intended objectives: to expose energy utility inefficiencies and slowly phase 
out poorly performing utilities. However, further investigation is required to examine which 
utilities become ‘winners’ and which become ‘losers’. It is plausible that the winner portfolio 
contains utilities that continue to exert market dominance, rather than the green-energy 
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utilities the EU aims to transition towards. Since the EU is considering a fourth liberalisation 
package, this can be taken as tacit acknowledgment that the efforts to date have not resulted in 
the competitive market desired. 
This thesis has also shown that term premium and commodities typically have a small 
impact on energy sector returns, but the frequency and magnitude of commodity risk exposure 
is increasing as liberalisation progresses. The inclusion of stock market risk factors typically 
reduces the significance of some commodities, indicating that inferences drawn from previous 
literature may be based on false positive results. In particular, Table 4.4 shows that coal 
returns are correlated with the global value premium – a measure of firm distress. However, 
the ability to detect any commodity price risk suggests that energy utilities have not fully 
realised the benefits of energy risk management. This raises questions as to why energy 
utilities have not been able to hedge effectively (addressed in Section 7.4.2). Similar to 
momentum, the impact of commodities mostly occurs as sector restructuring progresses. 
Therefore, we examined the impact of regulatory changes on the energy sector. 
This thesis is the first to empirically show the timing of market reaction during the 
EU’s protracted legislative procedure, and the impact of the four restructuring streams. The 
results show that nearly all utilities are exposed to the Internal Energy Market (liberalisation) 
and Energy Efficiency (environmental) streams. The Internal Energy Market stream 
fundamentally changes the regulatory and operating environment of utilities. The qualitative 
nature of the legislation requires lengthy consultations and informal trilogues between 
European political institutions. The acceptance of the proposal by one of the two institutions 
sends a strong signal that the proposal is near finalisation, and therefore likely to be 
anticipated by the market. It is also expected that investors are more likely to anticipate a 
sector-wide announcement due to the potential transfer of wealth; congruent with Binder 
(1985). Empirical results confirm this proposition. This thesis shows, empirically, that the 
market reacts at the announcement of the 1
st
 position, and the impact is observed across nearly 
all energy utilities. The Energy Efficiency stream shows similar results. The Energy 
Efficiency stream was expected to have a cross-sectional impact as the stream reduces energy 
consumption of EU citizens per capita, affecting all utilities. This thesis shows that the impact 
of the Energy Efficiency stream occurs surrounding the announcement of the 2
nd
 position. 
Across both streams, the results imply that investors are closely monitoring the legislative 
procedure and efficiently price regulatory risk for energy utilities. 
Importantly, this thesis shows that the press, such as The Economist (2013a; 2013b; 
2013c; 2015) and The BBC (2013), is subject to focalism. The press has argued that 
renewable energy objectives have negatively impacted the valuation of the EU energy utility 
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sector. This thesis has empirically shown that investors, in fact, react primarily to 
liberalisation and energy efficiency objectives. The results also show that the impact of 
renewables is typically isolated to a specific subset of utilities (discussed further below). 
7.4.2 Heterogeneity 
Beyond the sector-wide results, this thesis provides an in-depth examination of within-
sector heterogeneity to risk factors and regulatory changes. Regarding the risk factors, the 
local AFFM of Chapter 5 showed substantial heterogeneity in the return profiles of the 12 
energy portfolios tested. Regarding the risk factors, heterogeneous sensitivity to size, value 
and momentum premia were the largest determinants for the differences in expected returns 
across various energy portfolios. The stock market risk factors resulted in the largest spread in 
estimated coefficients, and expected returns varied by 4.60-8.48% per annum between energy 
portfolios. Term premium and commodity risk factors showed relatively little impact, with a 
small spread in estimated coefficients and a difference in expected returns, across all energy 
portfolios, being less than 0.87% per annum. Some portfolios have greater commodity risk 
exposure than others. 
For the most part, each energy portfolio showed unique risk exposure. Regarding the 
size portfolios, small utilities have lower systematic risk but greater commodity risk exposure 
compared with big energy utilities. The results show that commodities play a key role as an 
indicator for energy price developments when valuing informationally sparse stocks, such as 
small utilities; see Kumar (2009) and Oberndorfer (2009a). This increased commodity risk 
exposure could also indicate that small utilities are not hedging effectively. This places small 
utilities in a dangerous position, as there have been dramatic changes in the price of energy-
related commodities over the last decade, with record high prices for oil, natural gas and coal 
(Oberndorfer, 2009a). 
It is surprising that small utilities, which are typically associated with being marginal 
or distressed firms, have not chosen to fully protect themselves from commodity price 
volatility through hedging instruments and strategies. There are several possible reasons for 
this. First, as hedging represents an insurance against price volatility, it is possible that 
utilities could ultimately pay above-market rates if the market for the energy commodity falls 
below the hedged price. Second, Figure 4.3 (Plots F, G and H) shows that commodity prices 
have been increasing over the past two decades. It is possible that smaller utilities are altering 
endogenous risk exposure and speculating on commodity prices with the objective of 
supplementing income through arbitrage; congruent with Söderholm (2001). The third 
possibility is that the small utilities lack the capital, expertise or access to derivative markets 
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to hedge effectively. Regardless of the cause, there needs to be thorough investigation into 
why the small energy utilities are more exposed to commodity risk. 
Regarding firm operations, the asset pricing models show that the electricity industry 
is relatively distressed compared with other utilities, as evident in the higher cumulative 
returns in Figure 5.2 (Plot D) and greater commodity risk exposure. The results in Table 5.5 
show that all commodities are statistically significant for the electricity industry. Electricity 
utilities have the greatest commodity risk exposure compared with natural gas- and multi-
utility portfolios. Similar to the arguments above for small utilities, there may be a variety of 
reasons why electricity utilities choose to, or are unable to, hedge against commodity risk. 
Regardless of the cause, the increased risk exposure of electric utilities makes the likelihood 
of achieving ambitious decarbonisation goals less likely. As argued above, the increased risk 
exposure will result in investors expecting greater competition for holding energy positions. 
In contrast to the increased risk for electricity utilities, this thesis showed that the 
natural gas industry was the only energy portfolio to experience positive momentum over the 
full-periods (see Table 5.5), suggesting historically good performance or implies excess 
profiteering (argued in Section 1.2). Further, the natural gas portfolio shared many similarities 
with the oil & gas sector of Chapter 4, being positively impacted by oil and natural gas price 
risk, but is likely due to the integration of natural gas and oil operations.  Multi-utilities had 
the lowest risk-return relationship of all energy industries and shared elements of risk 
exposure with both electricity and natural gas utilities, consistent with the economy of scope 
argument and the ability to diversify operations. The diversified operations allow multi-
utilities to switch operations when faced with regulatory changes or fluctuations in 
commodity prices. 
This thesis showed heterogeneous impacts for regulations. While the liberalisation 
stream affected most energy utilities, the negative impact was larger for big and natural gas 
utilities, which lose market dominance and are at risk of asset stranding, respectively. 
Simultaneously, small utilities are experiencing positive returns as a result of liberalisation 
objectives. Liberalisation objectives appear to be diminishing the market power of big utilities 
by encouraging entry by some of their small/new entrant rivals, but liberalisation objectives 
are far from complete. Despite being frequently cited as the primary reason energy utilities 
have lost value over recent decades, the impact from renewables has mostly being limited to 
natural gas and hydrocarbon intensive utilities. Natural gas utilities lose potential market share 
from the electrification of transport, while any gas-fired electricity generating plants may be 
under-utilised as consumers switch to renewables suppliers, or the plants are forced to invest 
in renewable energy-based technology which they have little experience of. 
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Overall, the impacts of regulatory changes are partially consistent with the claims of 
press. While the energy sector as a whole is losing value, this is predominantly due to the fact 
that the big utility giants are negatively impacted by regulatory changes and their combined 
value represents 93.4% of total sector value. The heterogeneous impact suggests that press is 
subject to focalism, where the negative impact for the gas-majors is extrapolated to impact the 
entire energy sector. Critically, and despite the heterogeneous impacts, that the results show 
that regulatory changes are materially affecting the performance of the energy sector as a 
whole. The negative impact implies an increased cost of equity capital for energy utilities, 
negatively impacting their ability to raise the $2.2 trillion of total power sector investment is 
needed to transition to a ‘smart’ decarbonised energy system (IEA, 2014). A stable and sound 
market framework that reduces political uncertainty will encourage long-term investment in 
the energy sector (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2012). EU institutions should bear in mind that 
policy objectives may conflict and liberalisation is making it harder to achieve ambitious 
decarbonisation goals. 
 Thesis Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 7.5
Limitation of space and time dictated that some interesting avenues for further 
research related to the risk factors in European utilities returns could not be explored. The 
purpose of this section is to highlight these possible avenues for future research and related 
limitations. 
One limitation of this thesis is the inability to delineate the sample by operation. 
Section 5.3.2.1 (Table 5.1) showed that the SIC system could, at best, delineate the sample 
based on industry. If possible, it would have been preferable to delineate the electricity and 
natural gas producers into generation/production, transmission and distribution operations. It 
is expected that the transmission companies (to the extent that they are independent of 
generation and distribution) a reregulated and therefore may be less susceptible to the impact 
of stock market risk factors, macroeconomic variables and regulatory changes. One possible 
method is to use a smaller sample and to identify operations via company annual reports. 
With this method, it may also be possible to further delineate the sample based on energy 
sources: renewable versus combustion fuel sources. This would contribute to understanding 
asset stranding as a result of renewable energy objectives and grid priority afforded to 
renewable energy generators, extending the work of Ansar et al. (2013). The expectation is 
that electric generators which are able to adapt should experience significantly positive 
CAARs as a result of growth opportunities from the renewable energy objectives. 
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The global and local AFFMs have been utilised in this thesis to examine inter-sectoral 
returns and within-sector heterogeneity. The focus on stock returns was to remain congruent 
with the majority of the literature outlined in Chapter 3, as shown in Table 3.1. A natural 
extension of the AFFM is to examine the cost of capital for European energy utilities. Koch 
and Bassen (2013) use an augmented-CAPM to examine cost of capital for electricity 
generators, however, Chapter 5 of this thesis showed that the local AFFM does a better job at 
capturing returns in the energy sector. Further, Section 1.5 highlighted that this thesis uses a 
superior energy sample. The method could extend Fama and French (1997), who examine 
industry cost of capital using CAPM and a global three-factor model, by utilising the local 
stock market risk factors developed in Chapter 5. 
While the paragraph above focused on the dependent variable, the literature in Chapter 
3 also highlights that additional independent variables have been identified, but examined to a 
lesser extent compared with stock market risk factors and commodities. The first avenue with 
regard to independent variables would be examining the impact of commodity volatility on 
energy sector returns. This would extend Elyasiani et al. (2011) who examine the impact of 
both oil returns and oil volatility on oil & gas sector returns. The rationale is that the Security 
of Supply stream is expected to affect oil and petroleum products, partially regulating prices 
and preventing abnormal price increases. This must undoubtedly affect return and volatility of 
oil and petroleum. Therefore, changing the volatility dynamics of the commodities may 
impact the energy sector returns. The examination of volatility also opens avenues to 
understand asymmetric responses to positive and negative commodity innovations on returns; 
such as those examined by Sadorsky (2001) and Ramos and Veiga (2011). Methodologically, 
this suggests the use of a range of model specifications, such as the ARCH, GARCH, the 
Spline GARCH for low-frequency volatility, the Quadratic GARCH (QGARCH) for 
modelling asymmetric effects of positive and negative shocks, or the Asymmetric Power 
GARCH (APARCH) for changing power terms and asymmetric impact. However, the 
importance of these empirical models should not be overstated. A major criticism, identified 
in Section 3.1, is that the AFFM is based on four stock market risk factors and a major 
criticism is that it is an empirical model that has limited theoretical foundation.  
Regarding the impact of regulatory changes, the event study approach aggregates the 
legislation into four distinct restructuring streams. An implicit assumption is that the impacts 
of the regulatory changes are of similar importance.
73
 An avenue for further research with 
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 Note, we do not believe this to be a major issue in this thesis. The robustness checks in Section 6.4.3.1 
showed that removing, say, one Internal Energy Market piece of legislation did not result in substantive 
differences in results or inference. 
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respect to legislation is to examine the regulatory changes individually. An event-by-event 
analysis will allow greater insight into the particular impact of a single regulatory change. 
This would be of interest to a researcher who has a preference for an in-depth analysis of a 
particular regulatory stream or legislative act. While this thesis has examined the collective 
impact of the liberalisation stream, a researcher could, for example, independently examine 
the unique market reaction surrounding the only the third packages of liberalisation. Further, 
this specific analysis would allow the researcher to follow the individual legislative act the 
key stages of the legislative procedure. 
The event study approach can be extended to examine 1) buy-side versus sell-side 
abnormal returns preceding a regulatory event, or 2) stock turnover preceding a regulatory 
event. The former would indicate price pressure, while the latter is a measure of liquidity. 
Examining the variables above will provide further insight into the behaviour of investors 
around regulatory changes; for example, do investors de-risk or speculate on outcome of an 
upcoming regulatory event? Such an analysis is now possible given the list of restructuring 
events and key stages compiled in this thesis (see Table 2.1) 
When regulatory changes are published, inevitably some investors will receive the 
information before it rapidly diffuses across the entire market – known as information 
asymmetry. With such potentially large transfers of wealth, there is strong motivation for 
investors to access any information which may affect asset prices at the earliest available 
opportunity. Investors who receive information first (informed investors) can adopt 
economically advantageous positions at the expense of other investors (uninformed investors). 
Microstructure literature has documented that information asymmetry creates an adverse 
selection problem, where uninformed investors are continually disadvantaged when trading 
against informed investors (Wang, 1993). Adverse selection represents an undiversifiable risk 
for uninformed investors, which has been documented to affect risk premia (Wang, 1993; 
Easley et al., 2002; Easley and O'Hara, 2004), price volatility and cause illiquidity in stocks 
(Wang, 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). Certainly, Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.2.1) 
showed that the market begins to react in the days prior to the announcement of positions. 
This avenue for future research would be grounded in the microstructure literature and would 
explore the effects of asymmetric information related to regulatory change using high 
frequency data (intraday) in the context of European energy utilities. 
The four restructuring streams in Section 2.2 were designed to affect the operating 
environment (Internal Energy Market), energy consumption (Energy Efficiency), the use of 
green-energy technology (Renewable Energies) and securing energy at the EU level (Security 
of Supply). This thesis examines the impact of the four restructuring streams using market 
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data. An implicit assumption of any financial analysis is that investors are rational, wealth 
optimizing and forward-looking, reassessing their investment portfolios today based on their 
expected future changes to the firm’s operational and financial return. But does restructuring 
induce realised changes in the operational performance? Future research can examine the 
impact of the four restructuring streams on the operational performance and accounting-based 
financial ratios of energy utilities. This avenue of research can be multi-faceted, drawing on 
energy policy, finance, firm bankruptcy and accounting literatures. Such research could draw 
on related and established literature, including Megginson et al. (1994) and Hart and Ahuja 
(1996). Megginson et al. (1994) compare the pre- and post-privatisation financial and 
operating performance of 61 companies, across 18 countries and 32 industries, between 1961 
and 1990. Hart and Ahuja (1996) examine the effect of emission reduction objectives on the 
accounting performance of 127 manufacturing, mining, and production firms between 1989 
and 1992. 
An analysis of accounting performance would have relevance to both internal controls 
and external evaluation of energy utilities. The analysis of financial ratios would examine the 
impact of regulatory changes on realised profitability at firm-level. Further, Altman (1968) 
suggests that an analysis of financial ratios could be used by the utilities as an internal control 
which allows managers to identify strengths and weaknesses of their firm prior to distress and 
firm failure. Various financial ratios related to firm liquidity, leverage, profitability or cash 
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Appendix A. STOCK MARKET RISK FACTOR COMPARISON 
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, French (2015) provides access to monthly data 
regarding the three additional stock market risk factors to implement the four-factor model, 
including: size, value and momentum premia. The purpose is to allow researchers to 
implement three- and four-factor models without the task of calculating the additional risk 
factors. This thesis requires the manual calculation of the three additional stock market risk 
factors on a daily basis to examine the time-varying nature of risk premia (Chapters 4 and5) 
and to implement the event study approach surrounding regulatory changes (Chapter 6). 
Following the methodologies of Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
2006, 2012), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997), the three additional stock 
market risk factors are calculated. Guidelines regarding adaptations for daily data are 
provided on French’s (2015) website. 
As the three premiums represent zero-investment portfolios, with both long- and short-
positions, the cumulative returns of the investment strategy can be calculated. The cumulative 
returns on the three premiums are calculated as 𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 × (1 + 𝑟𝑡), with 𝑐𝑟𝑡 forming a 
daily index through time. To convert the daily index to a monthly index, the values of 𝑐𝑟𝑡 are 
extracted on the last day of each month, between July 1996 and June 2013. The first-log 
difference of the monthly index is calculated to represent the percentage change each month. 
This is a simple method to compare the percentage change of the three premiums in the thesis 
against the percentage change of French’s (2015) three premiums, on a monthly basis. 
French (2015) uses a mean of 4,887 European companies, each month, to calculate the 
risk factors. No additional information regarding sample composition is provided. Due to data 
constraints, computational power and the discussion in Section 4.2.3, the thesis’ sample is 
limited to the STOXX® 600 Europe index. However, the STOXX® 600 Europe index is 
designed to represent small, mid and large market capitalisations across a variety of sectors 
and therefore should be representative of European firms. A priori, some minor differences 
between the two return series may exist due to the methods of calculation and different 
sample sizes, but the general tenor of the results to be similar. 
Figure A.1 presents the return series of the three stock market risk factors of this thesis 
compared with French’s three factors. The thesis’ factors (A1, B1 and C1) appear to have 
similar return profiles to French’s (A2, B2 and C2), with relatively synchronised peaks and 
troughs throughout the time periods. Superficially, it appears that French’s 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor (Plot 
A2) has greater magnitudes of changes than the thesis’ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor (Plot A1). This may be 
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due to the differences in samples. French’s larger sample is likely to have a different 
composition of small and big firms, compared with the STOXX® 600 Europe Index. 
However, periods of volatility clustering occur in similar locations through time. The thesis’ 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor (Plot B1) is relatively similar to French’s (Plot B2). French’s 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor is more 
volatile in earlier years. The thesis’ 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factor (Plot C1) shows greater volatility than 







FIGURE A.1: COMPARISON OF THESIS’ THREE FACTORS AGAINST FRENCH’S THREE FACTORS 
This figure illustrates the monthly returns on the three stock market risk factors (size, value and momentum premia) for the 
thesis and French (2015). The daily return for the thesis’ stock market risk factors is outlined in Section 4.2.4. The method of 
transformation to monthly data is provided in this thesis. French’s  monthly stock market risk factors are extracted from 























































































































































































































































































































































(C2) French UMD Factor 
D.J. Tulloch© 
273 
Pairwise correlations between the three factors of the thesis and French were 
performed using monthly data between July 1996 and June 2013, with associated level of 
significance. The results are shown in Table A.1. The results of the pairwise correlations show 
strong correlation between the thesis’ and French’s three factors, with correlations of 0.602 
for 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 0.810 for 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 0.871 for 𝑈𝑀𝐷 factors; all three correlations are significant at 
𝑝 ≤ 0.001. Overall, the pairwise correlations are relatively consistent between the three 
factors. One difference between the two calculations appears to be the pairwise correlation 
between the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factor. For French’s 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵-𝐻𝑀𝐿 correlation was -
0.126, 𝑝 ≤ 0.1. For the thesis’ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factors, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵-𝐻𝑀𝐿 correlation was 0.209, 𝑝 ≤ 0.01. 
However, the magnitude of the correlation coefficient still meets the condition of Fama and 
French (1993): the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors have low correlation and do not bias each other. 
Multicollinearity tests will be implemented on empirical analyses to ensure this proposition 
holds. The 𝑈𝑀𝐷-𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝑈𝑀𝐷-𝐻𝑀𝐿 correlations have similar direction, magnitude and 
significance between the thesis’ calculations and French’s calculations. 
 
TABLE A.1: PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE THESIS’ AND FRENCH’S RISK FACTORS 
This table shows the pairwise correlations between the three stock market risk factors of 
this thesis and those of French (2015). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 





𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 1.000 
            𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ -0.126 1.000 
    
 
* 
     𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 0.110 -0.282 1.000 
   
  
**** 




    𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  -0.037 0.810 -0.448 0.209 1.000
 
  
**** **** *** 
  𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  0.136 -0.181 0.871 0.040 -0.355 1.000
 




The overall conclusion is that the monthly returns of the three risk factors are 
relatively similar between this thesis and French (2015). The differences are likely due to the 
larger sample available to French, compared with fewer companies available in the thesis 
sample. The large positive correlations and strong significance between French’s three factors 
and the thesis’ three factors shows that the methods of calculating the risk factors can 
reasonably reproduce French’s (2015) time series. The results of the thesis can be interpreted 
with greater confidence.  
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Appendix B.  
DELINEATING THE SAMPLE ON SIZE AND BE/ME 
B.1. The STOXX® 600 Europe firms 
Using a similar method to Fama and French (1993), the 600 firms of the STOXX® 
600 Europe index are sorted into a 5 × 5 matrix based on market capitalisation and 
(independently) on book-to-market ratios. Market capitalisations and BE/MEs at end of fiscal 
years are used for the sorting. The intersections of the matrix form 25 portfolios from the size 
and BE/ME quintiles. To examine the sorting method, the mean market capitalisation, book 
value of equity, BE/ME ratio and number of firms per intersection are calculated. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in Table B.1. 
 
TABLE B.1: SIZE AND BOOK-TO-MARKET PORTFOLIOS FOR EUROPEAN STOCKS 
Descriptive statistics for 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market quintiles. Portfolios are formed using annual data between 1996 
and 2013. Market capitalisation and book value of equity is quoted in € billions. BE/ME ratios are calculated using firm size and book 
value of equity values within this table. Number of firms in portfolios includes firms where one or more observations, across all years, 
were identified as belonging to the portfolio. 
 Book-to-Market Equity (BE/ME) Quintiles 
 
PANEL A 
Average of Annual Averages of 
Market Cap. (€ Billion) 
 PANEL B 
BE/ME Ratios 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High  Low 2 3 4 High 
Small  0.8   0.8   0.8   0.8   0.7   0.17 0.33 0.52 0.77 1.49 
2  2.2   2.3   2.3   2.1   2.1   0.17 0.33 0.52 0.75 1.47 
3  4.8   4.9   4.9   5.0   4.9   0.17 0.33 0.50 0.74 1.46 
4  12.0   12.0   12.1   12.4   11.8   0.17 0.33 0.49 0.72 1.39 
Big  72.4   66.9   62.4   63.2   49.1   0.16 0.33 0.50 0.73 1.31 
            
 
PANEL C 
Average of Annual Averages of 
Book Value of Equity (€ Billion) 
 PANEL D 
Average of Annual Number of Firms in 
Portfolio 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High  Low 2 3 4 High 
Small  0.1   0.3   0.4   0.6   1.0    93   98   101   115   122  
2  0.4   0.8   1.2   1.5   3.1    112   116   125   122   116  
3  0.8   1.6   2.5   3.7   7.2    105   131   139   120   108  
4  2.1   4.0   5.9   9.0   16.3    97   128   139   117   81  
Big  11.6   22.3   31.4   46.2   64.4    78   93   104   90   57  
 
Table B.1, Panel A shows that the sample can be reliably delineated on size. Each row 
for size is relatively uniform. The only exception include the largest firms, where big, low-
BE/ME firms tend to be larger than big, high-BE/ME firms; also found by Fama and French 
(1993). Across the smallest size quintile, firm size ranges between €705.5 million and €847.0 
million, while the largest size quintile captures firms between €49,117.2 million and 
€72,359.4 million. The sort on size should lead to reliable calculations of size premium.  
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Panel B shows that the BE/ME ratios are relatively uniform across columns, showing 
that the sample can be delineated by book-to-market ratio. Despite varying market 
capitalisations and book values of equity, a striking feature of is the uniform nature of the 
BE/ME ratios. The consistency across columns shows that the sort is largely free from the 
impact of size. The high-BE/ME quintile ranges from 1.31 to 1.49, while the low BE/ME 
quintile ranges between 0.16 and 0.17. These results mirror Fama and French (1993). The sort 
on BE/ME ratio should also lead to reliable calculations of value premium. 
Although Fama and French (1993) do not report book value of equity portfolios, some 
interesting results can be observed in Panel C. While market capitalisation (Panel A) is 
relatively constant across size quintiles, Panel C shows that, across each row, the high BE/ME 
firms typically have larger book value of equity. This indicates the high-BE/ME quintile is 
capturing larger firms which have lost market value. In contrast, the low-BE/ME quintile 
captures smaller firms which are trading well above book-value. This would be consistent 
with firms which are perceived to be distressed.  
Finally, Panel D shows that the majority of stocks are located in the middle quintiles, 
avoiding extreme size or BE/ME ratios. 
B.2. The 88 European Energy Utilities 
Following the method above (Section B.1), the 88 European utilities are sorted into a 
5 × 5 matrix based on market capitalisation and (independently) on book-to-market ratios, 
forming 25 portfolios from the size and BE/ME quintiles. The results are shown in Table B.2. 
The results in Table B.2 (Panel A) show that the energy sample can also be reliably 
delineated on size. The average firm size for the small quintile ranges between €130.3 million 
and €247.9 million,
74
 while the big quintile ranges from €24,129.7 million to €43,220.9 
million. Typically, the average market capitalisation for the 600 European stocks in Table B.1 
tends to be larger than the 88 European energy utilities in Table B.2. Thus, the global size 
premium in Chapter 4 may have produced biased estimated 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficients for the energy 
utility sector, as most energy utilities are of different size to most European firms. Despite the 
smaller mean sizes observed in Table B.2, the econometric results in Chapter 4 (Table 4.5) 
and Chapter 5 (Table 5.5) will show that big utilities dominate sector returns.  
                                                 
74
 Due to rounding, these values appear as 0.1 and 0.2 in Table B.2. The values are located in smallest size 
quintile of Panel A. 
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TABLE B.2: SIZE AND BOOK-TO-MARKET PORTFOLIOS FOR EUROPEAN ENERGY UTILITIES 
Descriptive statistics for 25 portfolios for 88 European energy utilities formed on size and book-to-market quintiles. Portfolios are formed 
using annual data between 1996 and 2013. Market capitalisation and book value of equity are quoted in € billions. BE/ME ratios are 
calculated using firm size and book value of equity values within this table. Number of energy utilities in portfolios includes firms where 
one or more observations, across all years, were identified as belonging to the portfolio. 
 Book-to-Market Equity (BE/ME) quintiles 
 
PANEL A 
Average of Annual Average of 
Market Cap. (€ Billion) 
 PANEL B 
BE/ME Ratio 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High  Low 2 3 4 High 
Small  0.1   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.1    0.28 0.46 0.68 0.77 1.80 
2  2.1   0.9   1.3   1.3   1.0    0.28 0.44 0.53 0.81 1.67 
3  3.9   5.3   5.4   3.8   2.6    0.33 0.44 0.63 0.76 1.15 
4  11.7   11.3   9.4   6.1   3.0    0.25 0.43 0.63 0.77 1.07 
Big  24.1   33.2   31.4   30.8   43.2    0.26 0.41 0.57 0.77 1.39 
            
 
PANEL C 
Average of Annual Average 
Book Value of Equity (€ Billion) 
 PANEL D 
Number of Energy Utilities in Portfolio 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High  Low 2 3 4 High 
Small  0.0   0.1   0.2   0.1   0.2    6   9   6   9   13  
2  0.6   0.4   0.7   1.0   1.7    10   15   14   16   18  
3  1.3   2.3   3.4   2.9   3.0    15   13   19   15   11  
4  2.9   4.8   5.9   4.7   3.2    15   16   20   17   6  
Big  6.3   13.6   17.8   23.7   60.1    10   12   13   8   2  
 
In nearly all cases, Panel B shows that the 88 European energy utilities in Table B.2 
have higher average BE/ME ratios than the 600 European stocks (see Table B.1), indicating 
that energy utilities are perceived to be more distressed than most European stocks. The low-
BE/ME (growth) firm’s ratios range between 0.25 and 0.33, while the high-BE/ME (value) 
firm’s ratios range between 1.07 and 1.80. The small, high-BE/ME energy utilities have 
highest BE/ME ratio of all energy utilities and all European stocks (see Table B.1). This 
indicates that these energy utilities are far more distressed than most European stocks. While 
the sample can reliably be delineated on BE/ME ratios, there is a peculiar observation within 
the highest-BE/ME quintile. Within the high-BE/ME quintile, the energy utilities
75
 in size 
quintiles 3 and 4 have lower BE/ME ratios relative to other high-BE/ME elements. These 
BE/ME ratios are also lower than the equivalent European stock in the same elements (see 
Table B.1). The market must perceive some benefit for these companies, making them less 
risky in comparison with other energy utilities or European stocks. Many of these energy 
utilities represent some of the largest in Europe. The perceived benefit could be market 
dominance, a motivation for the liberalisation objectives (see Section 2.2.1). 
                                                 
75
 Quintile 3, high-BE/ME: Bewag, Cez, Fesca, Hyder, International Power, Lahmeyer, Public Power, Sydkraft, 
Union Fenosa, Vattenfall, and Verbund. Quintile 4, high-BE/ME: Bewag, Cez, Fortum, Sydkraft, Union Fenosa.  
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Regarding the book value of equity for European energy utilities (Panel C), the big 
and high-BE/ME element of the matrix has the greatest book-value of equity, while the small 
and low-BE/ME element have the lowest book-value of equity. The average book value of 
equity for energy utilities is typically smaller than the average book value of equity for 
European stocks (see Table B.1). Exceptions include the mid- to low-BE/ME stocks between 
the 2 to 4 size quintiles. These energy utilities tend to have a greater book value of equity than 
most European stocks. This may suggest that extremely big utilities are under particular 
pressure and investors shift their wealth from the largest to medium size energy utilities. The 
largest energy utilities become value firms, while medium size energy utilities become growth 
firms. This would certainly be consistent with the intended liberalisation and competition 
objectives in Section 2.2.1, negating the market dominance from the largest energy utilities. It 
may also explain why these energy utilities tend to have large book values of equity. 
Concerning the distribution of energy utilities (Panel D), the results are similar to 
those observed in Table B.1. The number of energy utilities in each portfolio shows that most 




Appendix C.  
COMPARISON OF RISK PREMIUMS WITH EXTANT LITERATURE 
C.1. Comparison of Chapter 4 and Faff and Brailsford (1999) 
Faff and Brailsford (1999) examine oil price risk across 24 Australian industries, using 
monthly data between July 1983 and March 1996. The coefficients are estimated using the 
following specification: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖[𝑅𝑚𝑡] + 𝑜𝑖𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 (A.1) 
Table C.1 compares the estimated coefficients from Faff and Brailsford (1999) to 
those obtained from the augmented-CAPM model (Equation 4.2) from Chapter 4 (See Table 
4.5). For a simple comparison, the results only included oil coefficients - term structure and 
other commodity risk factors are omitted. 
 
TABLE C.1: COMPARISON OF THESIS RESULTS TO FAFF AND BRAILSFORD (1999) 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the augmented-
CAPM of Table 4.5, compared with the estimated coefficients of 
the two-factor model in Faff and Brailsford (1999).  
 Thesis Coefficients 
 Faff and Brailsford 
(1999) 
 
Market Oil  FB 
Market 
FB Oil 
Banks 1.2385 -0.0115  0.7691 -0.0873 
Oil & gas 0.9345 0.0719  0.9772 0.2349 
Industrials 0.9872 0.0019  0.6892 0.0119 
Insurance 1.2125 -0.0100  0.8821 0.0886 
Retail 0.7792 -0.0177  0.8581 -0.0439 
Media 0.9795 -0.0039  1.1810 -0.0850 
Chemicals 0.9148 0.0009  0.8017 -0.0424 
Financials 1.2206 -0.0090  0.7486 0.0526 
 
Overall, the results are qualitatively similar. Typically, Faff and Brailsford’s (1999) 
results show greater magnitude of oil price risk but lower magnitudes of systematic risk 
exposure. Of the oil price risk coefficients, three of the coefficients from this thesis are a 
different sign to Faff and Brailsford (1999). The differences in oil price risk may be due to 
Faff and Brailsford’s (1999) calculation of oil returns, where oil is scaled by exchange rate. 
Moreover, the banking, financial and insurance sectors of the Australian market appear to 
have much lower market beta’s compared with the equivalent European sectors. The 
differences in results are likely to be due to the fact that: 1) the two analyses are conducted 
over different time periods, 1983 to 1996 (Faff and Brailsford, 1999) versus 1996 to 2013 
(this thesis), 2) different markets are analysed, the Australian and European markets, and 3) 
Faff and Brailsford (1999) examines stock returns, while this thesis examines excess stock 
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returns. Regarding the former point, the time series in this thesis has been subject to the dot-
com, GFC and EUC, which will affect estimated of systematic risk. Further, the purpose of 
the comparison is to examine whether estimated coefficients are in the same direction, rather 
than to replicate the model in its entirety. 
C.2. Comparison of Chapter 4 and Fama and French (1997) 
Table C.2 shows the results of Fama and French (1997), who examine risk loadings 
between the CAPM and three-factor asset pricing model. Fama and French (1997) implement 
the three-factor model on 48 industries, between July 1963 and December 1994, based on 
evidence that the CAPM is insufficient at explaining expected stock returns (Fama and 
French, 1992). Fama and French (1997) report substantial inter-sectoral variability in the 
relationship between the stock returns and additional risk factors: market returns, size 
premium and value premium. Fama and French (1997) estimate their coefficients using the 
standard CAPM and three-factor specifications: 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐹 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖[𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹] + 𝑒𝑖 (C.1) 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐹 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖[𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹] + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑖 (C.2) 
The coefficients for this thesis are based on the CAPM and four-factor specifications 
in Equations (4.1) and (4.3) of Chapter 4, omitting momentum from the reported coefficients 
(see Table 4.5). Table C.2 provides a summary of Fama and French’s (1997) estimated 
coefficients, including sectors which are comparable to those investigated in Chapter 4. 
 
TABLE C.2: SUMMARY OF FAMA AND FRENCH (1997) EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This table presents the estimated coefficients extracted from Fama and French (1997), using the CAPM and the three-factor model. Based 
on Fama and French’s (1997) results, the mean and median coefficients are calculated. 
 CAPM  Three-Factor Asset Pricing Model 
 𝑎 𝑡(𝑎) 𝑏 𝑅2  𝑎 𝑡(𝑎) 𝑏 𝑠 ℎ 𝑅2 
Utilities -0.00 -0.02 0.66 0.55  -0.17 -1.33 0.79 -0.20 0.38 0.62 
Banks -0.04 -0.26 1.09 0.76  -0.25 -1.84 1.13 0.13 0.35 0.79 
EnergyA 0.13 0.71 0.85 0.50  0.08 0.45 0.96 -0.35 0.21 0.54 
Telecommunications 0.13 0.92 0.66 0.52  -0.02 -0.11 0.79 -0.23 0.35 0.59 
MachineryB -0.11 -0.86 1.16 0.82  -0.15 -1.22 1.11 0.25 -0.00 0.83 
Insurance 0.08 0.39 1.01 0.58  0.03 0.14 1.00 0.09 0.06 0.58 
Retail 0.07 0.48 1.11 0.73  0.06 0.37 1.04 0.27 -0.06 0.75 
ComputersC -0.11 -0.55 1.04 0.59  0.13 0.66 0.90 0.17 -0.49 0.63 
FunD 0.21 0.91 1.35 0.64  0.08 0.40 1.17 0.83 -0.04 0.73 
Chemicals -0.02 -0.17 1.09 0.81  -0.10 -0.85 1.13 -0.03 0.17 0.81 
Finance 0.19 1.14 1.16 0.72  0.12 0.75 1.11 0.30 0.02 0.74 
Mean 0.05 0.24 1.02 0.66  -0.02 -0.23 1.01 0.11 0.09 0.69 
Median 0.07 0.39 1.09 0.64  0.03 0.14 1.04 0.13 0.06 0.73 
A Petroleum and natural gas companies, proxy for the oil & gas sector. 
B Machinery companies, proxy for Industrials. 
C Proxy for Technology sector. 
D Defined as Entertainment firms, proxy for Media Sector. 
 
Figure C.1 shows that the estimated market betas using the CAPM specification are 
similar between this thesis and those of Fama and French (1997). Estimated coefficients for 
the three-factor specifications are shown in Figure C.2. Of the 33 pairs of coefficients (market 
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factor, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 across 11 sectors) in Figure C.2, all are in the same direction, except 
four pairs: 𝑆𝑀𝐵 coefficients in the Insurance, Technology, and Chemicals sectors, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 
coefficients in the Telecommunications sector. The minor differences may be due to the 
influence of the momentum factor on estimated coefficients. Again, the time-period analysed 
could be a factor which affects the results: particularly as the thesis sample includes the dot-
com collapse, GFC and EUC. Further, the comparison between the U.S. and Europe may 
produce different results. Qualitatively, the results are similar. 
 
FIGURE C.1 COMPARISON OF MARKET BETA FROM CAPM SPECIFICATION 
This figure reports the estimated coefficients for the CAPM specification of this thesis (Equation 4.1) and the CAPM 
specification of Fama and French (1997). The Market betas are compared across 11 sectors in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
FIGURE C.2: COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED STOCK MARKET RISK FACTOR COEFFICIENTS 
This figures illustrates a comparison of the estimated coefficients for the market factor, size premium and value premium. For 
the thesis, the estimated coefficients are extracted from the four-factor model in Equation (4.3). For Fama and French (1997), 
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Appendix D. INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
TABLE D.1: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF HIGH-BE/ME PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the high-BE/ME portfolio (𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉) 
is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk 
(𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The 
specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A -0.0002 
 
0.3681 **** -0.2631 *** 0.7317 **** -0.0127 
 




-0.0120    80.89% 70.31 **** 
1997 0.0002 
 








0.0072    82.54% 154.63 **** 
1998 0.0008 
 








0.0047    69.98% 76.78 **** 
1999 0.0000 
 








-0.0057    76.75% 108.31 **** 
2000 0.0004 
 








-0.0222 **   51.88% 35.91 **** 
2001 -0.0001 
 






0.0693 ** 0.0124    65.97% 64.00 **** 
2002 -0.0008 
 








-0.0004    60.11% 49.96 **** 








0.0005    62.85% 55.97 **** 






0.0065    78.60% 120.83 **** 
2005 0.0010 * 0.6787 **** 0.0501 
 






0.0018    59.75% 49.07 **** 
2006 0.0001 
 




0.0688 ** -0.0037 
 
0.0027  0.0043  72.76% 77.86 **** 
2007 0.0007 
 




0.1134 ** 0.0161 
 
0.0028  0.0009  55.17% 36.55 **** 
2008 0.0002 
 
0.5810 **** -0.0936 
 






-0.0528 * 0.0320 * 0.0038  44.39% 24.15 **** 
2009 -0.0004 
 




0.0482 * 0.0480 
 
-0.0042  0.0127  67.39% 60.69 **** 
2010 -0.0070 
 








-0.0054  -0.0435 * 88.75% 228.83 **** 
2011 -0.0034 
 








0.0211  0.0021  78.21% 104.27 **** 
2012 -0.0010 
 






-0.0446  -0.0044  76.09% 92.93 **** 
2013 A -0.0017 
 








0.0294  0.0019  74.39% 42.31 **** 
Mean: -0.0005  0.4392  -0.3685  0.6498  -0.0037  0.4011  0.0153  0.0006  0.0015  -0.0028  69.25%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.2: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF MID-BE/ME PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the mid-BE/ME portfolio (𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅) 
is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk 
(𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The 
specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒎𝒊𝒅 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0001 
 
0.5754 **** -0.4441 **** 0.0160 
 






-0.0074    62.93% 28.80 **** 
1997 0.0002 
 
0.6361 **** -0.3002 **** 0.0222 
 






0.0104    75.52% 101.27 **** 
1998 0.0002 
 








-0.1241 **** 0.0009    72.36% 86.07 **** 
1999 -0.0004 
 






0.0480 *** 0.0060    68.53% 71.78 **** 
2000 0.0005 
 










0.0001    32.15% 16.34 **** 
2001 0.0004 
 










0.0039    56.99% 44.07 **** 
2002 0.0002 
 










0.0016    80.01% 131.08 **** 
2003 0.0003 
 






-0.1014 *** 0.0018    79.41% 126.34 **** 






-0.0476 * 0.0032    54.90% 40.71 **** 
2005 0.0001 
 








0.0015    50.77% 34.39 **** 
2006 0.0005 
 
0.7980 **** -0.1699 **** -0.0715 
 
0.1564 ** 0.2175 
 
0.0677 *** -0.0153 
 
-0.0029  0.0192 **** 59.56% 43.38 **** 
2007 0.0005 
 




0.0438 ** -0.0103 
 
-0.0056  0.0002  70.59% 70.35 **** 
2008 0.0003 
 






-0.0425 * 0.0129  -0.0100 *** 85.23% 168.32 **** 
2009 0.0007 
 








-0.0046  -0.0084  72.11% 75.71 **** 
2010 -0.0017 
 




-0.0507 ** 0.0069  -0.0053  84.76% 161.66 **** 
2011 0.0014 
 






0.0241  0.0090  82.20% 133.86 **** 
2012 0.0010 
 






0.0092  0.0181  71.87% 74.81 **** 
2013 A -0.0011 
 






-0.0283  0.0011  70.02% 34.22 **** 
Mean: 0.0002  0.6352  -0.3280  -0.0250  -0.0162  -0.0697  0.0020  -0.0268  0.0019  0.0030  68.33%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.3: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF LOW-BE/ME PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the low-BE/ME portfolio (𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘) 
is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk 
(𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The 
specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A -0.0001  0.4400 **** -0.4968 **** -0.2347 **** -0.0741  1.0701 **** -0.0004  -0.0507  -0.0082    54.59% 20.68 **** 
1997 0.0002  0.4339 **** -0.4735 **** -0.2093 **** 0.0312  -0.1748  0.0140  0.0219  0.0065    56.22% 42.73 **** 
1998 0.0005  0.3509 **** -0.4136 **** -0.3101 **** -0.0824 * 0.0967  0.0379 ** 0.0091  -0.0005    57.12% 44.29 **** 
1999 -0.0001  0.3591 **** -0.5947 **** -0.4195 **** -0.1419 ** 0.0937  -0.0390 * 0.0206  -0.0071    63.69% 58.00 **** 
2000 0.0008  0.3183 **** -0.4040 **** -0.2719 **** 0.0192  -0.9404 * 0.0111  0.0548  0.0023    44.16% 26.60 **** 
2001 0.0004  0.4038 **** -0.3451 **** -0.1945 **** -0.0810  0.3614  0.0091  0.0387  0.0062    59.54% 48.83 **** 
2002 -0.0004  0.2799 **** -0.3025 **** -0.1535 **** -0.0786 ** -0.1780  -0.0394  0.0624  0.0078    70.55% 78.87 **** 
2003 0.0006 ** 0.3905 **** -0.4545 **** -0.3139 **** -0.1128 *** 0.2936  -0.0128  -0.0409  -0.0089    80.41% 134.41 **** 
2004 0.0008 *** 0.5744 **** -0.2359 **** -0.1680 **** 0.0570  0.0316  0.0052  -0.0035  0.0045    57.21% 44.63 **** 
2005 0.0005  0.9060 **** -0.0969 ** -0.1872 **** 0.1134 * 0.3617  -0.0038  -0.0243  -0.0028    61.45% 52.60 **** 
2006 0.0005 ** 0.6948 **** -0.1090 **** -0.2244 **** -0.0369  0.1236  0.0381 ** 0.0064  0.0054  0.0014  63.34% 50.72 **** 
2007 0.0003  0.5282 **** -0.2182 **** -0.1803 **** 0.0927 * -0.5295  0.0758 *** -0.0027  -0.0056  0.0017  54.35% 35.40 **** 
2008 -0.0004  0.5267 **** -0.4013 **** -0.5189 **** -0.0256  0.2874  0.0551 * -0.0633 *** 0.0343 ** 0.0038  80.35% 119.56 **** 
2009 -0.0004  0.4441 **** -0.4462 **** -0.4469 **** -0.1598 *** 0.1093  0.0223  0.0495 *** -0.0082  0.0152  75.82% 91.56 **** 
2010 -0.0177 ** 0.5007 **** -0.4349 **** -0.3346 **** -0.0678 * 10.0670 ** 0.0646 *** -0.0300  0.0054  -0.0044  71.23% 72.52 **** 
2011 -0.0013  0.7587 **** -0.2134 *** -0.1249 * -0.0932 ** 0.2953  0.0168  0.0357  -0.0223  0.0049  76.56% 95.02 **** 
2012 -0.0010  0.5730 **** -0.0809 * -0.0834 *** -0.1350 **** 0.5692  -0.0139  -0.0032  -0.0571 ** 0.0121  52.45% 32.87 **** 
2013 A -0.0037  0.6389 **** -0.0091  -0.2500 **** -0.1819 *** 2.0413  0.0184  0.0398  -0.0618 * 0.0108  42.47% 11.50 **** 
Mean: -0.0011  0.5068  -0.3184  -0.2570  -0.0532  0.7766  0.0144  0.0067  -0.0061  0.0057  62.31%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.4: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF UPPER MOMENTUM PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the upper momentum portfolio 
(𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓) is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil 
risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The 
specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0002  0.3344 **** -0.2382 **** -0.0023  0.4795 **** 0.2458  -0.0093  -0.0122  -0.0048    67.02% 34.27 **** 
1997 0.0007 *** 0.1959 **** -0.0686 * 0.0162  0.6927 **** -0.1475  0.0098  -0.0490 * 0.0053    80.48% 135.00 **** 
1998 0.0006 * 0.2368 **** -0.1395 **** -0.0497  0.3915 **** 0.0910  0.0123  -0.0075  -0.0008    67.50% 68.49 **** 
1999 -0.0005 * 0.1755 **** -0.3527 **** 0.0792 ** 0.5015 **** 0.0769  0.0260 * 0.0356 ** 0.0060    64.29% 59.51 **** 
2000 0.0008 * 0.1737 **** -0.1738 **** -0.0052  0.6126 **** -0.0767  0.0156  -0.0290  -0.0098    67.54% 68.38 **** 
2001 0.0004  0.2104 **** -0.1613 **** -0.0246  0.4728 **** -0.0390  0.0072  0.0328  -0.0015     50.41% 34.03 **** 
2002 0.0002  0.2435 **** -0.2354 **** 0.0610  0.4827 **** -0.8698 * -0.0127  -0.0294  0.0058    60.08% 49.92 **** 
2003 0.0003  0.1262 **** -0.1730 **** 0.0002  0.2826 **** 0.1074  -0.0008  0.0073  -0.0067 *   42.08% 24.61 **** 
2004 0.0006 *** 0.2693 **** -0.1310 **** 0.0040  0.5740 **** -0.0569  -0.0084  -0.0052  0.0062    73.14% 89.86 **** 
2005 0.0002  0.3641 **** 0.0135  0.0139  0.6878 **** 0.1501  -0.0145  -0.0167  0.0002    68.77% 72.29 **** 
2006 0.0001  0.3627 **** -0.0208  -0.0291  0.5686 **** -0.0698  0.0040  -0.0110  0.0061 ** 0.0113 **** 74.02% 82.98 **** 
2007 0.0005 ** 0.2984 **** -0.0734 ** -0.0610 ** 0.4984 **** -0.1706  0.0339 ** -0.0079  0.0003  -0.0015 ** 62.51% 49.16 **** 
2008 -0.0001  0.2565 **** -0.1121 ** -0.2097 **** 0.4449 **** 0.4696 * 0.0186  0.0018  0.0188 *** -0.0017  72.62% 77.93 **** 
2009 0.0003  0.1698 **** -0.1717 **** -0.1440 **** 0.4076 **** -0.2086  0.0357 *** 0.0166  0.0145 * 0.0169  49.08% 28.85 **** 
2010 -0.0042  0.3097 **** -0.1397 **** -0.1124 **** 0.3553 **** 2.5128  0.0289  -0.0065  0.0010  -0.0074  64.39% 53.23 **** 
2011 0.0011  0.3631 **** -0.0732 * -0.0120  0.3542 **** -0.7132  0.0384 * -0.0086  0.0027  0.0114  65.89% 56.60 **** 
2012 -0.0004  0.3729 **** -0.0964 *** 0.0400  0.2434 **** 0.1418  -0.0012  -0.0034  -0.0077  -0.0062  52.53% 32.97 **** 
2013 A 0.0013  0.3793 **** -0.0551  0.0893 ** 0.3904 **** -0.6031  0.0243  0.0022  -0.0494 * 0.0058  60.07% 22.40 **** 
Mean: 0.0001  0.2690  -0.1335  -0.0192  0.4689  0.0467  0.0115  -0.0050  -0.0008  0.0036  63.47%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.5: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF MEDIUM MOMENTUM PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the medium momentum portfolio 
(𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎) is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), 
oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0000  0.4734 **** -0.3540 * 0.1008  0.1691 ** 0.6808 * -0.0048  -0.0973  -0.0047    42.24% 12.98 **** 
1997 0.0003  0.7019 **** -0.3228 **** 0.0108  -0.0915 ** -0.5271 * -0.0077  0.0260  0.0144    71.45% 82.35 **** 
1998 0.0001  0.4001 **** -0.3868 **** -0.0016  -0.0130  0.1255  -0.0074  -0.0956 ** -0.0023    56.24% 42.77 **** 
1999 0.0001  0.3108 **** -0.6111 **** 0.0102  0.0030  0.1911  -0.0254  0.0276  0.0006    55.86% 42.13 **** 
2000 0.0005  0.1554 *** -0.5195 **** 0.0300  0.0095  -0.3770  -0.0005  0.0931  0.0116    27.20% 13.10 **** 
2001 0.0008  0.3817 **** -0.4168 **** -0.0992  0.0444  0.2498  0.0345 * -0.0125  0.0078    52.37% 36.74 **** 
2002 0.0005  0.3473 **** -0.3027 **** -0.0438  -0.0123  -0.0339  -0.0399  0.0237  0.0196    63.06% 56.49 **** 
2003 0.0002  0.3986 **** -0.3258 **** -0.1098 *** 0.0552  0.0691  0.0066  -0.0759 ** 0.0014    67.67% 69.02 **** 
2004 0.0007 ** 0.5485 **** -0.1984 **** -0.0814 ** 0.0611  0.1664  0.0057  -0.0392  0.0094    52.56% 37.14 **** 
2005 0.0006  0.9585 **** -0.1484 **** -0.1555 **** 0.0614  0.1529  -0.0086  -0.0272  0.0025    63.75% 57.95 **** 
2006 0.0008 ** 0.8279 **** -0.2035 **** -0.1516 *** 0.1200 ** 0.2642  0.0509 ** -0.0127  -0.0028  0.0042  62.56% 49.08 **** 
2007 0.0006  0.6905 **** -0.2807 **** 0.0063  -0.0325  -0.7057  0.0486 * 0.0231  -0.0036  0.0006  63.82% 51.95 **** 
2008 0.0003  0.6744 **** -0.5190 **** -0.3852 **** 0.0482  -0.1099  0.0022  -0.0506 * 0.0182  -0.0088 * 83.14% 144.04 **** 
2009 -0.0002  0.6065 **** -0.4144 **** -0.1988 **** -0.0284  -0.2268  0.0090  -0.0054  -0.0116  -0.0144  69.51% 66.85 **** 
2010 -0.0016  0.7306 **** -0.3208 **** 0.0208  -0.0114  0.6162  0.0333  -0.0342  -0.0009  -0.0093  82.07% 133.24 **** 
2011 -0.0002  0.7863 **** -0.2633 **** 0.0809 * -0.0168  0.2662  0.0307  -0.0247  0.0215  -0.0006  83.28% 144.32 **** 
2012 0.0017  0.6941 **** -0.1712 *** 0.1519 **** -0.1960 **** -1.1958  -0.0189  -0.0301  -0.0326  0.0251 * 63.82% 51.95 **** 
2013 A -0.0043  0.8111 **** -0.2139 *** 0.0950 * -0.0580  2.3989  -0.0661  -0.0415  0.0142  -0.0003  65.69% 28.23 **** 
Mean: 0.0001  0.5832  -0.3318  -0.0400  0.0062  0.1114  0.0023  -0.0196  0.0035  -0.0004  62.57%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.6: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF DOWN MOMENTUM PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the down momentum portfolio (𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏) 
is used as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal 
risk (𝑅𝑐), natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0002  0.3344 **** -0.2382 **** -0.0023  -0.5205 **** 0.2458  -0.0093  -0.0122  -0.0048    73.00% 45.28 **** 
1997 0.0007 *** 0.1959 **** -0.0686 * 0.0162  -0.3073 **** -0.1475  0.0098  -0.0490 * 0.0053    41.35% 23.91 **** 
1998 0.0006 * 0.2368 **** -0.1395 **** -0.0497  -0.6085 **** 0.0910  0.0123  -0.0075  -0.0008    77.75% 114.56 **** 
1999 -0.0005 * 0.1755 **** -0.3527 **** 0.0792 ** -0.4985 **** 0.0769  0.0260 * 0.0356 ** 0.0060    68.94% 73.12 **** 
2000 0.0008 * 0.1737 **** -0.1738 **** -0.0052  -0.3874 **** -0.0767  0.0156  -0.0290  -0.0098     48.40% 31.36 **** 
2001 0.0004  0.2104 **** -0.1613 **** -0.0246  -0.5272 **** -0.0390  0.0072  0.0328  -0.0015    71.06% 80.81 **** 
2002 0.0002  0.2435 **** -0.2354 **** 0.0610  -0.5173 **** -0.8698 * -0.0127  -0.0294  0.0058    85.36% 190.46 **** 
2003 0.0003  0.1262 **** -0.1730 **** 0.0002  -0.7174 **** 0.1074  -0.0008  0.0073  -0.0067 *   91.85% 367.11 **** 
2004 0.0006 *** 0.2693 **** -0.1310 **** 0.0040  -0.4260 **** -0.0570  -0.0084  -0.0052  0.0062    55.34% 41.42 **** 
2005 0.0002  0.3641 **** 0.0135  0.0139  -0.3122 **** 0.1502  -0.0145  -0.0167  0.0002    38.59% 21.34 **** 
2006 0.0001  0.3627 **** -0.0208  -0.0291  -0.4314 **** -0.0698  0.0040  -0.0110  0.0061 ** 0.0113 **** 62.44% 48.83 **** 
2007 0.0005 ** 0.2984 **** -0.0734 ** -0.0610 ** -0.5016 **** -0.1706  0.0339 ** -0.0079  0.0003  -0.0015 ** 68.06% 62.57 **** 
2008 -0.0001  0.2565 **** -0.1121 ** -0.2097 **** -0.5551 **** 0.4696 * 0.0186  0.0018  0.0188 *** -0.0017  86.48% 186.47 **** 
2009 0.0003  0.1698 **** -0.1717 **** -0.1440 **** -0.5924 **** -0.2086  0.0357 *** 0.0166  0.0145 * 0.0169  81.69% 129.92 **** 
2010 -0.0042  0.3097 **** -0.1397 **** -0.1124 **** -0.6447 **** 2.5129  0.0289  -0.0065  0.0010  -0.0074  81.73% 130.22 **** 
2011 0.0011  0.3631 **** -0.0733 * -0.0120  -0.6458 **** -0.7132  0.0384 * -0.0086  0.0027  0.0114  88.62% 225.09 **** 
2012 -0.0004  0.3729 **** -0.0964 *** 0.0400  -0.7566 **** 0.1418  -0.0012  -0.0034  -0.0077  -0.0062  89.14% 238.06 **** 
2013 A 0.0013  0.3793 **** -0.0551  0.0893 ** -0.6096 **** -0.6030  0.0243  0.0022  -0.0494 * 0.0058  71.78% 37.17 **** 
Mean: 0.0001  0.2690  -0.1335  -0.0192  -0.5311  0.0467  0.0115  -0.0050  -0.0008  0.0036  71.20%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.7: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICITY-UTILITY PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the electricity portfolio (𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍) is used as 
the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), 
natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0000  0.4756 **** -0.3802 ** 0.0655  -0.0941 * 0.7704 ** -0.0366 ** -0.1304  -0.0039    51.65% 18.49 **** 
1997 0.0006  0.4699 **** -0.3225 **** 0.0397  0.2698 **** -0.3150  0.0390  0.0197  0.0112    60.61% 51.01 **** 
1998 0.0010 ** 0.4630 **** -0.2028 **** -0.0001  0.1145 *** 0.1388  -0.0037  0.0006  0.0049    70.29% 77.91 **** 
1999 -0.0003  0.3900 **** -0.3458 **** -0.1115 ** 0.0667  -0.0082  -0.0691 **** 0.0449 ** -0.0100    53.42% 38.28 **** 
2000 0.0005  0.2124 **** -0.3166 **** -0.0523  -0.0172  0.1115  0.0161  0.0329  -0.0020    33.62% 17.40 **** 
2001 -0.0002  0.3486 **** -0.2944 **** 0.0391  -0.2242 *** -0.1177  -0.0019  0.0291  0.0079    59.63% 49.00 **** 
2002 -0.0003  0.2663 **** -0.2977 **** 0.1035 * -0.1089 ** -0.0771  -0.0187  -0.0296  0.0121    56.00% 42.36 **** 
2003 0.0009 *** 0.4282 **** -0.4329 **** -0.1803 **** -0.1293 ** 0.0084  -0.0144  -0.0399  0.0025    73.01% 88.91 **** 
2004 0.0007 ** 0.5571 **** -0.2108 **** -0.0320  0.1945 *** 0.2813  -0.0011  -0.0416  0.0116    47.49% 30.51 **** 
2005 0.0004  0.7222 **** -0.0019  -0.0106  -0.0063  0.0619  -0.0067  -0.0119  0.0056    44.90% 27.38 **** 
2006 0.0006  0.8110 **** -0.0560  0.0270  0.0943  0.0592  0.0881 *** -0.0044  0.0033  0.0263 **** 60.34% 44.79 **** 
2007 0.0008  0.5877 **** -0.2613 **** 0.1647 *** 0.0340  -0.8856  0.1007 *** 0.0194  0.0014  0.0012  48.24% 27.92 **** 
2008 0.0000  0.6060 **** -0.3447 **** -0.4283 **** 0.0014  -0.0516  0.0569  -0.0536 * 0.0525 *** 0.0006  75.82% 91.96 **** 
2009 -0.0005  0.5841 **** -0.2657 **** -0.2309 **** -0.1550 **** 0.1607  0.0421 * 0.0666 **** -0.0166 * 0.0171  71.52% 73.53 **** 
2010 -0.0146 ** 0.5802 **** -0.2187 **** -0.1652 **** -0.1077 *** 8.2653 ** 0.0438 ** -0.0257  0.0089  0.0147  74.07% 83.51 **** 
2011 0.0002  0.7725 **** -0.0798  0.0406  -0.1140 ** -0.3479  0.0479  0.0174  -0.0008  -0.0040  71.81% 74.31 **** 
2012 -0.0008  0.5560 **** -0.0445  0.1416 **** -0.1369 ** 0.3973  -0.0026  -0.0352 ** -0.0216  0.0267 ** 56.95% 39.21 **** 
2013 A 0.0002  0.4079 **** -0.1427 ** 0.0674  -0.3009 **** 0.0308  0.0297  0.0050  -0.0252  0.0092  52.22% 16.54 **** 
Mean: -0.0006  0.5133  -0.2344  -0.0290  -0.0344  0.4713  0.0172  -0.0076  0.0023  0.0115  58.98%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.8: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS-UTILITY PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the natural gas portfolio (𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍) is used 
as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), 
natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A -0.0014  0.9479 ** -0.6848  -0.1610  -0.0654  2.6625 *** -0.0486  -0.2520  0.0650    17.50% 4.47 **** 
1997 -0.0004  0.6813 **** -0.2128 * -0.0715  0.3063 *** -0.3870  0.0390  0.0689  -0.0139    48.14% 31.17 **** 
1998 0.0003  0.7213 **** -0.5392 **** 0.0898  -0.0675  0.0139  0.0448  -0.1278  -0.0107    50.66% 34.37 **** 
1999 -0.0002  0.3833 **** -0.7406 **** 0.1542 * 0.0867  0.1423  0.1333 **** 0.1270 *** 0.0491    41.41% 23.97 **** 
2000 0.0012  0.1676 ** -0.7793 **** -0.1353  0.3127 **** -0.2193  0.0696  0.1341  0.0165    25.06% 11.82 **** 
2001 0.0011  0.5669 **** -0.4291 **** -0.1034  0.4484 **** 0.4888  0.0843 ** -0.0457  -0.0157    32.53% 16.67 **** 
2002 0.0008  0.6788 **** -0.5093 **** -0.0387  0.1984 **** -0.3175  0.0094  -0.0863  0.0133    63.51% 57.56 **** 
2003 0.0002  0.5127 **** -0.3617 **** -0.2292 **** -0.0203  0.4204  0.0148  -0.0795  0.0060    61.64% 53.21 **** 
2004 0.0009 * 0.5731 **** -0.2728 **** -0.2064 **** 0.0419  0.0400  0.0215  -0.0035  0.0028    39.95% 22.70 **** 
2005 0.0003  1.0614 **** -0.1096 * -0.1954 **** 0.0806  0.1169  0.0246  -0.0605 * 0.0038    48.35% 31.31 **** 
2006 0.0002  0.8086 **** -0.1030 * -0.2119 **** -0.1653 * 0.2331  0.0739 *** 0.0181  0.0027  0.0057  49.30% 28.99 **** 
2007 0.0002  0.7279 **** -0.1659 *** -0.1568 *** -0.1907 **** -0.4654  0.0391  -0.0479 * 0.0039  0.0002  64.31% 53.05 **** 
2008 0.0005  0.7996 **** -0.4206 **** -0.3017 **** 0.0025  -0.1630  -0.0496  -0.0099  0.0001  0.0058  77.08% 98.54 **** 
2009 0.0023  0.7347 **** -0.1230  -0.1859 *** -0.0789  -1.5111  0.0069  0.0147  -0.0032  -0.0259  58.75% 42.15 **** 
2010 -0.0035  0.8123 **** -0.1743 ** -0.1076 ** -0.0487  1.9819  0.0153  -0.0301  -0.0049  0.0038  75.87% 91.83 **** 
2011 0.0008  0.8628 **** -0.2361 **** 0.0363  0.0245  -0.3238  0.0399  0.0094  0.0377 * -0.0099  77.51% 100.18 **** 
2012 0.0000  0.9534 **** -0.2278 **** 0.0876 ** -0.0041  0.1518  -0.0078  -0.0037  0.0442 * -0.0157  68.77% 64.62 **** 
2013 A -0.0019  0.8121 **** -0.2499 ** 0.0810  0.0291  0.7552  -0.0602  -0.0311  0.0057  0.0007  50.70% 15.62 **** 
Mean: 0.0001  0.7114  -0.3522  -0.0920  0.0494  0.2011  0.0250  -0.0225  0.0112  -0.0044  52.84%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.9: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF MULTI-UTILITY PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the multi-utility portfolio (𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊) is used 
as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), 
natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0004  0.5625 **** -0.4948 **** -0.0987  0.3677 *** 0.0027  -0.0026  0.0796  -0.0207 *   51.11% 18.12 **** 
1997 0.0005  0.6570 **** -0.3820 **** -0.0909  -0.0917  -0.4963  -0.0313  -0.0111  0.0187    49.84% 33.30 **** 
1998 -0.0003  0.3701 **** -0.2729 **** -0.1379 ** -0.1863 *** -0.1075  0.0086  -0.1301 *** 0.0025    41.55% 24.10 **** 
1999 0.0001  0.2199 *** -0.8360 **** -0.1007  -0.1927 ** 0.0086  0.0075  -0.0196  -0.0169    38.04% 20.95 **** 
2000 0.0012  0.1583 *** -0.4197 **** 0.0176  -0.0809  -1.0490 * -0.0385  -0.0357  0.0091    19.99% 9.09 **** 
2001 0.0005  0.3202 **** -0.3579 **** -0.1371 ** -0.0840  0.2730  0.0022  -0.0029  0.0074    48.33% 31.40 **** 
2002 0.0004  0.5322 **** -0.2797 **** 0.0405  -0.0921 ** -0.2532  -0.0597 ** 0.0481  -0.0008    79.05% 123.65 **** 
2003 0.0005 * 0.4224 **** -0.2731 **** -0.0734 * -0.0102  0.1984  -0.0003  -0.0655 ** -0.0131 *   71.43% 82.26 **** 
2004 0.0009 *** 0.5509 **** -0.2104 **** 0.0105  0.0105  -0.0815  -0.0020  -0.0243  -0.0005    60.43% 50.82 **** 
2005 0.0004  0.7372 **** -0.1206 ** -0.1230 *** 0.1229  0.0627  -0.0258  -0.0041  -0.0075    48.61% 31.62 **** 
2006 0.0007 ** 0.6141 **** -0.2160 **** -0.1180 *** 0.1982 *** 0.0828  0.0137  -0.0088  0.0000  -0.0056  54.68% 35.72 **** 
2007 0.0005  0.5487 **** -0.2089 **** -0.1218 **** 0.1381 ** -0.5051  0.0376 * -0.0065  -0.0130 ** 0.0010  58.98% 42.53 **** 
2008 0.0002  0.6401 **** -0.5241 **** -0.4049 **** 0.0352  0.3179  0.0010  -0.0684 ** 0.0116  -0.0084 * 78.96% 109.83 **** 
2009 -0.0003  0.5408 **** -0.5173 **** -0.4105 **** -0.1263 ** 0.0262  -0.0007  0.0473 ** 0.0010  -0.0084  73.23% 80.03 **** 
2010 -0.0051  0.8307 **** -0.2789 **** -0.2161 **** -0.1463 **** 2.6826  0.0511 ** -0.0596 ** 0.0093  -0.0293  81.36% 127.10 **** 
2011 0.0001  0.8114 **** -0.3763 **** 0.1114  -0.0536  -0.1375  0.0066  -0.0336  0.0037  0.0201  79.72% 114.12 **** 
2012 0.0015  0.6360 **** -0.1729 ** 0.1867 **** -0.2500 **** -1.1037  -0.0405  -0.0306  -0.0131  -0.0020  62.25% 48.64 **** 
2013 A -0.0004  0.5338 **** -0.2407 **** 0.1038 ** -0.1476 *** 0.3417  -0.0575  0.0233  -0.0359  0.0015  67.37% 30.36 **** 
Mean: 0.0001  0.5381  -0.3435  -0.0868  -0.0327  0.0146  -0.0073  -0.0168  -0.0032  -0.0039  59.16%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.10: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF SMALL UTILITIES PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the small utility portfolio (𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍) is used 
as the dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), 
natural gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A -0.0001  0.4333 **** 0.3922 **** 0.2427 **** 0.0276  0.6542 **** -0.0091  -0.0273  -0.0073    62.94% 28.81 **** 
1997 0.0002  0.3732 **** 0.2993 **** 0.0739 ** 0.0168  -0.2364  0.0162  0.0077  0.0036    55.28% 41.17 **** 
1998 0.0005  0.3447 **** 0.3652 **** 0.0655  -0.0602 * 0.1161  0.0178  -0.0094  -0.0061    51.74% 35.84 **** 
1999 -0.0002  0.2601 **** 0.1579 *** 0.1291 *** -0.0333  0.1359  -0.0044  0.0062  -0.0043    23.74% 11.12 **** 
2000 0.0007  0.2021 **** 0.3772 **** -0.0202  -0.0162  -0.8204 * -0.0163  0.1278 ** -0.0152    21.07% 9.64 **** 
2001 0.0000  0.2708 **** 0.2782 **** 0.1561 ** 0.0050  0.0474  -0.0026  -0.0066  0.0082    31.10% 15.67 **** 
2002 -0.0013  0.4017 **** 0.6165 **** 0.5090 **** -0.0386  1.0659  -0.0300  -0.0060  0.0005    33.10% 17.08 **** 
2003 0.0002  0.3872 **** 0.3561 **** 0.0946 *** -0.1088 *** 0.3439 * -0.0198  -0.0215  0.0001    41.33% 23.89 **** 
2004 0.0009 **** 0.4857 **** 0.5661 **** 0.2802 **** 0.0537  0.1421  0.0029  -0.0325  0.0047    63.89% 58.72 **** 
2005 0.0005  0.7924 **** 0.6008 **** 0.2016 **** 0.1161 * 0.2235  -0.0141  0.0082  -0.0015    68.41% 71.11 **** 
2006 0.0005  0.6858 **** 0.5125 **** -0.0913 ** 0.0292  -0.2779  0.0844 **** 0.0002  0.0015  0.0126 ** 57.94% 40.65 **** 
2007 0.0005  0.6242 **** 0.4407 **** 0.0427  0.0327  -0.7237 * 0.0735 *** 0.0106  -0.0051  0.0036  67.90% 62.10 **** 
2008 -0.0002  0.4842 **** 0.4689 **** -0.1076  0.0312  0.0153  0.0209  -0.0461 ** 0.0261 ** -0.0023  63.90% 52.33 **** 
2009 0.0016  0.4545 **** 0.1923 **** -0.0900 ** -0.0407  -0.9220  0.0259  0.0424 * -0.0064  -0.0181  56.05% 37.84 **** 
2010 -0.0115  0.6727 **** 0.2606 **** 0.1274 *** -0.0745 ** 6.3937  0.0610 *** -0.0413 * 0.0029  -0.0077  69.25% 66.07 **** 
2011 0.0002  0.7821 **** 0.5167 **** 0.0602  -0.0049  -0.2048  0.0220  -0.0240  0.0162  0.0035  71.54% 73.32 **** 
2012 0.0008  0.6578 **** 0.4963 **** 0.1963 **** -0.2141 **** -1.0463  0.0122  -0.0250  0.0022  -0.0084  55.56% 37.12 **** 
2013 A -0.0013  0.7839 **** 0.4106 **** 0.1390 ** -0.0663  0.7960  0.0075  0.0259  0.0016  0.0031  57.85% 20.52 **** 
Mean: -0.0005  0.5054  0.4060  0.1116  -0.0192  0.3168  0.0138  -0.0006  0.0012  -0.0017  52.92%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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TABLE D.11: INTER-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF BIG UTILITIES PORTFOLIO USING THE LOCAL AFFM 
This table presents conditional annual local AFFM, estimated on a year-by-year basis using Newey-West HAC standard errors between 1996 and 2013. The value-weighted returns of the big utility portfolio (𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈) is used as the 
dependent variable. The nine risk factors include: market premium (𝑹𝒎), local size premium (𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵), local value premium (𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿), local momentum premium (𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷), term premium (𝑹𝒕𝒑), oil risk (𝑅𝑜), coal risk (𝑅𝑐), natural 
gas risk (𝑅𝑔) and carbon risk (𝑅𝑐𝑜2). The intercept and error term is denoted 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒, respectively. A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The specification used is: 
 
𝑹𝒃𝒊𝒈 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑹𝑚 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑹𝑡𝑝 + 𝑜𝑖𝑅𝑜 + 𝑐𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜 + 𝑔𝑖𝑅𝑔 + 𝑐𝑜2𝑖𝑅𝑐𝑜2 +  𝑒 
 








𝑔𝑖  𝑐𝑜2𝑖  𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = Sig. 
1996A 0.0000  0.5247 **** -0.5246 **** 0.0578  0.0801  0.4965 ** -0.0184  -0.0410  -0.0082    75.33% 51.01 **** 
1997 0.0001  0.5850 **** -0.3756 **** 0.0448  0.1692 **** -0.0563  0.0114  -0.0199  0.0078    80.57% 135.73 **** 
1998 0.0003  0.5018 **** -0.3889 **** 0.0004  -0.0388  0.0544  0.0113  -0.0846 **** 0.0006    78.21% 117.67 **** 
1999 -0.0003  0.3334 **** -0.6829 **** 0.0282  -0.0116  0.0240  -0.0075  0.0328 *** -0.0014    81.78% 146.85 **** 
2000 0.0006  0.2307 **** -0.4938 **** -0.0067  -0.0062  -0.4277  0.0030  0.0202  -0.0007    48.25% 31.18 **** 
2001 0.0003  0.3987 **** -0.4062 **** -0.0870  -0.0298  0.1759  0.0250 * -0.0196  0.0055    68.30% 71.03 **** 
2002 0.0001  0.5086 **** -0.3711 **** 0.0145  -0.0566 * -0.1639  -0.0297  0.0075  0.0032    85.49% 192.50 **** 
2003 0.0004 * 0.4729 **** -0.4135 **** -0.1636 **** -0.0915 ** 0.2900  -0.0048  -0.0739 ** -0.0024    85.36% 190.52 **** 
2004 0.0008 **** 0.5547 **** -0.2598 **** -0.0764 ** 0.0711  0.0324  0.0047  -0.0242  0.0038    67.38% 68.40 **** 
2005 0.0004  0.8422 **** -0.1667 **** -0.1208 **** 0.0751  0.1230  -0.0093  -0.0206  -0.0004    62.91% 55.92 **** 
2006 0.0005 ** 0.7600 **** -0.1781 **** -0.0899 ** 0.0579  0.1225  0.0529 *** -0.0052  0.0022  0.0090 ** 71.64% 73.70 **** 
2007 0.0006 * 0.6208 **** -0.2817 **** -0.0707 ** 0.0670  -0.3810  0.0594 ** -0.0085  -0.0041  0.0004 * 67.55% 61.15 **** 
2008 0.0001  0.6700 **** -0.5130 **** -0.3998 **** 0.0015  0.1152  0.0211  -0.0525 ** 0.0235 * -0.0033  85.83% 176.65 **** 
2009 0.0001  0.5777 **** -0.4738 **** -0.2701 **** -0.1032 ** -0.3213  0.0181  0.0299  -0.0050  0.0022  79.15% 110.69 **** 
2010 -0.0078  0.7606 **** -0.2786 **** -0.2027 **** -0.1284 **** 4.2559  0.0397 ** -0.0464 ** 0.0067  -0.0084  85.68% 173.81 **** 
2011 0.0000  0.8261 **** -0.3756 **** 0.0762  -0.0753 ** -0.1603  0.0229  -0.0079  0.0069  0.0070  84.95% 163.44 **** 
2012 -0.0001  0.7355 **** -0.2354 **** 0.1737 **** -0.1977 **** -0.0210  -0.0206  -0.0187  -0.0183  0.0133  74.95% 87.44 **** 
2013 A -0.0020  0.7301 **** -0.3212 **** 0.1598 *** -0.1971 *** 1.0855  -0.0399  -0.0079  -0.0307  0.0044  72.92% 39.30 **** 
Mean: -0.0003  0.5907  -0.3745  -0.0518  -0.0230  0.2913  0.0077  -0.0189  -0.0006  0.0031  75.35%   
A Due to rebalancing in June, data contains six months of observations. 
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Appendix E. THE FRACTION OF VARIANCE UNEXPLAINED 
Section 5.4.2.4 of Chapter 5 showed that the residuals of the unconditional regression 
captured some of the changing relationship between the average returns in the energy sector 
and the risk premia. The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate, algebraically, that at least 
some of the fraction of variance unexplained (FVU) by the unconditional local AFFM 
regression can be explained by allowing the relationship between average returns and risk 
premia to vary over time. This is because the assumption of parameter stability the intercept 
term of the model, as well as the risk premiums, to be the same across all companies (Chan et 
al., 1985). This implicitly assumes that the coefficient is also constant across time. Therefore, 
any violation of the pricing equation, deviations from predicted values, will be absorbed by 
the residuals. The preceding proposition can be expressed algebraically. Consider a standard 
OLS regression: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 (E.1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 denotes the dependent variable, 𝛼 denotes the intercept, 𝛽 denotes the slope with the 
risk factor, 𝑥𝑡 denotes the risk factor and 𝑒𝑡 denoes the error term. The parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
assumed to be stable. The error term captures the shift in risk parameters over partition 𝐻 so 
as 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 − ∆𝛼𝐻 − ∆𝛽𝐻, (E.2) 
where ∆𝛼𝐻 nd ∆𝛽𝐻 represent the shift in the intercept and risk parameter over the structural 
break, respectively, and 𝜇𝑡 represents the true firm-specific returns. Substituting (E.2) into 
(E.1) gives: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 − ∆𝛼𝐻 − ∆𝛽𝐻, 
factorised as 




Coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the estimated from the unconditional regression (Table 5.5), 
while coefficients ∆𝛼𝐻 and ∆𝛽𝐻 are the estimated shifts in the sequential break point test of 
the unconditional residuals (Table 5.12). The true firm-specific component of Equation (E.4), 
denoted are 𝜇𝑡 are the residuals shown in Figure 5.7, Plot (3B). The best method to capture 
the true firm-specific component of returns is to allow the intercept and slopes to vary during 
structural breaks. Further, the benefit of estimating sequential break points from the 
unconditional residuals is that the test is performed relative to the long-term risk parameters. 
That is, the coefficients and 𝑡-statistics in Table 5.12 test whether the parameter shift(s) 
during the structural break, ∆𝛼𝐻 and ∆𝛽𝐻, are statistically different from zero, where zero 
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represents no change to the full-period coefficients, 𝛼 and 𝛽. In doing so, the test is better able 
to detect changes in price risk. For example, natural gas risk becomes statistically significant 
between April 2009 and January 2011. This coincides a rapid increase in natural gas prices 
following a period of relatively cheap gas (Plot H, Figure 4.3). This sudden increase in natural 
gas prices negatively impacted the energy sector. 
How can we deduce whether the sequential break point test on the residuals capture 
the variation of returns missed by the unconditional regression? This can be demonstrated by 
solving goodness of fit equation: the 𝑅2. The standard 𝑅2 specification is: 





where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the total sum of squares and 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 denotes the sum of squared residuals. Of 
interest is 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡⁄ , which is the unexplained variance of the residuals relative to the total 
variance – denoted the Fraction of Variance Unexplained (FVU). If the partial break point 
tests are able to capture a greater proportion of this FVU, decreasing the 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠, then there 
should be an associated increase in 𝑅2. Specifically, let 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐴 denote the fraction of variance 
unexplained for the unconditional model, and 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐵 denote the fraction of variance 
unexplained for the sequential break point regression. Divide 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐵 of the break point 
regression by 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐴 of the unconditional model to find the fraction of unexplained variance 
by both models, 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐶. Subtract 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐶 from 1 to find the coefficient of determination for the 
sequential break point regression on the residuals: 
𝑅𝐶


















2 represents the goodness of fit for the sequential break point regression on the 
unconditional residuals. That is, the test of the residuals explains a proportion of the 
previously unexplained variance equal to 𝑅𝐶
2. This can be adapted for adjusted 𝑅2 values, such 
as those provided in this thesis, where adjusted 𝑅2 is calculated as: 





where 𝑁 equals the number of observations and 𝑘 equals the number of parameters tested. 
Similar to Equation (E.6), Equation (E.7) is solved to show that the fraction of variance 



















while the adjusted 𝑅𝑐
2 is simply 1 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐶. Although Chapter 5 reports adjusted 𝑅
2, the 
unadjusted 𝑅𝐴
2 = 0.7282 for Table 5.5, while the unadjusted 𝑅𝐵
2 = 0.8077 for Table 5.10 
(omitted for brevity); 𝑁 = 4435, the number of parameters76 are equal to 𝑘𝑏 = 81 and 
𝑘𝐴 = 8. Substituting the values into Equation (E.8), the 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐵 = 0.1958 and 
𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐴 = 0.2722, which results in 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝐹𝑉𝑈𝐶 = 0.7193; therefore the 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝑅𝑐
2 of the 
sequential break point regression on the unconditional residuals is expected to be 1 −
0.7193 = 0.2807 or 28.07%. Note, the small differences between the manual calculations 
and that adjusted 𝑅2 provided in Table 5.12 (27.95%) is likely due to rounding error and some 
inference on the number of parameters for 𝑘𝑏, however, the value is reasonably accurate. 
E.1. Robustness Check – January Seasonals 
January seasonals is documented by Keim (1983), who finds that daily returns during 
the month of January tend to be abnormally high in relation to the remainder of the year. 
Further, the effect seems to be related to size, with small firms expected to produce 
abnormally high returns relative to big firms. In line with the robustness test of Fama and 
French (1993), this section examines the presence of January seasonals in the energy portfolio 
returns, local stock market risk factors, term premium, stock market risk factors and the three 
residuals extracted in Section 5.4.2.4. 
OLS regressions are implemented on the returns of the 12 energy sector portfolios, 
risk factors and the various measures of regression residuals – discussed in details shortly in 
Section 5.4.2.4. Following Fama and French (1993), a mean equation is specified as an 
intercept and a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 during January and zero 
otherwise. The intercept represents the average return over non-January months, while the 
slope of the dummy measures the difference between average returns in non-January months 
and the average returns in January. The results and model specification are shown in Table 
E.1. 
Overall, the January seasonals are mostly insignificant. The January dummies are 
insignificant for all 12 energy profiles. The local 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor shows some impact of January 
seasonals, congruent with Keim (1983) and Fama and French (1993). The spread in average 
returns between the small and big energy utilities widens in January, but the adjusted 𝑅2 is 
small (0.14%). Similar to Fama and French (1993), the January seasonals in the risk factors 
would have largely absorbed any seasonals in the stock returns – if present. Natural gas shows 
                                                 
76
 The parameters for the unconditional local AFFM, 𝑘𝐴, is the eight risk factors. For the sequential break point 
regression, the intercept and eight risk factors are allowed to vary across all partitions. The model detects nine 
separate partitions, therefore 𝑘𝑏 = 9 × 9 = 81 parameters. 
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some January seasonals, however natural gas was mostly insignificant in the empirical 
analyses. Finally, no January seasonals were detected in any residual calculations. 
 
TABLE E.1: TESTS FOR JANUARY SEASONALS 
Test for January seasonals in stock returns, risk factors, and residuals between 01/07/1996 and 28/06/2013. The 
mean equation is specified as: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖𝐽𝑎𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
Portfolios 𝛼𝑖  𝑑𝑖  𝑨𝒅𝒋. 𝑹
𝟐 𝑭 = 𝒑 
Energy Sector 0.0000  -0.0003  -0.02% 0.19  
High-BE/ME 0.0001  -0.0002  -0.02% 0.08  
Mid-BE/ME 0.0000  -0.0002  -0.02% 0.09  
Low-BE/ME -0.0001  -0.0006  0.00% 1.05  
Upper momentum 0.0003 *** 0.0001  -0.02% 0.14  
Medium momentum 0.0001  -0.0004  -0.01% 0.35  
Down momentum 0.0000  -0.0006  0.01% 1.33  
Electricity utilities 0.0001  -0.0001  -0.02% 0.01  
Natural gas utilities 0.0002  -0.0004  -0.02% 0.21  
Multi-utilities 0.0001  -0.0006  -0.01% 0.75  
Small utilities 0.0001  0.0005  0.00% 0.91  
Big utilities 0.0000  -0.0003  -0.02% 0.24  
        
Risk Factors        
𝑹𝒎,𝒕 0.0000  -0.0001  -0.02% 0.02  
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  0.0002 * 0.0012 *** 0.14% 7.18 *** 
𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  0.0002  0.0001  -0.02% 0.03  
𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  0.0003  0.0007  0.01% 1.66  
𝑹𝒕𝒑,𝒕 0.0003  0.0000  -0.02% 0.32  
𝑅𝑜,𝑡 0.0003  0.0007  -0.01% 0.48  
𝑅𝑐,𝑡 0.0001  0.0009  0.02% 1.67  
𝑅𝑔,𝑡 0.0011 ** -0.0077 **** 0.31% 14.61 **** 
        
Residuals        
Unconditional local AFFM regression 0.0000  0.0003  -0.01% 0.73  
Conditional annual local AFFM regressions 0.0000  0.0002  0.00% 0.83  




Appendix F. EVENT STUDY STATA CODE 
The following is an example of the STATA code used to implement the event study 
approach. The general framework of the code is extracted from the method outlined by 
Princeton University (2008). Modifications are made to allow the code to 1) loop over all 
events and the four restructuring streams, 2) loop over the 12 energy portfolios, 3) calculate 
CAARs through time, 4) test CAARs across eight event windows and 5) format data for 
export and storage. The results are qualitatively comparable to those obtained using Event 
Study Metrics – an event study software package. Event Study Metrics could not be used 
because the software limits the list of variables which can be used to estimate normal 
performance; the four-factor model was the most comprehensive model available. Further, 
STATA lacks a pre-written code to conduct the multivariate event study. 
 
 
*** START *** 
 
* DATA PREPARATION. 
* Uses two separate datafiles: eventdates and stockdata. 
 
* Analysis loops over all events and four restructuring streams. 
forvalues k=1(1)5 { 
*Opens record log. 
. log using "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Log\Log`k'.smcl", replace 
* Analysis loops over all twelve energy utility portfolios. 
forvalues n=1(1)12 { 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Event Dates\eventdates`k'.dta", clear 
by company_id: gen eventcount=_N 
by company_id: keep if _n==1 
sort company_id 
local no_of_events = _N 
display `no_of_events' 
keep company_id eventcount 
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\eventcount`n'.dta", replace 
* Merge the eventcount data with stockdata, ensuring both files have eligible observations. 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Returns Data\stockdata`n'.dta", clear 
sort company_id 
merge company_id using "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\eventcount`n'.dta" 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
* 'expand' command creates duplicate observations - accommodates multiple events per 
portfolio. 
expand eventcount 
* Indicates which 'set' of observations within the company each observation belongs to. 
drop eventcount 
sort company_id date 
by company_id date: gen set=_n 
sort company_id set 
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\stockdata2`n'.dta", replace 
* Creates a matching set variable to identify the different event dates within each portfolio. 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Event Dates\eventdates`k'.dta", clear 
by company_id: gen set=_n 
sort company_id set 
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\eventdates2`n'.dta", replace 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\stockdata2`n'.dta", clear 
merge company_id set using "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event 
Study\eventdates2`n'.dta" 
tab _merge 
* Examines and drops portfolios which have missing information surrounding event dates. 
list company_id if _merge==2 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
* Creates a new variable that groups company_id and set so that each has a unique identifier 
to use in future analysis. 
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egen group_id = group(company_id set) 
egen max_no_of_groups = max(group_id) 
local max_groups =  max_no_of_groups 
display `max_groups' 
 
* CLEANING THE DATA AND DEFINING THE EVENT AND ESTIMATION WINDOWS. 
* Creates a variable (dif) which counts the number of days between the observation and the 
event date. 
sort group_id date 
by group_id: gen datenum=_n 
by group_id: gen target=datenum if date==event_date 
egen td=min(target), by(group_id) 
drop target 
gen dif=datenum-td 
* Creates a variable with the event date. 
* Ensures a minimum number of observations before and after the event date, as well as the 
minimum number of observations before the event window for the estimation window. 
* For this analysis: event window is 41 days, estimation window is 100 days. 
by group_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-20 & dif<=20 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(group_id) 
by group_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<=-21 & dif>=-120 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(group_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
 
* Determines which companies do not have a sufficient number of observations. 
tab group_id if count_event_obs<41 
tab group_id if count_est_obs<100 
 
* ESTIMATING NORMAL PERFORMANCE USING THE AUGMENTED FOUR-FACTOR MODEL (AFFM). 
* The command loops over each event, running a regression in each estimation window, and uses 
estimated coefficients and intercept to predict expected return/normal performance.  
* Estimates are stored ready for export. 
set more off 
gen predicted_return=. 
egen id = group(group_id) 
forvalues i=1(1)`max_groups' { 
l id group_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
reg ret stoxx SMB HML UMD term oil coal gas if id==`i' & estimation_window==1 
eststo AFFM`i' 
predict p if id==`i' 




* Exports estimates. 
esttab AFFM* using "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\normal 
parameters`k'.csv" , b(4) ar2(4) plain not noobs append 
eststo clear 
 
* CALCULATING ABNORMAL RETURN AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN. 
* Generates abnormal return. 
sort id date 
gen abnormal_return = ret-predicted_return if dif<=20 & dif>=-120 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return = sum(abnormal_return)  
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\stockdata2`n'.dta", replace  
} 
 
* TESTING FOR SIGNIFICANCE 
forvalues n=1(1)12 { 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\stockdata2`n'.dta", clear 
 
* Calculates and uses Std Dev of CAAR during estimation window (-120,-21) for time-series t-
test. 
sort id date 
 
* Tests full event window (-20,20). 
by id: egen cumulative_return2020 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=20 & dif>=-20 
reg  cumulative_return2020 if dif==0, robust 
eststo CR2020 
 
* Tests short event windows (-20,-1), (-10,-1), (1,10) and (1,20). 
by id: egen cumulative_return201 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=-1 & dif>=-20 
reg  cumulative_return201 if dif==-1, robust 
eststo CR201 
by id: egen cumulative_return101 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=-1 & dif>=-10 
reg  cumulative_return101 if dif==-1, robust 
eststo CR101 
by id: egen cumulative_return110 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=10 & dif>=1 
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reg  cumulative_return110 if dif==1, robust 
eststo CR110 
by id: egen cumulative_return120 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=20 & dif>=1 
reg  cumulative_return120 if dif==1, robust 
eststo CR120 
 
* Tests narrow event windows (0,0), (-1,1) and (-2,2). 
by id: egen cumulative_return0 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif==0 
reg  cumulative_return0 if dif==0, robust 
eststo CR0 
by id: egen cumulative_return11 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=1 & dif>=-1 
reg  cumulative_return11 if dif==0, robust 
eststo CR11 
by id: egen cumulative_return22 = sum(abnormal_return) if dif<=2 & dif>=-2 
reg  cumulative_return22 if dif==0, robust 
eststo CR22 
 
* Exports estimates. 
esttab using "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\cumulativetest`k'.csv", 
b(4) plain noobs nostar append p(4) 
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\stockdata2`n'.dta", replace 
 
* Calculates cumulative returns through time and estimates std. dev. of CAAR for t-test. 
collapse abnormal_return, by(dif) 
gen cumulative_return=. 
replace cumulative_return = abnormal_return if dif==-120 
keep if dif<=20 & dif>=-120 
tsset dif 
replace cumulative_return = L.cumulative_return + abnormal_return if dif<=-21 & dif>=-119 
egen car_sd = sd(cumulative_return) if dif<=-21 & dif>=-120 
scalar sd = car_sd 
display sd 
 
* Truncates data for CAAR tests across varying event windows. 




* Calculates cumulative returns through time with time-series t-stats for descriptive results. 
gen cumulative_return=. 
replace cumulative_return = abnormal_return if dif==-20 
replace cumulative_return = L.cumulative_return + abnormal_return if dif<=20 & dif>=-19 
gen tstat = (cumulative_return/sd) 
scalar drop _all 
 
* Exports results 




* Consolidates multiple results from multiple files into one user-friendly file. 
* Prepares file CAARs for data import. 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\DND cumulative returns through 
time.dta", clear 
keep dif 
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\CAAR through time`k'.dta", 
replace 
 
* Joins cumulative returns through time, for all twelve portfolios, into a single file. 
forvalues n=1(1)12 { 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\Cumulative Returns\cumulative 
returns`n'.dta", clear 
keep dif cumulative_return tstat 
rename cumulative_return cumulative_return`n' 
rename tstat tstat`n' 
joinby dif using "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\CAAR through 
time`k'.dta" 
save "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\CAAR through time`k'.dta", 
replace 
} 
* Sorts data sequentially - simplifies Excel import. 
use "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\CAAR through time`k'.dta", clear 
order dif cumulative_return* tstat*, seq 









* Copy files to new location. 
 
copy "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Event Dates\eventdates`k'.dta" 
"C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Desktop\Event Study\temp\Event Dates\eventdates`k'.dta" 
copy "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\cumulativetest`k'.csv" 
"C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Desktop\Event Study\temp\cumulative tests\cumulative tests`k'.csv" 
copy "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\normal parameters`k'.csv" 
"C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Desktop\Event Study\temp\normal parameters\normalparameters`k'.csv" 
copy "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Log\Log`k'.smcl" "C:\Users\Dan 
Tulloch\Desktop\Event Study\temp\Logs\Log`k'.smcl" 
copy "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\CAAR through time`k'.dta" 
"C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Desktop\Event Study\temp\cumulative returns through time\CAAR through 
time`k'.dta" 
erase "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\cumulativetest`k'.csv" 
erase "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\normal parameters`k'.csv" 
erase "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\Output\CAAR through time`k'.dta" 
} 
* Clears disk-space by erasing unneccessary files. 
 
forvalues n=1(1)12 { 
erase "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\eventcount`n'.dta" 
erase "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\eventdates2`n'.dta" 
erase "C:\Users\Dan Tulloch\Documents\Stata\Event Study\stockdata2`n'.dta" 








Appendix G. ARS SURROUNDING EVENT DATES 
TABLE G.1: ARS SURROUNDING THE 1
ST
 POSITION 
Panel A presents the Abnormal Returns (ARs) for the 12 energy portfolios over the (−20,20) event window. Event days are relative to the 
announcement of the 1st position. For each portfolio, the 𝑡-statistics is calculated as the AR at day 𝑡 divided by the standard deviation of 
ARs over the estimation window (day -21 to -121). The 𝑡-test examines whether the observed ARs is significant different from zero. A 
****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 














 Small  Big  
-20 0.18% * 0.11% 0.28% ** 0.05% * 0.06% 0.19% 0.06% 0.03% 0.19% 0.22% ** 0.19% 0.19% * 
-19 0.13% 0.21% 0.01% 0.18% 0.09% 0.08% 0.09% 0.06% 0.04% 0.12% 0.05% 0.13% 
-18 -0.09% -0.03% -0.05% -0.13% -0.02% -0.18% -0.02% -0.07% -0.13% -0.07% -0.03% -0.09% 
-17 -0.17% * -0.09% -0.22% * -0.07% * 0.00% -0.27% ** 0.00% -0.16% -0.14% -0.15% -0.22% * -0.16% 
-16 -0.01% -0.22% * -0.03% -0.02% -0.03% -0.08% -0.03% 0.03% -0.25% -0.01% -0.21% * 0.00% 
-15 -0.14% 0.12% -0.28% ** 0.01% -0.12% -0.24% ** -0.12% -0.12% -0.43% ** -0.14% -0.03% -0.15% 
-14 -0.02% 0.23% * -0.09% 0.05% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.13% -0.24% -0.04% 0.19% -0.03% 
-13 0.07% 0.15% 0.03% 0.14% 0.12% * 0.06% 0.12% * 0.24% * -0.23% -0.01% 0.16% 0.07% 
-12 0.08% 0.15% 0.08% 0.01% 0.02% -0.08% 0.02% 0.06% -0.07% 0.11% 0.03% 0.08% 
-11 -0.09% 0.01% -0.13% -0.06% 0.01% -0.12% 0.01% 0.13% -0.46% ** -0.11% -0.14% -0.09% 
-10 -0.12% -0.21% -0.17% -0.11% -0.04% -0.17% -0.04% 0.00% -0.45% ** -0.02% -0.19% -0.12% 
-9 0.09% -0.02% 0.13% 0.01% -0.03% 0.11% -0.03% 0.16% -0.11% 0.08% 0.06% 0.09% 
-8 -0.07% -0.01% -0.06% -0.05% -0.06% 0.04% -0.06% -0.03% -0.16% 0.01% -0.13% -0.07% 
-7 -0.07% -0.08% -0.07% 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% 0.02% 0.04% 0.22% -0.20% * -0.13% -0.06% 
-6 0.04% 0.10% 0.00% 0.08% -0.06% 0.19% -0.06% 0.03% 0.05% 0.08% 0.17% 0.03% 
-5 -0.07% 0.24% * -0.21% * 0.11% -0.06% -0.16% -0.06% -0.17% 0.12% -0.04% -0.06% -0.07% 
-4 -0.07% 0.07% -0.09% -0.12% 0.00% -0.06% 0.00% -0.06% 0.01% -0.07% 0.04% -0.08% 
-3 -0.06% -0.13% 0.04% -0.09% -0.20% ** -0.10% -0.20% ** -0.03% 0.09% -0.02% -0.04% -0.06% 
-2 -0.14% -0.18% -0.04% -0.35% -0.04% -0.24% ** -0.04% -0.10% -0.23% -0.24% ** -0.14% -0.13% 
-1 -0.21% ** -0.02% -0.34% *** -0.05% ** -0.15% * -0.23% * -0.15% * -0.21% * -0.19% -0.10% -0.20% -0.21% ** 
0 -0.08% -0.22% * -0.09% -0.01% -0.01% -0.19% -0.01% -0.06% -0.06% -0.09% -0.20% -0.07% 
1 -0.12% 0.01% -0.21% * 0.03% -0.12% -0.09% -0.12% -0.19% -0.11% -0.02% 0.04% -0.13% 
2 0.07% -0.11% 0.08% 0.09% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.16% -0.21% 0.13% -0.02% 0.07% 
3 -0.07%  -0.07%  -0.07%  -0.03%  -0.07%  -0.08%  -0.07%  -0.02%  -0.10%  0.08%  -0.07%  -0.07%  
4 0.07% 0.06% 0.13% -0.05% 0.06% 0.03% 0.06% 0.17% -0.31% * 0.05% -0.03% 0.08% 
5 -0.06% 0.09% -0.20% * 0.12% 0.05% -0.02% 0.05% -0.07% -0.15% -0.05% 0.08% -0.07% 
6 -0.07% -0.21% -0.05% -0.09% -0.11% -0.02% -0.11% 0.00% 0.13% -0.20% * -0.05% -0.07% 
7 0.05% 0.03% -0.01% 0.13% 0.14% * -0.08% 0.14% * 0.30% ** 0.10% -0.17% 0.15% 0.04% 
8 -0.12% -0.13% -0.07% -0.21% -0.02% -0.14% -0.02% -0.03% -0.27% -0.12% -0.21% * -0.12% 
9 -0.12% -0.32% ** -0.15% 0.01% 0.01% -0.12% 0.01% -0.21% * -0.19% -0.03% -0.13% -0.12% 
10 -0.09% -0.15% -0.11% -0.08% -0.12% -0.16% -0.12% -0.02% -0.17% -0.12% -0.09% -0.09% 
11 -0.07% -0.03% -0.11% 0.01% -0.08% 0.03% -0.08% -0.09% 0.08% -0.09% -0.15% -0.06% 
12 -0.05% -0.25% * -0.02% -0.01% -0.07% -0.14% -0.07% 0.04% -0.38% ** 0.04% -0.12% -0.05% 
13 0.14% 0.25% * 0.06% 0.30% -0.05% 0.28% ** -0.05% 0.08% -0.02% 0.19% * 0.09% 0.15% 
14 0.01% -0.07% -0.01% 0.02% -0.06% 0.06% -0.06% 0.13% 0.05% -0.08% 0.07% 0.00% 
15 -0.08% 0.02% -0.09% -0.05% -0.08% -0.18% -0.08% -0.24% ** 0.06% -0.02% -0.04% -0.08% 
16 -0.11% -0.05% -0.14% -0.11% 0.00% -0.13% 0.00% -0.10% -0.37% ** 0.00% -0.09% -0.11% 
17 -0.05% 0.05% -0.11% 0.00% 0.01% -0.11% 0.01% -0.09% -0.17% -0.09% -0.02% -0.06% 
18 0.12% 0.05% 0.12% 0.17% 0.05% -0.04% 0.05% 0.19% -0.03% 0.09% 0.12% 0.12% 
19 -0.07% -0.06% -0.05% -0.13% 0.00% -0.10% 0.00% 0.02% -0.30% * -0.09% -0.21% * -0.06% 
20 0.17% * 0.03% 0.15% 0.23% * 0.10% 0.13% 0.10% 0.19% 0.06% 0.03% 0.13% 0.17% * 
 
Panel B reports the mean estimated coefficients from the local AFFM model in Equation (6.1). The coefficients are estimated in the 
estimation window prior to all announcements of the 1st position, and the mean coefficient is reported below. As the values below are 
averages across all events tested, no significance tests are provided. Qualitatively, the mean coefficients below are similar to those reported 
for the local AFFM in Chapter 5 (Table 5.5). Similar estimates of systematic risk gives greater confidence to the isolation of the unsystematic 
component in Panel A. Further, the similarity between the coefficients in Panel B and those in Table 5.5 show that nonsynchronous and thin 
trading have not biased estimated parameters. 














 Small  Big  
?̅?𝑖 0.5975  0.4475  0.6398  0.5252  0.2484  0.5931  0.2484  0.5411  0.7256  0.5320  0.5095  0.6033 
𝑠?̅? -0.2934  -0.2748  -0.2940  -0.3071  -0.1171  -0.3179  -0.1171  -0.2273  -0.2959  -0.2816  0.4319  -0.3418 
ℎ̅𝑖 -0.1021  0.6349  -0.0931  -0.2780  -0.0340  -0.0956  -0.0340  -0.0784  -0.1637  -0.1046  0.1126  -0.1155 
?̅?𝑖 -0.0225  0.0080  -0.0014  -0.0574  0.4414  0.0308  -0.5586  -0.0430  0.0478  -0.0102  -0.0300  -0.0215 
𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑖 -0.0379  -0.0256  -0.1191  0.0104  -0.1884  -0.2028  -0.1884  0.0893  0.1602  -0.3357  -0.2640  -0.0179 
?̅?𝑖 0.0161  0.0134  0.0119  0.0161  0.0117  0.0140  0.0117  0.0181  0.0290  0.0005  0.0123  0.0162 
𝑐?̅? -0.0486  0.0160  -0.0631  -0.0277  -0.0101  -0.0477  -0.0101  -0.0486  -0.0642  -0.0344  -0.0069  -0.0508 
?̅?𝑖 0.0054  0.0074  0.0043  0.0055  0.0022  0.0028  0.0022  0.0114  0.0160  -0.0010  0.0105  0.0049 
?̅?𝑖 0.0005  0.0004  0.0009  0.0002  0.0008  0.0007  0.0008  0.0005  0.0006  0.0008  0.0011  0.0005 




TABLE G.2: ARS SURROUNDING THE 2
ND
 POSITION 
Panel A presents the Abnormal Returns (ARs) for the 12 energy portfolios over the (-20,20) event window. Event days are relative to the 
announcement of the 1st position. For each portfolio, the t-statistics is calculated as the AR at day t divided by the standard deviation of ARs 
over the estimation window (day -21 to -121). The t-test examines whether the observed ARs is significant different from zero. A ****, ***, 
** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 














 Small  Big  
-20 0.01% -0.05% 0.08% -0.09% 0.03% -0.08% 0.03% 0.14% 0.22% -0.13% -0.10% 0.02% 
-19 -0.20% ** -0.21% * -0.25% ** -0.11% ** -0.10% -0.19% * -0.10% -0.20% * -0.30% ** -0.17% * -0.27% *** -0.19% ** 
-18 0.02% 0.16% 0.06% -0.10% 0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 0.01% -0.09% -0.12% 0.06% 0.02% 
-17 -0.11% -0.19% * -0.10% -0.13% -0.14% ** -0.10% -0.14% ** -0.27% ** -0.27% * -0.03% -0.22% ** -0.10% 
-16 -0.18% ** -0.17% -0.20% ** -0.14% ** -0.23% **** -0.12% -0.23% **** -0.17% -0.22% -0.15% -0.21% ** -0.18% * 
-15 -0.07% -0.12% -0.03% -0.02% 0.08% -0.05% 0.08% 0.03% -0.47% *** 0.14% -0.22% ** -0.06% 
-14 0.00% -0.16% 0.06% -0.06% -0.01% -0.06% -0.01% 0.06% 0.07% -0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 
-13 -0.08% 0.04% -0.07% -0.10% -0.07% -0.07% -0.07% -0.13% -0.12% -0.08% -0.01% -0.08% 
-12 0.08% 0.00% -0.03% 0.24% 0.02% 0.16% 0.02% 0.01% 0.15% 0.06% 0.07% 0.08% 
-11 0.07% -0.09% 0.14% 0.04% -0.03% 0.18% * -0.03% 0.00% 0.32% ** 0.18% * 0.04% 0.07% 
-10 -0.04% -0.17% -0.03% -0.01% -0.03% 0.05% -0.03% -0.10% 0.08% 0.02% -0.14% -0.04% 
-9 0.01% 0.04% 0.05% -0.09% -0.06% -0.05% -0.06% -0.03% 0.14% -0.18% * 0.10% 0.00% 
-8 -0.09% -0.04% -0.09% -0.12% 0.01% -0.11% 0.01% -0.27% ** -0.23% 0.07% -0.06% -0.10% 
-7 -0.13% -0.21% * -0.06% -0.17% -0.12% * -0.25% ** -0.12% * -0.17% 0.11% -0.19% * -0.12% -0.13% 
-6 -0.24% ** -0.16% -0.27% ** -0.15% ** -0.12% * -0.25% ** -0.12% * -0.33% *** 0.07% -0.27% *** -0.14% -0.24% ** 
-5 -0.05% 0.01% 0.04% -0.18% -0.07% -0.02% -0.07% -0.06% 0.01% -0.02% -0.08% -0.05% 
-4 0.11% -0.03% 0.09% 0.13% 0.10% * 0.20% * 0.10% * 0.12% 0.15% 0.10% 0.09% 0.11% 
-3 -0.15% * 0.00% -0.26% ** -0.08% * 0.10% -0.23% ** 0.10% -0.05% 0.15% -0.31% *** -0.11% -0.16% * 
-2 -0.10% -0.06% -0.10% -0.13% -0.06% -0.11% -0.06% -0.02% -0.32% ** -0.12% -0.05% -0.10% 
-1 0.06% -0.01% 0.06% 0.08% 0.05% -0.03% 0.05% 0.09% 0.07% 0.03% 0.00% 0.07% 
0 0.14% 0.25% ** 0.15% 0.08% 0.07% 0.12% 0.07% 0.21% * 0.18% 0.05% 0.11% 0.14% 
1 -0.07% -0.08% -0.03% -0.14% -0.01% -0.05% -0.01% -0.12% -0.05% 0.01% 0.01% -0.07% 
2 -0.28% *** -0.34% *** -0.24% ** -0.34% *** -0.07% -0.23% ** -0.07% -0.40% *** -0.33% ** -0.17% * -0.34% *** -0.27% *** 
3 0.05% 0.08% -0.02% 0.20% 0.10% -0.03% 0.10% 0.21% * -0.21% 0.11% 0.01% 0.05% 
4 0.07% 0.08% 0.02% 0.20% 0.06% 0.05% 0.06% 0.06% 0.12% 0.06% 0.06% 0.07% 
5 0.02% 0.21% * -0.01% 0.06% -0.07% 0.06% -0.07% 0.05% -0.22% 0.05% 0.04% 0.02% 
6 -0.14% -0.35% *** -0.07% -0.19% -0.02% -0.12% -0.02% -0.17% -0.03% -0.09% -0.12% -0.14% 
7 -0.08% -0.09% -0.06% -0.08% 0.10% * -0.05% 0.10% * -0.10% -0.34% ** 0.15% -0.08% -0.08% 
8 -0.10% -0.08% -0.17% * 0.05% -0.21% *** -0.02% -0.21% *** -0.06% -0.20% -0.08% -0.06% -0.10% 
9 -0.20% ** -0.16% -0.23% ** -0.09% ** -0.16% ** -0.27% ** -0.16% ** -0.32% ** -0.22% -0.18% * -0.19% * -0.20% ** 
10 -0.19% ** -0.11% -0.35% **** 0.05% ** -0.07% -0.23% ** -0.07% -0.16% 0.02% -0.36% **** -0.01% -0.20% ** 
11 -0.02% 0.06% -0.05% -0.01% 0.05% -0.09% 0.05% -0.06% -0.18% -0.04% -0.03% -0.03% 
12 0.20% ** 0.23% ** 0.15% 0.23% ** -0.08% 0.31% *** -0.08% 0.23% * -0.02% 0.31% *** 0.26% ** 0.20% ** 
13 -0.01% -0.17% 0.08% -0.19% 0.04% -0.01% 0.04% -0.08% 0.19% 0.00% -0.19% * 0.00% 
14 0.06% 0.09% -0.01% 0.09% -0.06% 0.01% -0.06% -0.19% 0.28% * 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 
15 0.03% -0.17% 0.09% -0.10% 0.09% -0.13% 0.09% -0.02% -0.01% 0.15% -0.08% 0.04% 
16 0.05% 0.08% 0.06% 0.02% -0.03% 0.15% -0.03% 0.01% 0.22% 0.03% 0.17% * 0.05% 
17 0.13% 0.06% 0.07% 0.18% -0.03% 0.07% -0.03% 0.10% 0.09% 0.23% ** 0.00% 0.13% 
18 0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.05% 0.10% 0.29% * -0.02% -0.12% 0.02% 
19 0.09% 0.21% * 0.02% 0.18% 0.05% 0.13% 0.05% -0.09% 0.20% 0.14% 0.23% ** 0.07% 
20 -0.02% -0.19% * -0.06% -0.04% -0.13% ** 0.10% -0.13% ** -0.03% -0.05% 0.07% -0.02% -0.03% 
 
Panel B reports the mean estimated coefficients from the local AFFM model in Equation (6.1). The coefficients are estimated in the estimation 
window prior to all announcements of the 2nd position, and the mean coefficient is reported below. As the values below are averages across 
all events tested, no significance tests are provided. Qualitatively, the mean coefficients below are similar to those reported for the local 
AFFM in Chapter 5 (Table 5.5). Similar estimates of systematic risk gives greater confidence to the isolation of the unsystematic component 
in Panel A. Further, the similarity between the coefficients in Panel B and those in Table 5.5 show that nonsynchronous and thin trading have 
not biased estimated parameters. 
PANEL B: Mean Estimated Coefficients from the Local AFFM  
 Energy Utilities  High-BE/ME  Mid-BE/ME  Low-BE/ME  Upper  Medium  Down  Electric  Natural Gas  Multi-Utility  Small  Big  
?̅?𝑖 0.5981   0.4374   0.6483   0.5188   0.2455   0.5983   0.2455   0.5436   0.7146   0.5351   0.5146   0.6035  
𝑠?̅? -0.2765   -0.2414   -0.2894   -0.2847   -0.1104   -0.2866   -0.1104   -0.2077   -0.2717   -0.2757   0.4198   -0.3226  
ℎ̅𝑖 -0.1015   0.6453   -0.0916   -0.2620   -0.0315   -0.0907   -0.0315   -0.0755   -0.1671   -0.1095   0.0852   -0.1130  
?̅?𝑖 -0.0336   0.0154   -0.0173   -0.0670   0.4623   0.0281   -0.5377   -0.0603   0.0563   -0.0302   -0.0421   -0.0328  
𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑖 -0.0670   0.1011   -0.2555   0.1645   -0.0476   -0.3043   -0.0476   0.0134   -0.3200   -0.1861   -0.4275   -0.0373  
?̅?𝑖 0.0089   0.0106   0.0070   0.0089   0.0119   0.0074   0.0119   0.0180   0.0229   -0.0078   0.0050   0.0091  
𝑐?̅? -0.0331   0.0306   -0.0508   0.0009   -0.0124   -0.0322   -0.0124   -0.0213   -0.0571   -0.0149   0.0001   -0.0347  
?̅?𝑖 0.0004   -0.0025   0.0033   -0.0032   0.0045   -0.0012   0.0045   0.0024   0.0126   -0.0024   0.0002   0.0003  
?̅?𝑖 0.0008   0.0006   0.0012   0.0004   0.0008   0.0010   0.0008   0.0009   0.0006   0.0014   0.0014   0.0008  




TABLE G.3: ARS SURROUNDING THE SIGNATURE DATE 
Panel A presents the Abnormal Returns (ARs) for the 12 energy portfolios over the (-20,20) event window. Event days are relative to the 
announcement of the 1st position. For each portfolio, the t-statistics is calculated as the AR at day t divided by the standard deviation of 
ARs over the estimation window (day -21 to -121). The t-test examines whether the observed ARs is significant different from zero. A 
****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 














 Small  Big  
-20 0.03% -0.01% -0.03% 0.07% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 
-19 0.12% * 0.01% 0.11% 0.06% * 0.12% ** 0.02% 0.12% ** 0.09% -0.07% 0.17% * 0.08% 0.12% * 
-18 -0.03% 0.07% -0.07% 0.01% 0.00% -0.09% 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% -0.15% -0.01% -0.03% 
-17 -0.07% -0.24% ** -0.04% -0.07% 0.01% -0.07% 0.01% 0.00% -0.19% -0.11% -0.07% -0.07% 
-16 -0.04% 0.01% -0.06% -0.02% -0.04% -0.06% -0.04% 0.07% -0.16% -0.02% -0.06% -0.04% 
-15 -0.07% -0.01% -0.16% * 0.01% -0.08% -0.07% -0.08% -0.02% -0.15% -0.18% * -0.06% -0.07% 
-14 -0.13% * 0.13% -0.17% * -0.07% * 0.02% -0.24% *** 0.02% -0.12% 0.02% -0.13% -0.03% -0.13% * 
-13 -0.12% * -0.17% -0.12% -0.07% * -0.13% ** -0.10% -0.13% ** -0.06% -0.29% * -0.07% -0.07% -0.13% * 
-12 -0.10% -0.09% -0.16% * 0.02% -0.07% -0.17% * -0.07% -0.14% * -0.20% -0.07% -0.14% -0.10% 
-11 -0.10% 0.02% -0.15% * -0.04% -0.09% -0.09% -0.09% -0.13% -0.01% -0.03% -0.08% -0.09% 
-10 -0.03% -0.08% -0.02% -0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.03% 0.02% -0.11% -0.03% 0.06% -0.04% 
-9 -0.14% ** 0.17% -0.30% *** 0.05% ** -0.14% ** -0.15% * -0.14% ** -0.13% -0.01% -0.26% *** -0.03% -0.15% ** 
-8 0.11% 0.12% 0.12% 0.00% -0.03% 0.12% -0.03% 0.11% 0.22% -0.06% 0.09% 0.10% 
-7 0.03% -0.01% 0.00% 0.08% -0.23% **** 0.09% -0.23% **** 0.05% -0.07% 0.10% -0.01% 0.03% 
-6 -0.13% * -0.12% -0.15% * -0.11% * -0.05% -0.14% -0.05% -0.07% -0.13% -0.16% * -0.07% -0.13% * 
-5 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -0.02% -0.10% * 0.01% -0.10% * -0.11% -0.01% -0.03% 0.09% -0.01% 
-4 -0.08% -0.04% -0.18% * 0.15% -0.06% -0.01% -0.06% -0.07% -0.27% * -0.05% 0.00% -0.09% 
-3 0.03% 0.08% 0.07% -0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.11% 0.06% 0.10% 0.00% 0.03% 
-2 -0.01% 0.10% -0.11% 0.10% -0.01% -0.12% -0.01% 0.03% -0.33% ** -0.02% 0.03% -0.02% 
-1 0.01% -0.06% -0.03% 0.07% -0.04% 0.12% -0.04% -0.07% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
0 0.05% 0.11% 0.08% -0.06% 0.02% 0.17% ** 0.02% -0.06% 0.23% 0.12% 0.01% 0.05% 
1 0.03% -0.02% -0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 0.06% 0.03% -0.15% * 0.24% 0.07% 0.10% 0.02% 
2 0.01% 0.06% -0.09% 0.10% -0.01% 0.05% -0.01% -0.05% -0.10% 0.08% 0.06% 0.01% 
3 -0.03% -0.02% 0.00% 0.01% -0.05% 0.09% -0.05% -0.02% -0.19% 0.05% 0.03% -0.03% 
4 0.10% 0.04% 0.12% 0.07% -0.08% 0.20% ** -0.08% 0.16% * -0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 
5 -0.04% -0.04% 0.01% -0.07% -0.17% *** 0.04% -0.17% *** 0.04% 0.00% -0.03% 0.00% -0.04% 
6 -0.13% * -0.03% -0.22% ** -0.08% * -0.06% -0.18% ** -0.06% -0.12% -0.17% -0.25% ** -0.03% -0.14% * 
7 0.00% 0.05% -0.04% 0.08% -0.02% -0.06% -0.02% 0.10% -0.13% -0.01% 0.07% -0.01% 
8 0.12% 0.21% ** 0.14% 0.12% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.17% * 0.03% 0.00% 0.25% *** 0.11% 
9 -0.04% -0.11% -0.06% 0.03% -0.11% ** -0.02% -0.11% ** 0.05% -0.05% -0.11% -0.03% -0.04% 
10 -0.11% -0.07% -0.11% -0.12% -0.02% -0.07% -0.02% -0.23% ** 0.14% -0.13% 0.01% -0.11% 
11 0.04% -0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.04% -0.01% 0.04% 0.05% -0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 
12 0.01% -0.05% 0.04% 0.00% -0.07% 0.02% -0.07% 0.15% * -0.09% -0.05% 0.07% 0.01% 
13 0.06% -0.09% 0.12% 0.00% -0.09% * 0.10% -0.09% * 0.04% 0.08% 0.01% 0.11% 0.06% 
14 0.06% 0.22% ** 0.02% 0.07% 0.03% 0.07% 0.03% 0.00% -0.15% 0.14% 0.05% 0.06% 
15 0.04% 0.04% 0.00% 0.08% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% -0.29% * 0.06% 0.09% 0.03% 
16 -0.07% -0.09% -0.13% 0.03% 0.10% * -0.20% ** 0.10% * -0.11% -0.14% 0.02% 0.06% -0.08% 
17 0.07% 0.07% 0.04% 0.01% -0.02% 0.03% -0.02% 0.19% ** 0.00% 0.11% -0.01% 0.07% 
18 0.01% 0.12% 0.01% -0.05% -0.02% -0.03% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% 0.01% 0.05% 0.01% 
19 0.08% 0.39% **** 0.05% 0.17% 0.01% 0.16% * 0.01% 0.11% 0.10% 0.17% * 0.26% *** 0.07% 
20 0.02% -0.05% -0.03% 0.09% 0.07% -0.04% 0.07% 0.08% 0.04% -0.05% -0.06% 0.03% 
 
Panel B reports the mean estimated coefficients from the local AFFM model in Equation (6.1). The coefficients are estimated in the 
estimation window prior to all announcements of the signature date, and the mean coefficient is reported below. As the values below are 
averages across all events tested, no significance tests are provided. Qualitatively, the mean coefficients below are similar to those reported 
for the local AFFM in Chapter 5 (Table 5.5). Similar estimates of systematic risk gives greater confidence to the isolation of the unsystematic 
component in Panel A. Further, the similarity between the coefficients in Panel B and those in Table 5.5 show that nonsynchronous and thin 
trading have not biased estimated parameters. 














 Small  Big  
?̅?𝑖 0.6054  0.4325  0.6673  0.5060  0.2549  0.5955  0.2549  0.5498  0.7429  0.5385  0.5012  0.6123 
𝑠?̅? -0.2913  -0.2612  -0.2969  -0.3005  -0.1238  -0.3058  -0.1238  -0.2221  -0.3063  -0.3016  0.4474  -0.3403 
ℎ̅𝑖 -0.0858  0.6665  -0.0774  -0.2686  -0.0340  -0.0757  -0.0340  -0.0559  -0.1490  -0.1095  0.1072  -0.0977 
?̅?𝑖 -0.0419  0.0040  -0.0265  -0.0813  0.4516  0.0164  -0.5484  -0.0655  0.0130  -0.0311  -0.0473  -0.0413 
𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑖 0.1056  0.0045  0.0055  0.3129  -0.0081  0.0214  -0.0081  0.2244  -0.0501  0.0563  -0.0900  0.1226 
?̅?𝑖 0.0100  0.0123  0.0106  0.0033  0.0096  0.0135  0.0096  0.0217  0.0257  -0.0086  0.0077  0.0100 
𝑐?̅? -0.0311  0.0196  -0.0464  -0.0057  -0.0119  -0.0285  -0.0119  -0.0397  -0.0436  -0.0068  -0.0026  -0.0324 
?̅?𝑖 0.0006  0.0010  0.0025  -0.0010  0.0029  0.0026  0.0029  0.0035  0.0134  -0.0021  0.0028  0.0003 
?̅?𝑖 0.0004  0.0003  0.0007  -0.0001  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0003  0.0000  0.0009  0.0005  0.0004 




TABLE G.4: ARS SURROUNDING THE PUBLICATION DATE 
Panel A presents the Abnormal Returns (ARs) for the 12 energy portfolios over the (-20,20) event window. Event days are relative to the 
announcement of the 1st position. For each portfolio, the t-statistics is calculated as the AR at day t divided by the standard deviation of 
ARs over the estimation window (day -21 to -121). The t-test examines whether the observed ARs is significant different from zero. A 
****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 














 Small  Big  
-20 -0.16% ** -0.51% **** -0.12% -0.19% ** 0.04% -0.21% ** 0.04% -0.17% -0.15% -0.03% -0.15% -0.16% ** 
-19 0.09% 0.11% 0.11% 0.08% -0.11% ** 0.11% -0.11% ** 0.11% -0.07% 0.20% * 0.12% 0.10% 
-18 0.08% 0.10% 0.05% 0.14% 0.02% 0.15% 0.02% 0.03% 0.07% 0.12% 0.10% 0.08% 
-17 0.00% 0.13% -0.10% 0.08% -0.19% *** 0.03% -0.19% *** -0.01% 0.06% -0.05% 0.03% -0.01% 
-16 0.03% 0.20% * -0.02% 0.10% 0.04% -0.07% 0.04% 0.10% -0.24% -0.07% 0.09% 0.03% 
-15 0.15% * 0.06% 0.19% * -0.02% * 0.08% 0.11% 0.08% 0.17% * 0.28% * 0.00% 0.10% 0.16% * 
-14 0.08% 0.30% *** 0.06% 0.10% -0.01% 0.03% -0.01% 0.12% -0.12% 0.10% 0.14% 0.07% 
-13 0.04% 0.14% -0.02% 0.13% 0.02% 0.10% 0.02% 0.06% -0.02% -0.02% 0.11% 0.03% 
-12 -0.03% -0.10% -0.01% -0.03% 0.02% 0.08% 0.02% -0.02% -0.13% -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 
-11 0.00% -0.02% 0.00% 0.02% -0.06% 0.03% -0.06% -0.02% 0.13% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 
-10 -0.06% 0.03% -0.16% -0.03% -0.01% 0.09% -0.01% 0.02% -0.07% -0.07% 0.04% -0.07% 
-9 -0.09% -0.10% -0.09% -0.06% -0.07% -0.12% -0.07% -0.09% -0.22% -0.05% -0.02% -0.10% 
-8 -0.04% -0.09% -0.05% -0.05% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.11% -0.15% 0.06% -0.01% -0.04% 
-7 -0.10% 0.04% -0.12% 0.03% -0.07% -0.15% -0.07% 0.01% 0.05% -0.19% * -0.03% -0.10% 
-6 0.03% -0.05% 0.03% -0.03% 0.09% -0.03% 0.09% -0.08% -0.08% 0.08% -0.02% 0.04% 
-5 -0.03% -0.01% -0.01% 0.03% -0.11% * 0.07% -0.11% * 0.05% -0.14% -0.02% 0.10% -0.04% 
-4 0.05% 0.18% * 0.06% 0.00% 0.02% 0.06% 0.02% 0.08% 0.08% 0.03% 0.11% 0.05% 
-3 0.17% ** 0.15% 0.19% * 0.09% ** 0.15% ** 0.10% 0.15% ** 0.14% 0.31% ** 0.17% * 0.10% 0.17% ** 
-2 0.13% 0.15% 0.19% * 0.06% 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.14% 0.00% 0.14% 0.11% 0.13% 
-1 -0.09% -0.19% * -0.05% -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% ** 0.00% -0.32% *** -0.17% 0.11% 0.00% -0.10% 
0 -0.02% -0.05% 0.01% -0.05% -0.05% 0.01% -0.05% -0.02% -0.03% 0.02% 0.02% -0.02% 
1 -0.02% 0.06% -0.07% 0.04% -0.04% 0.00% -0.04% -0.05% 0.15% -0.12% -0.01% -0.02% 
2 0.09% 0.11% 0.07% 0.17% 0.07% 0.12% 0.07% 0.14% -0.04% 0.07% 0.20% * 0.08% 
3 0.03% -0.08% 0.06% -0.06% -0.01% 0.04% -0.01% 0.04% 0.25% * -0.06% 0.00% 0.03% 
4 0.02% 0.20% * 0.01% -0.02% 0.06% -0.04% 0.06% 0.00% -0.06% 0.07% 0.10% 0.01% 
5 0.07% 0.08% 0.08% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.13% 0.10% 0.08% -0.04% 0.08% 
6 -0.15% * -0.10% -0.16% -0.10% * 0.06% -0.25% ** 0.06% -0.17% -0.33% ** -0.06% -0.11% -0.15% * 
7 -0.06% 0.02% -0.09% -0.06% -0.03% -0.10% -0.03% 0.02% -0.25% * 0.01% 0.00% -0.07% 
8 -0.09% -0.10% -0.14% 0.00% 0.00% -0.05% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% -0.26% ** -0.05% -0.09% 
9 0.12% -0.05% 0.21% ** 0.02% -0.02% 0.14% -0.02% 0.14% 0.22% 0.04% 0.13% 0.12% 
10 0.06% 0.15% 0.06% 0.05% -0.10% * 0.09% -0.10% * 0.08% -0.08% 0.10% -0.05% 0.07% 
11 0.01% -0.10% 0.10% -0.10% -0.02% -0.04% -0.02% -0.03% 0.21% 0.03% -0.03% 0.01% 
12 -0.11% 0.16% -0.20% * -0.02% 0.03% -0.14% 0.03% 0.14% -0.24% -0.18% * 0.05% -0.12% 
13 0.01% 0.02% 0.09% -0.06% -0.03% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% -0.02% 0.10% -0.09% 0.02% 
14 -0.06% 0.10% -0.08% -0.01% -0.13% ** 0.06% -0.13% ** 0.03% -0.09% -0.03% -0.05% -0.06% 
15 -0.01% 0.04% -0.02% 0.03% -0.01% -0.09% -0.01% 0.02% -0.07% -0.01% 0.03% -0.01% 
16 -0.02% -0.07% -0.05% -0.01% 0.05% -0.05% 0.05% -0.05% 0.01% -0.06% -0.10% -0.02% 
17 0.00% 0.23% ** -0.13% 0.13% -0.09% -0.08% -0.09% 0.04% 0.03% -0.03% 0.06% 0.00% 
18 -0.02% -0.13% 0.01% -0.01% -0.05% 0.02% -0.05% -0.07% 0.09% -0.09% -0.12% -0.02% 
19 0.06% -0.06% 0.16% -0.09% -0.06% 0.15% -0.06% 0.00% 0.22% -0.01% 0.06% 0.05% 
20 -0.04% 0.03% -0.01% -0.13% -0.06% -0.04% -0.06% 0.17% * -0.28% * 0.04% -0.07% -0.04% 
 
Panel B reports the mean estimated coefficients from the local AFFM model in Equation (6.1). The coefficients are estimated in the 
estimation window prior to all announcements of the publication date, and the mean coefficient is reported below. As the values below are 
averages across all events tested, no significance tests are provided. Qualitatively, the mean coefficients below are similar to those reported 
for the local AFFM in Chapter 5 (Table 5.5). Similar estimates of systematic risk gives greater confidence to the isolation of the unsystematic 
component in Panel A. Further, the similarity between the coefficients in Panel B and those in Table 5.5 show that nonsynchronous and thin 
trading have not biased estimated parameters. 














 Small  Big  
?̅?𝑖 0.6121  0.4327  0.6851  0.4990  0.2601  0.6083  0.2601  0.5561  0.7299  0.5617  0.4989  0.6197 
𝑠?̅? -0.2876  -0.2737  -0.2850  -0.3088  -0.1214  -0.2983  -0.1214  -0.2183  -0.2958  -0.3051  0.4454  -0.3358 
ℎ̅𝑖 -0.0958  0.6720  -0.0924  -0.2765  -0.0387  -0.0817  -0.0387  -0.0667  -0.1434  -0.1287  0.1029  -0.1081 
?̅?𝑖 -0.0498  0.0040  -0.0355  -0.0838  0.4378  0.0073  -0.5622  -0.0613  -0.0115  -0.0349  -0.0520  -0.0495 
𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑖 0.5260  0.7720  0.3011  0.7845  -0.0586  0.5883  -0.0587  0.6226  0.3504  0.3980  0.6327  0.5198 
?̅?𝑖 0.0112  0.0134  0.0118  0.0050  0.0115  0.0102  0.0115  0.0190  0.0253  -0.0032  0.0138  0.0108 
𝑐?̅? -0.0382  0.0073  -0.0529  -0.0162  -0.0153  -0.0325  -0.0153  -0.0453  -0.0456  -0.0169  -0.0156  -0.0391 
?̅?𝑖 -0.0003  -0.0021  0.0015  -0.0024  0.0013  0.0008  0.0013  0.0044  0.0094  -0.0052  0.0014  -0.0005 
?̅?𝑖 -0.0004  -0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0009  0.0005  -0.0006  0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0007  -0.0004 




Appendix H. EVENT STUDIES BY REGULATORY STREAM 
TABLE H.1: CAARS SURROUNDING INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET EVENTS 
Specific to the Internal Energy Market, this table reports the CAARs of various event windows surrounding the 1st position, 2nd position, signature date and publication dates. The results are presented in Panels A, B, C and D, 
respectively. The CAARs are estimated using the local AAFM outlined in Equation (6.1). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Panel A: CAARs Surrounding the 1
st








(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -1.85%   -1.32% * -1.04% ** -0.32% ** -0.62% ** -0.53%   -0.47%   -0.21%   
High-BE/ME 0.75%   0.72%   -0.15%   -0.31%   -0.28%   -0.17%   -0.28%   0.34%   
Mid-BE/ME -3.49% * -2.01% * -1.67% ** -0.29%   -0.83% ** -0.66%   -0.96%   -1.19%   
Low-BE/ME 0.36%   -0.53%   0.06%   -0.31%   -0.29%   -0.39%   0.24%   1.20%   
Upper -1.09%   -0.49%   -1.02% ** -0.25% ** -0.55% ** -0.71% ** -0.31%   -0.36%   
Medium -2.43%   -2.26% ** -1.13% * -0.23%   -0.60% ** -0.56%   -0.21%   0.06%   
Down -1.09%   -0.49%   -1.02% ** -0.25% ** -0.55% ** -0.71% ** -0.31%   -0.36%   
Electric -0.32%   -0.68%   -0.68%   -0.28% * -0.53%   -0.40%   0.06%   0.64%   
Natural Gas -6.26%   -4.05%   -1.04%   -0.17%   -0.56%   -0.63%   -0.52%   -2.05%   
Multi-Utility -2.49%   -1.29%   -1.00% * -0.40% * -0.37%   -0.52%   -0.58%   -0.80%   
Small -1.00%   -0.58%   -0.39%   -0.32% * -0.57% * -0.57%   -0.29%   -0.10%   
Big -1.95%   -1.39% * -1.10% ** -0.32% ** -0.63% * -0.54%   -0.49%   -0.24%   
                 
  
 Panel B: CAARs Surrounding the 2
nd
 Position Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.83%   -1.46%   -0.27%   0.32% ** 0.28%   -0.15%   -1.12%   0.31%   
High-BE/ME -0.83%   -0.81%   -0.07%   0.38%   0.17%   -0.63%   -1.05%   -0.39%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.44%   -1.33%   -0.34%   0.29% * 0.24%   -0.09%   -1.27%   -0.40%   
Low-BE/ME 0.07%   -1.49%   0.10%   0.30%   0.45%   -0.15%   -0.61%   1.26%   
Upper -1.88%   -1.28% * -0.57%   0.20%   0.10%   0.03%   -0.71%   -0.80%   
Medium 0.16%   -0.90%   -0.03%   0.29% * 0.19%   -0.03%   -0.99%   0.78%   
Down -1.88%   -1.28% * -0.57%   0.20%   0.10%   0.03%   -0.71%   -0.80%   
Electric -1.91%   -1.29%   -0.06%   0.36% * 0.34%   -0.04%   -0.93%   -0.99%   
Natural Gas 1.15%   -0.17%   0.46%   0.26%   0.57%   -0.46%   -0.43%   1.06%   
Multi-Utility -1.47%   -2.31% ** -0.89%   0.30%   0.17%   0.10%   -1.34%   0.54%   
Small -1.39%   -1.04%   0.05%   0.14%   0.26%   -0.32%   -1.05%   -0.49%   
Big -0.87%   -1.52%   -0.30%   0.33% ** 0.28%   -0.14%   -1.13%   0.33%   
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(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities 0.16%   -0.51%   0.08%   0.11%   0.23%   0.30%   0.31%   0.56%   
High-BE/ME -0.20%   -0.04%   0.19%   0.08%   0.26%   0.44%   0.30%   -0.24%   
Mid-BE/ME 0.28%   -0.87%   -0.17%   0.17%   0.13%   0.11%   0.39%   0.97%   
Low-BE/ME 0.94%   0.48%   0.66%   0.12%   0.49%   0.62%   0.40%   0.34%   
Upper -1.94%   -1.32%   -0.88%   0.15%   0.25%   0.27%   -0.83% ** -0.77%   
Medium 0.74%   -0.64%   0.38%   0.21%   0.64% *** 0.87% * 0.83%   1.17%   
Down -1.94%   -1.32%   -0.88%   0.15%   0.25%   0.27%   -0.83% ** -0.77%   
Electric 0.48%   -0.31%   0.01%   -0.11%   -0.33%   -0.19%   0.56%   0.89%   
Natural Gas -1.68%   -1.33%   -0.06%   0.25%   1.14%   0.06%   0.17%   -0.60%   
Multi-Utility 0.87%   -0.22%   -0.04%   0.27%   0.43%   0.86%   0.61%   0.82%   
Small 0.66%   -0.66%   0.17%   0.14%   0.31%   0.63%   0.82%   1.18%   
Big 0.12%   -0.51%   0.07%   0.11%   0.22%   0.28%   0.29%   0.52%   
                 
  
 Panel D: CAARs Surrounding the Publication Date Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities 0.24%   0.58%   0.15%   0.09%   -0.19%   0.04%   0.50%   -0.43%   
High-BE/ME 0.49%   1.15%   0.96%   -0.09%   -1.26% ** -0.70%   -0.46%   -0.58%   
Mid-BE/ME 0.83%   0.46%   0.07%   0.17% * 0.03%   0.27%   1.06%   0.20%   
Low-BE/ME 0.18%   0.79%   0.29%   -0.01%   -0.31%   0.13%   0.08%   -0.59%   
Upper -1.20%   -0.54%   0.01%   -0.04%   0.01%   0.17%   0.11%   -0.63%   
Medium 1.20%   0.73%   0.06%   0.24% ** -0.22%   0.16%   0.98%   0.23%   
Down -1.20%   -0.54%   0.01%   -0.04%   0.01%   0.17%   0.11%   -0.63%   
Electric 0.70%   0.25%   0.30%   0.31%   -0.45%   -0.32%   0.12%   0.15%   
Natural Gas -2.21%   -1.91%   -1.01%   -0.01%   -0.09%   0.03%   0.45%   -0.29%   
Multi-Utility 0.97%   1.51%   0.55%   -0.08%   -0.12%   0.34%   0.94%   -0.46%   
Small 0.54%   1.07%   0.58%   0.11%   -0.22%   0.17%   0.42%   -0.64%   
Big 0.23%   0.57%   0.13%   0.09%   -0.19%   0.03%   0.51%   -0.42%   
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TABLE H.2: CAARS SURROUNDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY EVENTS 
Specific to the Energy Efficiency stream, this table reports the CAARs of various event windows surrounding the 1st position, 2nd position, signature date and publication dates. The results are presented in Panels A, B, C 
and D, respectively. The CAARs are estimated using the local AAFM outlined in Equation (6.1). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Panel A: CAARs Surrounding the 1
st








(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.52%   0.18%   -0.28%   0.08%   -0.15%   -0.19%   -0.39%   -0.77%   
High-BE/ME -1.31%   0.04%   -0.57%   -0.13%   -0.16%   -0.60% ** -1.02% * -1.22%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.26%   -0.36%   -0.18%   0.02%   -0.41%   -0.21%   -0.38%   -0.93%   
Low-BE/ME 1.07%   0.99%   -0.41%   0.18%   0.29%   -0.05%   -0.18%   -0.11%   
Upper -0.10%   0.26%   -0.33%   0.11%   0.00%   -0.05%   0.00%   -0.46%   
Medium -1.73%   -0.25%   -0.14%   -0.17%   -0.40%   -0.39%   -0.73%   -1.31%   
Down -0.10%   0.26%   -0.33%   0.11%   0.00%   -0.05%   0.00%   -0.46%   
Electric 0.09%   0.21%   -0.34%   0.14%   -0.11%   0.02%   0.27%   -0.26%   
Natural Gas -3.30% * -0.63%   0.19%   0.01%   -0.11%   -0.18%   -1.17%   -2.67% * 
Multi-Utility 0.01%   0.46%   -0.15%   -0.03%   -0.14%   -0.24%   -0.48%   -0.42%   
Small -1.51%   0.01%   -0.51%   -0.06%   -0.09%   -0.30%   -0.61%   -1.46% * 
Big -0.44%   0.21%   -0.25%   0.08%   -0.16%   -0.18%   -0.38%   -0.73%   
                 
  
 Panel B: CAARs Surrounding the 2
nd
 Position Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -2.13%   -1.60% ** -1.07% ** 0.01%   0.25%   -0.19%   -1.22%   -0.54%   
High-BE/ME -3.08%   -2.44% ** -1.28% ** 0.13%   0.26%   -0.32%   -1.24%   -0.77%   
Mid-BE/ME -2.43%   -1.41%   -1.03% * 0.02%   0.36%   0.04%   -1.37%   -1.04%   
Low-BE/ME -2.24% * -1.90% ** -1.20% ** -0.14%   -0.23%   -0.79% * -0.96%   -0.20%   
Upper 0.00%   -0.25%   0.13%   0.09%   0.39% * 0.39%   0.22%   0.15%   
Medium -3.39% ** -2.37% ** -1.69% *** -0.05%   0.04%   -0.37%   -1.60%   -0.97%   
Down 0.00%   -0.25%   0.13%   0.09%   0.39% * 0.39%   0.22%   0.15%   
Electric -3.66% * -2.04% ** -1.25% ** 0.04%   0.28%   -0.19%   -1.42%   -1.66%   
Natural Gas -1.07%   -1.65%   -0.42%   0.03%   0.18%   -0.37%   -1.59%   0.55%   
Multi-Utility -1.15%   -1.32%   -1.06% * -0.02%   0.29%   -0.02%   -0.90%   0.19%   
Small -2.62% * -2.43% ** -1.22% *** 0.08%   0.15%   -0.32%   -1.14%   -0.27%   
Big -2.10%   -1.54% * -1.06% ** 0.01%   0.26%   -0.17%   -1.23%   -0.56%   
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(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.18%   -0.86%   -0.18%   0.03%   -0.03%   -0.05%   -0.12%   0.65%   
High-BE/ME 0.81%   -0.35%   0.41%   0.04%   0.01%   -0.04%   0.12%   1.13%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.63%   -1.66% * -0.77%   0.06%   -0.15%   -0.35%   -0.46%   -0.03%   
Low-BE/ME 1.22%   -0.16%   0.47%   -0.13%   -0.02%   0.10%   0.46%   1.50% * 
Upper -1.14%   -0.87%   -0.69%   0.01%   -0.16%   -0.19%   -0.63% * -0.29%   
Medium -0.38%   -1.20%   -0.24%   0.15%   0.25%   0.07%   0.16%   0.67%   
Down -1.14%   -0.87%   -0.69%   0.01%   -0.16%   -0.19%   -0.63% * -0.29%   
Electric 0.17%   -0.44%   0.06%   -0.03%   -0.32%   -0.45%   -0.11%   0.64%   
Natural Gas -1.86%   -1.63%   -0.44%   0.18%   0.23%   0.19%   -0.60%   -0.40%   
Multi-Utility -0.58%   -1.29%   -0.57%   0.03%   0.00%   -0.13%   -0.48%   0.67%   
Small 1.80%   -0.38%   0.24%   -0.05%   0.01%   -0.05%   0.78% * 2.22% ** 
Big -0.30%   -0.89%   -0.22%   0.04%   -0.03%   -0.05%   -0.17%   0.55%   
                 
  
 Panel D: CAARs Surrounding the Publication Date Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities 0.29%   -0.06%   -0.04%   -0.10%   -0.07%   0.24%   0.31%   0.45%   
High-BE/ME 1.65%   0.27%   -0.12%   -0.13%   0.10%   0.31%   1.00%   1.52% * 
Mid-BE/ME -0.20%   -0.19%   0.00%   -0.11%   -0.13%   0.23%   0.04%   0.10%   
Low-BE/ME 0.21%   -0.23%   -0.25%   -0.06%   -0.06%   0.09%   0.41%   0.50%   
Upper -0.22%   -0.15%   -0.02%   -0.10%   -0.15%   -0.02%   0.19%   0.03%   
Medium -0.73%   -0.41%   -0.37%   -0.08%   -0.20%   -0.09%   -0.14%   -0.24%   
Down -0.22%   -0.15%   -0.02%   -0.10%   -0.15%   -0.02%   0.19%   0.03%   
Electric 1.12%   0.05%   -0.25%   -0.14%   -0.28%   0.10%   0.88%   1.20% * 
Natural Gas 0.79%   -0.18%   -0.02%   -0.09%   0.05%   -0.09%   0.40%   1.07%   
Multi-Utility -0.02%   -0.01%   0.23%   0.03%   0.12%   0.36%   -0.14%   -0.05%   
Small 1.33%   0.97%   0.55%   -0.02%   0.15%   0.42%   0.33%   0.38%   
Big 0.23%   -0.12%   -0.08%   -0.10%   -0.08%   0.22%   0.31%   0.45%   
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TABLE H.3: CAARS SURROUNDING RENEWABLE ENERGIES EVENTS 
Specific to the Renewable Energies stream, this table reports the CAARs of various event windows surrounding the 1st position, 2nd position, signature date and publication dates. The results are presented in Panels A, B, C and 
D, respectively. The CAARs are estimated using the local AAFM outlined in Equation (6.1). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Panel A: CAARs Surrounding the 1
st








(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -2.65%   -2.50%   -1.08%   -0.13%   -0.82%   -1.49%   -0.75%   -0.01%   
High-BE/ME -2.60%   0.57%   0.30%   -0.46%   -0.09%   -0.74%   -1.48%   -2.71%   
Mid-BE/ME -2.81%   -2.39%   -0.76%   -0.24%   -0.88%   -1.78%   -1.06%   -0.18%   
Low-BE/ME -3.76%   -5.09%   -2.33%   0.15%   -0.53%   -0.91%   0.24%   1.18%   
Upper -0.10%   -1.82%   0.07%   0.55%   0.10%   0.75%   0.45%   1.18%   
Medium -7.26%   -3.89%   -1.81%   -0.41%   -0.77%   -3.02%   -2.17%   -2.97%   
Down -0.10%   -1.82%   0.07%   0.55%   0.10%   0.75%   0.45%   1.18%   
Electric 3.71%   2.07%   1.44%   -0.24%   -1.58%   -1.79%   0.37%   1.89%   
Natural Gas -8.22%   -4.91%   -3.14%   -0.03%   -1.27%   -5.36% ** -6.25% * -3.28%   
Multi-Utility -2.99%   -3.16%   -0.47%   0.48%   0.24%   0.63%   0.68%   -0.31%   
Small -1.17%   -2.97%   -1.63%   -0.59%   -0.75%   -1.12%   1.04%   2.39%   
Big -2.69%   -2.42%   -1.02%   -0.09%   -0.81%   -1.50%   -0.87%   -0.18%   
                 
  
 Panel B: CAARs Surrounding the 2
nd
 Position Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -3.35%   -0.59%   0.51%   0.22%   -0.30%   -1.19%   -3.48%   -2.98%   
High-BE/ME -1.64%   0.24%   0.79%   0.45%   -0.46%   -0.43%   -2.12%   -2.33%   
Mid-BE/ME -4.48%   -1.13%   0.17%   0.26%   -0.55%   -1.43%   -5.23%   -3.60%   
Low-BE/ME 1.68%   1.63%   1.19%   0.19%   0.86%   -0.39%   1.31%   -0.13%   
Upper -3.20%   1.17%   1.52% **** -0.19%   -0.89%   -2.18%   -3.88%   -4.18% * 
Medium -2.33%   -0.89%   -0.86%   0.18%   -0.30%   -1.59%   -2.16%   -1.62%   
Down -3.20%   1.17%   1.52% **** -0.19%   -0.89%   -2.18%   -3.88%   -4.18% * 
Electric -4.71%   -2.11% ** -0.72%   0.44% * -0.54%   -1.97%   -4.16%   -3.04%   
Natural Gas -3.26%   3.93%   1.84%   1.06%   -0.50%   -1.74%   -9.24%   -8.25%   
Multi-Utility 0.51%   -1.29%   0.38%   -0.33%   -0.52%   -1.96%   -0.29%   2.13%   
Small -0.12%   1.00%   1.39%   0.07%   -0.22%   -0.52%   -0.65%   -1.20%   
Big -3.58%   -0.70%   0.44%   0.23%   -0.30%   -1.22%   -3.63%   -3.12%   
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(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -4.23%   -4.90%   -2.77%   0.07%   0.38%   0.13%   0.34%   0.60%   
High-BE/ME -0.54%   -1.00%   -1.34%   0.68%   -1.24%   -0.26%   -1.44%   -0.22%   
Mid-BE/ME -6.88%   -7.28%   -3.67%   0.17%   1.21%   0.37%   0.57%   0.22%   
Low-BE/ME 1.05%   0.22%   -1.03%   -0.32%   -1.45%   -0.76%   0.03%   1.15%   
Upper -3.17%   -3.78% * -2.76%   0.21%   0.27%   0.12%   0.55%   0.41%   
Medium -5.31%   -5.84% * -2.28%   0.30%   0.53%   0.14%   0.10%   0.23%   
Down -3.17%   -3.78% * -2.76%   0.21%   0.27%   0.12%   0.55%   0.41%   
Electric -3.10%   -4.24%   -3.19% * -0.29%   -0.69%   -0.92%   0.65%   1.43%   
Natural Gas -7.89%   -10.78%   -5.39%   1.33% ** 3.55%   1.36%   2.61%   1.56% ** 
Multi-Utility -2.65%   -3.09%   -0.79%   0.71%   1.07% ** 1.72% ** -0.43% ** -0.27%   
Small -1.75%   -1.30%   -0.78%   -0.03%   0.15%   0.62%   0.46%   -0.42%   
Big -4.40%   -5.11%   -2.90%   0.07%   0.39%   0.07%   0.31%   0.63%   
                 
  
 Panel D: CAARs Surrounding the Publication Date Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.85%   0.31%   -0.14%   0.20%   -0.30%   -0.61%   -1.08%   -1.37%   
High-BE/ME 1.33%   0.06%   -0.65%   0.26%   0.57%   0.42%   0.41%   1.01%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.90%   -0.06%   -0.06%   0.35%   -0.32%   -0.85%   -1.75%   -2.19%   
Low-BE/ME 1.69% ** 1.88%   0.08%   -0.12%   -0.64%   -0.47%   0.01%   -0.08%   
Upper -2.08%   -0.45%   -0.28%   0.09%   -0.20%   -0.27%   -1.14%   -1.72%   
Medium 1.00%   0.74%   0.59%   0.11%   0.16%   0.09%   -0.22%   0.15% ** 
Down -2.08%   -0.45%   -0.28%   0.09%   -0.20%   -0.27%   -1.14%   -1.72%   
Electric 0.53%   0.68%   -1.31%   0.02%   -1.00%   -0.87%   -0.36%   -0.16%   
Natural Gas -5.04%   -0.70%   -0.63%   0.70% ** 0.49%   0.38%   -2.77%   -5.04%   
Multi-Utility -0.98%   0.28%   0.66%   0.01%   -0.56%   -1.11%   -1.26%   -1.28% *** 
Small 0.37%   0.54%   -0.15%   0.12%   -0.18%   0.12%   0.62%   -0.29%   
Big -0.87%   0.34%   -0.12%   0.21%   -0.30%   -0.65%   -1.17%   -1.41%   
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TABLE H.4: CAARS SURROUNDING SECURITY OF SUPPLY EVENTS 
Specific to the Security of Supply stream, this table reports the CAARs of various event windows surrounding the 1st position, 2nd position, signature date and publication dates. The results are presented in Panels A, B, C and D, 
respectively. The CAARs are estimated using the local AAFM outlined in Equation (6.1). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Panel A: CAARs Surrounding the 1
st








(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.97%   -1.41%   -1.16%   -0.12%   -1.02%   -1.28% ** -0.52%   0.56%   
High-BE/ME 1.91%   3.53%   1.71%   -0.46%   -0.95%   -1.74%   -1.58%   -1.16%   
Mid-BE/ME -1.08% * -2.10%   -1.73%   0.18%   -1.20% ** -1.67% *** -0.11%   0.83%   
Low-BE/ME -1.28%   -0.71%   -0.51%   -0.51%   -1.03%   -1.01%   -1.43% ** -0.06%   
Upper -5.66% ** -3.47%   -2.05%   -0.74% * -1.76% * -2.22% ** -1.22%   -1.45%   
Medium 2.02% * -1.08%   -1.12%   0.15%   -0.63%   -0.62%   0.73%   2.95%   
Down -5.66% ** -3.47%   -2.05%   -0.74% * -1.76% * -2.22% ** -1.22%   -1.45%   
Electric -1.99%   -1.42%   -1.40%   -0.54%   -1.52%   -2.16% * -0.87%   -0.03%   
Natural Gas 0.34%   -1.27%   -0.74%   -0.19%   0.17%   1.16%   1.62%   1.80%   
Multi-Utility 1.40%   -0.39%   -0.56%   0.10%   -0.33%   -0.63%   -0.37%   1.69%   
Small -1.06%   -1.15%   -0.39%   -0.01%   -0.44%   -0.57%   -0.25%   0.10%   
Big -1.01%   -1.44%   -1.22%   -0.13%   -1.07%   -1.34% * -0.57%   0.56%   
                 
  
 Panel B: CAARs Surrounding the 2
nd
 Position Event Windows and Significance Tests 
 (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.64%   0.44%   -0.46%   0.11%   -0.41% * -0.42%   -0.24%   -1.20%   
High-BE/ME -1.02% ** -0.13%   -0.19%   0.18%   -0.07%   -0.24%   0.67%   -1.07%   
Mid-BE/ME 1.03%   1.18%   0.16%   0.24%   -0.23%   -0.22%   -0.28%   -0.39%   
Low-BE/ME -3.11%   -0.87%   -1.82%   0.01%   -0.65% ** -1.00%   -0.32%   -2.24%   
Upper -1.47% * -1.09%   -0.81%   -0.06%   -0.16%   -0.23%   0.12%   -0.32%   
Medium 0.92%   1.81%   0.82%   0.17%   -0.24%   -0.02%   -0.52%   -1.06%   
Down -1.47% * -1.09%   -0.81%   -0.06%   -0.16%   -0.23%   0.12%   -0.32%   
Electric -0.18%   -0.14%   -1.19%   0.18%   -0.27%   -0.40%   0.27%   -0.22%   
Natural Gas -5.18% ** -0.64%   0.43%   -0.25%   -0.58% * -0.61%   -1.92%   -4.29%   
Multi-Utility 0.45%   1.16%   -0.61%   0.14%   -0.39%   -0.43%   -0.20%   -0.86%   
Small -2.71%   -1.02%   -0.75%   0.01%   -0.09%   -0.11%   -0.05%   -1.70%   
Big -0.49%   0.54%   -0.44%   0.12%   -0.44% ** -0.43%   -0.25%   -1.16%   
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(0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities 0.42%   1.59% * 0.54%   0.02%   0.29%   0.50%   -0.26%   -1.19%  
High-BE/ME 2.15%   1.83% ** 0.70% * 0.36%   0.75% ** 1.00%   0.70%   -0.04%  
Mid-BE/ME 0.61%   1.33%   0.83%   0.03%   0.12%   0.22%   -0.29%   -0.74%  
Low-BE/ME -0.57%   1.29%   -0.04%   -0.14%   0.46%   0.88%   -0.40%   -1.73%  
Upper 1.37%   0.48%   0.05%   -0.06%   0.38%   0.42%   0.73%   0.95%  
Medium 1.28%   2.28% ** 1.35% *** 0.10%   0.30%   0.44%   -0.11%   -1.10%  
Down 1.37%   0.48%   0.05%   -0.06%   0.38%   0.42%   0.73%   0.95%  
Electric -0.41%   0.65%   -0.06%   -0.16%   -0.14%   0.11%   -0.26%   -0.90%  
Natural Gas 1.69%   3.92% * 1.48%   -0.09%   0.08%   0.18%   -1.13%   -2.14%  
Multi-Utility -0.01%   0.65%   0.23%   0.19%   0.56%   0.76%   0.06%   -0.85%  
Small 0.10%   0.97%   0.30%   0.03%   0.32%   0.59%   -0.06%   -0.90%  
Big 0.44%   1.63% * 0.55%   0.02%   0.29%   0.49%   -0.26%   -1.21%  
                 
  
 Panel D: CAARs Surrounding the Publication Date Event Windows and Significance Tests 
CAARs (-20,20)  (-20,-1)  (-10,-1)  (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)  (1,20)  
Energy Utilities -0.99%   0.69%   -0.38%   -0.04%   -0.26%   -0.14%   -1.60% ** -1.64% ** 
High-BE/ME -1.16%   0.41%   -0.54%   0.29% ** 0.41%   0.30%   -1.39%   -1.86%   
Mid-BE/ME -0.04%   0.64%   -0.07%   0.00%   -0.21%   0.03%   -1.28% * -0.69%   
Low-BE/ME -1.80%   0.87%   -0.61%   -0.12%   -0.38%   -0.16%   -1.86% * -2.55% ** 
Upper 0.89%   1.47%   0.60%   0.09%   0.10%   0.36%   -0.34%   -0.67% ** 
Medium -0.45%   1.45%   -0.11%   -0.18%   -0.25%   -0.36%   -1.76% ** -1.72% * 
Down 0.89%   1.47%   0.60%   0.09%   0.10%   0.36%   -0.34%   -0.67% ** 
Electric 0.02%   1.29%   0.15%   -0.25%   -0.25%   -0.20%   -1.20%   -1.03%   
Natural Gas -2.70%   0.21%   -0.09%   -0.17%   -0.52%   -0.25%   -1.86%   -2.74%   
Multi-Utility -1.00%   0.28%   -0.78%   0.08%   -0.16%   -0.10%   -1.75% ** -1.36%   
Small -0.71%   0.43%   -0.59%   0.00%   0.02%   0.28%   -1.36% * -1.14%   
Big -1.01%   0.71%   -0.37%   -0.04%   -0.28%   -0.17%   -1.61% ** -1.68% ** 
D.J. Tulloch© 
321 
TABLE H.5: CAARS AFTER OMITTING CONTEMPORANEOUS REGULATORY CHANGES 
As noted in Table 6.1, the Internal Energy Market Stream overlaps with other restructuring streams. This table presents CAARs after omitting overlapping events. The CAARs are 
estimated using the local AFFM presented in Equation (6.1). A ****, ***, ** or * denotes significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
   Significance Tests 
Stream Stage of Procedure Date Deleted (-20,20)   (-20,-1)   (-10,-1)   (0,0)   (-1,1)   (-2,2)   (1,10)   (1,20)   
Conflict #1:                   
    Internal Energy Market 1st Position 22nd April 2009 -2.14%   -1.41% * -1.00% *A -0.31% *A -0.52% B  -0.40%   -0.51%   -0.42%   
    Security of Supply 1st Position 22nd April 2009 -1.98%   -1.94%   -1.02%   0.05%   -0.69%   -1.01% *A -0.74%   -0.09%   
                   
Conflict #2:                   
    Internal Energy Market 2nd Position 16th June 2003 -0.94%   -1.71%   -0.38%   0.39% ***A 0.38%   -0.09%   -1.12%   0.38%   
    Internal Energy Market Signature Date 26th June 2003 0.29%   -0.43%   0.20%   0.08%   0.20%   0.35%   0.37%   0.65%   
    Internal Energy Market Publication Date 15th July 2003 0.37%   0.74%   0.13%   0.12% *B -0.20%   0.00%   0.53%   -0.49%   
    Energy Efficiency 2nd Position 16th June 2003 -2.26%   -1.75% ** -1.18% ***A 0.04%   0.30%   -0.16%   -1.22%   -0.55%   
    Energy Efficiency Signature Date 26th June 2003 -0.13%   -0.84%   -0.14%   0.01%   -0.05%   -0.04%   -0.11%   0.69%   
    Energy Efficiency Publication Date 15th July 2003 0.35%   -0.01%   -0.05%   -0.09%   -0.07%   0.23%   0.32%   0.45%   
                   
A Change in magnitude or significance, but consistent direction relative to previous results 
B Change from significance to insignificance (or vice versa), inconsistent with previous result. 
 
